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ABSTRACT 
 
The regulatory framework for the Australian university has brought about a 
radical transformation of the Australian university.  The changes to the 
framework shifted the burden for resourcing from government to students and 
introduced a wide variety of competition based regulatory instruments.  The 
Australian university has been successful in generating these resources, primarily 
from selling education to international students and has become a world-leader in 
the export of higher education.  However, the other effects of the regulatory 
changes have been less positive.  The thesis seeks to evaluate the regulatory 
change from the perspective of regulatory coherence.  That is, rather than 
political or economic evaluations, the thesis examines the regulation from a 
legal, mechanical perspective.  
 
The changes to the regulation reflect a broader societal shift from the welfare 
state to the regulatory state.  For regulation to be successful it must be coherent 
within itself including taking adequate account of the extant institutions and 
social arrangements.  This thesis provides a coherence analysis of the regulation.  
It is composed of eight chapters.  After the introductory chapter, the thesis 
commences with a chapter reviewing regulatory theory and developing a theory 
of regulatory coherence.  This theory is a new theory which facilitates a focus on 
the mechanical aspects of the regulation.  The next chapter develops the analysis 
by examining the regulatory framework. This part of the thesis provides detailed 
analysis of the regulation, in particular, its instruments and accountability 
structures.  It then turns in Chapter 4 to examine the policy-regulatory questions 
of public versus private providing a basis for evaluation of coherence.  Next it 
turns in Chapters 5 and 6 to an examination of the institution of the university 
and its corporate organisational form.  To capture the complexity of the 
university, the thesis takes an interdisciplinary view of the phenomenon.  The 
penultimate chapter then provides an evaluation of the regulatory framework as 
against theory of regulatory coherence.  The concluding chapter of the thesis 
reiterates the finding that fundamental incoherence impairs the well functioning 
of the institution and its organisations.  
 6 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 12 
1. Introduction 12 
2. Introducing Regulation 16 
3. Introducing The University 21 
4. Transformation Of The University: Politics, Policy And Regulation 26 
5. Statement Of The Problem 30 
6. Methodology 33 
7. Outline Of The Dissertation 34 
8. Conclusion 39 
 
CHAPTER 2: REGULATORY THEORY 41 
1. Introduction 41 
2. Disciplinary approaches to regulatory studies 43 
3. Regulatory theory 52 
a. Regulatory Failure 52 
b. Responsive Regulation and Really Responsive Regulation 54 
c. Smart Regulation 58 
d. Regulatory Coherence 60 
4. Mechanics of Regulation 66 
5. Organising social problem, risk identification and regulatory intervention 66 
6. Technical aspects of regulation: regulatory targets, regulators, tools and 
instruments 69 
a. Regulatory targets: persons, organisations, acts, things or risks 69 
b. Regulators 71 
i. Regulators’ Tasks: 71 
ii. Organisation of the regulator: Agencies, Boards, Commissions and 
Authorities 76 
c. Tools 78 
d. Techniques 80 
i. Command and control 81 
ii. Competition 81 
 7 
iii. Regulation by Information 84 
iv. Soft-Law, Consensus Based and Experimentalist 86 
7. Accountability: Law, Markets, Social Norms and Bureaucratic 88 
a. Accountability via Law 92 
i. Westminster Accountability 93 
ii. NPM Accountability and Audit 95 
iii. NPM and Accountability Standards 98 
b. Accountability via Social Norms 100 
c. Accountability via Markets 101 
8. Method 102 
9. Conclusion 105 
 
CHAPTER 3: REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 107 
1. Introduction 107 
2. Regulatory Problem: pre- and post- World War Two 108 
3. Regulatory Response: policy, regulatory arrangements and technical aspects 
110 
a. Commonwealth Universities Commission and the Mills Report 110 
b. Australian Universities Commission and the Murray Report 112 
c. The Martin Report 119 
d. The Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission and mass university 
education 120 
e. Dawkins: the Higher Education Support Acts 1988 2003 and the rise of 
Neo-liberalism 122 
f. West and Nelson Reports: hardening ideology under Howard: 129 
g. The Bradley Review, Rudd and Gillard: Changing Directions? 131 
4. Hard and Soft Law Instruments: Regulatory Framework 135 
a. Hard Law: Higher Education Support Act 2003 136 
i. Protocol A—All Higher Education Institutions 139 
ii. Protocol D 141 
iii. State University Acts and University Corporations Law 142 
b. Soft Law: Regulation by Consensus, Code and Competitive Schemes 143 
i. Commonwealth Grant Scheme 144 
ii. Other Grant Schemes 145 
 8 
iii. Other Grants—Subsidiary Regulation 147 
iv. Non Higher Education Support Act competitive funding schemes 151 
5. Accountability for the Institution of the Australian University: Westminster 
152 
a. Accountability for Australian University Corporations: Law and NPM 
153 
b. Accountability standards 157 
i. Public Standards: Education, Research and Public Service 159 
ii. Private Standards: Prestige and Survival 162 
c. Accountability for Australian University Corporations: Social 163 
d. Accountability for Australian University Corporations: Markets 163 
6. Conclusion 164 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE PUBILIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE, THE PUBLIC GOOD 
AND THE UNIVERSITY 168 
1. Introduction 168 
2. Historical: Government, The Public and The Private 170 
3. Economic theory: Public Goods and the Public-Private Dichotomy 173 
a. Economic analysis of the goods and services of Higher Education 176 
b. Public economic support for Higher Education and the University: 179 
c. Critique of economics and regulatory recommendations 182 
4. Politics and the Public-Private Melange 185 
5. Sociology, Public Good and the University 190 
6. Regulation, Law and the Public and Private Spheres 194 
7. Conclusions: Public Good and University Regulation 199 
 
CHAPTER 5: REGULATORY OBJECTIVES AND THE INSTITUTION 
OF THE UNIVERSITY 
1. Introduction 204 
2. Institutional Missions of the University: Research, Teaching and Public 
Service 210 
3. Historic Knowledge Based Missions 215 
a. Development of Individual, Citizens and Civilisation 217 
b. Training For Statesmanship 218 
 9 
c. Liberal Arts 219 
d. Development Of Scientific Research 221 
e. Training For Professions 224 
f. Contributing to the nation-state and social welfare policy 225 
4. Economic: Profits, Non-profit and Development 227 
5. Sociological: Sorting, Storing and Survival 235 
a. Societal: Sorting, Weeding, Cooling and Credentialing 236 
b. Societal Storing: Holding space for underemployed youth 237 
c. Survival: Institutional and Organisational 239 
6. Legal Objects 240 
7. Policy 242 
a. Policy: Government and the University 243 
b. Policy: Australian Government and the University 245 
8. Institutional Coherence: Complex and Conflicting Missions 249 
9. Policy Coherence with the Institution: Adding Conflicting Missions 252 
10. Conclusion 253 
 
CHAPTER 6: REGULATED BODIES: THE UNIVERSITY 
ORGANISATION 
1. Introduction 255 
2. Sociological Analysis: Analysis Of Organisational Form 258 
a. Academic Profession and the Community of scholars 259 
b. Organized anarchy 265 
c. Strategic organisation 267 
d. Matrix 269 
e. Entrepreneurial organisation 270 
3. Economic Analysis: Participant In A Market Economy 274 
f. The university as a business firm 275 
g. The university as a non-profit firm 277 
4. Political Analysis: Public Administative Perspective 288 
h. Understanding government bodies 289 
i. Mode of creation 290 
ii. Formal status 291 
iii. Principal resource 292 
 10 
i. Three categories of government bodies 292 
5. Legal Analysis: The University Corporation and Public Law 297 
a. Legal character 301 
b. Enabling law 301 
c. Characterisation in the spectrum of governmental bodies 302 
d. Legal accountability via administrative law 303 
e. Extent of the application of private law 304 
f. Appointment of executive 305 
6. Conclusion 306 
 
CHAPTER 7: ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 309 
1. Introduction 309 
2. Systemic Coherence 309 
a. Organising Problems and Organising Norms 309 
i. Characterising the Organising Problem 311 
ii. Systemic Norms 314 
b. Supplementary Organising Problems 318 
c. Normative policy response: regulatory theory and the public-private 
assignment 323 
d. Conclusion 327 
3. Policy Coherence 328 
a. Policy coherence: norms 328 
b. Policy coherence: techniques 331 
4. Instrumental Coherence 335 
a. Analysis of Instruments 336 
b. Analysis of Technique: Regulatory Bodies 338 
5. Conclusions Systemic, Policy and Instrument Coherence 341 
6. Institutional, Organisational and Administrative Coherence 342 
a. Regulatory coherence and the Institution 343 
b. Regulatory coherence and the Organisation 345 
7. Accountability Coherence 347 
a. Political, and Public Institutional Accountability 347 
b. Institutional Accountability: Academic Profession, Rankings and Markets 
353 
 11 
c. Legal Accountability for University Corporations 355 
d. Conclusions on Accountability Coherence 355 
8. Regulatory Coherence and Incoherence in the Regulatory Framework 361 
9. Conclusions 365 
 
 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 369 
1. Introduction 369 
2. Review and Summary 369 
3. Evaluation of Regulatory Framework 374 
4. Recommendations for regulatory design 380 
5. Preliminary considerations of Labor’s reforms under Rudd and Gillard 387 
6. Conclusion 389 
 
Bibliography 394 
 12 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
  
1. Introduction 
 
This dissertation is about the regulation of the university. These two discrete 
topics—regulation and the university—are not often brought together and 
discussion of them quite easily leads into two different directions. 
Chronologically the ordering could put the university first and regulation second 
depending on how one defines the terms; however, the disciplinary commitment 
of this thesis puts the regulatory first and the university second. Further, this 
dissertation recognises both the phenomena of regulation and the university as 
social creations and hence socially embedded.  Accordingly narrow disciplinary 
foci that do not attend to the political and social dimensions may be destined to 
failure. Thus the introduction to this dissertation in addition to introducing the 
topic also attempts to locate the subsequent study in its socio-political context.  
The dissertation sets out the thesis that effective regulation is regulation that is 
coherent at multiple levels—systemic, policy, instrument, institutional and 
administrative—and that regulatory incoherence is a cause of regulatory failure.  
The argument is made that the regulation addressing the university in Australia is 
incoherent and if not reformed, will lead the university to greater levels of 
failure.  
 
The university in western countries is in difficulty and perhaps none more so 
than in Australia.  A comprehensive review in 2008 of higher education 
commissioned by the then new Federal government found serious problems in 
every major aspect of the system from the quality of education and student 
preferences, to students’ difficulties in coping, staffing issues and physical 
infrastructure.1  The review was the first complete review of the national system 
since the radically changed policy settings under the Hawke government in 1988.  
Under that government, the tertiary education sector was rationalised and re-
conceived along economic lines as an “industry.”  This new policy was driven 
through the university sector by a comprehensive reform of the regulation 
                                                 
1
 Bradley, D P. Noonan, et al. (2008). Review of Australian Higher Education: Final Report. 
Canberra, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations. 
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governing higher education regulation in Australia.  The reform caused the 
dismantling of the non-governmental specialist advisory committee, the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission “CTEC,” created new 
legislation changing funding formulas and reduced overall public contributions, 
and imposed mergers of various higher educational organisations, among other 
things. These radical changes were not unique to the university.  Rather, they 
were part of a larger ideological shift in public and expert thinking about the role 
of government in society, education and the public and private spheres.   
 
This ideological shift—referred to globally as neoliberalism and as economic 
rationalism in Australia—changed the frameworks and mandates for 
governments.  Government’s tools and abilities have been modified as its 
mandate shifted from public provision in the welfare state, to facilitating markets 
in the regulatory state.  Privatisation and economic liberty have become the 
predominant policy concerns and directed the critical tasks of governments in 
breaking up public monopolies and public space in favour of private economic 
opportunity and individuals’ private preferences.  A strong preference for 
regulation by markets has been the regulatory corollary of the neoliberal political 
agenda. 
 
This shift has also occurred at a time of considerable changes in both the natural 
and social environments. Increased pressures from population growth, 
globalisation, shifting geo-political power balances and climate change on the 
international level, as well as increased demands from within the nation state 
challenge governments in ways not imagined fifty or even thirty years ago.  The 
rapid growth of transport and telecommunications industries, the spread of 
powerful multi-national corporations and their norms and practices, and the 
development of western pop culture hegemony made the demand for western 
style of production, consumption, governance and management ubiquitous.  In 
western countries, the domination of media by private capital re-shaped media 
content to meet commercial interests purportedly to give voice to consumer 
demands through choice—especially the wealthy or aspiring consumer—rather 
than voice and choice to socially oriented democratic citizens.  All of these 
changes occurred at a time when new ideas were emerging about regulation. 
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These ideas of regulation, introduced more fully in the next section, included a 
move away from a simple Austinian command and control approach to more 
sophisticated approaches focused on incentives for behaviour as well as alternate 
models for reforming social behaviours and norms.  As government changed 
from welfare state to regulatory state in this environment, it is fair to say the 
regulatory challenge for government has never been greater.  
 
This dissertation investigates the regulatory framework of the Australian 
university.  As noted, it investigates the regulation from the perspective of 
coherence, on the theory that coherent regulation facilitates desired policy 
outcomes, and incoherence leads to regulatory failure.  The dissertation seeks to 
answer the question: does the regulatory framework enhance or detract from the 
Australian university’s ability to carry out its knowledge based social, economic 
and political missions as evaluated through a coherence perspective?  It is argued 
that the regulatory framework is incoherent and is leading the Australian 
university toward failure in achieving its institutional mission which forms part 
of the policy objective.  This study is innovative, as will be demonstrated below 
in the summary of arguments in each chapter, in that there has been no study 
undertaken on this topic. Accordingly, the answer to this question provides new 
knowledge and is one of the major contributions of this dissertation. It is 
significant because of the university’s key role in western society as the core 
institution for the creation, preservation and dissemination of knowledge, the 
importance of the university to the Australian economy as a major export, the 
impact of the university on the shape of society and the opportunities it provides 
its graduates and because of the public investment made in its on-going 
operations and growth.  Further it is significant because the Australian regulatory 
framework has moved toward market norms including private funding more than 
any other OECD country.2  Accordingly, it is important to understand the 
framework and its strengths and weaknesses.  
 
As part of the evaluative task, the dissertation must address both the theory of the 
university in terms of form and function as well as the university as it exists in 
                                                 
2
 Ibid p. 147. 
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contemporary Australia.  That is, there must be an understanding of the 
institution and the organisation3 to evaluate the contemporary domestic policy 
settings against the institutional and organisational forms and functions.  In other 
words, the dissertation considers the consequences of regulatory reform on the 
institution and organisation of the reformed Australian university.  The 
dissertation argues that the consequences while positive from the perspective of 
reducing government expenditure are negative from most other perspectives.   
 
The answer to this question sheds light on the related higher education question 
concerning the nature and shape of the reformed Australian university.   In this 
aspect too, the dissertation offers a contribution to knowledge.  There is no such 
analysis of the Australian university.  It is significant because it moves the 
discussion beyond the confines of traditional higher education scholarship which 
tends to battle old traditional elite conceptions of the university on the one hand 
and uncomfortably challenging the economic conception of the firm on the other.  
This dissertation while not providing new institutional or organisational models 
nevertheless offers a review of the foundations of the university, sets out the 
delimitations of the debate and identifies some of the necessary features of any 
university organisation or institution.    
 
This effort to identify regulation appropriate for a public institution,4 to the 
extent it is generalisable offers a further contribution to knowledge.  The 
regulation of public goods is a highly problematic issue not least because of the 
normative commitments of the dominant discourse of economics.  Economic 
analysis fails to address satisfactorily the regulation of impure public goods—
those public goods which fail to fall neatly into the economic model of public 
goods.5  This dissertation by avoiding an exclusively economic perspective, 
using regulatory theory, focusing on the regulation surrounding a traditional 
public good offers new insights into the issues and a different approach to public 
goods regulation.  
                                                 
3
 Institution means social norms, organisation being an organised grouping discussed further 
below. Scott, W. R. (1994). Institutions and organizations: Toward a theoretical synthesis. 
Institutional Environments and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism. W. R. 
Scott and J. W. Meyer. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage: 55-80. 
4
 Analysed in Chapter 5. 
5
 See Chapter 4 on the public-private divide. 
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There are a variety of ways to go about answering the question raised.  An 
interdisciplinary comparative approach is self-evidently a necessity; however, as 
a law dissertation, this work takes its cue from law and accordingly, working 
with emerging regulatory theories and coherence analysis focuses on the 
regulation surrounding the university.  That is, the dissertation examines the 
regulation from the perspectives of regulatory theory and coherence throughout, 
examining the process from the development of the problem, policy response, 
regulatory design through to coherence with the social institutions and objects 
they were designed to regulate.  To do so, as noted,  it must work through an 
interdisciplinary analysis crossing into the political and economic discussions of 
public-private divide and public good, higher education and higher education 
policy and notions of public good in the post-neoliberal era.  The balance of this 
chapter introduces in order, regulation, the university, the socio-political 
background of the contemporary Australian university, the research question of 
the dissertation, and method.  Next then is the introduction to regulation. 
 
2. Introducing Regulation  
 
The complexity of the problem of regulating the university is a microcosm of the 
larger challenge of regulation itself.  This challenge is the basic institutional 
problem of regulating human social interaction6 and has a long history.7  Some 
types of regulation foster more positive social arrangements, other types more 
positive spiritual, economic or other arrangements—each regulatory effort of 
course creates some negative impacts in another part of the particular social 
system.  Each type of regulation has a favoured agenda in the balance of positive 
and negative elements: economic growth over environmental preservation, or 
social stratification over egalitarian objectives, or change over tradition and 
preservation.   
 
                                                 
6
 Sampford, C. (1991). "Law, Institutions and the Public/Private Divide." Federal Law Review 
20: 185-222., pp. 185-6, echoing perhaps Selznick, P. (1948). "Foundations of the Theory of 
Organization." American Sociological Review, 13(1): 25-25. 26-27. 
7
 For example, the Roman Emperor Zeno promulgated anti-monopoly regulation in 483 C.E. 
Majone, G. (1996). Regulating Europe. London, Routledge., p. 9 
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It is important to correctly characterise the regulatory debate at the outset.  The 
regulatory debate is not a matter of more versus less, or regulation versus de-
regulation.  That debate is more accurately described as a matter of whose 
regulatory priorities, whether private property or social equality, or which of 
some other set of objectives  or prioritisation is to be favoured.  Rather, the issue 
of regulation is “good regulation” versus “bad regulation”.  Good regulation is a 
matter of avoiding too much of Regulation X or too little of Regulation Y to 
achieve specific ends—the well functioning of a society or other social 
organisation. Bad regulation is simply its opposite.  From this perspective, good 
regulation is the ultimate public good in that it is the basis for the effective 
facilitation and preservation of human society.  Thus the basic regulatory 
problem is providing a framework that allows humanity to flourish, preserving 
what needs to be preserved, while constraining its destructive tendencies and 
extinguishing that which is harmful. 
 
While the discussion at this level is moral, the dissertation makes an effort to 
avoid some of the moral discussion of regulation in favour of the more technical 
discussion of regulatory efficacy.  Inevitably an author’s political views will be 
engaged; however, the purpose of this dissertation is not to advance those 
political views but to focus on the technical, and where those views are engaged, 
to have them in a secondary position to the first technical task.  Efficacious 
regulation is simply regulation which achieves the desired policy ends.  The 
discussion of the moral or normative dimensions, however, cannot be avoided 
altogether.  Regulation embodies politically decided norms, and an analysis of 
coherence requires attending to those norms.  The normative dimension of the 
dissertation is drawn from the discussion of public good in Chapter 4, and further 
discussion of the institution and organisation of the university in Chapters 5 and 
6 respectively. Essentially, the argument is that the university as a global 
millennium old institution has provided a public good and been a non-profit 
organisation throughout that history.  Further, it is argued that these two, the 
institutional and organisational decisions have complemented one another 
allowing the university to develop to its current state.  These decisions have 
normative implications for regulation, and it is argued, regulation which 
embodies different normative decisions which are at odds with these traditional 
 18 
norms will lead ultimately to the decline and loss of the institution and the 
organisation.  To the extent that the regulation leads in this direction it may be 
effective and coherent with the policy norms; however, it is incoherent with the 
norms of and destructive to the university.  In this latter sense, the regulation may 
be “bad regulation.”  The dissertation takes on both the effective and moral 
evaluation of the regulation.  However, the focus is on the effective with the 
moral being merely a consequence of the analysis of the efficacy and coherence. 
 
Various approaches to understanding the regulation of humanity’s activities and 
institutions have been developed.  From a regulatory perspective, approaches can 
be divided into the two political spheres of public and private.  While 
considerable scholarly attention has been granted to regulation in the private 
sphere and in particular as it pertains to private economic rights, less attention 
has been granted to the regulation of public goods.  There are a variety of 
reasons, ranging from the complexity and related problems of human social 
organisation and the difficulty of defining the public good, to the complexities of 
designing appropriate regulation to achieve complex regulatory objectives. Peter 
Drahos, for example, observes that the regulation of public goods must attend to 
a wide range of matters, from their provision and distribution, to their uptake, to 
attending to their character as norm dependent or independent, capability 
dependent versus automatic flows, and status either as a primary public good 
setting a foundation for a host of other public and private goods, or a secondary 
public good.8  
 
While regulation has been the focus of study for several decades, it has usually 
been an activity undertaken by disciplines such as economics and political 
science rather than law or public administration.9  The former analytical lenses 
study regulation as a means of supporting one or another normative commitment 
and tend to see it as a battleground for ideology.  Indeed, until the 1960’s the 
dominant theory of regulation saw it through an economic lens as a response to 
                                                 
8
 Drahos, P. (2004). "The Regulation of Public Goods." Journal of International Economic Law 
7(2): 321-339., 322, 329 
9
 Croley, S. (1998). "Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process." 
Columbia Law Review 98(1). 
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market failure.10  Moving regulatory study away from the narrow disciplinary 
lenses and ideological battle grounds of the above disciplines one accesses the 
disciplines of sociology, law, public administration and the various institutional 
approaches.11 
 
While a variety of disciplinary perspectives provide insight into regulation, none 
provides a method for a comprehensive analysis of the regulatory framework, 
tying policy objects, institutions, regulatory arrangements and administration in a 
coherent manner.  A discussion of regulatory failure arose in the 1970’s again 
among economists possibly to challenge the power of the discourse supporting 
the social, collective leanings of the state and the potential challenge that 
discourse posed for private enterprise, laissez faire normative neoclassical 
economics.   
 
Taking the discussion a step beyond the neoclassical lens, Breyer approached 
regulatory failure as more a matter of failure of technical and administrative 
arrangements than a big government worry.  Breyer cautioned in 1983 that 
regulatory failure was the result of a mismatch of methods and objects of 
regulation.12  It is only more recently, however, that the emerging field of 
regulatory law or regulatory studies has appeared establishing a foundation for a 
more coherent and careful approach to the coordination of the elements of 
regulation. Regulatory studies examine the rules, organisations, institutions and 
norms that facilitate and constrain social interaction—both collective 
coordination and protection of the individual. Unlike other approaches to 
regulation, regulatory studies focuses on rules, tools and instruments of 
regulation without prior normative commitment.  A rough analytical framework 
has emerged in which the instruments of regulation are identified and analysed.   
 
Following on Breyer’s innovative description of regulatory failure13 and refining 
the rough analytical framework already established, Feaver and Durrant draw 
                                                 
10
 Majone, G. (1996). Regulating Europe. London, Routledge., p. 28. 
11
 Goodin, R. (1996). Institutions and Their Design. The Theory of Institutional Design. R. 
Goodin. Melbourne and Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1: 1-53. 
12
 Breyer, S. (1983). Regulation and its Reform. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 
13
 Ibid. 
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upon the coherence discourse in jurisprudence arguing that for regulation to be 
effective, it must be coherent.14  That is, a discrete coherent social issue must be 
identified, a coherent normative framework must be identified and developed 
from which a coherent policy can be extrapolated. That policy must then be 
transformed into legislative rules creating institutions, organisations, rules and 
instruments which cohere with the norms of the previously mentioned social 
problem, norms and policy. In other words, for regulation to be effective it must 
be free to depart from political and disciplinary ideologies to identify and address 
an identified social problem in a coherent fashion.  This dissertation, as will be 
expounded below, draws on Feaver and Durrant’s work for its method.  
 
In sum, there are three cornerstone considerations for a regulatory analysis.  
These are: first, a political decision needs to be made assigning the objects of 
regulation to either side of the public-private divide. This decision needs to be 
taken to determine not only who will be involved in the regulation, how the 
regulation will be carried out and what resources will be used to achieve the 
social policy but also which laws will apply.  Second, the coherence issues 
identified by Feaver and Durrant—including the object to be achieved (also a 
matter of political determination)—is critical. Regulatory analysis without 
attending to coherence is analysis which lacks a rudder to avoid regulatory 
failure.  Third, as regulation seeks to change some aspect of human society and 
hence has institutional impacts, it is necessary to consider the pre-existing 
institutional arrangements.  Seldom if ever does a legislator find a blank slate 
upon which to legislate.  To a considerable degree the success of a regulation 
will depend on the degree to which that regulation coalesces or diverges from 
pre-existing institutional arrangements.  That is, whether regulation seeks to 
eradicate some social practice, or promote a new one, its designers must take 
account of those existing arrangements in order to create a system which 
addresses the policy objects and shapes them to work within social reality.  That 
is regulation needs to be socially sensitive rather than generic.   
 
 
                                                 
14
 Feaver, D. (2006). "The Regulatory Coherence of Multilateral Regulation." Australian 
International Law Journal 13: 33-56. and elsewhere 
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3. Introducing The University 
 
In western societies, the university is an institution of considerable age.  
Depending on how one chooses to examine it, it may have an antiquity dating 
back to the classical Greek era of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle,15 or to the 
medieval period when universities such as Bologna, Oxford and Paris were 
founded.16  Despite the intervening centuries, the university today remains the 
direct descendant of at least the medieval university.  The institutional continuity 
is evidenced in its objects, organisational structure, location on the public-private 
divide and corollary resourcing.  Over the years its objects and roles have 
differed from theological training centres, to centres of scientific research, to 
technical training institutes, to centres of political critique and activism17 and 
national economic growth. The university institution has been instrumental in the 
development of western society and society has demanded much of its university 
institution over the ages, at times in consort with that institution’s self-conception 
and at other times in conflict.  Indeed, society’s demands on the university are 
often in conflict.  As a result the university finds itself being pulled in one 
direction externally, while trying to maintain its own mission internally.   
 
The university as an institution has long been the target of conflicting criticism.  
As noted medieval scholar of the university, Charles Homer Haskins, observed,  
 
universities are at times criticised for their aloofness or their devotion to 
vocationalism, for being too easy or too severe, and drastic efforts have 
been made to reform them by abolishing entrance requirements or 
eliminating all that does not lead directly to bread and butter; but no 
substitute has been found for the university in its main business, the 
training of scholars and the maintenance of the tradition of learning and 
investigation. 18 
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Over the centuries of its existence it has been forced to re-invent itself, usually 
shifting between the poles identified by Haskins.  Such a broad and deep 
foundation is a good grounding upon which to develop an understanding of the 
contemporary university. It emphasises the conflicting demands and radical shifts 
in the institution while sharply identifying its institutional core and critical role in 
society.  
 
From the foregoing discussion, it is evidently a mistake to see the university as 
one thing or from one perspective. The university can be viewed historically, 
sociologically, economically, politically and legally.  For example, one can 
consider historical perspectives that return to the medieval origins and consider it 
as a body corporate, first of students, and later of professors.19 Or one may 
choose to view it as a collection of people dedicated to higher education dating 
back to the classical era of Greek antiquity.20  It can be analysed sociologically in 
terms of its distinct organisational characteristics including such things as its 
status as an autonomous body of scholars with legal recognition, a course of 
study and examinations leading to degrees, and a hierarchy within a collegial 
governance structure.21 It can be considered politically as a public or private 
body.  It can be analysed legally as a corporate body of some particular type. It 
can be evaluated economically as simply another firm generating revenue 
through the production of goods and services or a non-profit enterprise.  
 
Among these perspectives, the institutional will be referred to throughout.22  
Institutionalism emphasises the social embeddedness and normative character of 
collective activities such as those within and around the university. The 
institutionalist approaches avoid the overly abstract models put forward by some 
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disciplinary perspectives and their associated errors.23 These institutional 
perspectives help explain the diverse roles the university has played over the 
centuries noted above—from a centre of training for civil duties, to theological 
advocacy, to an instrument of state indoctrination, to technical training institute 
as well as the continuity—and particularly the normative continuity that has been 
central to those roles.  The university’s institutional bedrock that has remained 
stable throughout the centuries of change is the value placed on knowledge.  The 
creation, dissemination and preservation of knowledge have been viewed as the 
overriding raison d’être of the institution, and knowledge itself as the premier 
value.   
 
Entwined with the discussion of the intrinsic value of knowledge, however, is the 
question of the utility value of that knowledge.  The value of knowledge depends 
on fundamentally philosophical commitments—is knowledge Truth and as such 
an avenue to the Divine as early church fathers would have it, or empirically 
verifiable phenomena or merely the misshapen opinion resulting from a recent 
marketing campaign? Answering the question of the utility value of knowledge 
and hence the utility value of the university has led to evaluating the university 
instrumentally in economic terms for example, of what it can produce as 
measured by numbers of graduates trained for vocations. Or as another example, 
from a sociological perspective, it may be asked: is the university an important 
social institution in its own right, creating, developing, storing and transmitting 
the knowledge that permits a society to sustain itself?  
 
The debate about the nature of knowledge and the university—and hence the 
value of the university—has ranged from idealists like John Henry Newman24 
and Wilhelm von Humboldt, to functionalists like Talcott Parsons,25 and Martin 
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Trow,26 to sociologist-philosophers like Jurgen Habermas27 and José Ortega y 
Gasset,28 to economic rationalists who see no value in the university except as it 
contributes to the economy.29  Accordingly, argument concerning proper policy 
for the university remains as fierce today as it has for centuries and reflects 
disciplinary, normative and political commitments as much as anything else30, 
and accordingly, a regulatory analysis without such commitments is unlikely to 
satisfy any particular camp.  While answering the regulatory questions will not 
satisfy these questions, they will point to important institutional orientations such 
as the university’s role in society creating, transmitting and preserving 
knowledge, and providing other broad public goods that are hallmarks of the 
university and which must be integrated into any appropriate regulatory 
framework.  
 
The issues raised about the nature and utility of knowledge and the university are 
pertinent to the discussion of regulation of the university in a variety of ways. 
Where the university is some type of a pure knowledge institution peopled by 
high minded academics, it can be argued that they can be trusted to regulate 
themselves and the institution they inhabit.  Where the university is a body of 
students, their concerns will reign and the regulation will meet their demands.  
Politicians have regulated to ensure an appropriate political agenda and sought 
power to appoint university officials to achieve their ends; church authorities 
have done so seeking to keep doctrinal purity in the heads and hearts of 
adherents; business has sought to control universities both to limit critical 
perspectives and to ensure a supply of trained labour and applied research at low 
cost.  Where the university is the tool of a government or religion or economics, 
it will suit the doctrinal imperative placed on it, and its scholars forced to work 
within its ideological restrictions or face expulsion. Where the university is a 
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pathway to social acceptance or career advantage, its regulation will reflect those 
values. Perhaps this is what Maurice Kogan meant when observing a university 
can be anything the government wants.31  
 
Before moving further it is important to define a few dimensions of the study.  
One must note the basic distinction between regulating higher education, which 
is a matter of broader educational policy, and regulating the university which is a 
matter of the control of an institution and its organisations.  The two are not 
synonymous. Higher education need not take place in a university.  The 
university is a particular social institution, organisational form and legal 
instrumentality.  The university has been the traditional home of higher 
education.  Higher education should also be distinguished from tertiary 
education: the former has some expectation of critical thinking while the later 
encompasses broadly any post-secondary training.  The university is the focus of 
this dissertation and, as the paradigmatic institution of higher education, the term 
“university” is at times used for the latter.  
 
Further, for regulation to address the university, it must be noted that the term 
university does not have a single referent.  It will be used in three distinct senses 
in this dissertation.  These are the “university institution” which refers to the 
norms and practices of university organisations and their participants across 
geographic as well as time dimensions.  It includes practices at national, regional 
and international levels associated with the term “university.”  The term 
“university organisation” refers to specific organised groups of people carrying 
on the practices of the university institution within a defined group.  The term is 
used as a sociological term.  Finally, the term “university corporation” refers to a 
specific type of legal corporation that is the result of a unique sui generis 
trajectory in corporate law. To clarify, the term “corporate” is used exclusively 
for the legal corporation and the term “corporatisation” to refer to practices 
deemed private management practices sought to be introduced to the public 
sector. More on these terms will be offered later on in the dissertation as 
appropriate. The term “Australian university” too is used to refer to the local 
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institution and its organisations marking out its distinct characteristics as 
appropriate.  
 
 
4. Transformation Of The University: Politics, Policy And Regulation  
 
In last half century or so the university has been subject to two novel sets of 
changes that have had a profound impact on the institution and have had major 
consequences for its regulation.  A first set of changes occurred after the end of 
World War Two. The university changed from an elite private institution to a 
mass public institution.  This change put severe strains on the former, private, 
centuries old traditions of internal self-regulation, as well as introducing the state 
in new ways as it funded growth and took control exercising rights concerning 
organisational and institutional objects.  To a large degree these changes were 
incorporated into the university organisation through expanded administration, 
while maintaining norms of the intrinsic value of knowledge and citizenship. 
This shift, however, forced the university away from a dominantly inwardly 
looking, self-referential institution to make it take more attuned to external 
environmental factors.  
 
A second set of radical changes have taken place particularly in the last four 
decades as the nature of government has changed from welfare state to regulatory 
state and social activity conceived of as mimicking private economic behaviour. 
This second set of changes has changed the discourse about the university’s 
institutional norms from static and intrinsic value of knowledge, personal 
development and public good, to dynamic as it attempts to align them with the 
norms of economic values and measurement, and private good.  This set of 
changes were introduced to the university by governments.  Neoliberal 
governments imposed the norms and practices of private business through 
regulatory changes, attempting among other things to introduce business 
management practices and market mechanisms through a form of “quasi-
market.”  Quasi-markets are structured around tight central controls, but marked 
by deep channels of market-like conditions which combined serve to re-
configure the form and function of the university.   This second set of changes 
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has resulted in a radical challenge to the conception of university and a corollary 
change in the institution.   
 
In terms of the conception of the university, the idea of an important social space 
not concerned with commercial activities but focused instead on social objectives 
of knowledge creation, transmission and preservation has been challenged.  The 
traditional academically focused conception of the university has changed as 
priorities have placed commercial values at the forefront with academic norms 
remaining to the extent that they do not undermine the economic objects.32  
Along with this shift is the tight central control—through a combination of re-
oriented policy and re-configured regulation creating new audit type controls and 
agencies.  This re-configuration allows driving the university by external 
performance measures set by government, rather than professional standards of 
the academic profession internal to the university.  As to the changes in the 
institution, in essence the academic norms of collegiality and knowledge have 
been displaced by the norms of authority based business hierarchies and 
economic revenue generating and cost cutting norms as will be shown in 
throughout.  
 
These changes to the university were introduced through sweeping regulatory 
change. It is important to note that the changes in Australian higher education do 
not stand in isolation.  They form part of a broader policy debate concerning the 
role of the state, noted earlier and reflected in part in the debates surrounding 
various economic theories.  The policy shift harkens back to the 1970’s at least, 
with the worldwide recession of that era, the onset of “stagflation” and the 
challenge this economic climate posed for Keynesian economics. In a nutshell, 
the combination of inflation and high unemployment challenged certain 
fundamental axioms of Keynes’ theory and led to a search for alternative 
approaches to securing the economic strength that was understood to provide the 
backbone for capitalism threatened by communism of the Cold War era—an era 
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in which led to the concepts of political freedom and (elite) economic freedom 
being conflated, or at least seen as critically interdependent.33  
 
Whereas Keynes had advocated a strong role for the state in the economy, as a 
major participant in both the purchase and supply of goods and services, the 
alternative model proposed in the face of a “socialist threat" to the capitalist 
status quo offered that the state should have a minimal role, reducing 
inefficiencies and leaving supply and demand to the market. This position was 
advocated by economists such as Frederick Von Hayek and Milton Friedman.  
One aspect of this was the withdrawal of the state from the funding of various 
activities that previously fell under its auspices to provide—the shift from 
welfare state to regulatory state. Included in these cut backs were hospitals, 
schools and universities.  In the political arena this policy is referred to as neo-
liberalism. 
 
The current regulatory framework of Australian universities can be traced back to 
the reforms implemented following the 1980’s inquiry of Labor minister for 
education, John Dawkins.34 Dawkins reforms were, in the words of journalists 
Maslen and Slatter, “fired by an impatience with the universities’ poor attempts 
to adapt to the demands of economic restructuring brought on by the 1982-3 
recession, and in part by a view at elite levels of the Labour Party that the 
universities were fat, lazy and complacent institutions.”35  
 
Dawkins reforms were based on a “do more with less” managerial approach and 
placed the university under considerable stress as it has been forced to secure 
private funding to make up for declining state funding. Their concern has been 
reflected in various schemes organized to increase revenues including industry 
partnering, commercialization arms, commercial subsidiaries, and recruitment of 
international student at highly differential rates.   
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The net result of the new regulatory framework introducing the market into the 
previously public sector has been the introduction of some of the market’s ethos, 
including a shift of emphasis from producing of public goods to production of 
private profit. A second shift is a reallocation or redistribution of externalities.  
This redistribution has permitted the social good of education to be distributed 
along the lines of market demand, namely to those with sufficient resources to 
invest the economic productivity potential of early adulthood into higher 
education while paying their living expenses in order to benefit from the market 
priced education. A further consequence has been the redistribution of the social 
costs of market driven education. These costs, it is alleged have put the 
university into crisis.36  As well, the changes include the driving out of public 
education, making the university for socio-economic elite, the cooption and 
corruption of the institution of the university changing it from a social institution 
to a profit driven corporation, and the degree from a certification to society of a 
student’s level of intellectual achievement to a diploma granted to a customer for 
having paid sufficient fees and passed a number of assessments.  They pose a 
fundamental challenge to the coherence of university regulation.   
 
Combined, these changes lead to consideration whether the regulation has so 
changed the university that the university is no longer able to fulfil its 
institutional role, and whether society so changed that the university’s former 
roles are no longer needed or desirable. Another way of framing the debate is 
whether the regulation has so changed the Australian university that an 
institutional break is occurring the result of which is to so alienate it from its 
roots and irrevocably change its path to make it simply another institution of 
private capital?   
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5. Statement Of The Problem 
 
On the one hand, the university is a core social institution of western society—as 
argued in Chapters 4 and 5.  It is the carrier of culture, the repository of all 
explicit knowledge concerning not only the organization and operation of 
government and society, but also the creative centre of knowledge in that society. 
As such, it is the critical institution for both sustaining and the development of 
western society.  As an institution, it has developed its own path which has 
allowed it to carry on these functions successfully in the dynamic environment of 
human society for centuries. That is, the university has a long standing mission, 
is closely connected to societal needs, has its own norms and socialization 
processes, and its members have internalised these norms.37 
  
Yet, on the other hand, starting in the late twentieth century and thereafter, the 
governments of western societies adopted a particular ideology in part in 
response to certain environmental conditions, that led to a fundamental 
reconceptualising of society.38 That re-conception was put tersely by then Prime 
Minister of the UK, Margaret Thatcher: “there is no such thing as society.”39  In 
other words, social, collective humanity no longer existed—there were only 
autonomous individuals (and apparently families).  It followed that no social 
projects were necessary to sustain society.  Accordingly, projects aimed at the 
preservation, maintenance and development of a society were to be 
systematically undermined.40  The university was no exception. More or less, 
government reduced its political and economic support from the university 
leaving it to sink or swim in the marketplace as would any other economic actor.  
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In the same era there was a shift in political discourse to an overriding concern 
with economics.  In economic terms, policy advisors advocated and implemented 
policies that reflect a normative preference for private economic goods, faith in 
regulation by markets, a rejection of public goods which is not simply an 
aggregate of individuals’ private preferences, and a minimal role for government 
provision of goods and services.  Where policies based on this view have touched 
upon the university, as with most other public and civil institutions, the effects 
have been profound. The notion of the university as a significant public 
institution, with a role to play in society’s well-being, a well-spring of 
knowledge, a store of culture and knowledge, a public resource, and centre of 
education and intellectual development has been in serious decline. The 
dominant discourse became that of business, markets, profit, and consumer. 
Accordingly, government and government enterprises seeking to provide a 
variety of public goods such as health care and education were challenged by that 
discourse, and derided and denied power as well as funding, denationalised by 
privatisation and subjected to scrutiny through the lens of business. The lens of 
business is not always focused on the larger social concerns of government and 
the members of society which do not hold potential for profit impacts.  
 
The three contemporaneous changes—abandonment of social projects, 
reconceptualising of humanity as economic actors, and population boom 
mentioned previously—pose a significant challenge to the university.  
Traditionally conceptualised as a society itself, focused on societal well-being, 
without profit objectives, and generally restricted in numbers, the university was 
poorly positioned to respond to these changes.  What has occurred in the 
university has been an effort to respond to the significant challenge.  These 
efforts while successful to some degree, have left the university in a state of 
crisis and dysfunction not seen since its creation nearly a millennium ago. Its 
ability to carry its role as the central institution of western culture is in serious 
question, as it becomes increasingly subject to the discourse of individual, 
society, and profit, and is overwhelmed with people who have little idea about or 
interest in the institution dedicated to knowledge in which they wish to 
participate. More particularly, as the university struggles to address 
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individualised conceptions of human interests, generate its own economic 
resources, and participate in a economy organized around profit, while educating 
a less select margin of society, the stresses on the institution and its 
organizations, and the demands on its governance have increased significantly.   
 
The discussion thus far, however, only focuses on part of the outcomes.  The 
Australian university has adapted to these changes, and by some accounts, 
become a policy and regulatory success.  It has become an economic powerhouse 
celebrated by government and media alike as forming a trilogy (with coal and 
iron ore) as a leading Australian export industry.41  Again the regulatory 
objective comes to the fore: What is the social problem that university regulation 
seeks to address? Is it the production of services for export and short-term 
economic gain? Or, is it for the education of Australian citizens for the long-term 
benefit of the nation?   
 
The foregoing problems of institutional and socio-political change have caused 
the regulatory landscape for the university to be completely re-designed.  This 
dissertation examines and evaluates the efficacy of the regulation of the 
university. The issue is not normative.  Rather, it is a technical question 
concerning the choices of mechanisms and arrangements and of coordination to 
achieve politically determined ends—matters of coherence with institutions and 
coherence in regulatory design.   
 
Addressing these issues requires not only a thorough review of government 
policy and regulatory arrangements, but makes a thorough analysis of the 
university itself mandatory.  It requires in the first instance a review of the 
institution of the university to avoid regulatory failure emanating from a generic 
approach to regulation.  This imperative finds a sounding within the discipline of 
higher education itself.  As Professor Simon Marginson observes “Much is 
written on universities; and it is often didactic in tone, normative in project, and 
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circular in argument.”42  This dissertation attends to the university as an 
institution and an organisation in its own right, emphasising description, being 
interdisciplinary and acknowledging a multiplicity of norms in the discourse 
surrounding the university.   
 
6. Methodology  
 
This section briefly explains the methodology of the dissertation.  The basic 
question of the dissertation—does the regulatory regime facilitate, hamper or 
change the functioning of the institution of the university—does not lend itself to 
an easy answer.  As the choice of methods to a considerable degree leads to 
particular conclusions the importance of correct methodology is difficult to 
overstate.  A variety of methods provide information and analysis which will 
have bearing on the analysis.  These include the standard methods of economics, 
political science, sociology and law.  While a variety of disciplines including 
political science and higher education could be used to provide policy analysis—
and this dissertation’s debt to those disciplines will be evident—law and 
specifically regulatory analysis provides a different, less ideologically driven 
approach. Using this legal method allows a more technical evaluation of the 
system to speak to the issues surrounding the regulation of this important 
institution at this juncture in history.  It allows the contributions of sociology and 
economics to be considered to be integrated without allowing either to dominate 
the discussion.  Rather, it takes those discourses and feeds their findings into the 
regulatory analysis to provide a basis for regulatory evaluation and potential 
reform. None of these disciplines, however, provides a comprehensive method 
for the analysis necessary to answer the question as it stands.  Accordingly, from 
a methodological perspective, a non-standard approach may be best suited to the 
analysis. Such an approach as developed by Feaver and Durrant is referred to as 
regulatory coherence.  
 
A basic principle of law is the notion of consistency, captured in the doctrine of 
stare decisis. That is, the same law applies to similar fact scenarios, and similar 
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actors.  What Feaver and Durrant claim is that coherence is a property of well 
designed regulatory systems.  That is, where a regulatory system is coherent in 
terms of system, policy and instrument its chances of being a regulatory success 
are increased.  The corollary is that where a regulatory system is incoherent, the 
chances of regulatory failure are also increased. By using their approach and 
analysing coherence at the systems, policy and instrument levels, an overall 
analysis of the regulatory system for the university and higher education in 
Australia answering the question posed by this dissertation can be achieved.   
 
7. Outline Of The Dissertation  
 
The dissertation is composed of 8 chapters including introduction and conclusion. 
The chapters are as follows.  The Chapter 1: Introduction explains the broad 
political, institutional and legal issues and introduces the theory of regulation. It 
provides the historical, political and social institutional context for the topic, as 
well as the basic rationale for the theoretical approach.  It then identifies and 
explains the specific research question. Chapter 2: Regulatory Theory provides 
the theoretical foundation and justification for the dissertation.  It argues that 
regulation has only recently come to be studied in its own right and that the 
approaches taken in these studies are piecemeal and limited by disciplinary 
perspectives.  With the exception of recent work by Feaver and Durrant, the net 
result of these approaches leaves regulatory studies in an unsatisfactory position 
of lacking an overarching critical framework for the analysis and evaluation of 
regulation. Feaver and Durrant’s work on regulatory coherence is critiqued and 
adopted as the analytical framework for the dissertation.   
 
The chapter also identifies and distinguishes various disciplinary approaches to 
regulation. This task is undertaken to distinguish the peculiarly legal approach as 
opposed to the more common economic and sociological approaches.  The legal 
aspects of regulation are often subsumed or assumed in the other disciplinary 
approaches.  By identifying the other approaches and distinguishing them from 
the legal approach taken in this dissertation, the chapter is used to lay a further 
foundation for arguing that this dissertation makes a unique contribution.   
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Finally, the chapter identifies the key aspects and features of regulation.  These 
aspects and features from organising problem to policy development to regulatory 
design including accountability, have not been put together in this same way in 
the literature.  That is, the dissertation’s use of Feaver and Durrant’s analytical 
framework is expounded in a more robust manner than elsewhere.  This 
discussion of regulation and regulatory studies provides the basic literature 
review for the dissertation and grounds the rest of the dissertation from a 
theoretical perspective.    
 
Chapter 3: Regulatory Framework critically examines the particular policy 
framework and regulatory arrangements in Australia. It reviews the history of the 
university in Australia in order to understand its purposes and the policy 
development.  Further, it reviews the historical regulatory arrangements 
examining the role of government and its approach toward the university 
including over the century and a half since the founding of the university in the 
Antipodes.  It focuses on regulatory bodies, government commissioned reports 
and policy responses.  This historical background is used to argue that the 
Australian university has experienced an institutional shift from private elite, to 
public mass and back to private education provider as a result of changes to its 
regulation and its relation to government.   
 
This argument is carried forward by a detailed examination of the contemporary 
regulatory framework.  That examination, utilising the features and aspects 
approach developed in Chapter 2, draws attention to the highly directive nature of 
the regulation, the privatised aspects and the various strategies of regulation by 
code, consensus and competition.  The final part of the analysis of the regulatory 
framework is the accountability framework. By examining the accountability 
framework, it becomes clear by what standard the university is being measured, 
and what values are expressed. Further, it becomes clear how the government 
sees the university.  This part of the chapter argues that the university is primarily 
a source for government to underpin its economic reforms particularly 
strengthening private micro-economic reforms introduced in the 1980’s and 
shifting the university institution away from its broader public mission—a theme 
picked up and discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5. Finally, the chapter provides 
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the exposition of the regulatory framework on which the coherence analysis of 
Chapter 7 is conducted. 
 
This chapter is one of the innovative and core contributions to knowledge made 
by the dissertation.  Its detailed analysis of the policy, legislation, and regulatory 
structures through the lens of regulatory studies, provides a unique picture of the 
Australian higher education system. Its exposition of the policy framework and 
regulatory system forms the foundation for understanding the Australian 
university from both institutional and legal perspectives.  The Australian 
regulatory system and Australian university as developed in this chapter are 
evaluated with reference to the university as a world-wide institution and 
organisation as discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 
 
The next chapter Chapter 4:  Public-Private Divide, Public Goods and the 
University, addresses a fundamental political and regulatory issue—the nature 
and location of the public and private spheres.  It asks questions and examines 
answers about those spheres and the boundary between them. In terms of 
regulation, it examines the basis for assigning problems to the public or private 
side of the public-private divide and identifies the important consequences of the 
assignment, namely, what elements of public and private social and economic 
resources will be assigned to address the problem. The regulation, including its 
objectives, resources and accountabilities must be tailored to the sphere to which 
it is assigned.  
 
This chapter serves the dissertation by identifying, clarifying and critically 
analysing the basic premises—public versus—private underlying and informing 
regulatory debate and decisions.  In particular it examines critically the dominant 
neo-classical economic division between public and private spheres.  It is argued 
that an economic understanding of public goods as a type of market failure is 
inadequate to the task of understanding the public good of the university.  
Further, it examines the significant positive externalities created by the university 
and their contribution to society at least to the extent they can be measured. This 
argument is significant as it provides the basis for the critique of the regulatory 
framework which is premised on economic understandings of public goods, and 
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in consequence reflects policy which privileges private economic goods and 
diminishes non-economic public goods.  
 
The chapter then argues that the perspectives of political science and philosophy 
provide a more helpful understanding of public goods. These disciplines define 
public goods as those goods which contribute to the public functioning of a 
community.  Understood through the lenses of these disciplines, the university 
delivers a significant public good.  Accordingly, this chapter argues that the 
university is a foundational provider of public goods and so should be subject to 
regulation designed for public goods. As such, the chapter argues for considering 
the university as a public good, and provides the foundation for the coherence 
assessment in Chapter 7 in which the university regulation is evaluated as to its 
adequacy in supporting the university in the first instance as a public institution.  
 
The next chapter, Chapter 5: Regulatory Objectives and the Missions of the 
University—examines the various roles of the university from a variety of 
institutional perspectives. An interdisciplinary perspective is important as the 
regulation will inevitably have an impact on the whole of the institution and all of 
its roles.  Therefore, rather than simply relying on a single disciplinary 
perspective on the nature of the university, an interdisciplinary investigation will 
serve more effectively to understand the nature of this institution, its role in 
society and inform regulators of the nature of the matter being regulated.  The 
chapter argues that the university serves multiple roles including knowledge 
creation, dissemination and preservation, contributing to the development of 
citizens, professionals and government, serving important sociological roles of 
sorting and credentialing the population, and helping government to achieve 
political objectives such as nation building and economic competitiveness. 
Examining these roles or missions of the university advances the argument that 
the university is best considered a public organisation strengthening the argument 
of Chapter 4 and further developing the foundation for the coherence analysis of 
Chapter 7.  Chapter 5 argues that the complexity of missions requires an ordering 
of priorities which preferences the public missions and benefits over the private, 
and that overly narrow modelling and hence, regulation is likely to stifle the other 
significant missions of the institution.  
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Chapter 6: Regulated Bodies: Sociological, Economic, Political and Legal 
Perspectives on the University examines the university from various disciplinary 
perspectives detailing its organisational form.  Again, the interdisciplinary 
perspective is important in order to understand the nature of the regulated body, a 
university corporation, which alternative models may be appropriate, and from 
which the coherence analysis can be developed.  Organisationally, the university 
can be considered as a firm, a government department, or civil association.  Its 
characterisation in this regard is significant in determining the laws which may or 
may not apply as discussed in Chapter 4 concerning the public and private 
spheres, and in consequence, the limitations on regulation which may ensue.  
Further, the chapter considers the economic alternatives of the university as a 
profit generating and non-profit organisation.  This consideration is particularly 
important in terms of regulation and regulatory coherence because the regulatory 
framework for private for-profit and public non-profit organisations is likely to be 
markedly different. Further, from a policy perspective which favours private 
enterprise, it is important to identify the nature of organisations and understand 
how the university institution may fit into the alternatives.  Further, the chapter 
examines the university organisation with respect to other public bodies from 
legal and public administrative perspectives.  It argues that university 
organisations are most consistent with public bodies in terms of law and 
administration.  This chapter builds on the arguments of Chapters 4 and 5 by 
arguing further that the university as an organisation is best understood and most 
coherent with public, non-profit organisations.  
 
Chapter 7: Analysis: Coherence and Incoherence in University Regulation is the 
final substantive chapter.  It brings the arguments, perspectives and analysis of 
Chapters 1 through 5 forward to subject the regulatory scheme to coherence 
analysis. Beginning with the Chapter 2 framework for regulation, i.e. the 
organising problem, the approaches, regulatory techniques structures, the 
coherence analysis examines each aspect of university regulation examined in 
Chapter 3 for coherence.  The coherence is tested both externally with the social 
organising problem and institution internally with the organisation.  Drawing 
from the foundations laid in Chapter 4 in which it was argued that the university 
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fits best on the public side of the public-private divide, the coherence analysis 
examines whether or the extent to which the regulation is coherent with this 
default position.  The coherence analysis demonstrates that the regulation is 
incoherent with this public default position. From Chapter 5, the coherence 
analysis tests the regulation against the institutional features of the university. 
The coherence analysis leads to the conclusion that the regulation is incoherent 
with the institution of the university.  The Chapter 6 organisational analysis is 
used in the coherence analysis to test whether the regulation is coherent with the 
organisational form that is most coherent with the university institution.  The 
coherence analysis leads to the conclusion that the changes to the organisation 
fail to be as coherent as possible or as past.   The chapter concludes that the 
elements of incoherence overwhelm the policy and regulation. It is the second 
and the major contribution to knowledge that this dissertation makes.  The final 
chapter of the dissertation, The Chapter 8: Conclusion provides insight into the 
regulation of public goods not economically considered in the post-neoliberal era 
and provides some suggestions about how such regulation may be considered.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The dissertation contributes to the three fields of regulation, higher education and 
government policy.  In particular its focus on the coherence of the regulation, i.e. 
the intersections of government policy, regulation and well established 
institutions and organisations provides new and unique insights into regulation, 
higher education and the development of appropriate policy.  The dissertation 
demonstrates that the current regulatory framework is problematic.  Lacking 
coherence at any level, it is a prescription for regulatory failure.  Regulatory 
failure leads to failure of the projects subject to the regulation—in this case, the 
Australian university.  The evidence for a degree of failure in the Australian 
university is dealt with in the literature and is referred to in the references 
throughout, one manifestation of which is the “crisis” literature referred to 
earlier.43  
 
                                                 
43
 See n. 34 above. 
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One of the failings of neoliberal regulation is the neoliberalism’s ideological 
dependence on neo-classical economics.  In particular, economics 
methodological assumption of radical individualism and that discipline’s 
ahistorical understanding of itself lead to solutions appropriate for spot markets 
and short-term financial gain rather than long term collective social survival.  
The recent 2008-2009 collapse of financial markets should make clear that there 
are fundamental flaws in the neoclassical model.44  In the post-neoliberal era, 
new models of regulation are desperately needed, and it is hoped that this 
dissertation contributes to the development of such models.  
                                                 
44
 See for example, the “mea culpa” of one of its chief architects. Hellweg, E. (2008). 
Greenspan's "Mea Culpa". Harvard Business Review. 
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CHAPTER 2: REGULATORY THEORY 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In order to understand the regulation of the university, it is necessary to 
understand regulation: this chapter provides that introduction and draws out the 
relevant aspects of various theories of regulation to be used in the remainder of 
the dissertation.  This chapter does so in three parts. First, as noted in the 
previous chapter, the academic study of regulation is relatively recent and so 
lacks a single, generally accepted approach to or definition of regulation. Such 
being the case, the chapter examines scholarship on regulation.  Academics in the 
various disciplines of law, sociology, economics, various institutionalisms45 and 
political science all work on regulation46  and each develops its different theory 
of regulation according to the different disciplinary perspective.47    Each 
discipline makes a significant contribution to understanding regulation and 
regulatory theory and so has the potential to contribute to the analysis and 
evaluation of a regulatory framework. Further disciplines with their different 
methodologies and normative commitments contribute to the political debate 
about regulation. Therefore, in order identify, understand and capture the distinct 
disciplinary contributions to regulatory study, this chapter surveys and analyses 
the contributions most relevant for this study. Further, identifying the different 
disciplinary approaches and concerns will set the foundation for the approach 
taken to proposals and critiques of university regulation put forth by various 
disciplinary experts.  Finally, this survey and analysis is used in the second part 
to argue for the selection of the methodology adopted by the dissertation, 
namely, Feaver and Durrant’s regulatory coherence. 
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An important aspect of this first part of the chapter is the argument that a large 
body of research has been developed by economists who because of disciplinary 
methodology focus on private economic goods.  That focus and the 
recommendations so developed, it is argued, are inappropriate and inadequate for 
public goods like the university—a matter taken up and argued in detail in 
Chapter 4, and elsewhere in the dissertation. Further, the chapter argues that the 
contributions of political science and public administration while providing 
significant benchmarks and approaches to management, do not address the 
evaluation of a regulatory framework as a whole, which is the objective of this 
dissertation. Finally, the examination of institutional approaches to regulation 
contributes to an understanding of regulation that moves away from positivist 
approaches associated with one strand of legal scholars and allows a more 
socially relevant look at regulatory frameworks.  The argument here is that each 
of the disciplines has a significant contribution to the understanding and 
evaluation of regulation, and accordingly, the dissertation will take account of 
these perspectives as appropriate. 
 
The second part of the chapter aims to develop the dissertation’s theoretical 
foundation in regulatory studies.  The chapter argues that the various theories of 
regulation while contributing to the current regulatory discourse fail to provide 
an overall framework for the critique of a regulatory framework. It would be a 
mistake, however, to dismiss them for this reason as they do indeed contribute 
significantly in their respective areas of focus.  Accordingly, a survey and 
analysis of the main theories contributing to regulatory studies is conducted in a 
way which examines critically the focus and contributions of these theories.  This 
survey and analysis is used in Chapter 7 which critiques the regulatory 
framework and proposes alternative regulatory arrangements.  This critical 
review is used to argue that Feaver and Durrant’s theory and approach is the 
most suitable theoretical approach for the dissertation.  
 
Finally, the third part of the chapter addresses the technical or mechanical aspects 
of regulation.  Regulation as understood in this dissertation is a formal political 
response to socially interpreted phenomena.  To understand that phenomena and 
to critique a specific manifestation of that phenomena in the form of university 
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regulation, a survey of the mechanics of regulatory systems is called for. That is, 
a review of the regulatory alternatives with respect to the organisation and design 
of a regulatory system is needed.  This then includes a review of the organising 
problems, the regulators, strategies and accountability structures and processes. 
Simply put a more effective analysis and critique of a regulatory system can be 
developed once the technical and mechanical aspects and alternatives of 
regulatory systems are clear.  Accordingly, the last part of the chapter surveys 
critically the various technical and mechanical aspects of regulation. 
 
2. Disciplinary approaches to regulatory studies  
 
This section reviews the contributions of various disciplines to development of 
contemporary regulatory studies.  Distinguishing the various disciplinary views 
of regulation is important in order to develop a comprehensive evaluation 
because a regulatory scheme may be successful from one disciplinary 
perspective, but a failure from another.  For example, a regulatory scheme that 
privatises the university may be highly successful from an economic perspective 
generating significant revenues, but unsuccessful from a sociological point of 
view in terms of concentrating benefits among a certain social class, or failing to 
achieve other functions such as creating and preserving knowledge. The 
disciplines with their distinct focal points and related accounts of regulation rely 
on different methodologies.  As a result, it is difficult to analyse or provide an 
overall evaluation of a regulatory scheme without reference to a variety of 
disciplines. Indeed, it could be argued that to do so without an interdisciplinary 
approach is likely to unfruitful if not misleading.   
 
a. Public Administration  
 
To a certain extent, contemporary academic concern with regulation can be 
traced to Woodrow Wilson’s interest with the administration of government and 
its bodies.  Wilson was concerned to avoid corruption as well as ensuring 
effective execution of the various mandates with which the departments and 
agencies were charged.  Wilson’s work coincided in time with the development 
of large business corporations.  The issues encountered in large business 
organisations with the coordination of large numbers of people and resources 
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were similar to those of government.  These two coincident developments and 
concerns led to the development of public administration in government and 
business management business respectively. As noted, both were concerned with 
the effective and efficient use of those people and resources.  In the public 
administration discipline, initially the work of Wilson, later followed by the work 
of Waldo and in business studies, the work of Frederick Taylor, then later 
followed by Chester Barnard pointed to the difficulty of rationalistic mechanical 
models of human behaviour in organisations and regulation.48 As well, both 
Taylor and Barnard noted the difficulties associated with and importance of 
coordinated regulation and effective government.  Waldo argued as early as 1948 
that regulatory study is an interdisciplinary enterprise.  In that year Waldo stated: 
“administrative thought must establish a working relationship with every major 
province in the realm of human learning,”49 a view even more important today as 
disciplinary perspectives have greater impacts on regulatory prescriptions.50  The 
dissertation now turns to examine the perspectives and contributions of policy 
analysis, political science, public administration, economics and institutionalism. 
Policy analysis, itself an interdisciplinary study, examines the development and 
implementation of policy—which usually means the design and evaluation of 
regulation. Policy analysis has taken a variety of approaches over time.  Early 
rationalist approaches to policy making and regulation focused on before-the-fact 
evaluation.  Government interventions were to be done by central planning 
agencies, and the execution and goal achievement were believed to be 
unproblematic, natural outcomes of the well laid plans. Little attention was paid 
to the overall design of the resulting regulatory framework.   
 
This rationalist approach, as will be seen, has dominated the Australian higher 
education policy at least since the 1980’s.  It is not an unproblematic approach.  
It is referred to as “naïve rationalism” because it ignores such things as side-
effects, reverse effects, null effects, perverse effects, in other words a whole host 
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of unintended consequences—the problems associated with bounded rationality. 
As a result, critics of rationalist policy analysis began to focus on implementation 
planning.51  
 
Recognition of problems associated with rationalist and implementation planning 
approaches led to a search for yet another framework. One solution taken from 
management studies was the management by objectives approach.  This 
approach looked less toward input-oriented and process-oriented management 
and more toward “good management practice.”  Good management in this 
context meant: 1) setting clear goals, 2) participatory decision making, and 3) 
objective feedback of achieved results.52 This has been criticised as a modified 
form of Taylorism and carries with it many of the same rationalist problems.  It 
provided no complete solution. In the field of higher education, the policy 
analysis approach provides neither an objective standard against which to 
evaluate nor normative direction.  Further, it provides little guidance about the 
larger objectives of preserving the knowledge of and educating a society.  It is 
focused on the minutiae of management.  
 
Ex post approaches of policy analysis examine outcomes.  Three main 
approaches to evaluation of policy outcomes have been developed. They are: 
Effectiveness Evaluation Models which examine goals, results, systems, and 
clients, Economic Efficiency Models, focused on efficiency and productivity, 
and Professional Models which examine quality and do so on the basis of peer 
review.53 Again, each of these has strengths and weaknesses, none dominating 
the discussion to the exclusion of the rest. More importantly, however, the 
problem of measurement becomes more acute as the less measurable objectives 
of higher education—i.e. knowledge creation, dissemination and preservation 
and education—being the most important, are exceedingly difficult to measure.  
In sum, policy analysis contributes to regulatory studies at two points: the 
importance of attending to the policy which animates regulation, a matter 
addressed in Feaver and Durrant’s work, and the importance (and limitations) of 
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measurement for evaluative purposes—a significant issue in the design of 
regulatory accountability measures. 
 
b. Political science  
 
The related approach of political science examines the legitimacy of regulation in 
relation to a series of five tests or benchmarks.  These benchmarks are whether 
the regulation is: supported by legislative authority, has appropriate 
accountability structures, procedures, expertise and efficiency.54  This approach 
acknowledges the potential for conflicting mandates and the complexity of 
evaluative frameworks and criteria.  In particular, it is noted that any gain in one 
of the five areas is likely to require a trade-off in another.55  Further, it takes 
account of the inherent political nature of the basis of decisions concerning 
regulation.  Rather than engaging in the politics, it aims to evaluate the regulation 
against the benchmarks.  As Baldwin and Cave write:  
“the weight that individuals place on each legitimating argument will 
reflect their personal political philosophies and, in the absence of all 
persons agreeing on the nature of an ideal world, we will differ on matter 
of weighting, what we do seem to agree on, however, is the benchmarks 
themselves.”56  
To avoid the political debate Baldwin and Cave focus on simply the presence of 
the legitimacy or the grounds for legitimacy of a regulatory regime rather than 
attempting to weigh them or set out a calculus for such.  In doing so they move 
the regulatory debate beyond the reductionist economic view and into a more 
technical realm, taking account of non-economic values and public good which 
their legitimacy theory recognises.  Good regulation, from this perspective, is 
regulation which achieves an acceptable balance between the five criteria—it is 
regulation which merits public support.  In this sense, “the legitimate” reflects 
the normative preferences of a society and so merits the term “good” in terms of 
that society. While this framework works for a political analysis, it fails to 
address the critical issue: what is the purpose of the regulation in the first place? 
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Any comprehensive evaluation of regulation must begin with that question and 
then move to the evaluation.  
 
c. Institutionalism  
 
Institutionalism—including new institutionalism—moves beyond the 
individualist analysis of liberalism to examine the social forces that shape 
organisations and institutions, focusing on the formal and informal rules and 
organisations that arise.  As to regulation, institutionalism provides an account of 
the interactions between people, organisations and other institutions in the 
development, maintenance and demise of regulation.57   In this regard, an 
institutionalist approach offers insight about the workings of legal rules and 
arrangements, and through historical analysis provides a source of guidance for 
regulatory design.58 Institutional analysis emphasises the organisations and 
institutions created thereby, the degree of coordination between the rules, 
organisations and policy objectives. One important critique developed by 
institutionalists concerns assumptions of coherence within organisations and 
institutions.59  Contrary to rationalist efficiency accounts, new institutionalists 
emphasise legitimacy and other non-rationalist, non-economic goals as the true 
goals of organisations.  These critiques offer crucial insights into the rationalist 
programmes of government policy and economic agendas, and lead to the 
suggestion that other agendas not only should be considered, but are critical to 
understanding organisations and institutions including government.  As to the 
idea of coherence upon which this dissertation is founded, as will be argued 
below, it is not that conflicts cannot be sustained within an organisation or 
institution. Rather, the argument that will be made is that a prioritisation between 
incoherent or conflicting goals, objectives and norms needs to be made. Finally, 
institutionalism examines current institutions and formal attempts to modify 
them.  As will be seen in the discussion of regulator theory below, institutionalist 
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approaches and insights are becoming increasingly important in regulatory 
discourse.  
 
One increasingly important idea introduced into regulatory study from 
institutionalism is the notion of soft law.  That is, where “hard law” is viewed as 
explicit rules formally promulgated by a recognised governmental authority, soft 
law refers to non-governmental regulation, self regulation, and the regulation 
stemming from non-legal institutions.  So, for example, regulation of universities 
may occur by way of ranking systems as universities change their behaviour, 
focus and structures in order to achieve higher rankings. The term soft-law is not 
only used by institutional scholars, but also public administration scholars to 
describe regulatory techniques other than command and control. For example, 
regulation which provides incentives or forms of self-regulation in which 
standard setting is delegated to the regulated body may all be considered soft 
law. Public administration scholars refer to combined hard and soft law as 
“carrots, sticks and sermons.”60 Soft law regulatory approaches are particularly 
effective where strong institutions guide behaviour of organisations which seek 
to follow, mimic, comply and compete within a sector.61  Further, the soft law 
and hard law approaches are not mutually exclusive,62 and indeed the distinction 
at times is amorphous.  For example, governments may create a regulatory 
regime that has both incentives for good behaviour as well as fines for non-
compliance. As well, governmental policy may change the mix of hard and soft 
law over time in response to internal dynamics of the industry as well as changes 
in the external environment.  In terms of accountability, whereas hard law 
usually relies on courts and Parliament, soft law may leave accountability to 
social reporting and censure, markets or other arrangements.   
 
The significance of understanding the university as an institution and an 
organisation can hardly be overstated.  In order to regulate effectively, one must 
understand the phenomenon to be regulated. Accordingly, the institution and 
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organisation of the university are examined in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively.  
Further, institutional soft law is a major contributor to the regulation of the 
university and this is integrated into the analysis and critique of the regulatory 
framework  throughout, but particularly in Chapter 7. 
 
d. Economics  
 
Although the distinct projects of public administration, business management, 
policy analysis, political science and institutionalism provide grounds for 
different types of analysis, they do not provide complete or comprehensive 
models or analysis.  Economists seeking to apply their methods broadly purport 
to do both.  
 
Economics works within two significant constraints.  First, economic analysis is 
constrained by a single overriding normative preoccupation—efficiency.  In this 
aspect, economics is highly normative in its prescriptions for regulation. It 
promotes all that enhances efficiency and censures what does not, and often 
regards distributional issues as secondary—a consequence of adopting Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency.  Accordingly, economic analysis of regulation is mostly 
conducted by way of cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) and is primarily about the 
efficiency of a particular piece of regulation or regulatory regime and its impact 
relative to an imaginary perfect market.  Second, economic evaluation of 
regulation starts from a fantastical benchmark.  Economics takes an imaginary 
free market in which all actors have complete, timely and accurate information, a 
complete suite of property rights—in other words, perfect markets—and obey 
laws all of which were sui generis as its starting point. These two elements of 
economics effect the analytical lens of economics such that its evaluations and 
recommendations concerning regulation may tend to skew its evaluation and 
policy advice.   
 
In terms of economists’ approach to regulation, the analysis begins with its 
assumption of perfect markets and then examines areas where markets fail. These 
market failures include monopolies, externalities, information asymmetries, and 
may extend to areas such as scarcity, rationing and social policies including 
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distributive justice.  From an economic perspective, regulation is no panacea.  
Indeed, in the hands of certain more politically motivated economists regulation 
seldom achieves its proposed outcomes, and the CBA often suggests costs 
regularly outweigh benefits.  From this perspective it is asked: if regulation for 
the most part fails to deliver the desired norm of efficiency, the natural question 
is what less desirable motivations drive it?  The answer to this question leads to 
public choice theorists, who apply economic analysis to politics and find hidden 
under most public initiatives a private exploitative motivation.  Their analysis is 
what one would expect from ideologues: a single finding that regulation is bad. 
 
While economists’ efforts fail to provide a complete description of regulation, 
they have contributed an important part of the theoretical foundation by 
categorising regulation as public or private, and contributing to the debate on 
regulatory justifications and purposes. From both justificatory and purposive 
perspectives, two broad theories of regulation can be identified: public interest or 
private interest theories of regulation.  The former, which includes welfare 
economics, seeks to promote the overall good of the collective.  Public interest 
regulation aspires to do what the market cannot do.  In economic terms, public 
interest regulation seeks to address market failure. That is, it “produces market 
correcting, general interest policies.”63 Public interest regulation also has 
political justifications.  These include the values of broad participation in society, 
social justice, a diversity of views, and respect for individual human dignity.  
Regulatory objectives include raising sufficient funds to purchase public goods, 
and creating political consensus on the quantity of public goods to be supplied as 
well as their quality.  These are important objectives because they speak to the 
economically non-rational in the sense that demand is not a function of 
willingness to pay.64  
 
Further, public interest regulation seeks to address the problems of bounded 
rationality, inequitable distributions and preference shaping by private interests.  
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That is, there is a role for government to address inequities in society, to shape 
preferences for such things as democracy, cooperation to overcome collective 
action problems, and civic values all of which are undersupplied by the market.65 
These theories tend to view regulation for public collective purposes as desirable 
and such ends as achievable.   
 
In contrast, private interest theorists are sceptical of the public intention of 
legislators, ideas of a collective as anything other than individuals, and as a result 
favour a limited space for regulation.  Private interest regulation rejects 
substantive goals for society, and rejects any trans-individual goals.  That is, 
there are no collective aspirations for the future of a community, generation or 
nation-state.  All preferences are purely individual.  These public choice views of 
regulation, although coming from public choice economics, fail empirical 
testing.66 As Morgan and Yeung distinguish the two, “Public interest theories 
stress market failure and the capacity of regulation to correct such failure.  
Private interest theories stress regulatory failure and the tendency of regulation to 
benefit narrow special interest rather than to promote collective welfare.”67 
 
This characterisation of regulation as public or private interest is critical for the 
regulatory program including the regulation of the university.  Not only do public 
regulatory projects call for public support in terms of political legitimacy and 
public resources, but if the university is to be regulated consideration must be 
given to whether and how it should be considered in terms of public and private. 
The issue of the public-private distinction is addressed in Chapter 4 and the 
university is considered in these terms institutionally and organisationally in 
chapters 5 and 6 respectively.  
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3. Regulatory theory  
 
This section turns to the second review of the literature—on regulatory theory.  
As will be seen, this literature does not form a coherent body of knowledge with 
a linear progression of ideas.  Rather this body of literature is grows out of 
relatively recent work which was the result of new thinking about government.  
This new thinking was combined with the social sciences in part reviewed above. 
It comes from a disparate group of scholars working in different disciplines 
examining different parts of regulatory schemes, in turn developing their 
thinking about the particular area of regulation on which they have focused their 
research. Accordingly, the survey is not comprehensive, or as will be seen, 
demonstrating a coherent trajectory and development of ideas.  It is important 
because the review connects the current work with the literature in the area and 
provides a justification for the choice of methodology. 
 
a. Regulatory Failure 
 
Economists and others have long bemoaned the failures of government 
regulation to achieve desired outcomes.  These complaints came to be termed 
“regulatory failure.” Taking up this theme led to a landmark work and in new 
thinking about regulatory design by Stephen Breyer.  Breyer’s work in regulatory 
failure and reform was a significant departure from the prior economic work.  
Whereas analysis of regulation prior to Breyer had been the province of 
economists68 and public choice theorists,69 Breyer separated out from the 
motivations of the political sphere and economic analysis the techniques and 
objectives of regulation and suggested that they be studied independently.  
Further, he suggested that such techniques and objectives needed to be coupled 
appropriately with the justifications for the regulation.   
 
Breyer identifies his work as a theory of regulatory failure.  According to Breyer, 
failure to achieve the objects is the predictable result of the mismatch of 
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regulatory objects and regulatory methods. That is, Breyer suggested that 
regulatory goals needed to be matched to regulatory systems.70  Breyer explained 
as “axiomatic” that objectives be determined first, that alternative regulatory 
regimes be considered second and finally, optimal methods be chosen. This 
ordering would militate against selecting regulatory regimes on ideological basis, 
or the alternative, simply working with the existing institutions.  While Breyer 
acknowledged the importance of existing institutional arrangements, these are to 
be considered at the end of the analysis not the beginning.  Breyer points to the 
importance of institutional arrangements and political conventions, as context; 
however, he suggests that regulatory analysis should not start from these 
contentious points, but from the coordination of the twin points of object and 
method.  Finally, while starting from a normative preference for liberal freedoms 
and “unregulated markets” Breyer indicates that governmental activity is “needed 
to achieve an important public objective that an unregulated marketplace cannot 
provide.” 71  
 
In explicating his argument, Breyer identified a list of justifications for regulation 
such as monopolies and social costs—Breyer focused on economic regulation 
and hence used market failure justifications—and then examined an array of 
regulatory techniques and identified their strengths and weaknesses. Once this 
examination was complete, he sought to ascertain which techniques were best 
suited to which problems or justifications for regulation. After his analysis and 
application, Breyer proposed a few general rules. These are: regulation should be 
aimed at worst cases with simplicity of rules, bargaining and incentive are 
preferable to command and control, and in economic regulation an order of 
preferences need to be set from unregulated markets to command and control.  
 
Breyer’s concern for coherence between objects and methods is significant.  It 
appears to be the first such identification. Even within economic regulation he 
identified coherence as critical.  A failure to have such coherence he claimed was 
a cause of regulatory failure. While he does not distinguish between instrument 
and approach—that is, for example, between information instruments and cost-
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plus approach—he does identify a variety of both.  His analysis shed light from a 
non-economic perspective into the black box of regulation.  
 
The significance of Breyer’s work for this dissertation is his novel idea that 
regulatory failure is the consequence of incoherence between problem and 
regulatory response, and the important separation of regulatory techniques from 
political ideologies. The first of these two contributions provides a foundation for 
Feaver and Durrant’s regulatory coherence and the second a foundation for the 
non-political evaluation of regulatory scheme of the university. 
 
b. Responsive Regulation and Really Responsive Regulation 
 
Since Breyer’s work, approaches to the study of regulation have blossomed. One 
such landmark work is that of Ayers and Braithwaite.  Unlike Breyer, who 
adopted an economic normative default position of deregulation, Ayers and 
Braithwaite, a lawyer-economist and a criminologist respectively, attempt to 
address the ideological deadlock between de-regulationists and people who can 
see the benefits of regulation by avoiding a normative political commitment.  
They argue that rather than addressing regulation from a political perspective, 
thereby hobbling any attempt to coordinate activity, it is the operational aspect of 
obtaining compliance—which must be the focus of regulatory studies.  Further, 
they argue that a more sophisticated and realistic model of actors—both regulator 
and regulatee is necessary if regulation is to be effective.   
They note that scholarly opinion on regulation has become divided on the basis 
of disciplinary perspectives rather than on the sui generis issues arising from 
regulation as an activity.72  They point out that economists working from an 
economically rational actor model ignore intrinsic motive and provide a limited 
range of approaches and predictions.   By way of contrast they note that 
sociologists working from a model which allows for social norms and a variety 
of motives empirically proved rather than the economists’ assumed model have a 
larger array of tools and approaches for solving the regulatory puzzles.  So, for 
example, Ayers and Braithwaite are able to take account of such intrinsic aspects 
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of human nature as the desire to be viewed as “basically good—reasonable, of 
good faith, motivated to abide by the law” which they note is driven out by 
punitive models of regulation. 73  Working from a sociologically informed model 
not focused on game theoretic free riders, Ayers and Braithwaite explicitly state 
that regulation should be designed not only to control the bad but to encourage 
the good. 74 
 
They too identify the potential for regulatory failure; however, rather than a 
mismatch of object and method like Breyer, they describe regulatory disaster as a 
conflagration which occurs when “the tough, unprofessional, confused self of the 
regulator encounters the irresponsible profit-driven self of the business 
executive.” 75  That is, where people are treated or act as if they were evil 
simpletons, i.e. simple caricatures with single motives like self-interested utility 
maximisation rather than real humans with multiple motives and values, they are 
more likely to cause cataclysm than where dealing with each other and acting as 
socially aware, multi-faceted beings.  
 
Ayers and Braithwaite suggest a normative ordering, which they refer to as a 
“lexical ordering”, can form a framework for accessing and understanding 
motivations of actors. 76  In addition to acknowledging a variety of potentially 
conflicting norms and objects, this ordering allows more effective guidance from 
regulators. Where regulators are able to appeal to the intrinsic or institutional 
norms of the regulated they are more likely to have the regulation internalised 
than if they were only to appeal to external monitoring and punishment.  
Ayres and Braithwaite argue that there “is no such thing as an ahistorical optimal 
regulatory strategy.... the appropriateness of a particular strategy is contingent on 
the legal, constitutional and cultural context and the history of its invocation.” 77  
That is, contrary to the economic “scientific” model, Ayers and Braithwaite point 
out that regulation is not an application of some abstract science.  Rather, it is 
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contextually applied social activity—in other words, they recognise the 
institutionalists’ focus of studying phenomena as socially embedded.   
 
Ayers and Braithwaite’s focus is on effective operationalisation of regulation 
through effective design.  Their study is focused on regulatory schemes that take 
account of various types of actors with different types of motivations in a 
dynamic interaction.  They recommend regulation be designed to allow 
regulators to be “contingently cooperative, tough and forgiving.” 78 Instead of the 
crude economic model of punishment and reward, Ayres and Braithwaite 
recommend a model that allows for cooperation in the first instance, where that 
fails escalation, where compliance follows, forgiveness and where it ultimately 
fails a “big gun.” Rather than a dyadic game, played strategically as economists 
model it, they see regulation as an iterative relationship between a variety of 
parties with a variety of interests. 
 
Given Ayers and Braithwaite’s preference for analysing regulatory relationships 
as on-going iterative relationships, they recognise the potential for regulatory 
capture.  To avoid negative regulatory capture, they advocate a third party 
participant in the regulatory regime—a Public Interest Group. This public group 
operates to ensure that the discretion in the variegated regulatory regime is not 
abused, but used for proper purposes of achieving compliance with the 
regulation.  
 
Ayers and Braithwaite’s work is significant for this study because it emphasises 
not only the contextual nature of regulation contrary to the scientific model 
proposed by economists, but also the non-economic aspects of regulatory 
activity.  Ayers and Braithwaite are not limited to consideration of economic 
impacts.  In this way, their work not only compliments but moves beyond 
Breyer’s work which was limited to the problems of economic activity.  In this 
vein, Ayers and Braithwaite’s idea of normative ordering is a further critical 
contribution.  Their identification of worthwhile but conflicting regulatory 
objectives within a single regulatory scheme leads them to the idea that these 
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conflicts need to be ordered or prioritised.  As will be seen, this idea has 
significance in the analysis and evaluation of the university.  The conflicting 
objectives summarised as public good and private economic good co-exist in the 
institution and the regulation of the university must work so as to balance 
effectively both in order for it to work.  
 
Finally, Ayers and Braithwaite’s work draws attention to the alternative 
regulatory arrangements that are possible by creating the idea of public interest 
groups involved in regulation. In sum, Ayers and Braithwaite’s contribution 
facilitates an expanded non-political, non-economic critique of certain aspects of 
regulation and regulatory arrangements.  
 
Picking up on Braithwaite’s work, Baldwin and Black have examined what they 
call “really responsive regulation.”79  This regulatory approach which they see as 
addressing short-comings in Braithwaite’s model for enforcement, takes greater 
account of the institutional context of the regulatory efforts. That is, rather than 
looking exclusively at the regulator-regulated relationship as does Braithwaite, 
and attitude of the parties, they investigate the cognitive frameworks within 
which the parties are operating, the institutional framework and “the different 
logics of regulatory tools and strategies”.80  These factors combined are to be the 
focus of regulatory examination. 81  That is, evaluating non-compliant actors 
requires a subtle, carefully designed, responsive regime allowing regulators act 
with considerable discretion within a carefully prescribed area to achieve the 
identified preferred outcomes. These cognitive frameworks not only reflect the 
disciplinary approaches discussed above, but also the political programs of 
various governments be they left or right leaning.  The implications for 
governments regulating the university are problematic particularly for highly 
ideological governments.  The norms and critical, reflective and exploratory 
agendas of university research pose a direct threat to certain agendas such as 
neoliberalism. Again, like Braithwaite’s contribution, Baldwin and Black provide 
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further subtlety and sophistication to modelling regulatory schemes.  This 
subtlety is an issue for this dissertation as it addresses regulation designed by 
economic rationalists for one of society’s most complex organisations and 
significant institutions, the university. Although Baldwin and Black’s model does 
not provide a direct contribution to the analysis, it does emphasise the complex 
cognitive maps which underlie regulators perspectives and regulatory 
preferences. 
c. Smart Regulation 
 
Further innovative thinking about regulation comes from Australians 
Gunningham and Grabosky. They developed what some see as a distinctive 
Australian approach to regulation combining empirical case study, broad theory 
and policy pragmatism.82 They have denominated their non-particularist 
approach as “smart regulation.”  This approach is referred to as smart because it 
does not follow a single policy prescription, instead preferring to select carefully 
among alternatives, electing from the alternatives complementary policies and 
instruments along principled lines to design regulation suited to achieving 
desired outcomes as well as minimising the potential for unintended 
consequences.  Their principles are simple:   
• Prefer complementary instrument and institutional mixes over single 
instruments 
• Prefer less intervention over more 
• Prefer escalating response models with failure triggers over single 
response models 
• Empower third parties to act as co-regulators 
• Maximise opportunities for win-win83 
 
To a certain extent one can see elements of Breyer and Ayers and Braithwaite in 
the list.  Breyer’s preference for unregulated markets aligns with “prefer less 
intervention.” And Ayers and Braithwaite’s iterative response model as well as 
public interest groups sound with “escalating response” and “empowered third 
parties.”   
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While smart regulation is still a first generation form of regulation, it provides a 
good basis for second generation regulation. Smart regulation it is argued is too 
idiosyncratic to be a broadly applicable model, and leaves many standards to be 
developed.  This challenge has been take up by Howlett.  Howlett describes 
second generation as sensitive to context rather than a broad policy prescription 
to be applied bluntly across large sections of society.84 That is, the traditional 
alternatives of “markets vs state” and “carrots, sticks and sermons” must be set 
aside as single, universal solutions.  Being aware of context, however, greatly 
complicates the issues of instrument choices.  As Howlett observes, in good 
times, governments find it easier to create more generous regulation. In times of 
scandal and collapse, heavy handed regulation, which normally would be 
rejected on philosophical grounds comes into favour.  Additionally, second 
generation moves beyond “good and evil” dichotomy of and examines “why is a 
particular combination of procedural and substantive instruments utilized in a 
specific sectoral context?”85  The design of appropriate policy and underlying 
system is a matter of considerable complexity,86 a matter of systems theory,87 
and well beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, ignoring extant 
organisations and institutions underlying the system is a recipe for failure.  
Accordingly, these two matters are taken up in chapters 5 and 6 respectively.  
The survey so far has identified a number of theoretical approaches to regulation 
that are significantly removed from the simplified cost-benefit-analysis of 
economics, that are far more than simple command and control, and conceive of 
regulation as an iterative, localised, relationship, in which complex sophisticated 
analysis are appropriate.  The survey makes clear that various scholarly 
discourses all coming under the heading “regulation” have markedly different 
focal points and methodologies.  Accordingly, the difficulty for a dissertation on 
university regulation is to find one or a group of approaches that will address the 
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research question. This observation leads to consideration of Feaver and 
Durrant’s work. 
 
What is lacking in all the foregoing approaches is an overarching framework for 
analysis of a regulatory scheme.  None of the theories gives consideration to 
coherence among problem identification, regulatory response of policy choices 
and decisions, targets of regulation and regulatory design.  That is, while some 
policy decisions may be well suited to economic regulation, others manifestly 
will not. However, given the ideological commitments of some governments, 
preferred regulatory designs will be implemented across the regulatory 
landscape with little consideration of the policy objectives, the norms inherent in 
the objects, or the consequences of various regulatory choices.  These 
arrangements, as Breyer would predict, are primed for regulatory failure.  
 
d. Regulatory Coherence 
 
An innovative approach to regulation has been developed by Feaver and Durrant.  
They have identified the potential for aspects of legal coherence to be applied to 
regulation, and regulatory systems. Whereas Breyer identified the mismatch of 
approach and object as the cause of regulatory failure, Feaver and Durrant claim 
that such a mismatch is but one type of larger problem of incoherence.  The 
corollary argument to incoherence leading to regulatory failure is that coherence 
widely construed leads to stability and regulatory success.88   
 
Feaver and Durrant claim that regulatory coherence has three dimensions: 
systemic, policy and instrumental.  Each of these dimensions must be coherent in 
order for an overall regulatory system to be coherent.  They explain of the 
dimensions or levels.  Systemic coherence is described as follows:  “a regulatory 
arrangement is systemically coherent where the underlying social need for 
regulation coalesces… with the normative policy objectives formulated to 
address that need.”89   That is, where there is a social norm that demands some 
good or service such as public health, a normative policy framework is set up 
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that attends to the provision of public health.  Where this coalescence of problem 
and policy response occurs, one has systemic coherence—i.e. a coherence 
between the social norm and the normative policy objective—public health. An 
example of incoherence in this dimension would be the social need for public 
health being addressed by policy that has a normative objective of creating 
private profit making opportunities.  
 
Feaver and Durrant do not describe systemic coherence as extending beyond 
need and policy norms, yet the term systemic coherence is suggestive of a larger 
concern of coherence in the first instance among the systems comprising the 
social system and in particular, the political system.  Systemic coherence so 
conceived would require a particular problem to be located on the public-private 
divide. That is, systemic coherence requires a political decision to allocate a 
particular problem to the public system or to the private system, so allocating 
primarily responsibility for the problem to the public or private realms.  This 
allocation is necessary from both theoretical and practical grounds. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the decision to regulate is based on certain 
political and economic theories about the role and operations of government and 
private actors, as discussed in the survey of disciplinary approaches to regulation 
above.  As noted, the public and private systems have different norms and scopes 
of concern.  To fail to distinguish and scatter regulatory response over the 
division will lead to systemic incoherence.  From a practical perspective, the 
ability to call upon the state’s authority and resources in aid of any proposed 
regulatory project requires the project to be cast as having a significant public 
impact.  Accordingly the classification of a project as public or private is 
evidently a critical step.  Systemic coherence therefore should require a careful 
consideration and development of policy that takes clear account of the public 
and private categories.  Unsurprisingly, the location of the dividing line between 
public and private spheres is hotly contested for various regulatory projects.  This 
important contest is a political and ideological manifestation of the larger contest 
of the public-private divide taken up in detail and argued as a fundamental 
theoretical issue in Chapter 4 and with respect to higher education and the 
university in the next chapter.  
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Systemic coherence is addressed in this dissertation in Chapter 3 by expositing 
the policy framework demonstrating a shift from public to private normative 
foundations, Chapter 4 in the discussion of the public-private divide and in 
Chapter 5 by examining the institutional options and related disciplinary 
perspectives.  The systemic coherence analysis rests on normative foundations 
flowing from location on the public-private divide.   The discussion in Chapter 4 
identifies the normative and hence political nature of the public-private divide. 
Chapter 5 expands the systemic foundation by focusing on the social need 
addressed by the regulation—in the case of the university, the creation, 
preservation and dissemination of knowledge—and the regulatory potential of 
shifting the university to non-knowledge based tasks, including generating profit 
as a for profit business organisation.  The potential for systemic incoherence 
resulting from such shifts is examined in detail and sheds light on what better—
i.e. systemically coherent regulation of the university—might look like.  Finally, 
the systems coherence arguments from these chapters are brought together and 
argued in the coherence analysis of Chapter 7. 
 
Policy coherence, Feaver and Durrant state, has both internal and external 
coherence dimensions.  In the first instance it is an internal alignment among the 
norms driving the policy and the choice of techniques embedded in positive legal 
instruments.  One can return to the health care example. The provision of a 
public benefit like health care must not be driven by insurance companies 
seeking to maximise their private profits by such activities as denying benefits.90  
Rather, public health care must be driven by the public who use, and health care 
professions who provide, health care services.  It must utilise therefore 
instruments designed for distribution of public goods as opposed to instruments 
promoting competition for scarce private goods.  
 
Externally, policy coherence requires consistency of regulation among similar 
types or categories of matters being regulated, as well as consistency across 
categories where related but distinct objectives are being pursued via 
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regulation.91  That is, policy coherence requires competitive regulatory 
arrangements in like instances and cooperation facilitating regulatory 
arrangements in other similar contexts.  So, for example, public hospitals should 
not be driven to compete on economic grounds. Rather, if competition is 
considered desirable it should be on quality of health care on a wide range of 
measures including inputs and outputs.92  
 
Policy coherence will be developed in the dissertation through the examination 
of regulatory techniques below, then used in the analysis of the regulatory 
framework in Chapter 3 and in particular the analytical review of historical 
policy framework.  These policies will be analysed to identify missions and 
objectives for the university.  These missions and objectives will be visited again 
in the coherence analysis of Chapter 7. 
 
Finally, instrumental coherence requires coherence between positive instruments 
containing specific regulatory techniques and the social and normative drivers of 
policy.  Thus for example, instruments must reflect a public good where public 
good is the normative policy being pursued.  Returning to the health care 
example, instruments with regulatory techniques suited to spot markets in 
commodities are unlikely to be an appropriate model for health care. Feaver and 
Durrant’s instrument coherence finds its application in the exposition of the 
historical and contemporary regulatory frameworks set out in Chapter 3.  That 
chapter works through the historical policy framework, related regulatory 
regimes and legal instruments regulating the university opening its regulatory 
foundations and elements for coherence analysis.  Instrument coherence provides 
a lens for identifying particularly significant aspects of the regulatory framework.  
Instrument coherence is also applied in Chapter 6 where various approaches to 
university organisations are considered.  The instrument coherence in that 
chapter examines whether the instruments have created an appropriate 
organisational form to achieve the systemic and policy objectives.  The 
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instrument coherence identified and analysed in these chapters are brought 
together and argued in the coherence analysis of Chapter 7. 
 
From a coherence analysis, regulatory failure is not just a mismatch of objects 
and instrument as Breyer would have it.  Rather, it is the net result of overall 
regulatory incoherence. That is, incoherence at systemic, policy or instrument 
selection points (or some combination of them) will lead to a relative degree of 
regulatory failure.  Where there is incoherence there will not be a well 
functioning, effective regulatory regime nor the desired regulatory outcome. 
Instead, as Feaver and Durrant have it incoherent regulation will be “ineffectual, 
produce unintended consequences, or impose… too many costs relative to the 
social benefits [it] achieve[s].”93  Critical therefore to any successful regulation is 
coherence, and hence any evaluation of regulatory arrangements may be 
construed as an analysis of the coherence of a regulatory system.  Further, Feaver 
and Durrant’s approach is comprehensive. It is not limited to examining 
compliance or policy. It is an approach that addresses the whole of a regulatory 
system. For these reasons, Feaver and Durrant’s regulatory coherence is adopted 
as the theoretical approach for this dissertation. 
 
The strength of Feaver and Durrant’s approach is that not only does it move 
away from the political to an examination of coherence of the regulatory 
technology, but it also provides a coherent framework for the analysis of a 
complete regulatory regime.  Further, it does so attending to the overall politico-
socio-legal architecture of regulation considered from the perspective of external 
policy coherence.  As such, it demands interdisciplinary analysis. Without an 
interdisciplinary analysis, a coherence analysis will fail to take account of the 
fundamental systemic, policy and instrumental components of a regulatory 
system.  Given the complexity of regulation, any single disciplinary approach 
will fail to adequately inform the coherence analysis.  Finally, it emphasises the 
centrality of law understood as rules, the outcome of the political decision 
process, as a given and so provides a basis for a positive analysis rather than a 
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political or (contested) economic basis. While drawing on the various ideas about 
regulation and regulatory failure, this dissertation rests primarily on Feaver and 
Durrant’s idea of regulatory coherence, examining the coherence of system, 
policy and instrument choices. 
 
The weakness of Feaver and Durrant’s approach is that it fails to take account of 
coherence between proposed regulatory arrangements and existing organisational 
and institutional arrangements—or “the context” as others such as Gunningham 
and Grabosky refer to it.  The existing order in the final analysis may be the 
undoing of any proposed regime, stymieing its implementation.  Feaver and 
Durrant’s framework is not likely to bring to light an underlying organisational 
or institutional coherence—matters addressed in Chapters 5 and 6.  Further, 
where a positive law analysis may only reveal a coherent regulatory arrangement, 
such an analysis will not reveal a lack of implementation or a merely apparent 
compliance while persisting in undesired practices as allowed by loosely coupled 
systems.94  Finally, it does not take sufficient account of the organisation and 
structure of the regulatory body.   
 
To avoid the weakness, of Feaver and Durant’s regulatory coherence the 
dissertation will attend to organisational and institutional regulatory 
arrangements as necessary, and given the strong traditions of the university, 
considerable attention to the institutional and organisational characteristics as 
mentioned will occupy chapters 5 and 6.  That is, it will take note of the 
traditions and practices within the institutions and organisations, particularly as 
the organisations are themselves both creatures of law and creators of law.  Thus 
in addition to Feaver and Durrant’s theory, it is proposed that institutions, 
organisations and resources need to be scrutinised to ensure coherence in these 
arrangements.  These aspects of coherence will be addressed in the coherence 
analysis of Chapter 7.  
 
 
                                                 
94
 Oliver, C. (1991). "Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes." Academy of Management 
Review 16(1): 145-179., cited in Leisyte, L. (2007). University Governance and Academic 
Research: Case Studies of Research Units in Dutch and English Universities. Twente, The 
Netherlands, University of Twente. PhD..  
 66 
 
 
4. Mechanics of Regulation 
 
 
This part identifies the questions that must be posed and answered in order for a 
regulatory system to be created and implemented.  Further, it surveys regulatory 
mechanisms available to develop a regulatory system.  Again, the purpose of a 
analysis of the mechanisms is to provide an understanding of the choices made in 
the regulatory framework being analysed in this dissertation and to offer a 
critique based on alternatives. The regulatory questions which must be answered 
are predicated on a number of prior determinations and decisions.  The first is the 
determination of an unsatisfactory state of affairs.  Next a determination needs to 
be made as to whether or not to address it.  To determine whether regulation is 
warranted in any given situation, and if so, the type of regulatory response 
required, political positions must be expressed about the objectives, parties and 
methods—including methods of accountability. That is, as seen above, policy 
must be developed about the issue being regulated, the delegation of power, the 
shape of the regulatory regime, the resources and the role of public and private 
sectors. These political decisions tend to attract significant amounts of attention95  
and become a confused overlay when focused on a more technical legal analysis. 
These political issues cannot be ignored in a dissertation examining regulation, or 
indeed any examination which includes consideration of the public-private 
divide.  The focus of the dissertation, however, is on the technical aspects of the 
regulation and accordingly, less attention is given to some of the normative 
political aspects of the regulatory scheme.  The dissertation now turns to examine 
those technical aspects of regulation. 
 
5.  Organising social problem, risk identification and regulatory intervention 
Although largely ignored in the regulatory literature, two critical points in any 
regulatory scheme need attention. These are the organising problem—the 
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problem addressed by regulation—and the classification of the organising 
problem as a public or private matter.  The first provides the initial reason for 
regulation and the second provides the orientation for the subsequent regulatory 
scheme and its critique. Because the development and implications of a 
regulatory scheme may be markedly different depending on classifying an 
organising problem as public or private, and because the classification of public 
and private are themselves contested, the issue of the public-private divide is 
taken up and explored in detail in Chapter 4. All regulation is an adaptive 
response to a potential opportunity or perceived problem.  That is, the first issue 
is “problematisation” or “framing”.96  Some person(s) must identify some 
phenomenon in the social or natural environment as existing and as presenting an 
opportunity or as problematic.  Thus in the first instance, humans must create the 
phenomenon for it to exist, call attention to it and propose that is amenable to 
some type of organised response—a regulatory response.  This problem is 
referred to in this dissertation as the “organising problem.”  It is a problem or 
complex of problems that have drawn attention and around which the response 
has been organised.  
 
For example, although microwaves have been part of the natural environment for 
as long as the planet has existed, they were not identified until the late 1800’s.  
Further there was neither problem nor opportunity in need of regulation 
concerning them until a few decades ago when commercially viable technology 
was created which could exploit them en masse for mobile telephone use.  This 
technology created an opportunity as well as a problem or risk.  The opportunity 
was the commercial exploitation of the bandwidth.  The risk was that unlimited 
access driven by profit motive would create chaos to the point that the bandwidth 
could not be used—a classic commons problem.  At that point the problem drew 
attention and government decided some type of organised response or regulation 
was needed to limit access to part of the bandwidth. A regulatory solution was 
developed through the creation of property in the waves and the licensing of 
access to those waves.  
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In the same way, the regulation of the university may be considered as regulatory 
response creating opportunity.  In the first instance, some group of people saw 
the need for organising knowledge and disseminating it.  Its regulation involved 
the creation of an organisation and ultimately an institution dedicated to the 
creation and dissemination of knowledge.  The regulation created opportunities 
in ways not limited to the individual interests of parties with sufficient resources 
to do so on their own. These opportunities included the creation of new 
knowledge, the maintenance of as well as new openings into social hierarchies, 
and other types of social benefits—discussed in full in the review of various 
disciplinary views of institutional mission of the university in Chapter  5.  
 
A second aspect of the opportunity-problem dyad of regulation concerns 
problems characterised as risk. 97  Risk may be defined as “the probability that a 
particular adverse event will occur during a stated period of time, or result from a 
particular challenge.”98 Risks may be voluntarily undertaken or imposed, 
individual or collective, naturally occurring or the result of social arrangements.   
 
Thus, from a risk perspective, the regulatory tasks are as follows: to identify 
those risks which can and should be regulated; to characterise them in politically 
mobilising way; to determine when and how to intervene.  That is they must 
determine whether the intervention should be before the risk arises by limiting 
the production of the risk creating activity, or mitigating the effect, or aimed at 
creating resilience? 99 The issue of risk poses an important touch point for the 
discussion of the university in this dissertation.  The risk which university 
regulation must be designed to avoid is harm to or loss of society’s premier 
institution dedicated to the creation, preservation and dissemination of 
knowledge.  
 
The issue facing would be regulators is to design a regulatory scheme appropriate 
to the opportunity, problem or risks.  It is important to recall that the various 
disciplines identify and prescribe responses to opportunities, problems and risks 
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according to their distinct literatures, methods and frameworks.  For this reason, 
again, single disciplinary approaches are unsuited to the complex institution of 
the university.  
 
6. Technical aspects of regulation: regulatory targets, regulators, tools and 
instruments 
 
After the political decision to regulate had been made, decisions need to be made 
about what is to be the target of regulation (person, organisation, acts or things-
such as services or goods), tools, instruments, regulatory 
administration/organisations, as well as where in the system or dynamic chain to 
intervene (e.g. producer, retailer, consumer), and at what point—i.e. a priori or ex 
post—taking regulatory action is most likely to achieve the desired outcome.  A 
brief review of these factors and identifying their strengths and weaknesses, 
particularly in terms of the public-private divide, will provide a foundation for 
evaluating the regulation of the university, as per Chapter 7. 
 
a. Regulatory targets: persons, organisations, acts, things or risks 
 
Decisions need to be made about what is to be regulated.  This decision parallels 
the discussion of risk above which drew attention to the need to make decisions 
about where in a causal chain to intervene.  If, for example, in the causal chain of 
narcotics it is the growing of the plant, or the refinement that is the object, 
different bodies, legal powers, resources and regulatory bodies need to be 
involved.  Alternatively, if in the causal chain the focus is on local distribution 
and use, a different set of bodies, powers, resources and regulatory bodies will be 
appropriate.  This section identifies some of the potential objects of regulation in 
the context of higher education.   
 
Regulators may decide that it is a substance such as knowledge that needs to be 
controlled in its distribution, and hence regulation will be developed to control 
distribution without impacting on production or pricing. Regulators may decide 
that production is the issue, for example, where degree mills sell degrees or other 
educators purporting to offer higher education do not in fact do so.  In other 
instances, such as potential monopolies, or where government deems broad 
distribution of a good or service a public benefit, the pricing of a good may be 
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controlled or otherwise subsidised. In  the context of the university, those 
creating regulation may decide that the production of knowledge and its  
preservation and dissemination is under produced, over produced, of inadequate 
quality or poorly distributed, and so design regulation to address these issues. 
Regulators need not focus on regulating the substance like knowledge. 
 
Regulators may also focus their attention on people or organisations.  Certain 
behaviours may not be considered in the public interest and so not be tolerated.  
For example, higher education institutions dedicated to advancing certain types 
of religious radicalism may not be permitted to operate.  Similarly, regulators 
may prohibit some types of persons from engaging in activities such as people 
without higher education credentials teaching in higher education organisations.  
Further, regulators need to decide whether individuals should be regulated only 
when acting as individuals or only in groups. In the context of the university, 
politicians may decide that its knowledge activities be best housed in a single 
body such as the university, or separated out into teaching organisations like 
TAFE and research organisations like CSIRO.  These positions will be examined 
in detail, in Chapters 5 and 6 which consider the university as organisations and 
as institutions respectively.  However, these are not the only regulatory options 
regulators have in the development of a regulatory scheme.   
 
Regulators may equally focus attention on actions or activities.  So, for example, 
a regulator may decide that knowledge acquisition is a benefit and should be 
promoted.  Or in the negative, that tertiary education is a waste of economic 
resources and so be prohibited.  Regulation to achieve these desired ends focuses 
on actions or activities rather than actors. In the context of the university, it may 
be that regulators decide the study, research and knowledge related activities are 
valuable and preferred ways to spend resources in a society and so design 
regulation to promote such.  A regulatory focus on persons, organisations, 
actions or activities does not exhaust the alternatives.  Some aspect of each could 
be included in the next category.  
 
Rather than regulating goods, actors or activities, regulators may be decide to 
regulate to avoid, manage or develop responses to risks or opportunities.  Risks 
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such as fire, consumer abuse, or workplace injury are all subject to regulation as 
risk.  This perspective shifts focus from humans actions toward ex ante 
environmental (both natural and social) considerations and shift related 
regulatory interventions toward the preventative rather than curative.  As to the 
university, regulators may decide that a society which loses essential knowledge 
is at risk of losing some important aspects of its functioning, including the ability 
to respond to unknown risks.  Accordingly they may regulate to support an 
institution dedicated to the creation, organisation, dissemination and preservation 
of knowledge to minimise the risk.  
 
These decisions about risk and opportunity regulatory focus can be taken across 
one or more of the potential targets of regulation. That is, regulators may decide 
to regulate actions and/or people and/or organisations, and risks, and intervene at 
any one or more points in the causal chains of activity.  As will be seen in later 
chapters, all of these approaches and considerations are brought into the 
consideration and critique of the regulatory framework of the Australian 
university. 
   
b. Regulators 
 
In the decisions about regulatory schemes, there are decisions about regulators 
that need to be made. The basic decisions are which tasks the regulator will be 
charged with and the organisational structure most suited to achieving those 
ends.   
i. Regulators’ Tasks: 
 
Regulators may be charged with the execution of a wide variety of tasks and be 
granted a range of governance powers to carry out those tasks. Regulators may 
be given the task of regulating a market to preserve competition and integrity, 
ensuring quality of services through standard setting, monitoring compliance, 
recommending and undertaking enforcement among other tasks. 
 
Standard setting is an increasingly preferred approach as it allows for the design 
of a responsive regulatory relationship, more nuance in evaluation of 
performance and compliance, and the use of a greater variety in incentives and 
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disincentives. Standards regulators typically can be categorised by their focus: 
design/ process specifications, performance/ output standards, and target 
standards.  Design/ process regulators focus on prevention of identified risks.  
The theory is that by limiting processes to proved processes, the risks of failure 
can be brought to an acceptable level.  The drawbacks of this type of regulator 
are: it is highly intrusive, may inhibit innovation and professionalism, requires 
the regulator to lead innovation, and the difficulties of predicting harms and 
unintended consequences.100  In the university context, such standards are likely 
to lead to uniformity in the sector, and are recognised as a cause of organisational 
isomorphism.101 
 
Performance/ output standards allow management to determine internal 
processes and measure instead the level of risk introduced into the system being 
monitored. 102 Such standards may provide incentives to organisations to 
innovate in processes to achieve outputs by various means; however, it may be 
difficult to relate outputs to broader policy objectives. In the case of the 
university, numbers of graduates and numbers of research publications do not 
indicate the education or new knowledge created.  Students can be graduated on 
a percentage basis and publications, even in prestigious journals, can be 
increased by a conservative strategy of following a journal’s formula.103  
 
A third type of standard, target standards, works by having government set a 
policy goal explicitly and allowing producers to achieve those targets among 
themselves. 104  It works well where a group of producers can monitor and divide 
responsibility among themselves—a form of self-regulation—to achieve targets 
set by government. The organisations bear the costs of figuring out how to 
achieve the targets, and how to do so most efficiently.  However, this approach 
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can only work where organisations are adequately resourced, able to cooperate, 
and have sufficient information among themselves to achieve those targets.  
 
There are a number of significant issues to standard setting. These include the 
difficulty in gathering accurate, timely and complete information including 
finding appropriately unbiased experts to provide such information,  identifying 
the costs of imposing the standard—including unintended costs such as those 
which may be incurred in preparing staff and records to provide acceptable 
evidence for audits, and calculating the net benefit from all the expense.  
 
The standard setting approach is an increasingly common approach to regulation.  
Standard setting, often, requires some form of audit to demonstrate compliance 
with the standard set.  The new institutionalists would argue that the audit 
provides legitimacy which they see as the objective of organisational activity.105  
Although increasingly common, it is also becoming increasingly problematic. As 
Michael Power has argued in The Audit Society, 106 the effects of pervasive audits 
on society are markedly negative. Among other things, the standard setting and 
audit approach to regulation forces parties to comply with an audit system to 
achieve audit targets as opposed to supporting efforts to achieve the desired 
outcome.  Thus, rather than promoting the task—i.e. the first order objective, the 
second order activity, the audit regime, imposes itself over the first order, 
changing the nature of the auditee and its activities to comply with the audit.107 
As Power describes: “Organisations must be changed to make them 
auditable.”108  What makes something auditable is breaking it down into its 
component parts, creating measures, developing an opinion on whether the 
number assigned by accountable parties is an accurate ascription of the measures 
to the part or verifying that it has been done according the accepted system. This 
vague and abstract definition is what Power refers to as “the essential obscurity 
of auditing.” 109 
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How this transformation of organisations and complex systems to become 
auditable occurs is not explained by Power.  What may explain it, however, can 
be drawn from sociology.  Ritzer, in his work, the McDonaldization  of Society, 
argues that rather than Weber’s bureaucracy, the rationalism exemplified in the 
McDonald’s restaurants can be held as a model for contemporary 
organisations.110   Ritzer’s thesis is that rationalisation of organisations within 
society are changed or “McDonaldised” along four lines. These are: efficiency, 
calculability, predictability and control.  Each of these is readily measurable and 
hence, auditable.  The end result, he argues, is that the McDonaldised system, far 
from improving rationality and working better, promotes a new irrationality.  He 
writes: "irrationality means that rational systems are unreasonable systems. By 
that I mean that they deny the basic humanity, the human reason, of the people 
who work within or are served by them." 111 Not only is it irrational to those who 
operate within McDonaldised services, but also to those who must interact with 
or received services from such systems.112  
 
Such McDonaldised services have a particular benefit from a management 
perspective.  By subjecting the service to the single norm of efficiency and 
breaking tasks down to promote calculability, predictability and control, the 
service can be managed relatively easily.  Any generically trained manager can 
manage the McDonaldised service. Relatively simple systems that do not require 
professional judgement or discretion can be put in place to capture and calculate 
the service provision, and measure and adjust accordingly. The McDonaldisation 
or de-professionalisation of management is promoted by some economists and 
business scholars who describe it as “context indifferent” management.113  It is a 
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view that good management is not dependent upon or relative to the 
organisations being managed, but on the implementation of generic prescribed 
formulae and techniques.   Certainly norms such as respect, efficacy and 
efficiency are generic, but their ordering in the different contexts such as in the 
delivery of public goods, or in the context of charitable enterprises or private for 
profit enterprise would be expected to be different.  These orderings would need 
to be implemented through the exercise of professional judgement and are 
unlikely to be readily reducible to generic formulae and techniques.  
 
This discussion leads to a second explanation of how the audit changes the 
organisation, implicit in Power’s work. Given that what is measured is what is 
valued, and what the audit does is make measurable and make visible some 
products of the organisation, it requires a shift in the normative ordering of the 
organisation. The re-ordering works to shift the audit from a measure of 
production processes or outputs to the focus of production—i.e. the production of 
auditable measures and reports becomes the organisation’s focal or main activity. 
 
Returning to Power’s audit thesis it is noted that in order to satisfy audit 
requirements, organisations are required to invest significant resources 
distracting from first order tasks to provide information and evidence for 
auditors. Power notes two additional effects of audit that result from the dynamic 
interplay of an organisation and an audit regime. These are decoupling and 
colonisation.114  These two effects lead to dysfunction in two senses: decoupling 
is a form of an organisation avoiding the destabilising and delegitimizing effects 
of audit, and so, essentially fabricating whatever myth needs to be fabricated to 
keep the audit system satisfied and away from the core activities.  The second 
dysfunction results as the audit is absorbed into the organisation and becomes a 
part of management strategy.  It undermines the trust relationships and discretion 
required to operate any large organisation.   
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Perhaps of greatest concern is Power’s argument about the ultimate consequence 
and characterisation of the audit process.  He describes audit as “the fatal 
remedy”.  He explains thus:  
“It has also been said that the rise of the performance related contracts has 
led to irrevocable damage to cultures of trust. New games are created to 
demonstrate quality and substantive performance declines… [O]ne might 
compare this imperative with that which informed the detailed output 
targets of the former Soviet Union…a situation characterized by 
pathologies of ‘creative compliance’, poor quality goods and the 
development of survival skills to show that, often impossible, targets 
were achieved. Games are played around an ‘indicator’ culture where 
auditable performance is an end in itself and real long term planning is 
impossible.”115 
In other words, the effort to control, achieve and measure by way of such 
mechanisms is ultimately damaging to the individual, organisation and institution 
to which it is being applied. 
 
Finally, the standards may be in conflict with existing institutional norms, a 
matter of systemic incoherence, or within themselves a matter of instrument 
incoherence. These audit issues are significant in the regulation of the Australian 
university and are discussed and considered in greater depth in the organisational 
and institutional analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, and in the regulatory analysis of 
Chapter 7. 
 
ii. Organisation of the regulator: Agencies, Boards, 
Commissions and Authorities 
 
There is a wide variety of options for bodies charged with implementing and 
administering regulation—regulatory bodies.  With respect to higher education, 
for example, the current government has declared its intention to create an 
agency, Tertiary Education Quality Standards Agency (TEQSA).116 The structure 
of the agency has yet to be announced, but it is not the only option as explained 
below and as demonstrate in the next chapter’s discussion of previous bodies 
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tasked with regulating universities. The options for organisation of the regulator 
range from individual government departments to Directors General, to statutory 
agencies, to courts. Some regulators are part of government run by elected 
officials, others may be specially designed organisations with on-going 
operations managing substantial resources and generating significant resources, 
while others may simply be ad hoc boards, meeting irregularly to decide issues 
on a case by case basis.  Each approach has distinct strengths and weaknesses 
from the perspectives of efficiency, democratic accountability and expert 
knowledge among other things. 117  For example, in the case of the university, as 
will be argued in Chapters 5 and 6 expert knowledge is more important than say 
either democratic accountability or efficiency. The options, however, need to be 
set out to be discussed and examined to provide a basis for critique. 
 
Ultimate regulatory authority is combined in parliament and the courts by the 
Commonwealth Constitution and the respective constitutions of the states. Both 
parliament and the courts, however, have their limitations as regulatory bodies.  
The executive lacks coherent objectives and suffers from a lack of consistency 
between committees.  Further, changes in governments lead to changes in policy 
and hence regulation.  Such changes while desirable in some instances, in others 
cause considerable upset making long term planning and certain benefits of 
stability impossible to achieve. As well, political interference in administration of 
the regulatory tasks can distort or even corrupt the regulatory objects.  Finally, 
accountability through Parliament while notionally high, can easily be lost in the 
wide range of political activities and vast arrange of matters brought to 
Parliament. 118   
 
Courts for their part have other limitations.  It has been argued that courts lack 
democratic accountability in the sense that they are not susceptible to public, 
political censure for their decisions.119  Further courts are charged with upholding 
a different agenda than government. This agenda may be in conflict with the 
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agenda of the elected officials.120 Further, they create policy only sporadically 
and in a piecemeal fashion making it difficult to organise around its instructions.  
Finally, they lack expertise in certain areas which may require specialised 
decision making. 121  
 
These limitations have led to the development of some other alternatives set out 
above.  In the UK the Hammonds suggest that the start of this process of 
alternative regulatory bodies was a development stemming from the factories 
inspection system established in the mid-nineteenth century.122  In that system 
civil servants were selected on what was then novel criteria: non-class based 
technical criteria and charged with the duty to inspect factories and report their 
findings to Parliament. An inspectorate was created in order to carry out the 
inspections and was given independence from political interference.  While 
certainly not the first regulatory body, it was among the first independent 
regulators charged with a regulatory task, resourced by government, operating 
independently on technical grounds and reporting back to Parliament.  
 
In the context of the Australian university, as will be seen in the next chapter, a 
variety of regulatory bodies have been created, operated and dissolved. The 
current position is that they are regulated by a combination of Commonwealth 
government departments and a loosely formed council of state ministers.  As 
noted, this arrangement is to be replaced or at least modified by the proposed 
agency TEQSA. 
c. Tools  
 
Further decisions about a regulatory scheme need to be made as it is evident that 
resources among other things must be marshalled in order for regulation to be 
created and implemented effectively.  Bureaucrats charged with developing a 
regulatory scheme will need to consider what resources or tools they have at their 
disposal.  Christopher Hood, who has done pioneering work in this area, 
identifies what he describes as the tools of government: “authority”, “treasure”, 
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“nodality” and “organisation.”123    Authority is the sovereign’s power to declare 
a rule and command people and organisations to follow it. This type of tool is 
associated with command and control forms of regulation.  Authority ultimately 
relies on power the exercise of which may cost or benefit a government 
politically.  This approach to regulation is the application of the political science 
description of effective regulation as being regulation with legitimacy.  In the 
context of higher education, command and control must be exercised with care 
because of the institutions of independence associated with the university and in 
particular, of the academic profession. More importantly in a legal dissertation, 
legitimacy means that a government must only command in those areas in which 
it has constitutional authority to do so. This issue of jurisdiction is a significant 
issue in the division of power between Federal and state governments with 
respect to Australian higher education.  While the states have constitutional right 
to legislate for education they lack the resources, and the commonwealth is 
restricted to the duty of funding students.  This division of powers is identified in 
Chapter 3 and analysed in Chapter 7. 
 
Treasure is the government’s wealth which may be used to achieve desired 
outcomes.  That is, by using incentives or spending its resources as per its 
legislation, government can regulate society.  This approach, which is discussed 
below as soft law regulation, can be implemented by way of payments or 
taxation. It is seen in the Australian system for among other reasons, the reason 
just identified—the division of legislative competence and economic power 
between the commonwealth and state governments.  
 
In other instances, Hood observes, government may wish to be a central point for 
parties organising in a society.  It may have information and facility to allow 
people to create networks through its operations. Regulation using this tool is 
usually some form of self-regulation or used to facilitate regulation by 
information.  This tool or facility is referred to by Hood as “nodality.”  In the 
higher education system of Australia, the government has attempted to create 
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regulatory bodies which among other things have functioned as nodes for 
information flows.  
 
Finally, Hood identifies “organisation” as a tool by which he means government 
using its own resources to create or provide a specific good or service.  This type 
of regulation was particularly common in the era of the welfare state when the 
government was involved in the provision of a variety of goods and services for 
citizens including in the Australian university context, not only the universities 
themselves, but payment in full of all the associated costs and expenses allowing 
students a university education free of tuition.  
 
The university over the centuries has been both a centre and subject of 
governments’ tools. Which tools a government wishes to use in the development 
of a regulatory scheme must be made clear and the implications thought through.  
For example, a government which chooses to regulate the university by authority 
while more likely to receive the demanded outcomes, may find that in doing so it 
has stifled the creative functions of the university. Treasure alone is unlikely to 
achieve all a government’s objectives, although by funding expansion it might 
allow the university to absorb more unemployed youth.  The use of nodality and 
organisation too are important in the regulation of the university.  Crucially, 
which tools a government uses to regulate the university will depend to a 
considerable degree where it places the university on the public-private divide.  
There is little reason to expend limited public resources on a university dedicated 
to the provision of private goods—and vice versa. The coherence of tools with 
objectives, as will be demonstrated in the coherence analysis of Chapter 7, is 
critical to effective regulation. 
 
d. Techniques  
 
As noted, more recent thinking in regulation has led to an expanded conception 
of regulation beyond the traditional Austinian command-and-control model of 
sovereign and subject.  This section reviews these developments with some 
consideration about their suitability for different parts of social and economic 
organisation, including the public-private divide and higher education 
specifically. Four techniques and one strategy of regulation are identified as 
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potential techniques for pursuing policy objectives.  These are after command 
and control,  regulation for competition (including tradable permits), regulation 
by information, soft law-experimentalist,124 consensus and code design.125 
 
i. Command and control  
 
This basic conception of regulation posits a single source of omnicompetent 
authority and a subordinate wholly under the control of the authority.  It is a 
simple model, operating on the single motivation of fear: fear of detection and 
fear of penalty. As discussed above in the consideration of tools of government, 
command and control has a variety of problems particularly in the area of higher 
education. Further, even if it were free of those problems, the problems of 
compliance, enforcement and political costs associated with command and 
control, not to mention the issue of stifling creativity in the case of the university 
as mentioned above, lead governments to opt for other means to achieve 
regulatory objectives.  
 
ii. Competition 
 
In addition to command and control techniques, regulation for purposes of 
creating competition is simply creating a market.  Markets work for goods and 
services that are readily commodifiable, where efficiency is the primary norm 
and distributions can safely be ignored.126 From government’s perspective they 
are particularly well suited to areas where the details of regulatory coordination 
would overwhelm a command and control approach.127  Markets may reduce the 
government’s regulatory burden by allowing government to set broad targets and 
allowing the individuals and organisation to respond as they see fit.  This 
approach allows the government to avoid having to create detailed rules seeking 
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to cover all the eventualities and avoid at least some of the unintended 
consequences of regulation.   
 
Markets are believed to have the intrinsic virtues of efficiency and innovation—a 
contestable assumption.128 These virtues are believed to result from creative 
strategic management seeking ways to survive and grow in a competitive 
environment.  This regulation by market is the opposite of a state created and 
maintained monopoly both producing and distributing goods.  It assumes the 
state no longer directs the producers with detailed rules leaving them to innovate 
as they see fit.  In order to harness these purported market virtues for 
government, regulators have created “quasi-markets”—market suited to 
governmental organisations.129 This form of regulation is developed by the 
creation of new property rights, or such competitive practices as competitive 
tendering, in the form of a monopsony—purchasing from a single buyer, 
government.  
 
There are tools which allow refinement in the use of markets for regulation.  
These include creating licensing regimes to delimit boundaries (providing the 
opportunity to unbundle services), set entry requirements, protecting customers 
among other things. It may operate within a sector with an independent agency 
administering the regulation (USA preference), or as a department within a 
ministry (UK preference).130  There are a range of competitive alternatives, with 
varying levels of discretion, engagement, coordination and strategy allocated to 
state, intermediaries and organisations. The key economic concerns of capture, 
politicisation and judicialisation may guide among the preferences to be 
expressed in the ultimate design.  
 
The regulation of the university in Australia has attempted to take advantage of 
some of these refinements setting the limits for use of the term “university” and a 
minimal standard for classification as a “higher education provider.” Further, it 
                                                 
128
 On the lack of evidence of efficiency in government, see  Morgan, B. and K. Yeung (2007). 
An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials, Cambridge University Press. p. 140. 
129
 Breyer, S. (1983). Regulation and its Reform. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. in 
Morgan, B. and K. Yeung (2007). An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials, 
Cambridge University Press p. 88-91. 
130
 Breyer, S. (1983). Regulation and its Reform. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 
 83 
has developed various agencies as sector wide regulatory agencies.  In the 
Australian context, the Bradley Review has proposed a voucher system—
discussed in Chapter 7 as part of the analysis of the regulatory framework.131 
Markets have particular limitations in the higher education context.  The value of 
education is not readily discoverable ex ante, nor is the quality and nor are the 
costs or the benefits.  In fact, it is argued that it is impossible to capture either the 
full benefit of the production of higher education—a classical type of market 
failure—of achieve desirable distributions of higher education by markets—a 
reason for the non-profit organisational preferences of the university—discussed 
in Chapters 5 and 6.  Accordingly, if it is to be used, this approach should be 
used with caution in the higher education system.  
 
1. Tradeable Permits and Vouchers 
 
Although some see tradeable permits as distinct from markets,132 it may be better 
to consider them in the same category as cap and trade systems, vouchers and 
coupons—all as sub-species of regulation by competition. Trade permits and 
cap-and-trade systems while usually conceived as means of regulation pollution 
can be conceived of more broadly as a means to regulate production of the good 
or nuisance by way of price signals.  Permits and vouchers are property created 
to be traded or encashed in a type of market created for the particular voucher or 
permit in question.  Where these instruments are tradeable for services, they are 
supposed to give direction to producers of the demand for particular products, as 
well as create the virtue enhancing competition. 
 
Vouchers have long been applied to university systems.133  Voucher systems are 
designed to give power to consumers to cause producers to produce in accord 
with the preferences of the voucher holder.  In both tradable permits and 
vouchers systems, the government has only minimal policy input—setting the 
desirable level of pollution or the number of students graduating.  It is makes no 
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decisions in the university context about where higher education services should 
be provided whether regionally or in major centres, no decisions about what 
skills and education its citizens will require.  Government takes a back seat to the 
decisions made by students.  So, although vouchers are not tradeable, by being 
allocated to interested parties, they work to control producers by a type of market 
mechanism.  As noted, these theories of markets, higher education and the 
university will be explored in Chapter 7 as well as in chapter 6 addressing the 
university organisation. 
iii. Regulation by Information 
 
A third regulatory option is referred to a regulation by information.  This option 
seeks to correct information asymmetries between citizens/consumers and 
governments/producers.  Information asymmetries are both pre-existing in the 
community and intentionally created by marketing efforts.  The regulatory 
mechanism works by requiring the provision of information, often through some 
form of mandatory prescribed disclosure, allowing citizens to make informed 
decisions to achieve a variety of ends, including private, public, economic and 
social ends.  For example, where information is provided about the effects of 
greenhouse emissions citizens are able to make informed choices about the 
whole range of interests from collective public social choices leading to lobbying 
politicians to increase spending on public transport to private economic decisions 
to purchase appliances which have lower greenhouse emissions.  This regulatory 
option may be based on rankings, certifications and labelling, or such things as 
disclosure (voluntary or involuntary).134  It regulates activity exogenously, 
“ceding sanctioning to other actors.”  Of course this regulatory option has its 
risks and drawbacks, which Yueng identifies in her aptly article title: 
“Government by publicity management: sunlight or spin?”135   
 
While at first, the idea of regulation by information seems to be a weak 
alternative to command and control, its efficacy in generating momentum to 
comply with public approval is marked.  In addition to the aforementioned 
example of the power of information for regulation of greenhouse gas, the 
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efficacy of this approach in regulating university organisations has already been 
demonstrated.  In the university context public ranking systems disclosing certain 
information about university organisations have become a fierce regulator of 
university organisations’ behaviour.136   
 
In fact, under the New Public Management (NPM) program, government has 
taken regulation by information to a new level allowing it to transform its 
governance.  Michael Power in his work, The Audit Society, writes: “The 
‘hollowing out of the state’ by the NPM generates a demand for audit and other 
forms of evaluation and inspection to fill the hole.”137 He describes audit as a 
form of internalising external standards138 and externalising internal processes.139  
NPM allows government to create the standards with which it wishes to inform 
the electorate. Bodies, in exchange for receipt of any privilege from licensing and 
permits to receipt of funding, in return must provide disclosure of the 
information demanded by government regardless of the type, quality and 
quantity, but particularly at intervals the government prefers.   
 
There are a number of important issues in designing and utilising this form of 
regulation.  A serious drawback of this approach is that the creation of auditable 
measures around which recipients must re-organise their organisational 
structures, processes and outputs has the potential to fundamentally alter and 
even distort the ability of the organisation to accomplish its intended ends.140 
Power cautions that “the imposition of audit and related measures of auditable 
performance leads to the opposite of what was intended, i.e. creates forms of 
dysfunction for the audited service.”141 Further, information must be relevant. 
One may ask, for example, do the measures provide a measure of anything 
actually relevant? Again, Power explains that the first issue for NPM is to create 
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auditable measures: “auditing must never be allowed to be impossible”142—i.e. 
the matter must be readily reducible to numbers.  Next presuming there is 
relevant information, the matter of getting the correct, complete and timely 
information arises.  This second set of issues is no small matter for the university 
or any large organisation for that matter.   Another and perhaps even more 
worrisome issue is ensuring people understand the information.  Not only can it 
be quite complex and inaccessible to non-specialists, the basic problem of 
bounded rationality and costs associated with gathering, sorting, analysing and 
assimilating relevant information, particularly where costs of poor choices are 
high, militate against regulation by information.143  Further, where the 
information is to include some type of standard setting, developing the 
appropriate standard, monitoring and enforcing compliance can be both very 
costly and very difficult.  Finally, it is a matter of concern that people often do 
not use the information in the desired way. Research on how potential students 
choose which university to attend is seldom based on the relevant information.144 
Again, as part of market design and the Bradley Review, information in the 
context of higher education and the university are taken up in the Chapter 7, 
analysis. 
 
iv. Soft-Law, Consensus Based and Experimentalist 
 
The soft-law, consensus based and experimentalist regulatory options are 
regulatory mechanisms generated or at least influenced by the participants 
themselves.  In contrast to command and control, markets and information based 
techniques—all of which may be imposed externally—in these techniques the 
regulated parties participate in the development of the technique’s rules. These 
techniques are referred to as soft law because they rely in part on the wiling 
participation of the regulated parties.  Instead of being only the object of formal 
state coercion, soft law social dynamics guide and regulate. In some instances 
they may be accompanied by the state in Ayers and Braithwaite’s responsive 
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regulation model with a “benign big gun” at the top of a hierarchy.145  Rules 
created are sensitive to the local environment as they are developed by parties in 
that particular context although they may take account of other standards and 
rules to the degree appropriate.  Soft law approaches are also favoured as they are 
more likely to take account of the expertise within the sector, have lower 
monitoring and enforcement costs and be more easily amended.146   
 
Of course, self-regulation has limitations and risks.  These include soft 
enforcement, usurpation and combination of all three governmental powers: 
legislative, executive and judicial and putting them into control of a small body 
of regulators creating an opportunity for super-rents.147  While to some extent 
these risks can be overcome by injecting government regulation into the self-
regulatory system at specific points or levels, certainly it cannot wholly eliminate 
them.  Two soft-law techniques have significant history in the case of the 
university, both as an institution and as an organisation.  These regulatory 
techniques are outlined with some indication of how they will be used in the 
coherence analysis of Chapter 7. 
1. Consensus Based 
 
The techniques which fall into this category include a variety of self-regulation, 
co-regulation and partnering alternatives.148  Generally, they occur where 
industry participants recognising an external threat such as impending regulation, 
or some such other threat, or an opportunity to create value by regulation and so 
work cooperatively to achieve mutually agreed upon ends by way of regulation.  
Often a peak body is organised, broad consensus based principles developed, and 
an option to join is provided to sector participants who see the benefit of joining.  
Benefits may include increased prestige, increased notoriety by membership, 
discounted goods and services, access to certain privileges such as access to 
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regulators or other similar incentives. The regulation may any form from 
enforceable standards, to mere ascription to an aspirational code.  Although as 
described, the technique is self-generated, it may be developed in concert with 
government and include some form of government participation via a public 
interest group in their on-going enforcement and review, forming a type of co-
regulation, as in the “responsive regulation” model149 or be wholly sector based, 
informed, enforced and reviewed.   
 
In the context of the university, such bodies as Universities Australia, formerly 
the Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee, and the Group of 8, may be viewed 
as consensus based regulatory bodies.  They provide principals by which the 
members agree to conduct themselves and offer benefits such as prestige and 
privileges of access to government. 
2. Experimentalist  
 
The experimentalist approach is a combination of regulation by information and 
self-regulation.  This approach allows a sector to attempt to achieve goals 
cooperatively, by identifying approaches, strategies and tactics that work and that 
fail.  It requires open sharing of information, to avoid the costs of each 
organisation trying and failing, and it permits rolling standards as things 
improve. It requires generation of data, sharing of information and metrics. 150  
This model has met with success both in Australia and abroad.151  Interestingly, it 
is the model of academic conferences. At successful conferences, academics 
create networks of people engaged in similar projects and share information 
about outcomes on an on-going basis and so the regulation of academic work, 
ideas and efforts occurs as members of the profession limit their work and shape 
it to the confines of the discipline as understood by the profession.  
 
7. Accountability: Law, Markets, Social Norms and Bureaucratic  
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Accountability is a core feature of regulation and a significant concern of 
governance. In broad terms accountability has two dimensions: accountability 
has a relational dimension. As matter of logic, a party that has responsibility for a 
system may be accountable to another party for the working of that system. 152 
Second, it has a time dimension: it is backwards looking for purposes of 
evaluation and potentially reward and punishment, but also has as a primary 
purpose of future guidance by allowing for reform or redirection.  In this way, 
accountability can be thought of as an institutionalisation of the lessons of trial 
and error.  
 
The notion of accountability stands in contrast to the notion of autonomy.  
Autonomous organisations are free of accountability requirements—at least free 
of formal, non-voluntary requirements. They are not subject to accountability 
imposed by or to external parties. Autonomy is a tradition of the institution of the 
university, as will be seen in the institutional discussion of Chapter 5, although 
that need not mean that it was free from external control.   
 
More particularly, the meaning of the term “accountability” is contested.  It has 
“explanatory, remedial, supervisory, and sacrificial,” connotations, 153 that is 
responsibility for reporting, empowering for making changes, providing 
oversight, or suffering in consequence for undesired consequence.  As well 
accountability may be understood as a process, a state of affairs, or a product. 154  
Finally, it may engage personal, communal, and political dimensions of morality 
and call upon professional ethics.155 In evaluating accountability structures and 
processes as part of a regulatory regime, as will be done in this dissertation, one 
must be clear on the nature and purposes of the accountability. 
 
Accountability in the public sector, is conceptualised differently.  As Dowdle 
observes it is viewed by economic development agencies as rationalized and 
transparent “systems of bureaucratic control”, by legal development agencies in 
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terms of “judicial enforcement of legal norms,” by human rights activists as 
broad based “participation in and supervision of political decision making” 
processes, by regulatory reformers as the creation of “market like competition 
and disciplines.”156 A variety of accountability mechanisms are available.  Stone 
identifies five.  These are: 1) accountability as parliamentary control, 2) 
managerialism, 3) judicial/quasi-judicial review—i.e. law, 4) constituency 
relations, and 5) markets.157 In other words, accountability has a very broad 
range of meanings and dimensions across a variety of public, private, personal 
and community institutions.  
 
A different perspective on accountability comes from the work of the Dutch 
scholar Mark Bovens.158  Bovens’ identifies passive and active dimensions of 
accountability.  The former is accountability in the sense of providing an answer, 
particularly post facto.159  Passive accountability may be individual, 
organisational, hierarchical, or collective.  The other accountability, active 
accountability, he discusses only in individual terms which he describes as 
“responsibility as a virtue” and a notion of “organisational citizenship.” 160   He 
observes that in a bureaucratic organisation, different types of active 
responsibility posit loyalty or responsibility to different norms.  These loyalties 
and norms he identifies as follows: hierarchical responsibility is to superiors on 
the norm of following orders; personal responsibility is to one’s conscience on 
the norm of one’s personal ethics; social responsibility to one’s peers on the basis 
of social norms; professional responsibility is to a profession on the basis of 
professional ethics; and civic responsibility as to citizens on the basis of civic 
norms.161  
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Each of these approaches has particular strengths and shortcomings.  In terms of 
the professional he notes that “appeal to professional norms may also promote 
the effectiveness of the organisation’s conduct. Their proximity to the actual 
outputs of policy making and their technical expertise enable professionals, more 
so than general managers… to spot instances of corporate… deviance.”162  The 
weakness of professional norms, however, is that as Bovens cautions, professions 
also seek to protect their members, tend to have loyalties external to the 
organisation and are not readily open to public scrutiny or democratic debate.163  
 
The basic issues in evaluating an accountability regime are: 1) who is 
accountable, 2) to whom, 3) for what activities, 4) using which standard, 5) by 
what processes, and 6) to what effect or outcomes.164  These critical questions 
help orient the accountability regime Stone’s five can be reduced to four 
potential accountability structures which may be used in developing a regulatory 
scheme. These are the three systems of law, social norms and bureaucratic 
accountability and the one mechanism of markets. The legal system encompasses 
the creation of a regulatory scheme which is likely to include some type of 
accountability to Parliament by way of reporting, and possibly, some form of 
administrative review provided through access to the administrative appeals 
systems.  Social norms provide accountability by way of membership in a 
particular social context or club.  Accountability through social norms operates 
as members are required as a condition of participation in that particular society 
or segment of society to comply with its norms or face risk of exclusion.  
Whether members report on themselves, are monitored by others or submit other 
information deemed relevant, accountability comes about as others are able to 
scrutinise and evaluate the behaviour of the member.  Bureaucratic accountability 
occurs in organisations, both public and private.  In such systems, accountability 
is mandated along hierarchical lines with subordinates accounting for the use of 
the organisation’s resources and the use of their time. Markets do not provide 
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accountability per se; rather, participation in a market limits the amount of goods 
or services provided in excess of demand.  The nature, strengths and weaknesses 
of each accountability system is turned to next in order to develop a framework 
to critique the accountability system used for the university. 
 
a. Accountability via Law  
The basic accountability structure in a public regulatory scheme is through law.  
Legal accountability in the regulatory context has three dimensions. These are 
accountabilities of the regulated parties, the regulatory organisation, and the 
legislators creating the regulatory scheme. Legal accountability may operate via 
courts or parliament or through some other integrity agency.  The rules forming a 
regulatory regime usually include among other things rules establishing 
mechanisms for monitoring, evaluating and enforcing compliance of the 
regulated, reporting obligations of the regulators and some provisions for 
administrative or judicial review. Legal accountability is manifested in the 
ultimate accountability structures of government created by the Constitution—
Parliament and the administrative bureaucracy. These are taken up in the next 
discussion of accountability in the Westminster system and bureaucratic 
hierarchies. The mechanisms employed in legal accountability may include 
inspectors, complaints system. Legal accountability operates on the basis of legal 
authority and is primarily backward looking and punitive. 
 
Accountability via law has both strengths and weaknesses.  Its strengths are its 
objectivity, broad acceptance and long history.  These all add to its institutional 
authority, predictability and universality.  The weaknesses of legal accountability 
where conceived of as common law include the delay, cost and complexity of the 
legal process, the limited issues that can be addressed, including the limited 
rights of citizens to bring an action against government—although these issues 
are addressed at least to some degree by administrative tribunals. Further, legal 
accountability gives little direction for the future—at least beyond the precedent 
of a specific case.  Forward looking legal accountability leading to reform is the 
province of the legislature.  Finally, where legal accountability is by way of 
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mandated reporting and audit, it operates as a form of regulation by information, 
as noted above. 
 
i. Westminster Accountability  
The Australian government’s accountability follows to a large extent the 
traditional Westminster model.  In that model, government ministers are 
responsible to Parliament for the activities undertaken by their departments and 
the agencies of which they have oversight.165  This accountability is a type of 
bureaucratic accountability.  
 
Max Weber identified bureaucratic accountability as the opposite of the pre-
modern accountability which was based on social accountability obligations such 
as kin, religion and locale. Weber saw bureaucracy as the appropriate response to 
organisational problems resulting from the revolutionary overthrow of the 
established socio-political order and the industrial revolution—Hobsbawm’s dual 
revolution.166 For Weber, an alienated, rational, meritocratic bureaucratic 
organization was the solution.167 Weberian hierarchical bureaucracy operated on 
the basis of authority with those at the top providing orders to those lower down. 
Accountability in the hierarchy then was responsibility to answer to those higher 
up in the hierarchy. In the government context, as seen, accountability is between 
lower agencies to higher ministers. In the university context, Weberian 
accountability occurs within the organisation through the management 
structure—an issue of internal governance somewhat tangential to the external 
regulatory focus of this dissertation—and the bureaucracy of government 
administering the regulatory regime enacted in the legislation discussed as NPM.  
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This simple account of public accountability is outdated—described by Sir 
Anthony Mason as “a gross overstatement”168 and indeed, it is unclear whether in 
fact it ever truly operated even in the UK.169 As  Lord Greene MR noted: “the 
functions which are given to ministers (and constitutionally properly given to 
ministers because they are constitutionally responsible) are functions so 
multifarious that no minister could ever personally attend to them.”170 
 
The overwhelming of the Westminster model in Australia led to an ‘open 
government’ agenda under then Treasurer, Coombs. As a result of the reports of 
Sir John Kerr (1971) and Sir Henry Bland (1973) which led to the enactments of  
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), Ombudsman Act 
1976 (Cth), and Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)171  public 
accountability in Australia improved significantly. This suite of legislation was 
later complemented by a second series of legislation governing the public service 
including the Public Services Act 1999 and the Financial Management and 
Accountability Act 1999. This complement of accountability agencies, officers 
and institutions form the core of current accountability structure in Australia.172 
The functioning of this accountability model will be seen in the main cases 
dealing with the university, discussed in Chapters 3, 5 and 7 some of which were 
brought before tribunals before being appealed through the courts. 
 
Although this public accountability may open up public bodies to scrutiny of the 
courts, it does not address the other dimension of public accountability—the 
broader issue of political accountability for social institutions. That 
accountability is presumed to occur through the political election process. 
However, this presumption is questionable for voters may cast their votes for a 
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variety of reasons and often not on a single issue such as a government’s policy 
on the university. As seen, the Westminster system is not viable as complete 
accountability system. This situation does not, however, mean government is 
unaccountable nor as the next section demonstrates that government bodies are 
unaccountable.  
 
ii. NPM Accountability and Audit 
The failings of the Westminster system resulting from the increased size of the 
administrative state and correlated problems of accountability, combined with the 
failure of Keynesian economics to address the economic problems of the 1970’s, 
provided critics of the welfare state with a strong case for reform. Government 
no longer had the resources to support a broad array of public goods and the 
consensus on the government’s role was shattered.   
 
A new theoretical framework was developed on the basis of a research program 
conducted by economists in the USA.  Essentially, the tools of the neoclassical 
economists were applied to the public sector creating the public choice school of 
government which came to dominance in the USA with echoes elsewhere.  
According to the view espoused by public choice theorists, politicians have no 
activity but maximizing their private individual benefits and the only regard they 
have toward public is opportunistic, allowing them to gain well out of proportion 
with the benefit they provide.173  This critical lens coalesced with right wing 
ideologies and resurrected the “less government is good government” slogans of 
by-gone eras.174   
 
Studies of government organizations exposed waste, corruption and redundancy, 
and perverse incentives, all of which led to the creation of fiefdoms and inflated 
budgets instead of increased quality and quantity of public services.  One 
obvious next step was to look for alternative means of controlling government 
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agencies and their managers, making them more efficient and responsive, i.e. 
“accountable”, a task answered by managerialism, audit and implemented via 
NPM175—matters discussed above in reference to Power’s Audit Society.  The 
new institutionalist approach provides an alternative to this rationalist 
explanation. Institutionalists observe that public organisations are chaotic which 
may lead to legitimacy problems.176 The new institutionalist focus on legitimacy 
leads may support an argument that auditable reporting model as copied from the 
private sector (distinct from the long-standing role of Auditor-General and 
similar public auditors) is a strategy of NPM to enhance the legitimacy of public 
organisations. 
 
The sharp focus of NPM can be seen in its seven main principles: 1) management 
of organizations by people trained in management “professional managers” as 
opposed to people trained in civil service, 2) clear measurable objectives often 
developed as Key Performance Indicators, 3) an emphasis on output measures, 4) 
disaggregation of civil service into discrete semi-autonomous units, 5) creation 
of competition in the public sector via tendering and contracts, 6) private sector 
management practices, and 7) raising the value of efficiency over other values 
such as effectiveness, equity or other non-economic values.177 Examining these 
seven principles, one notes a marked shift in the conceptualisation of public 
service and as a result, of accountability.  Rather than the civil service being a 
corps designed to service the needs of the public, it becomes a disaggregated 
service focused by a business manager on a auditable economic measures which 
narrowly define a segment of ministerial concern and focus.178 Its sharp focus on 
economy, closely aligned financial incentives and measurable objectives, 
attention to other matters such as fairness, equity, and effectiveness, which are 
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more difficult to measure, are subordinated or lost altogether.179 Accountability is 
narrowed to objects and outputs readily measured and audited.180   
 
These narrowed concerns result from the private sector’s audit approach to 
accountability.181 In the private sector accountability is viewed as a matter of 
compliance by way of reporting on some created performance measure or control 
system rather than a more broadly construed responsibility for providing the 
good or service itself. 182  This form of accountability displaces the personal 
sense of accountability that is an important component of certain activities, as 
argued by Bovens, particularly those services associated with the professions.  
The result of a compliance and reporting approach is that the focus shifts to 
technically conceived measures avoiding a more penetrating analysis and reform 
of processes and structures in institutions and organizations.183  Thus, while this 
agenda provides intimate accountability for certain nominated activities within 
organisations, it fails to provide important information about large systemic and 
institutional issues, such as the well-being of the university as an institution—the 
focus of this research. 
 
As noted, one important idea under the NPM initiative was to provide 
accountability for public funds, later dubbed “Value for Money.” 184  That is, 
NPM was to ensure that money provided for a particular objective would be 
spent with “economy, efficiency, and effectively.”185 This approach of 
monetising and attempting to make measurable matters which may not be 
measureable at all called for the migration of the private audit practice into the 
public sphere.186 
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While the idea of Value for Money is an eminently rational objective on its face, 
it confronts a fundamental and intractable problem.  As Nobel laureate in 
economics Herbert Simon has shown, measurement of public objectives is an 
impossibly difficult task because of bounded rationality.  Essentially, Simon 
argued that quantitative performance measures tended to be inappropriate as 
public services had hard to define objectives. This situation exists because the 
services usually have multiple purposes and furthermore, even if it were possible 
to provide precise identification of the purposes, measurement requires difficult 
value judgments i.e. political judgments in order to weigh the respective value of 
these purposes.  Finally, Simon observed that varying results could not be 
causally linked to such factors as competence, effort, or the varying local 
conditions in which the agencies found themselves.187    
 
Further research on the measurement problem has demonstrated that efforts to 
provide simple or simplified agendas and incentivise such objectives must 
navigate a hazardous route.  As Rothstein writes: “Simon and Campbell defined 
two shoals on which public accountability policy has foundered: that public goals 
are too complex to reduce to simple quantifiable measures; and attempts to do so 
corrupt public service.”188  In other words, this form of quantitative 
accountability is destined to fail because it cannot be designed to measure and 
evaluate what needs to be measured and evaluated.   Accordingly, purporting to 
achieve accountability by some such design is either misguided or misleading. 
The discussion leads to the issue of standards for accountability to which the 
dissertation turns next. 
 
iii. NPM and Accountability Standards 
The discussion of measures and measurements is intimately related to the matter 
of standards. The standard chosen gives an orientation for a regulatory regime 
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and provides a benchmark for the reward or censure function of in a regulatory 
regime. Such standards focus the attention of the regulator or regulatee on the 
measure it will have to meet and allows it to monitor and adjust its activities. 
Standards may be orientated toward inputs, outputs, quality, quantity, substance, 
and process.  
 
In the context of the university, the standards to be used must reflect among other 
things the objectives of the university—be they private economic, private social, 
public economic or public social, or some admixture of them all. Among the 
standards that could be applied to the university are: economic, as in output 
measures of the generation of revenues, production of degrees (i.e. number of 
students graduating), or commercialisable research or patents, or process 
measures such as efficiency in use of resources or input measures against outputs 
as in “return on investment”. The standards, however, could also be social such 
as inclusion of marginalised peoples, or breadth of distribution of degrees in 
terms of population or disciplines. Finally, they could also include social inputs 
such as the quality of members of the academic profession, the quantity and 
quality of the students admitted, resources per student, teaching and research 
funding and levels of support both professional and physical for the teaching and 
research projects undertaken.  These standards tend to be ex ante measures often 
seeking to ensure some form of “quality.”   
 
Output standards would focus on the delivery of teaching, research and 
community service.189 Such teaching standards are expressed numerically as in 
raw numbers of graduates and encompass everything from the more pedestrian 
standards of “fit for purpose” and an objective measure of mastery of a body of 
knowledge, to the aspirational standard of transformation through acquisition of 
intellectual skills and personal development.  Output may also be measured in 
terms of the quality and achievements of graduates—whether in employment or 
otherwise. Standards can also be knowledge based such as the breadth of 
program offerings and curriculum, or creation of public, private, utilitarian or 
basic knowledge.  Output standards are more quantitatively focused and provide 
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a basis for censure and reward.  Thus, standards may be developed for university 
as for other organisations, measuring inputs, processes and outputs. As is evident 
from the range of standards available, the choice of standards is not only a 
complex issue190  but also an important normative and political decision. Given 
the power of audited standards to shape organisations, they need to be chosen 
with care.191 Regulators need to make careful decisions about them being clear 
about what can and cannot be measured.   
 
b. Accountability via Social Norms 
Accountability may also work on the basis of social norms.  For example, 
organizations such as the professions contribute to accountability as individual 
members are judged by group norms, via some form of collective or peer 
appraisal, leading to either approval or removal from the social network.  Social 
norms are also at work with respect to accountability in institutional settings.   
 
The university institution among other things operates on local, regional and 
global contexts setting acceptable norms for the behaviour university 
organisations and its academic members.  These norms, for example, will extend 
only to those organisations which require substantial critical study of an area of 
knowledge and so excludes “degree mills” and organisations whose mission is 
indoctrination.  Further, the university institution as a professional organization 
of the academic profession capitalises on the academic profession’s mutual 
recognition of peers, as is evident in the successful completion of examinations 
which allows individual applicants either to “admission to the degree” or where 
unsuccessful, to rejection. The standard was set by the academic profession, who 
likewise had been subjected to an examination by a collective of graduates, who 
in turn either approved admission to the academic guild or rejected the supplicant 
student.  The leader of a university organisation, traditionally at least, was 
accountable to the other members of the community.  Leaders were accountable 
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for upholding academic values—that is, some demonstration of scholarship or 
mastery of knowledge was required.  Thus the university was an institution based 
on accountability by social norms.   
Social accountability allows for both punishment and reward.  Punishment 
results in the loss of social status and may even lead to expulsion from the social 
group. Reward is the increased social status that results from compliance with 
group norms.  The on-going engagement with the group and the important social 
resources that are derived from group membership make this form of 
accountability a powerful source of pressure.  
 
This review of accountability mechanisms provides insight into their respective 
characteristics, strengths and weaknesses.  The legal and political models provide 
the highest levels of public scrutiny and attention. They suffer from the 
limitations of narrow focus, high levels of abstraction in Parliamentary reports 
and distortion by NPM audit demands. Market mechanisms do little more than 
provide incentives for producing to demand. They do not address quality issues 
in services or matters of distributions.  Social mechanisms may work well in 
professional contexts; however, they are difficult to measure, manipulate and 
censure.  
c. Accountability via Markets  
A fourth accountability mechanism results from the operation of markets.  It 
should be noted that it may be inappropriate to refer to markets as providing 
accountability.   As noted, they do little more than limit the production of goods 
and services which are not readily produced at a desirable level of profitability.  
Such being the case, the discussion of markets providing accountability must be 
a limited discussion. Production, distribution and pricing via a market will cause 
producers to produce items which satisfy consumer wants and provide producer 
profits.  Markets do not arise in a total vacuum.  Regulation (formal or informal) 
creating the market links parties to the market limiting and stimulating 
production and consumption, and so no further accountability for production and 
consumption is necessary.   
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Accountability via markets, as indicated, is a limited proposition.  Accountability 
in the product market is from producers, to consumers, for quantities and 
qualities that are immediately discoverable on inspection, at the standard of 
individual preference. Problematically for the university, the notion of 
accountability in the market is limited in important respects.  For example, 
quality of services is difficult to measure ex ante—a situation which favours 
producers over consumers in markets.  Thus low quality education may be 
marketed effectively but students will not be aware of quality problems until they 
have made an irreversible investment of time and money in a particular 
university. Another issue for regulation of the university institution is 
accountability for how a market distributes education. Markets provide no 
accountability for distribution except on the basis of economics. They fail to 
address public goods issues associated with distributions, needs, or other equity 
issues.   
 
Market accountability has both punitive and reward consequences. That is, where 
organisations ignore their markets they suffer the punishment of being ignored 
by consumers.  Organisations that create or follow markets find themselves 
rewarded to the extent that they respond to the preferences expressed in those 
markets.  In this sense, market accountability allows for future adjustment. 
 
The problems of market mechanisms, including the inadequacy of accountability 
forms a justification for regulation and have been the basis for creation of 
considerable areas of law including, contract, product liability, employment, 
financial regulation and certain aspects of private property law. Looking to the 
market to regulate institutions providing public goods is a decision to adopt a 
market failure, the effects of which may be difficult to predict and the costs of 
which difficult to calculate ex ante. 
 
8.  Method 
 
The foregoing surveys of disciplinary approaches to and theories of regulation, 
and of the technical issues and decisions need to be taken together to provide the 
basis for a regulatory analysis and evaluation.   Further, as noted, the overarching 
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theory for this dissertation is Feaver and Durrant’s regulatory coherence.  In 
order for that theory to be applied, not only does the legislation need to be 
examined, but the larger issues to which the legislation responds, as well as the 
registered bodies need to be considered. It requires regulatory theories, decisions 
and techniques to be identified and analysed.   
 
Coherence analysis in the first instance requires a normative analysis of problem 
and policy at the foundation of the regulatory framework. Next an analysis of 
coherence between policy norms and instruments must be conducted.  Finally, 
instruments need scrutiny.  In addition, it has been argued that institutional, 
organisational and administrative aspects of regulation need to be analysed for 
coherence.   
 
These tasks can be accomplished by identifying the various components of 
regulation discussed and applying a coherence analysis.  That is, beginning with 
an analysis of the social problem and risk, identifying the public-private divide, 
identifying and analysing targets of regulation through an approach to the 
institution, organisations and administrative arrangements that make up the 
regulatory framework for the university will allow a thorough-going analysis of 
coherence.  As the analysis is of an existing regulatory arrangement, that of 
Australia, the first step is to identify and work through those arrangements. 
 
The next chapter, Chapter 3, is an examination and preliminary analysis of the 
policy and legislative framework for the university and higher education in 
Australia. It provides an exposition of the social organising problem to which 
higher education and university policy are the regulatory response.  Further, as a 
technical chapter dealing with the legislation and regulatory arrangements, the 
technical aspects of design and technical aspects of regulation—the target and 
regulator, and choices of technique—are identified. The chapter identifies the 
tools the government has employed over time and forms the foundation and 
reference point for the analysis in the chapters which follow. Finally, it examines 
the accountability regime.  
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As noted, regulation rests on fundamental conceptions of the public and the 
private, and the public-private divide. Coherence and regulatory response as well 
as institutional and organisational arrangements are organised around 
understandings of the public and the private. The chapter following, Chapter 4, 
sets out the parameters and issues in the debate about the public-private divide.  
It does not seek to harmonise positions or avoid the political.  Rather, it points to 
the socio-political nature of the divide and evaluates where the university and 
higher education might fit coherently into the divide variously construed. With 
this background, an analysis is positioned to identify and evaluate this aspect of 
the normative coherence of regulatory arrangements.   
 
The chapter which follows, Chapter 5, examines the institution of higher 
education and the university.  As noted, a lack of attention to institutional 
arrangements and in particular, to coherence between institutions and the 
environment may result in failure of identification of opportunities, problems and 
risks, as well as a failure in terms of implementation.  It is assumed institutions 
serve purposes in the first instance and so changes to institutions should be done 
only after due regard for those existing arrangements and purposes.  The chapter 
considers the institution of the university from a variety of disciplinary 
perspectives and the various missions or objects that may be assigned to it. It 
explores the various normative orderings associated with these perspectives and 
missions and lays the foundation for the coherence analysis at an institutional 
level. As coherence between systems and institutions is critical for success, and 
the university is an institution, a coherence analysis requires a clear 
understanding of the institution and its relation to the systems environment. 
 
The chapter which follows, Chapter 6, addresses the organisation of the 
university.  Examination of the university from an organisational perspective 
allows a coherence analysis to be conducted to evaluate whether the 
organisational characteristics are coherent with the institutional environment 
including mission.  Organisational configuration may arise from the institutions 
of the university, or be imposed by external regulatory authorities.  To achieve 
institutional missions, organisations must be suited to the purpose. As different 
organisational forms have different purposes adequate account must be taken of 
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such in the regulatory framework and the coherence analysis must lead to a 
determination of whether they serve either or both institutional and regulatory 
objects.  
 
Chapter 7 provides an analysis of the coherence of regulatory arrangements 
drawing from all parts of the dissertation.  That is, it provides an analysis of the 
coherence at systemic, policy and instrumental levels as well as coherence in its 
institutional, organisational, and administrative and accountability dimensions. It 
provides the basis for the conclusion that serious regulatory incoherence is at the 
basis of Australian university and higher education regulation and leads to a 
conclusion of a higher likelihood of failure in the future.  
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
As has been argued, regulation is a highly complex task—a matter reflected in 
the diverse and divergent disciplinary approaches to it. These approaches were 
made clear in the survey of the relevant disciplinary literature.  This survey 
provided a foundation for approaching the more specific theories dealing with 
various aspects of regulation.  A second survey of these specific but disparate 
theories made it clear that there is only one theory of regulation which provides a 
comprehensive approach to regulatory analysis—Feaver and Durrant’s regulatory 
coherence.  This survey also provided a variety of insights and approaches to 
specific aspects of regulation which are utilised and referred to in various parts of 
the dissertation as alternatives, points from which to critique existing regulatory 
arrangements, and provide recommendations for reform. Having reviewed these 
theories of regulation then provides the first part of an analytical tool kit for the 
analysis required by this dissertation.  A third and final survey of regulatory 
methods, including organisation of the regulator, regulatory techniques and 
accountability structures, provided the foundation for the last part of the analysis.  
A critical understanding of these hard features of regulatory systems is necessary 
again to critique and offer alternatives for the regulatory system under analysis.  
This chapter not only provides a foundation for the analysis which follows but 
argues that the approach of a single discipline is likely to mislead rather than 
inform. Thus, it argues strongly that the dissertation must be interdisciplinary if it 
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is to succeed.  Finally, it argues that the nature of Feaver and Durrant’s 
regulatory coherence demands interdisciplinary analysis to fill its framework. 
Achieving an adequate analysis of that regulation requires careful attention to a 
variety of disciplinary perspectives, careful consideration of the regulatory 
arrangements, paying attention to the socio-political, technical and existing 
institutions and organisations.  It must be based on a detailed evaluation of the 
social problem, risk, regulatory response in terms of legislation, tools, and 
instruments.  
Scrutinising these arrangements through a coherence lens provides critical 
insight into the strengths and weaknesses of regulatory arrangements and will 
draw attention to the potential for regulatory failure and success as well as 
drawing attention to important opportunities, problems and risks.  
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CHAPTER 3: REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter takes up the basic task of identifying the regulatory issues identified 
in the previous chapter by examining the Australian regulatory framework for 
universities.  That is, it identifies the social organising problem as Australian 
governments have shaped it, it examines the assignment on the public-private 
divide, further, it identifies the relevant legislation, analyses the legislation from 
a technical perspective, and identifies the accountability framework. It provides a 
preliminary evaluation of coherence, which is consolidated and developed in the 
analysis of Chapter 7. 
 
Although the traditional focus of work on the regulation of the university has 
been on the internal structures of the university, the regulation and governance of 
university corporations and the institution is neither solely nor primarily a matter 
of internal structures and processes.192 Indeed, as Clark Kerr observed in the 
1970’s “the ‘ivory tower’ of yore is becoming a regulated public utility.”193  In 
the 1990’s this trend continued to the point that, as Shattock pointed out in the 
UK, “higher education has moved from being privately to being publicly 
governed, essentially changing from self-governance to governance explicitly by 
the state.”194 The same trajectory has been followed in Australia195 with the 
regulation of the university becoming a combined effort among a significant 
number of parties.  In broad terms, Clark has identified the regulatory 
environment as being composed of government, market and the academic 
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profession.196  Consideration of the regulation of the university corporation is an 
analysis of the university corporation’s relations with its external environment 
including legal authorities.197  The analysis below will focus on the regulatory 
control of the university corporation as a legal person operating in the legal 
environment created by the state.  
 
This chapter develops the foundation for the argument that the policy framework 
has changed having significant implications for the university institution. It is 
argued that policy and subsequent regulatory arrangements integrating the 
university into the state apparatus has forced the university to mould itself to the 
demands of government and subjected it to New Public Management style 
accountability.  The chapter sets up in inchoate form the argument that these 
regulatory changes, while serving government agendas, are incoherent with the 
university institution and lay the groundwork for increasingly dysfunctional 
university sector in Australia.   
 
2. Regulatory Problem: pre- and post- World War Two 
 
Prior to the Second World War, the university in Australia as elsewhere was a 
private body (i.e. a body not required to pursue government defined interests) 
that selected the best and brightest from the middle and upper classes, and 
provided socialisation and credentialing of the upper classes.198 Although 
opening up the institution in the nineteenth century may be evidence of a public 
policy to make access more equitable and available, it remained largely a private 
institution with the objects just mentioned.  The strong government interest in the 
university came only as a result of the war and its potential technological 
contribution to the war effort.  After the war, a variety of forces came to bear on 
the university, as well as the rest of society, which set a course radically altering 
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the shape of both.  These were access to the populace at large, expansion of 
knowledge, and reconceptualising on the public-private divide.  
 
The creation of the regulatory organising problem as shaped by the Australian 
government post World War Two is somewhat at odds with the mission of the 
university institution, namely, the creation, preservation and transmission of 
knowledge (discussed in Chapter 5).  That is, the government has identified 
nation building and economic competitiveness as problems to be addressed by 
the university.199  
 
By way of contrast the three universal objects of the university institution are 
undergraduate teaching, research, and public service. That is, the university’s 
institutional tasks of providing high quality higher education, producing annually 
a cohort of graduates who have developed a mastery of a body of disciplinary 
based knowledge, mastered critical thinking skills, and developed a set of 
flexible intellectual skills as a foundation for a lifetime have become subject to 
government instrumental policy objects.  It is not that the two agendas are wholly 
incompatible or inimical. 
 
The convergence of government and university interests occurs in research and 
teaching: the university is to provide the new knowledge and graduates needed 
by the nation both to solve its own internal problems and to compete and 
cooperate on the international field. This activity—producing both knowledge 
and researchers—is vital to the nation’s ability to survive and thrive.  In this 
aspect the Australian government policy has benefited from the university 
institution’s own objects for purposes of national interest and business power.  
This interest is distinct, however, from the policy alternative of the development 
of citizens for their own sake.  The university also has a role as the preserver of 
unique Australian knowledge and culture.  This role is of limited value to 
government, particularly where governments prefer a less than transparent 
account of the past and policy options.  Finally, even less felicitous to 
government has been the university’s unique position as a critic and general 
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contributor to political and social debate.  Evidently, the Australian university is 
charged with difficult tasks at least partly in conflict with the government policy, 
and all of which are expensive to establish, maintain, measure and monitor.  The 
dissertation now turns to examine the problem shaping, policy development, and 
regulatory arrangements that form the regulatory response.  
 
 
3. Regulatory Response: policy, regulatory arrangements and technical 
aspects  
 
 
a. Commonwealth Universities Commission and the Mills Report 
 
As noted, prior to the Second World War, Australian universities had been pre-
eminently private organisations despite their public status.  That is, they were 
free to pursue their own objects with little regard for government policy, but in 
receipt of public funds.200  They were funded by a mix of state government, 
benefactions, and student fees.201  During the Second World War it became 
evident to the Allied countries that university research was going to be critical to 
success. Accordingly, governments took a renewed interest in the institution.  
 
The Commonwealth began to provide significant funds after hearing from its 
newly established Commonwealth Universities Commission (often referred to as 
“UC”) in 1943, which was created pursuant to regulation under the National 
Security Act,202 for the purpose of supervising the Commonwealth Financial 
Assistance Scheme for students.203  Labor Prime Minister Chifley decided to 
establish a committee under the chair of Professor R.C. Mills.204  The Mills 
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Committee issued an interim report which explained the financial situation of the 
universities as being a matter of urgency.205  The interim report was the final 
report issued by the committee and it urged unequivocally “that in view of the 
national importance of the development of universities, the Commonwealth 
Government is justified in extending its interest in the work of the Universities 
and, in association with the States, in accepting further responsibilities.”206  The 
committee still recognized a distinction between State and Federal obligations for 
the universities, placing the primary obligation for the universities on the 
State,207 consistent with the Constitution which assigns the obligation for student 
support to the Commonwealth.208  
 
The Mills Report had two important features. First, it demonstrated that the 
Commonwealth had a long standing interest in the universities, particularly in the 
development of original research and training of researchers, leading to the 
conclusion that the universities were institutions of national importance.  Second, 
the Mills Report held that the Commonwealth had financial responsibilities for 
the universities, which were to be shared with the States and which it 
implemented through a revised grant scheme. The grant scheme, however, was 
far from a carte blanche for unlimited spending.  It required the university to 
obtain three times the value of the grant from the State government and tuition 
fees in order to obtain the top level of grant. Further Federal grants were 
restricted to operating costs of the university rather than capital improvement 
measures.209 
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The Mills Report led to the passing of the States Grants (Universities) Act 1951 
(Cth).210  This statute formalized and legitimized the Federal government’s on-
going involvement in the universities, justified pursuant to s. 96 of the Australian 
Constitution.211  Menzies, however, recognized the need for the universities to 
retain their autonomy and their individuality at least with respect to issues of 
internal management.212 
 
The Mills report brought with it a changed view of the objects of the university.  
This changed view is seen in the government’s change of policy from private 
goods to public goods.  Further, as a result of the Mills report, the government 
selected a nodality tool, and following a consensus model of regulation, inserted 
the first of a series of commissions to mediate between government and the 
university institution.  
 
b. Australian Universities Commission and the Murray Report 
 
 
Although universities are state bodies, that is, they are established and controlled 
as state statutory corporations, the universities in Australia remained elite 
training institutions until after the Second World War when the Federal 
government became active in setting policy. The return of service personnel, led 
many countries including Australia to make adjustments, one of which was the 
re-training of recently returned service personnel.  Any discussion of the 
university after the Second World War must take cognizance of critical changes 
in the environment.  Foremost is a public interest policy expressing collective 
preferences for nation building and social mobility.  These equitable objectives 
were to be achieved through providing mass higher education.   
 
This change demanded a fundamental reworking of the notion of the university 
from an elite institution to an institution suited to serving an expanded mission—
i.e. mass education.  It resulted in rapid growth in student numbers. It created 
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confusion in the Australian system as the inquiries discussed below illustrate and 
in the various university corporations.213 American universities in this era, 
according to the former President of the University of California, Clark Kerr, 
faced challenges he identified as expansion of student numbers, coordinating the 
curriculum with society’s needs, dealing with new knowledge, and the related 
administrative structural changes necessitated by the three previous changes, led 
to what he termed the “multiversity”.214   
 
The situation of the universities in Australia after Second World War is well 
described by the historians of the University of Sydney.: 
 
“[beginning around 1955 the University of Sydney] began to experience 
what could justly have been described as a sea change, extensive and 
comprehensive but not such a complete transformation as to obscure the 
previous structural outline of the university body.  During the next two 
decades the university greatly increased its population of students and 
staff.  It had to come to terms with the new phenomenon of student and 
non-professorial staff power. It accumulated new buildings and engulfed 
acres of old settled areas of inner Sydney. It substantially remodelled 
curricula in all departments, saw a dramatic rise in the popularity of the 
social sciences, computing, applied mathematics, and the performing and 
fine arts. There was an expansion beyond the previous preoccupation 
with European-based scholarship to an interest in Asian cultures and an 
appreciation of Asian, American and Canadian scholarly work.  And 
there was a much greater importance placed on the duty of academic staff 
to engage in diligent and productive research.”215 
 
 
These changes were disorienting for those involved at the time.  Two 
Professorial Board committees reported on matters in 1958 and 1959 at Sydney 
and commented on such matters as the maximum size of the university, lack of 
effective communication between staff and students, lack of communication 
between departments, lack of administrative cohesion—all without any 
suggestions on how the situation might be improved.216  The Faculty Association 
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at Melbourne faced similar issues and complained of being excluded by 
administration undermining the sense of collaborative enterprise and 
community.217 These dramatic changes led to a crisis in the universities which in 
turn drew the attention of government to the potential for the development of 
higher education by policy rather than simply allowing organic development to 
continue.  
 
As a consequence of the dramatic changes, the Menzies government determined 
that a new inquiry into the state of the universities was due.218  In 1957 Menzies 
approached Sir Keith Murray to head an enquiry: Committee of Enquiry into the 
Future of the Australian Universities.219  The committee’s terms of reference 
were not sharply proscribed, but were set out as: 
 
“to inquire into such matters as— 
1 the role of the University in the Australian community;  
2. the extension and co-ordination of University facilities;  
3 technological education at University level; and  
4. the financial needs of Universities and appropriate means of providing 
for those needs.”220   
 
The terms of reference continue: “The list is not meant to be exhaustive and it 
does not set out to the limit the inquiry to be undertaken by the Committee.”221  
 
The committee in its report, known as the Murray Report, identified five 
particular issues for the universities of Australia.  They were: increasing student 
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numbers, high failure rates, weak honours and post-graduate work, serious 
shortages of facilities, and support, including inadequate staff remuneration 
(salaries, superannuation, study leave, research support and travel).222  It was 
clear to the committee that the universities were inadequately resourced for the 
task with which they were charged.223  Indeed, the report was instigated by 
financial crisis of university corporations the result of a combination of increased 
demand and inadequate state funding, among other things.224 
 
There were several important outcomes from the Murray Report, not the least of 
which was the establishment in 1959 of the Australian Universities Commission, 
set up to replace the UC via the Australian Universities Commission Act 1959-
1973 (Cth). This new commission strengthened regulation through Hood’s 
nodality.225  Menzies envisioned a new statutory authority, as a regulatory body 
instead of the advisory body of the UC.226 The Australian Universities 
Commission would in Menzies’ words: “coordinate the work of the universities 
to avoid overlapping, to push somebody here and hold somebody back there, and 
to get the overall pattern of university training in Australia brought into the most 
useful shape.”227  It is interesting to note in contrast to today’s managerialists, the 
Commission’s committees and civil servants discussed their own embarrassment 
at their lack of knowledge and their acknowledgement and reliance on the 
expertise of the Australian Universities Commission.228 
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The legislation, which is quoted at length as it remained relatively untouched for 
the next thirty years, gave the Australian Universities Commission and its 
successors a clear mandate, clear discretion and clear, strong public 
accountabilities. 
13 (1) The functions of the Commission are to furnish information and 
advice to the Minister on matters in connexion with the grant by the 
Commonwealth of financial assistance to universities established by the 
Commonwealth and of financial assistance to the States in relation to 
universities, including information and advice relevant to  (a)  the 
necessity for financial assistance and the conditions upon which any 
financial assistance should be granted; and (b)  the amount and allocation 
of financial assistance. 
 
In addition, the Act sets out clearly policy objectives within which the 
Commission is to exercise discretion. Section 14 reads as follows:  
 
(1) The Commission shall perform its functions with a view to promoting 
the balanced development of universities so that their resources can be 
used to the greatest possible advantage of Australia.   
(2) For the purpose of the performance of its functions, the Commission 
shall consult with universities, with the Australian Commission on 
Advanced Education and with the States upon the matters on which it is 
empowered to furnish information and advice. 
 
That is, it was public interest based regulation, justifying the intervention on the 
basis of “the greatest possible advantage for Australia.”  Further, the commission 
was to regulate using a consensus model. It was to “consult” with the 
universities, the Australian Commission on Advanced Education, and with the 
states. While it was not forced to achieve consensus, the Commission was to take 
account of the issues, interests and needs of the various stakeholders. 
 
Finally, the Act sets out clear processes for accountability. Section 15 read:  
 
(1) The Commission shall, at such times and in respect of such periods as 
the Minister directs, furnish to the Minister reports containing 
recommendations with respect to the financial assistance that should be 
granted to or in relation to universities in respect of those periods and the 
conditions upon which the financial assistance should be granted. 
 
And further, “(2) The Minister shall, as soon as practicable, cause each report 
under the last preceding sub-section to be laid before each House of the 
Parliament.” Section 16 created the duty on the Commission to furnish to the 
Minister on request such further reports as well as the right to issue such further 
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reports as the Commission “thinks fit.” The Commission worked therefore as a 
conduit for information between the targets of regulation, the universities and the 
government.  
 
The Australian Universities Commission’s impact on the universities was 
dramatic.  The Murray Report justified increased Commonwealth involvement 
on the basis of decreased availability of state funding, and increased national 
demands on the university corporations.229  In his detailed and exhaustive study 
of the Australian Universities Commission, Gallagher convincingly argues that 
“the AUC increasingly served the Commonwealth Government rather than 
universities or State Governments, thereby facilitating a growing national role in 
an area traditionally the responsibility of the States.”230  Although the states may 
have wished to circumvent the Federal government in the latter’s power to make 
conditional grants, two High Court decisions231 effectively put an end to that 
option, allowing the Federal government to attach such conditions to funding as 
it saw fit.232 
 
The Murray Report also established a rationale for creating a nation-wide 
university system, in the sense of government seeing them as a single category or 
institution, as opposed to the dealing with each university corporation 
individually.233 Thus the university came to be a tool of national government 
policy, a point of Federal government contact with a community, demonstrating 
Federal government largess and interest in a particular location.  The university 
was no longer a local expression of an international institution serving local 
needs.   
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Further, it was the Murray Report that first publicly, although informally, 
determined that the university was no longer to be an elite institution (rather an 
admission of the post-war reality than a new direction), but an institution for the 
benefit of the masses, and to contribute to the knowledge of all humanity as well 
as providing training for practical purposes.234  This shift in the internal mission 
increasing emphasis on practical training challenges traditional intellectual 
pursuits of the university.  
 
In terms of university governance, the most significant effect of the Murray 
Report was the laying of a foundation for Federal involvement in the universities, 
in a sense without limitation. It undermined the independence of the universities, 
and by reducing the role of state funding, it removed a power which helped 
balance the competing interests of the universities, the Commonwealth and the 
State governments.   
 
The Murray Report had such significant consequences for Australian universities 
because of the personal interest taken in the universities by the then Prime 
Minister, Menzies235 and given the dire financial circumstances in which the 
universities found themselves when left to the generosity of the state 
governments’, the enthusiasm of the Vice-Chancellors as expressed by the 
AVCC letter to Menzies personally, is understandable.236  The Vice-Chancellors 
could not but be pleased with a promise of increased funding; however, they 
remained cautious about the necessity for the universities to retain their 
autonomy.237   
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c. The Martin Report  
 
The Government adopted the Murray report and began what was intended to be a 
tri-ennial grants scheme as recommended by the report.  The near sufficient 
funding promised by the Government’s adoption of the Murray Report was not to 
last. By 1960, as the Government was preparing the second round of triennial 
funding, it was made clear through the Martin Report that the recommendations 
were to be in line with “financial limits which are relatively very much more 
modest” than under the first grant.238 
 
The Martin Report of 1964 built on the changes in the Murray Report, the net 
effect of which is described by Marginson and Considine as “a complete 
transformation of higher education from a semi-private domain of upper-class 
culture and state-based training for the elite professions into a system of mass 
credentialing designed to capture the spirit of optimism of the long boom.”239  In 
other words, as Australia’s economy boomed, its social vision changed as 
well.240  
 
The boom, combined with the vision and Keynesian economic theory, provided a 
justification for regulatory intervention from which a dramatic expansion of the 
Federal government’s role in education was possible.  It resulted in the marked 
growth of the tertiary sector which remains albeit in a rather modified form 
today.  It had as its focus the development of individuals on the basic belief that 
investment in individuals was a contribution to the nation itself.241  This policy, a 
public interest policy was concerned with both general economic welfare and 
social justice concerns of equity and social mobility.  
 
Martin’s basic view was carried forward in the years of the Whitlam Labor 
Government (1972-75) in which the positive liberal notion of rights was 
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extended to include the right to tertiary education as a means of developing the 
individual to one’s fullest potential. Throughout the era, policy makers paid little 
heed to development, and the tertiary sector became rather confused with 
Colleges of Advanced Education, teachers’ colleges, institutes of technology and 
universities all claiming similar traditions of research and teaching.242 
 
d. The Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission and mass 
university education  
 
The trajectory of history is never linear.  The next issue Australian policy makers 
had to consider was economic turbulence, growth in state budgets along 
Keynesian lines, and re-trenchment following the 1970’s recession.  The 
economic contraction in the OECD countries beginning in the late 1970’s led to a 
review of budgets and a challenge of the Keynesian view of the role of 
government.  That view was based on the premise that government investment in 
the economy was always a net positive regardless of the specific social results.243 
Thus, while from a Keynesian perspective such investment was a positive, in the 
changing policy environment moving away from Keynes, government 
investment was not necessarily a positive and needed to be justified. 
 
Further, discussion of regulatory change must take into account the rise of the 
neo-liberalism as a political movement that has shifted government attention and 
resources from the provision of broadly available public goods to a narrow focus 
on providing regulation aimed at increasing private economic goods with little 
regard to distribution. These effects have not been limited to Australia of course, 
but have been world-wide phenomena. Consequently, some of the discussion 
which follows will include references to international standards, issues, and 
universities.244 
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The Australian Universities Commission survived until 1974, after which it was 
re-named Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission by amending the 
University Commission Act 1974 (Cth).  This Act was repealed in 1977 and 
following a re-organisation to encompass the whole of tertiary education in 
Australia a completely new piece of legislation the Commonwealth Tertiary 
Education Commission Act 1977 (Cth) was enacted.  The statute charged the 
Commission with a much larger mandate, functioning essentially as a 
comprehensive source of information on the institutions of higher education 
being the university, the colleges of advanced education, and TAFE as well as 
various specialised organizations (s.7).  Its mandate allowed it to report to the 
minister on any matter related to tertiary education that it considered important. 
In other words, it was not limited to answering questions, but was able to provide 
a professional opinion on its own initiative on matters it deemed important to the 
sector. However, its was circumscribed by the legislation with respect to the 
internal, academic matters of the various autonomous institutions. Section 7(4) 
reads: “The functions conferred on the Commission do not extend to matters that 
relate to a course, or courses, at an institution … of tertiary education.”  This 
restriction is significant in that it permitted organisations to follow their own 
paths, conform to institutional norms, and had the effect of promoting diversity. 
 
In addition to the mandate of “balanced” development for all of Australia drawn 
from the prior Act, the Commission was charged with seeking to increase higher 
education opportunities and increase cooperation across the sector’s institutions s 
8(2)(b)-(c). The commissioners were an equal mix of specialised civil servants 
and experts s 10.  
 
The Act specifically excluded for profit provision of tertiary education s 5 and 
there was a clear commitment to tertiary education as a public good. It may be 
implied from these provisions that there is a view that profit making motivations 
are in conflict with the production and distribution of public goods. The nation 
state had an obligation to educate its populace.   
 
The establishment of this Commission marked formal recognition (as opposed to 
Murray informal acknowledgement) of the transition from elite to mass higher 
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education.  By composing the group of commissioners with a balance of 
bureaucrats, non-academics, and academics, the commission expresses the view 
that the university is not solely for the elite. Rather, it is a public concern, the 
funding of which is a matter for those not holding positions within the institution. 
Further, the Act marked the shift of university governance from academic centric 
to management centric by displacing academics from the centre of university 
affairs at the higher level of the commission.  
 
The CTEC was also the final buffer to exist between the university and 
government.  The CTEC was dissolved by Minister John Dawkins in 1988 when 
its experts refused to conform to his economic view of the university.245 
Essentially, it had provided direct accountability to Parliament and refused 
rationalist economic orthodoxy doctrines, setting itself up for excommunication. 
Marginson describes the era as one of “ministerialisation” which he describes as 
“the imposition of economic agendas and the displacement of the role of the 
directors-general of education by generic managers without the same interest in 
policy or professional matters.”246  In other words, this shift marks a change from 
education as a matter of specialisation and professional concern with significant 
public goods dimensions, to education as another contribution to the economy, 
simply a private economic commodity the production and distribution of which 
is to be controlled by business managers.  This view reflects economic and 
business scholars’ belief in “context indifferent” management discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
 
e. Dawkins: the Higher Education Support Acts 1988 2003 and the 
rise of Neo-liberalism 
 
The mid-1980’s under the Hawke Labor government adopted a neo-Keynesian 
approach of coordinating labour and business interests, taking on the 
management mantra of “do more with less”.247  This movement emphasized the 
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measurement of the effectiveness of policy by constant monitoring and checking 
whether desired results were achieved.248  One very significant impact was 
“managerialism,” which greatly increased power and profile of senior 
bureaucrats and managers who came to view constant change as an important 
strategy and basis for personal advancement, while decreasing the focus on the 
tasks at hand.249  The language of accountability, strategic planning, and the 
tying of departments to performance plans closely linked to policy was 
introduced.250 This change reflected a hardening economic climate, a loss of faith 
in government,251 and the rising strength of neoliberalism and its commitment to 
the private economic benefits over equity and public good.  This change, it 
would appear, complemented a change in industrial policy as government 
ministers considered Australia’s balance of trade in light what they believed to be 
an impending decline in the value of primary industries particularly as 
globalisation began shifting toward a knowledge economy. Looking for new 
sources of wealth, ministers looked to the university as a potential industry 
providing new revenues.252  
 
A vast series of reforms referred to earlier were initiated by Hawke’s minister for 
Education and Training, John Dawkins.  Dawkins conducted a review of the 
higher education system and started a series of structural reforms that have had a 
dramatic, long-lasting effect.  Indeed, Marginson and Considine in their study of 
Australian universities consider the Dawkins reforms to be the most significant 
reforms to higher education policy to the time of their writing.253   
 
Dawkins labelled university administration archaic, preferred a five year 
probationary period,254 proposed professorships to be temporary and subject to 
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seven year terms after which incumbents could re-apply,255 opposed the elections 
of deans,256 supported dividing the academic profession by rewarding achievers 
(those who publish rapidly), and punishing those who fail to perform—although 
the same criteria is noticeably absent in his discussion of management.  In 
Dawkins’ words: “inadequate performance should not be protected.”257   
 
Problematically, Dawkins’ Report has no references and so provides no evidence 
for his assertions.  Marginson describes Dawkins policies as  
statements of policy as truth that were designed to secure authority over 
education and its professionals, to demonstrate that authority to an 
outside public in business and the media, and to open education to 
external intervention. They were not descriptions or analysis, and were 
not subject to testing or verification.258  
 
Dawkins, an economist by training, re-envisioned higher education as an industry 
and unsurprisingly his policy document reads like an economist’s analysis of the 
system.  While he acknowledged social, personal development and cultural 
contributions of the university, the public socio-economic goods and private 
social goods, the bulk of the document stands on economic issues, and in 
particular private economic goods. For example, Dawkins’ objective was 
“outputs”, and in particular, degreed graduates ready for the workforce, a rather 
narrow training view of the university.  As another example, the review is 
oriented by his statement that Japanese and American policies see higher 
education as “important sources of their economic strength and vitality,”259  that 
technical change requires more skilled workers in design, production and 
management260; and in his comparisons of Australia economy with the 
economies of other OECD countries.   
 
Reading Dawkins one gets the impression he viewed the higher education 
“industry” as a terra nullius, a wholly malleable collection of inputs from which 
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he was seeking certain measurable outputs.  His policy instruments are command 
and control with an element of markets.  Dawkins, however, was not naive about 
the traditions in the organizations that were located in his terra nullius.  He 
makes his scepticism of the university clear and uses it to justify his policy 
instrument choice: “unless an institution has that commitment [to a profile agreed 
with the Federal government] it will inevitably regard its profile as a limiting 
factor to be ignored or bypassed.”261  In other words, Dawkins was clear about 
the university’s institutions of public socio-economic goods and private social 
goods as well as the power of the academic profession to resist. He was worried 
they would thwart his private economic agenda unless he could silence and 
control it. Lacking legal jurisdiction to command the university and so unable to 
withdraw the Federal government’s organisational resources, he had only the tool 
of treasure by which he could exercise control.  
 
The Dawkins review was explicitly focused on achieving organisational growth, 
in an environment of declining resources.  The shortfall was to be made up from 
efficiencies and finding new sources of funding.  Dawkins was explicit about his 
policy.  He wrote on the first page of the Green paper “growth in a climate of 
continuing financial restraint will require close attention to the efficient use of 
resources.”262  How was this efficiency to be obtained? Dawkins provided a 
blueprint.  At a systemic level, Dawkins did not see diversity. Rather, Dawkins 
saw a fragmented and poorly coordinated situation with universities, Colleges of 
Advanced Education (CAE’s) and Technical And Further Education (TAFE’s) 
organizations all offering of tertiary education to Australians.  Through his 
economist’s eyes, he saw opportunities to make the system work more efficiently 
by changing from a binary university-CAE system to a unitary system, by 
combining small institutions, improving the ease of movement of students 
through the system’s various types of tertiary institutions, including course 
recognition and transfer.  Thus he proposed a more coherent system, coordinated 
at a national level by the Federal government.  The latter point was important: 
Dawkins made it clear that a re-structured system would make it easier for the 
Federal government to achieve its policy ends of having a well-trained 
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competitive workforce—a source of serious concern for Dawkins.263 As is 
evident from subsequent Federal government actions, the university has been 
used to achieve many other Federal government policy aims, discussed in detail 
later in this chapter. It should be noted that under-funding provides additional 
leverage to government as cash starved organisations will be more compliant 
with government demands.264  
 
At an organizational level, ironically Dawkins determined that his efficiencies 
could be achieved by a combination of: institutional specialization, diversity, a 
dominant focus on teaching, competition for funding, flexible staffing, and 
causing them to be “more focused.”265 Internally Dawkins saw serious 
“constraints.”  Chief among his concern was the academic profession’s board, 
which when over 100 persons can cause “important decisions [to be]... delayed, 
causing inefficiencies and inaction.”266 In particular, the Academic board and 
other bodies said Dawkins were: “not [to] function to dilute the management 
power of the chief executive or to restrict appropriate delegation to those who 
should have responsibility at other levels.”267  While Dawkins repeatedly stated it 
wa not the Federal government’s role to meddle in the internal affairs of the 
university, his determination of the size of boards, appointments to those boards, 
the roles of committees and the subordinate place of academics seemed to 
suggest the contrary.  Indeed, Dawkins appears to have stepped further into the 
university than any of his predecessors.  Troublingly, as previously noted, there 
was no evidentiary basis for his determination that the arrangements were 
inefficient and ineffective in the first instance. Understandably, Dawkins was 
worried that his reforms would not be adopted with alacrity by the university 
organisations. 
 
For Dawkins the definition of “university” was primarily an economic one and 
must be drawn from two related sections of the report.  A university must have 
                                                 
263
 Ibid Preface iii-iv.   
264
 Argued in the American context in Berliner, D. C. and B. J. Biddle (1995). The Manufactured 
Crisis: Myths, Fraud, and the Attack on America's Public Schools New York, Addison Wesley. 
265
 Dawkins, J. S. (December 1987). Higher Education: a Policy Discussion Paper [Green Paper]. 
Canberra,, Australian Government Printing Service p. 28. 
266
 Ibid p. 50.  
267
 Ibid p. 51.  
 127 
more than 5,000 students, and offer “an appropriate range of undergraduate and 
post-graduate programs” in three areas.268 The definition has no clear conception 
of the institution and its distinct mission nor its organisation. He did not mention 
academic staff, which presumably Dawkins would acknowledge are an important 
part of an organization calling itself a university, nor give any idea what “three 
areas” means: one cannot know if Dawkins meant broadly arts, science and 
medicine, or something as narrow as medieval English, modern English and 
English as a second language. This bare definition of the university underscores 
Dawkins view of the sector as a production centre in a market economy rather 
than a critical social institution tasked with the creation, dissemination and 
preservation of significant non-economic, social, public goods.  Dawkins set the 
university on a trajectory of increasing regulatory incoherence from which it has 
not turned.  
 
Finally, as Dawkins made clear funds would not be increasing. He steered the 
university toward private funding in the form of consultancies, 
commercialisation of research, and private fee-paying international students (of 
which there were about 1,000 in his time).  Whereas up until Dawkins’s reforms 
Australia had been a contributor to the international community, providing 
scholarships and support under the Colombo plan to the best and brightest in 
developing nations in the region, so developing a reputation for quality, Dawkins 
saw this contribution as a waste.  This decision was part of a broader neoliberal 
commitment to colonising public social production with private enterprise.  In 
line with this change of views, Dawkins saw a great market opportunity in Asia.  
The reputation for quality could attract private investment and used to subsidise 
the education of Australians and the best and brightest from needy countries 
would find their own ways.   
 
As previously mentioned, Dawkins dissolved the CTEC, a well-informed agency 
which had provided an informed view on the sector.  In line with its tradition of 
integrity without regard to political concerns, it criticised Dawkins policy.  
Dawkins retaliated by strategically creating a “purple circle” of supporters from 
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the sector, effectively silencing opposition by excluding them from this informal 
policy body.269 Dawkins’ NPM in this matter mirrored closely that of his UK 
counterparts. Dissolving the University Grants Commission and in its stead 
creating the University Funding Council (later renamed Higher Education 
Funding Council), the UK neoliberal government was able to change its position 
from receiving advice to imposing an agenda.  As Power observes: “These 
institutional changes signalled a fundamental shift in evaluative philosophy… 
from … local forms of self-evaluation to standardised measures of output.”270 
 
Despite the rhetoric of efficiency and consumer choice from rationalisations, 
Marginson and Considine observe:  
“Rarely was efficiency or consumer choice uppermost. For example, it 
was taken as a virtual necessity that the major universities would simply 
absorb any CAE close to their main campus and that such institutions 
would quickly lose their identity and distinct purpose…. Few would 
afterwards argue that the allocations followed any pattern or served any 
wider purpose than the crude fact that many were easily reduced to 
few.”271   
This post-facto evaluation of the merger activity initiated by the government 
further evidences ideology as the driver rather than economic rationality, public 
benefit, or  regulatory coherence.272 
 
Dissolving the CTEC allowed Dawkins the Federal minister to control university 
organisations directly individually and not as a group.  He did this by introducing 
the Higher Education Funding Act 1988 (Cth).  That legislation replacing the 
Universities (Financial Assistance) Act 1963  (Cth) marked the start of steering 
from a distance by tight control on finances, by careful targeting and by under 
funding, creating new pressures on university organizations to comply with 
Federal government ideology on higher education. In anticipation of the 
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legislation the Federal government established the Higher Education Council 
which took on the advisory role of the CTEC but not the coordinating role.273  
 
f. West and Nelson Reports: hardening ideology under Howard:  
 
The Liberal/National Coalition government under Prime Minister John Howard 
drove Australia further to the political right/conservatism.  With respect to 
tertiary education policy, Howard’s Liberal coalition government continued the 
policies set by the previous Labor governments, but with markedly increased 
intensity. The impact on higher education policy in this environment is 
predictable.   
 
Howard commissioned two reports: the West Report and the Nelson Report.  The 
West Report came from a man who was a banker with no public experience and 
contributed little to the university.  His advice was simply more neoliberal 
markets and private sector management practices—aligning with the NPM 
agenda of the government.274 The Nelson Report275 provided little more than 
promises of further funding.276  The net outcome of the Howard government has 
been that the changes since 1990 have been more profound than those in the 
revolutionary prior 40 years.277 What in substance are these changes? David Pick 
provides an overview of Australian higher education policy over the last two 
decades.278 
 
Pick writes:  
This policy shift is significant in that at its core is an acceleration of the 
privatization of Australian universities through industrial relations 
reform, changes to student fees, increased competition and continued 
reductions in government funding support… reshaping the higher 
education system [even] beyond that envisaged in the Dawkins reforms of 
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the 1980s representing a further shifting of universities from their 
traditional roles and functions.279 
 
These changes reflect frame shifts.  In terms of Australian educational policy, 
Pick sees a frame shift in two steps. These are:  
“a reinterpreting of the deeply held cultural values of nation building. 
This reinterpretation was, first, from one of national, social and economic 
development to one that the future of the nation depends on being 
globally competitive (to be a lean and mean competitor in the global 
marketplace) and, second, to one that is focused on private gain and 
market competition.”280 
 
This re-visioning of the Australian university has dramatically altered the core 
institutions of the university (discussed in Chapter 5).  Traditionally the 
institution of the university held the academic profession in high esteem and had 
a strong mission of public service.  The post-Dawkins era has seen in the marked 
decline of the status of the academics vis-à-vis administration (now called 
management to indicate the control it now exercises); a struggle for the 
university to re-define itself and present a coherent mission of public service and 
revenue generation in the midst of on-going financial crisis. The new university 
has been described as the “Enterprise University” by Marginson and Considine 
who see it as an organization with the combined aims of economic sustainability 
in a hardening financial climate while struggling to maintain institutional 
prestige.281  This Enterprise University looks to re-shape or “re-invent” itself as a 
service provider, tends to be short-term, and a in a constant state of re-
organization as management use re-organisation as a strategy to create 
instability.282  The outcome of the Howard era was a rigid, system in which 
university corporations had no effective discretion,283 one third were in a 
precarious financial condition,284 the system in a state of serious decline, and 
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burdened with the reporting requirements a summarized version of which 
occupies fourteen pages when set out in chart forms.285  
 
g. The Bradley Review, Rudd and Gillard: Changing Directions? 
 
Part of Labor’s 2007 election platform was renewed interest in education, 
including higher education.  To that end, on 13 March 2008, the then Deputy 
Prime Minister, Julia Gillard initiated a Review of Australian Higher Education. 
After an initial consultation document, an invitation for submissions, and a series 
of nation-wide consultations, the Chair of the review, Professor D. Bradley, a 
former Vice Chancellor of the University of South Australia submitted a 271 
page report on 12 December of that same year.286   
 
The report is markedly different from all since Dawkins for a number of reasons. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, it was given a comprehensive mandate in its 
terms of reference.  The effect of the broad terms of reference was that a 
systemic review was possible. In contrast to the Dawkins Report, not only was it 
based on significant, referenced research, and broad consultation, its evaluation 
moved beyond the narrow confines of economic analysis to a more realistic 
evaluation of the situation.  Perhaps most importantly the Review acknowledged 
that the Howard government failed Australian society by failing to safe-guard the 
higher education system. Howard’s policy failed this important objective by its 
protracted and significant under-funding which sent the system into a serious 
decline. 
 
For example, Bradley pointed out that the policy goal of developing diversity in 
the university corporations through management was unrealistic. She observed 
that this goal was unrealistic because “under the current framework, the general 
mission and strategic direction and the level of student load cannot be 
implemented or applied in any practical sense without the approval of the 
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Commonwealth government.”287 Bradley also noted serious problems with the 
quality of student experience.288 This problem was one of the results of under-
funding which led to high student-staff ratios and efforts to compensate using 
information technology.  She also noted the undermining student ability to solve 
collective needs by the removal of compulsory student union fees. 
 
Turning to the Australian university’s increased international activity, and the 
growing dependence on revenues from selling education, Bradley also found 
cause for significant concern. She noted that the reliance on international 
students for funding the university’s basic operations, and the vulnerability of the 
sector to changes in demand whether resulting from competition or variation in 
the economic environment and the system as a whole vulnerable to economically 
induced collapse.  
 
The Bradley Report while identifying areas of significant problems and making 
recommendations for change, in other areas continues some of the direction 
identified earlier with Dawkins.  In particular, despite a greater 
acknowledgement of the non-economic role of the university—i.e. the social and 
public role of the university—Bradley’s focus and recommendations continue 
with the conception of higher education being primarily a private economic 
good.  That is, Bradley focuses on the role of higher education in preparing 
students for the workforce and does so by framing the social problem as a matter 
of international competition.  While students educated to participate in the 
workforce contribute to the overall public good, the focus on their individual 
economic benefit permits them to be classified as a private good—and so 
provides a policy justification for increasing individual student fees. Bradley also 
continues the error of equating the aggregate of individual preferences as an 
expression of collective preferences.289  That is, she advocates relying on 
individual student demand as the only criteria for the creation, preservation and 
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dissemination of knowledge and education without regard to the needs of society 
as a collective whole.   
 
By excluding all but the individual student as the beneficiary of the private 
economic good of education, Bradley ignores the important social and political 
roles of the university identified by her earlier—i.e. the university as a space for 
informed debate about the shape of society, model of democratic governance, 
and a place for civic and non-economic values of public collective existence.  Its 
unique place as a public outpost apart from the market, organised on a basis other 
than economic and political power, and the last and best opportunity for shaping 
preferences prior to participation in the workplace.  Her private focus precludes 
her from seeing the problem of increased enrolments in a narrow range of 
business and related disciplines.   
 
Bradley provides a number of recommendations.  The Bradley Review 
recommends regulating the university and tertiary education providers by 
markets and in particular by way of competition between higher education 
organisations for student consumers empowered with vouchers and by way of 
competition for funding for teaching and research.  This set of controls is to be 
supplemented by a new regulatory agency. In sum, the report’s regulatory 
recommendations are use of regulation for competition, regulation by 
information, and regulation by consensus and resort to the policy tools of 
treasure, nodality and organisation.   
 
The Rudd Labor government accepted for the most part the Bradley Review and 
its recommendations.  The education revolution was to form one third of the 
government’s broad policy initiatives along with climate change and 
broadband.290 In the policy paper released in 2009, Transforming Australia’s 
Higher Education System, 291 the Rudd government set out ten broad policy 
initiatives which can be summarised as follows: growth in size, diversity and 
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participation, increased capital and operations funding, reformed regulatory 
administrative arrangements, and a demand driven system for education. 
 
While the bills for the reform have not been tabled in Parliament and so no 
further description of the details of the Rudd reforms is possible, it is possible to 
identify some of the parameters of the changes—which appear to be still in place 
under the Gillard government.  The 2009 budget set out significant funding for 
the university.  It included $500 million for infrastructure, indexation for 
research funding, and a host of other initiatives.292   
 
The Rudd government has also indicated its intention to set up a new quality 
agency to be known as the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency 
(TEQSA).  This agency is to be tasked with a wide set of responsibilities.  The 
policy paper states:  
It will accredit providers, evaluate the performance of institutions and 
programs, encourage best practice, simplify current regulatory 
arrangements and provide greater national consistency…. [it] will take 
the lead in coordinating this work.293  
Next, it is responsible to establish “objective and comparative benchmarks of 
quality and performance.” 294 Further, the policy paper advises that “[t]he agency 
will collect richer data and monitor performance in areas such as student 
selection, retention and exit standards, and graduate employment.”295 This 
increased data collection will certainly increase reporting loads on university 
organisations.  In addition, TEQSA “will evaluate the performance of 
universities and other higher education providers.”296 It will have the power to 
deny the right of an organisation to use the title “university.” From a regulatory 
perspective, the charging of a single agency with rule making, rule enforcement 
and adjudication is a problematic decision. However, it appears the Rudd and, 
subsequently, the Gillard governments is prepared to do so.  
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Finally, the Labor government plans to fund the university system on the basis of 
student demands. That is, rather than either centrally planned matching of 
university programs and places, or university organisations deciding what 
programs to offer, university organisations will have to provide programs and 
courses to the demands of students.  This system appears to be an 
implementation of the voucher system proposed by Bradley.297 As discussed in 
the previous chapter, a voucher system is a type of market instrument. 
 
 
4. Hard and Soft Law Instruments: Regulatory Framework 
 
The regulatory framework for the university is a complex matrix of instruments.  
It involves both state and commonwealth governments for historic and 
constitutional reasons.  As noted the university corporations are creatures of state 
legislation.  All of them, with the exception of The Australian National 
University which was created pursuant to Federal legislation, were created by a 
State or Territory enactment.   
 
Constitutionally, the Commonwealth has no power over education. Pursuant to s. 
51 xxiii of the Commonwealth the Federal government’s sole responsibility with 
respect to education is for ensuring students are properly funded. Accordingly, 
for the Commonwealth to exert power over the university corporations it cannot 
use tools of authority. Such being the case, one would not expect in the 
examination of the legislation to encounter a command and control approach to 
regulating the university corporations. One expects and does indeed find, soft 
law methods of regulation, particularly using government’s treasury tool and 
incentives.  The States have been sidelined in terms of their control of the 
university, for without funds, they are largely without say.  They are able to 
advance their interests solely through the newly created Ministerial Council for 
Tertiary Education and Employment.298 
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The use of treasure incentives fit neatly with the neoliberal rhetoric of “choice” 
and autonomy. Such choice is supposed to represent autonomy.  It has more 
accurately been described as “a paradox: it is the autonomy to be free to 
conform.”299  Hence, the Commonwealth has invited university organizations to 
choose to comply or be cut off from funding and fail.  The general criteria and 
conditions for funding, a practice first established after the Murray Report, are 
contained in the relevant statutes; the details of specific compliance are contained 
in individual contracts negotiated between the individual university organizations 
and the Commonwealth. The legislation is discussed next.  Efforts to obtain a 
negotiated contract, or compact between a university and the Commonwealth 
have been fruitless—a matter addressed by the proposed new compact regime 
under the Gillard government which will publish the compacts on 
Commonwealth websites.300 
 
a. Hard Law: Higher Education Support Act 2003 
 
The foundation for higher education regulation in Australia is the Higher 
Education Support Act 2003 (Cth).301  It instrument is composed of seven 
chapters and runs to some 387 pages in length and includes a “dictionary” as 
Schedule 1.   
 
The objects of the Act are broad, diverse and at least to some degree in clear 
conflict. They are set out in section 2 which reads as follows: 
 
The objects of this Act are: 
 (a) to support a higher education system that: 
  (i) is characterised by quality, diversity and equity of access; 
and 
(ii) contributes to the development of cultural and intellectual 
life in Australia; and  
(iii) is appropriate to meet Australia’s social and economic 
needs for a highly educated and skilled population; 
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Paragraph (a) addresses the system of higher education in Australia. It views this 
level of education as a whole, and within this system is the university.  The 
university at this systemic level is analysed in Chapter 5 of this dissertation as an 
institution.  Clear conflicts in the objects of legislation are evident in 
subparagraph (a)(i) as “quality” understood as a high standard of knowledge is 
likely to be in conflict with equity of access.  This and other conflicts at the 
institutional level are discussed in Chapter 5. Subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) are 
objects best cast as social and public good, which include public economy. 
 
The objects of the Act are continued in section 2, defined as:  
 (b) to support the distinctive purposes of universities, which are: 
(i) the education of persons, enabling them to take a 
leadership role in the intellectual, cultural, economic and 
social development of their communities; and 
  (ii) the creation and advancement of knowledge; and 
(iii) the application of knowledge and discoveries to the 
betterment of communities in Australia and 
internationally; recognising that universities are 
established under laws of the Commonwealth, the States 
and the Territories that empower them to achieve their 
objectives as autonomous institutions through governing 
bodies that are responsible for both the university’s overall 
performance and its ongoing independence 
 
In paragraph (b), the legislation seems to have made a jump from the higher 
education system or institution of paragraph (a) to individual universities, and the 
objects of this subsection are directed to those individual university 
organisations. It is not clear that the legislators intended the shift. Again, these 
objects are not necessarily coherent. For example, education is not necessarily 
coherent with enabling a person for leadership (i), nor is education necessarily 
coherent with the applications of knowledge (iii).  A further incoherence occurs 
where the balance of the Act is about control, reporting and accountability, yet 
the final part of the subsection identifies them as “autonomous institutions” and 
further injects its own organisational preference of “governing bodies that are 
responsible for both the university’s overall performance and its ongoing 
independence.”  These matters are taken up in Chapter 6 addressing the 
organisational form of the university.  
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The final two paragraphs of the section address broad political, economic, social 
and globalisation objectives, and the actual purpose—funding. 
(c) to strengthen Australia’s knowledge base, and enhance the 
contribution of Australia’s research capabilities to national 
economic development, international competitiveness and the 
attainment of social goals;  
 
These objects are clearly the priorities of government.  All three objectives—the 
development of a knowledge base that supports the Australian economy, the 
power of Australia in the international political and economic arenas—are 
important political priorities.  The added “attainment of social goals” appears to 
be an effort to align or improve coherence between the former goals with the 
institutional and organisational objects of higher education and the university 
respectively.   The final paragraph, which reads: “(d) to support students 
undertaking higher education and certain vocational education and training” 
seems to be the basic objective and consistent with the Commonwealth’s 
constitutional jurisdiction as discussed below. 
 
Despite its size, it provides little detail of the regulatory techniques of incentive 
programs; rather it provides a general framework as well as the administrative 
framework for reporting and student financing.  The Act has two main funding 
provisions: the Commonwealth Grant Scheme, and the Other Grants. Each of 
these will be examined in detail below. 
 
The main exercise over the administration of the universities is set out in the 
appendix of National Protocols for Higher Education, and the funding formulae.  
Incorporated by reference in s. 19.20 of the legislation, the National Protocols 
form an important part of the main legislation. The Protocols are composed of an 
introduction and five independent individual protocols titled Protocol A- 
Protocol D.   
 
Their primary objective is to set standards regulating entry into and maintenance 
of status as organisations providing higher education in the Australian higher 
education sector.  They address the criteria for classification as a higher 
education provider in Australia, accreditation of “non self-accrediting” 
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institutions and their courses, self-accrediting non-university providers, 
establishment of new Australian universities, and overseas higher education 
providers wishing to operate in Australia respectively.  The Labor government 
has declared that they remain in force and in any event have become 
institutionalised.  
 
The significance of the status is the access to public funds for capital and 
operating costs as well as tuition subsidies in the form of loans to students.  
Accordingly, the Federal government is able to control these bodies in the 
absence of jurisdictional authority, by denying them access to funds.  Further, it 
has regulated the use of the term “university” to limit organisations’ use of the 
term to those organisations which comply with Federal government research 
agendas. 
 
The dissertation next turns to examine the relevant protocols in some detail. 
 
 
i. Protocol A—All Higher Education Institutions 
 
All such institutions (organizations in this dissertation) must be  
 
“a legal entity... recognized by... Australian legislative instrument... 
contribute to the [national] goals of higher education... [have] a higher 
education purpose that... support[s]... free intellectual inquiry... delivers 
teaching... with advanced knowledge... has governance arrangements, 
quality assurance processes and a[n appropriate] staffing profile. [must 
have] sound financial and business management... comply with AQF 
[where granting qualifications]... academic staff ... active in scholarship 
that informs their teaching... provide sufficient support and infrastructure 
for effective student learning and provide... for protection of students in 
the event of closure of the entity or any of its courses.”302  
 
Essentially, this protocol establishes the ground rules.  The legal entity must be a 
corporation or a trust.  Reference is made to “national goals of higher education”.  
Puzzlingly, neither the legislation nor government policy has any list of “national 
goals of higher education”—nor even a reference to such in the Department 
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charged with the education portfolio. The Act does refer to “national priorities” 
and offers the following definition.  
 
Section 30.20  National priorities 
  A national priority is a particular outcome: 
 (a) that relates to the provision of higher education; and 
 (b) that is an outcome specified in the Commonwealth Grant 
Scheme Guidelines as a national priority. 
 
Given the vague definition, the same section of the Act goes on to provide some 
specific examples. 
 
“The following are examples of national priorities: 
(a) increasing the number of persons undertaking particular 
courses of study; 
(b) increasing the number of particular kinds of persons 
undertaking courses of study; 
(c) increasing the number of persons in particular regions 
undertaking courses of study. 
 
Despite this assistance, however, the relationship between “national priorities” 
and “national goals” is unclear.  
 
Higher education (and hence its purpose) is likewise not defined. Higher 
education may cover anything from hairdressing to astrophysics. Traditionally, 
higher education would require the critical faculties to be engaged and demand at 
least something more than basic job skills. This notion of higher education is 
expressed in the National Protocal’s phrases “free intellectual inquiry” and 
possibly in “advanced knowledge.”303   The focus on intellectual development 
here is clear.   
 
The protocol then identifies the practical concern of delivering teaching, and 
shifts to managerial concerns: governance arrangements, quality assurance, 
staffing profile—and some pressure for scholarship, business plan, and 
infrastructure for students. 
 
These basic criteria for higher education institutions are supplemented by an 
additional protocol for the university.  
                                                 
303
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ii. Protocol D 
 
This protocol is a supplement to Protocol A for university corporations. It reads 
in part:  
“in addition to meeting the nationally agreed general criteria... an 
Australian university will meet the following criteria:... a culture of 
sustained scholarship... in all fields in which courses are offered; 
undertakes research that leads to the creation of new knowledge... in 
those fields in which Research Masters and PhDs... are offered; 
demonstrates commitment of teachers, researchers, course designers and 
assessors to free inquiry and the systematic advancement of knowledge... 
demonstrate governance [and process] admission policies ... underpinned 
by the values and goals of universities... and which ensure the integrity of 
the institution’s academic programs” and “deliver AQF higher education 
qualifications across a range of broad fields of study... and sets standards 
for those qualifications which are equivalent to Australian and 
international standards.” 
 
This protocol differs in that it calls for “sustained” scholarship as a culture of the 
corporation in all areas taught.  Further, where higher research degrees are being 
offered, research in the fields offered is required. Courses are to be designed to 
facilitate “free inquiry”—that is not simple mastery of skills.  
 
The protocol identifies the normative “values and goals of universities”; 
however, it does not specify or define them. Rather, it appears to be a reference 
to the informal, institutional norms of the universities—discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5 of this dissertation.  Importantly, despite mandating quality assurance 
management processes, it places these institutional norms as the foundations for 
appropriate admission policies and integrity of the academic programs. Again, 
integrity is not defined and can be widely interpreted from meaning avoidance of 
plagiarism to philosophical integrity of adherence to values of knowledge 
generally throughout all programs.  
 
The protocol also addresses the managerial concerns of governance and 
compliance with Australian Qualifications Framework.   
 
In essence, this Protocol establishes a baseline for university organizations and 
does so at least in part by institutionalising the values of the academic profession.  
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Curiously, it does so not by empowering the academic profession, but by 
empowering management while undermining the basic mechanisms of quality 
control—adequate control of inputs: adequate resourcing; restricting access to 
suitably qualified students, and employment of suitably qualified academics. 
 
iii. State University Acts and University Corporations Law 
 
The States’ Ministries of Education have enacated various pieces of legislation to 
regulate university corporations operating within their jurisdiction.  The 
legislation since Dawkins has for the most part been simply brought the state 
statutes into conformity with the imperatives imposed by the Federal 
government.304 
 
The university organisations are all incorporated bodies.  That is, each one is a 
corporation created by statute.  Unlike Corporations Act companies, they have 
restricted membership and objects clauses that restrict their activities.  For 
example, membership in Melbourne University is limited to the following: 
 
 (a) a council and its members; 
 (b) the graduates; 
 (c) the professors; 
 (d) members of the academic staff; 
 (e) members of the faculties and boards of studies; 
 (f) the graduate students; 
 (g) the undergraduate students; 
 (h) the diplomates; 
 (i) such members of the staff of the University, other than the 
academic staff, as are designated from time to time by the 
council; 
 (j) such members of the staffs of the affiliated colleges as are 
designated from time to time by the council as members of 
the University; and 
 (k) such students (if any) as are neither graduate students nor 
undergraduate students. 305 
 
Further, it is limited to the following objects:  
 
The objects of the University include— 
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 (a) to provide and maintain a teaching and learning environment 
of excellent quality offering higher education at an 
international standard; 
 (b) to undertake scholarship, research and research training of 
international standing and to apply that scholarship and 
research to the advancement of knowledge and to the benefit 
of the well-being of the Victorian, Australian and 
international communities; 
 (c) to equip graduates of the University to excel in their chosen 
careers and to contribute to the life of the community; 
 (d) to serve the Victorian, Australian and international 
communities and the public interest by— 
 (i) enriching cultural and community life; 
 (ii) elevating public awareness of educational, scientific and 
artistic developments; 
 (iii) promoting critical enquiry, informed intellectual 
discourse and public debate within the University and in 
the wider society; 
 (e) to confer degrees and grant diplomas, certificates and other 
awards.306 
 
 
b. Soft Law: Regulation by Consensus, Code and Competitive 
Schemes 
 
The funding itself is complex.  It is broken up into at least seventeen different 
sources, some in the form of compliance grants and some in the form of 
competitive, contestable funding.  Each of the various funds sets a distinct 
objective the government wishes to achieve and sets a pathway university 
organizations, having complied with the Protocols must further follow to obtain 
the associated funds—in Morgan and Yeung’s terms, regulation by code.307   
 
A primary government objective for the university are its economic goal: 
supplying the labour market with trained graduates, minimising expenditure of 
public funds by characterising higher education as a primarily private good and 
charging fees accordingly, and maintaining higher education as a significant 
source of export generated revenues, which it does through positioning the 
Australian university as a high quality institution.   
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A brief review of the major public funding sources follows.  It should be noted 
that private sources of funding are primarily student fees in the form of domestic 
subsidies and from international students who pay full fees. Unlike other 
developed countries, the role of philanthropic and industry investment in 
university based research is minimal in Australia. 
 
i. Commonwealth Grant Scheme 
 
This grant scheme is developed pursuant to Part2-2 of the Higher Education 
Support Act 2003 (Cth). As the basic grant, it is fairly comprehensive addressing 
all of the following:  
 
• National priorities  
• Regional loading  
• Medical student loading  
• Enabling loading  
• National Governance Protocols & Higher Education Workplace 
Relations Requirements 
• Adjustments to basic grant amounts  
• Determining the funding clusters  
• Special purpose advances 
 
This grant supports the basic teaching activities of the university organisation. As 
the government explains, it “supports the provision of undergraduate and some 
non-research postgraduate higher education places.”308  
 
While government does not specify which disciplines should be offered by a 
university, or how a particular university should manage its funds, the 
government controls the course offerings by the Commonwealth Grant Scheme. 
Government does so by providing individual higher education providers an 
amount for an agreed number of Equivalent Full Time Student Load in a given 
year.  The amount is determined by reference to overall numbers per discipline 
cluster309 as established by the government.310  That is, funding is set to 
government calculations of costs associated with teaching each clusters 
regardless of student interest or other social or public motivations.   
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Government will provide higher subsidies to some subject clusters, but will set 
the numbers of subsidies available.  For example, it funds commerce and law at a 
cluster 1 level of $1,674 and humanities at $4,647.311  However, it may fund 
15,000 law places but only 1,000 humanities places.  Non-economic objectives 
such as personal development, arts and social projects will receive only limited 
funds. Indeed, the Minister has the discretion to determine that any particular 
course should not be supported by the Federal government under the 
Commonwealth Grant Scheme—and no guidelines for the exercise of that 
discretion are offered.312 The Grant Scheme is highly prescriptive in the powers 
granted to the Minister313 including the discretion to provide no commonwealth 
supported places at all to any particular higher education provider.314  
 
In other words, a limited amount of funding will be assigned to clusters that are 
not supported by government—regardless of student interest or other social or 
public motivations—and government will fund those interests it seeks to 
advance.  In line with political debate in Australia being focused on economic 
growth, and government’s strong commitment to neoliberalism and economic 
rationalism raise the possibility that priority will be given to those clusters which 
advance those objectives.   
 
ii. Other Grant Schemes 
 
The Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth) works as incentive based 
instrument in other ways to achieve “national priorities”—defined as above and 
explained in the previous paragraph.  Section 41-10 is a table of programs and 
incentive based programs.   
 
Eligibility for grants under this Part 
Item Purpose of grant Who is eligible 
1 Grants to promote equality of 
opportunity in higher education 
*Table A providers 
                                                 
311
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Eligibility for grants under this Part 
Item Purpose of grant Who is eligible 
2 Grants to promote the productivity 
of higher education providers 
*Table A providers 
3 Grants to enhance learning and 
teaching in higher education 
*Table A providers 
4 Grants to support national institutes 
specified in the Other Grants 
Guidelines for the purposes of this 
item 
*Table A providers 
5 Grants to support the capital 
development projects of higher 
education providers 
*Table A providers and *Table B 
providers 
6 Grants to assist with the cost of 
higher education providers’ 
superannuation liabilities 
*Table A providers 
7 Grants to support research by, and 
the research capability of, higher 
education providers 
*Table A providers and *Table B 
providers 
8 Grants to support the training of 
research students 
*Table A providers and *Table B 
providers 
8A Grants to assist with the cost of 
providing the practical component of 
teacher education 
*Table A providers, *Table B 
providers, and bodies corporate that 
are specified in the Other Grants 
Guidelines for the purposes of this 
item 
9 Grants to foster collaboration and 
reform in higher education 
*Table A providers and bodies 
corporate that are specified in the 
Other Grants Guidelines for the 
purposes of this item 
9A Grants to support diversity and 
structural reform 
*Table A providers, *Table B 
providers that are universities, and 
bodies corporate that are specified in 
the Other Grants Guidelines for the 
purposes of this item 
9B Grants to support structural 
adjustment 
*Table A providers and *Table B 
providers that are universities 
10 Grants to support the development 
of systemic infrastructure used by 
higher education providers 
*Table A providers and bodies 
corporate that are specified in the 
Other Grants Guidelines for the 
purposes of this item 
11 Grants for activities that: 
(a) assure and enhance the quality of 
Australia’s higher education 
sector; or 
(b) foster an understanding of the 
importance of, or promote 
research and scholarship in, 
science, social science or the 
humanities in Australia; or 
(c) support open access to higher 
education across Australia. 
*Table A providers and bodies 
corporate that are specified in the 
Other Grants Guidelines for the 
purposes of this item 
12 Grants to assist higher education 
providers with the transitional costs 
of changes to maximum student 
contribution amounts 
Higher education providers to which 
Commonwealth-supported places 
have been allocated for any year 
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These incentives further stretch university organisations to achieve government 
objectives in regional areas—maintaining regional economies and a locally 
trained workforce.315 That is, government provides revenues to revenue starved 
organisations to stay and service regional areas.  In some instances, regional 
universities are the major employers in the region and critical to the on-going 
economic viability of those regional centres.  Further, government is seeking to 
improve efficiencies in regional university organisations and is providing 
incentive funding to achieve that end.   
A separate “medical student loading” is an incentive to train physicians—a long 
and gruelling training program that leaves significant parts of Australia under-
serviced. Thus, university organisations are conscripted to achieving this 
governmental task. 
 
 
 
iii. Other Grants—Subsidiary Regulation  
 
The Other Grants are regulated by two pieces of subsidiary legislation, Other 
Grants Guidelines (Research) 2009316 (“Research Guidelines”) and Other Grants 
Guidelines (Education) 2008317 (“Education Guidelines”). The Research 
Guidelines similarly have a variety of policy aims and objectives and set out 
many competitive research grants.  These are set out in the four different chapters 
that make up the Guidelines. Chapter 1 has four grant schemes as follows. The 
Research Infrastructure Block Grants (RIBG) Scheme, is a scheme designed “to 
maintain and strengthen Australia’s knowledge base and research capabilities by 
developing an effective research and research training system.”318 
 
The Joint Research Engagement (JRE) program is designed to: “give greater 
emphasis to end-user research by encouraging and supporting collaborative 
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research activities between universities, industry and end-users, beyond those 
specifically supported by competitive grants.”319 
 
The Sustainable Research Excellence (SRE) in Universities program is designed 
to address the negative impacts resulting from more than a decade of under 
funding, specifically, “to ensure that these institutions are better placed to meet 
the indirect cost of research activities that are not entirely met by the various 
competitive grant programs.”320  
 
The final scheme in the chapter is the Institutional Grants Scheme (IGS).  The 
IGS is an annual block grant to support research and research training activities. 
It allows discretion in spending on “any activity related to research.” 
The government adds: “Specifically, the IGS aims to… allow HEPs to manage 
their own research activities and set their own priorities, assist HEPs to response 
flexibly to their research environment in accordance with their own strategies 
[and] enhance support for areas of research strength.”321   
 
Under the Gillard government, following Rudd, the IGS is to be replaced by 
“compacts.”  These compacts are comprehensive “agreements” between 
universities and the Federal government directly.  In the language of the 
government, the compacts speak to “the responsibilities of the Commonwealth to 
ensure that the institutions it funds are sustainable and deliver the outputs for 
which they are funded, that their outcomes are of a high quality and that they 
comply with their legal obligations.”322  
 
This assessment framework addresses four government identified principle 
elements: organisational sustainability, achievements in higher education 
provision, quality outcomes, and compliance.  Government monitors and 
evaluates each institution by an extensive data collection, annual reports from 
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each organisation, AUQA audits and biennial visits by senior bureaucrats from 
DEEWR and DIISR. 
 
Chapter 2 of the Research Guidelines offer further competitive funding.  The first 
of these is the Research Training Scheme (RTS).  The objectives of this scheme 
are to increase the number and quality of trainee researchers.  It is a scheme of 
block grants, granted on an annual basis to support research training for students 
undertaking Doctorate and Masters degrees by research.  
 
The objectives of the RTS are to: 
 
(1) Enhance the quality of research training provision in Australia; 
(2) Improve the responsiveness of HEPs to the needs of their research 
students; 
(3) Encourage HEPs to develop their own research training profiles; 
(4) Ensure the relevance of research degree programs to labour market 
requirements; and 
(5) Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of research training323 
 
In order to achieve this later result, students will have to be pushed through more 
quickly.  
 
Government has also created a Commercialisation Training Scheme.  The 
Guidelines state:  
The objective of the CTS is to provide high quality research 
commercialisation training for the next generation of Australian 
researchers (Doctorate and masters by research students) as a means of 
equipping them with the skills, knowledge and experience necessary to 
bring research-based ideas, inventions and innovations to market.324 
 
In addition, the Guidelines make provision of non-public universities and bodies 
to access certain funds to assist with the development of infrastructure to assist in 
data collection and compliance for governmental purposes, as well as providing 
funds to other learned bodies, such as the learned academies of Australia.  
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The Education Guidelines are made up of nine chapters setting out a variety of 
competitive grants to achieve various government policy aims.  These include,  
Indigenous Support Program the purpose of which is: “to assist eligible higher 
education providers to meet the special needs of Indigenous Australian students 
and to advance the goals of the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Education Policy.”325  The Equity and Disability grants are designed to “to 
undertake activities that assist in removing barriers to access for disadvantaged 
domestic students and promote equality of opportunity in higher education.”326  
A Disability Policy seeks to distribute funds through three programs:  
 
(a) Additional Support for Students with Disabilities;  
(b) Australian Disability Clearinghouse on Education and Training; 
and  
(c) Performance-based Disability Support funding. 327  
 
Another series of grants are aimed at Learning and Teaching.  The Learning and 
Teaching Fund, is to “reward those higher education providers for excellence and 
improvement in learning and teaching.” 328 
 
Special grants programs have been created to fund quality assurance and 
enhancement, and are available to some of the bodies that contribute to the soft 
law institutional regulation of the university.  These are set out in the guidelines: 
(a) The  Australian Institute for Learning and Teaching in Higher 
Education (ALTC); 
(b) The Australian Universities Quality Agency (AUQA); 
(c) Graduate Careers Australia (GCA); 
(d) The Australian Council for Educational Research Limited 
(ACER);  
(e) Universities Australia (UA); and 
(f) The Organisation for Economic, Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) 329 
A special grant has been established for open access (Open University 
Australia).330  
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A Diversity and Structural Adjustment Fund has been established for reform.  
Specifically, it seeks  
to promote structural reform by eligible higher education providers that 
supports greater specialisation among providers, more diversity in the 
higher education sector and better responsiveness to labour markets 
operating in the local or national interest.331 
 
In addition, funds are available under the Educational Guidelines for a variety of 
other policy initiatives.  
 
iv. Non Higher Education Support Act competitive funding 
schemes  
Outside of this legislation other funding schemes are or have been available.  
These include the Rudd Government’s Better Universities Renewal Funding 
(BURF) announced in the 2008-09 Budget as a one off $500 million to address 
the effects of the severe underfunding of previous governments on 
infrastructure;332 a Capital Development Pool (CDP) Program to encourage 
development of campuses in suburban growth corridors and regional centres and 
particularly projects which support greater collaboration between higher 
education providers and other organisations of all types, that assist higher 
education providers to establish or expand courses identified by the government 
as discipline areas of national importance, information and communications 
technology infrastructure projects which improve the cost-effectiveness and 
quality of educational delivery, and projects which enhance capital infrastructure 
for student amenities.333 
 
The Nation-building Funds Act 2008 (Cth)334 establishes the Education 
Investment Fund which subsumes Higher Education Endowment Fund.335 Under 
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this Act competitive funding for capital improvements is also available to higher 
education providers. A National Competitive Grants Program is administered by 
the ARC and NHMRC.336 In sum, there is a plethora of soft law incentive 
schemes which universities must diligently pursue in order to maintain financial 
viability. The regulatory choice of instruments appears to rely solely on 
competition.  
  
 
5. Accountability for the Institution of the Australian University: 
Westminster  
 
This section provides an overview of institutional accountability.  That is it 
examines the accountability structure and processes for the university institution 
in Australia.  In Australia, accountability for the university institution is in the 
first instance in the political arena via the Westminster system.  This public 
accountability is a function of the location of the university on the public side of 
the public-private divide.  The decision to create university corporations by way 
of Parliament makes them public bodies at law.  Additionally, the use of public 
funds to operate the national system makes them public. Accordingly, both their 
individual status as statutory corporations and as a publicly funded system makes 
them public.  That makes the State and Federal governments accountable for the 
university institution and corporations.  
 
At the Federal level, the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace 
Relations reports to Parliament pursuant to section 63(1) of the Public Service 
Act 1999 (Cth).  The most recent annual report, 2007-2008, expresses the 
Department’s view of that for which it is accountable to Parliament.337  In the 
first 264 page volume of the report, Higher Education is reported as “Outcome 3” 
and covers 24 pages. It offers an overview of the main activities, including the 
revocation of the National Governance Protocols (firmly entrenched in any 
event) and the Higher Education Workplace Relations Requirements— budget 
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information, measures of effectiveness with highlights and aggregates of funding 
programs and projects, and the plan for the sector under the Government.  
Parliament has remained silent about the reports.338 
 
Understanding whether, what and how the individual university corporations are 
achieving their mandates is done via an Institutional Assessment Framework.  
The report explains it thus: 
The department monitors accountability, quality, fairness and financial 
viability of higher education institutions and the sector through the 
Institution Assessment Framework (IAF). The IAF aims to ensure that the 
institutions it funds are sustainable and deliver the outputs for which they 
are funded, that their outcomes are of high quality and that they comply 
with their legal obligations. The department’s assessments are based on 
quantitative and qualitative data from universities and external sources. 
Assessments focus on the four key areas of organisational sustainability, 
achievements in higher education provision, quality, and compliance with 
requirements of the Higher Education Support Act 2003. In 2007–08, the 
department visited 21 Australian universities for bilateral discussions as 
part of the IAF process.339  
 
In sum, the report indicates no problems, makes no recommendations for reform 
and is tabled, open to question in Parliament.  
 
a. Accountability for Australian University Corporations: Law and 
NPM 
 
Accountability for individual university corporations as opposed to the institution 
is like any a statutory body, also through the courts.  That is, the university is 
subject to administrative law requirements.  The application of administrative 
law has been limited. It is not that the university has escaped public 
accountability via public law; rather, that the public law has had a limited role in 
the regulation of the university corporation.  There are a number of court cases 
on this topic. These include Australian National University v. Burns,340 a case in 
which a professor had become senile and the university wished to fire him, 
Australian National University v. Lewins341 dealing with promotions, and Griffith 
                                                 
338
 A search of Hansard for the years 1990-2009 returned not a single question concerning the 
university in the reports. 
339
 Department of Education Employment and Workplace Relations (2008). Annual Report 2007-
08. Canberra, Parliament., p. 60 
340
 Australian National University v. Burns (1982) 43 ALR 25. 
341
  Australian National University v. Lewins (1996) 68 FCR 87.  
 154 
v. Tang,342 a case in which a PhD student appealed the termination of her 
candidacy by the university on the grounds of her having falsified scientific data.  
Two other cases Quickenden v O’Connor343 in which a lecturer objected to a new 
union agreement which included performance measures and University of 
Western Australia v Gray344 involving ownership rights in intellectual property in 
innovative medical research round out the collection. While the latter two cases 
refer to the university as a “trading corporation”, they provide little insight into 
the legal nature of the university or provide a distinct regulatory structure for the 
university corporation. None of these cases addresses accountability in any broad 
sense of either university corporations or the university as an institution.  Rather, 
as appropriate to the courts, they examine narrowly defined, specific acts of 
university corporations in the normal course of operations. In addition to courts, 
various inquiries have been instituted, as for example, in the case of Professor 
Hall and UNSW examining questioned use of scientific data345 and by way of the 
independent investigatory bodies as in the case of the Independent Commission 
Against Corruption investigation at the University of Newcastle.346 While the 
latter inquiry encompassed a broader review of the university organisation, it did 
little to address the matters under consideration in this dissertation. 
 
Accountability via the courts and such inquiries, however, is not the only or even 
the main form of accountability.  As will discussed in greater detail below, 
accountability of Australian university corporations is primarily by way of 
reporting—an obligation that has increased significantly under NPM. In a review 
of the reporting requirements of Australian university corporations 
commissioned by the then AVCC, consultants PhillipsKPA wrote: 
 
universities [are]... undertaking a very diverse range of activities, [and] 
are probably subject to more reporting requirements than any other type 
                                                 
342
 Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7. 
343
  Quickenden v O'Connor, Commissioner of Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
(2001) 184 ALR 260. 
344
  University of Western Australia v Gray (2009) 259 ALR 224., University of Western 
Australia v Gray (No 20) (2009) 246 ALR 603. 
345
 Van Der Weyden, M. (2004). "Managing allegations of scientific misconduct and fraud: 
lessons from the “Hall affair” " Medical Journal of Australia 180 (4): 149-151  
346
 Cripps, J. (2005). Findings of corrupt conduct & disciplinary action recommended in 
Newcastle University report. Sydney, Independent Commission Against Corruption. 
 155 
of organisational entity. This total sum of reporting requirements is 
unseen by any single government agency.347  
 
The consultants go on to note that excluding state based reporting, and reporting 
on activities not directly related to teaching, learning and research, university 
organisations are subject to “more than 30 major categories of reporting 
obligations and over 100 more specific elements.”348 
 
Accountability for Australian university corporations is primarily by way of 
reporting. A brief example of the accountability reporting can be drawn from The 
University of Melbourne, which provides an overview of its reporting cycle.349  
The overview identifies the main form of reporting as by way of reports filed 
with the government. The University of Melbourne’s 2007 Annual Report is in 
excess of 156 pages and is divided to address the issues the university believes 
addresses its accountabilities and it believes are important in terms of disclosure. 
The first seven pages is information on Council membership, its senior executive 
and leadership. 350 The pages from 14-64 provide a five year statistical profile, 
information about governance as well as information about its activities.  The 
university reports on its activities in research and research training, learning and 
training, knowledge transfer, international engagement being whole of 
organisation measures largely based on performance in international rankings by 
way of comparing outcomes with “Performance Against Targets.” In addition, it 
publishes information about some noteworthy achievements and plans, and 
highlights work by particularly successful members of the academic profession. 
 
It discloses and reports on ten of its statutory reporting obligations. These 
statutory reporting obligations occupy pages 71-83.  They are:  
1. Environmental Sustainability, Statement on Occupational 
Health and Safety Matters,  
2. Statement on the University’s Risk Management Strategy 
3. Conformity with the Building Act 1993 
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4. National Competition Policy and Competitive Neutrality 
Requirements 
5. Compliance with the Educational Services for Overseas 
Students Act 
6. Statutes and Regulations 
7. Whistleblowers Protection Act 2001 
8. Grievance Procedures   
9. Freedom of Information, and  
10. Statement Concerning Compulsory Non-academic Fees, 
Subscriptions and Charges 
 
The final and significant portion of the report, pages 84-154, address the finances 
of the corporation. For the year 2007-8 these indicate a gross income of $1.5 
billion and a net of $5.2 million, a loss on university investments of 
approximately $300 million reducing endowment funds from $1.4 billion to $1.1 
billion as a result of investments in financial products effected by the global 
economic crisis as the main figures.  Further, reporting on subsidiaries and 
breakdowns of income sources, expenses and comparative figures from previous 
years provide an overview of the corporation’s financial situation. 
 
In addition to that report, the university publishes as part of its annual report an 
investment report and provides its budget, and strategic plans.351 Finally, the 
university published a glossy 28 page booklet “Ensuring Accountability: A 
Strategic Framework for Planning, Managing & Assuring Growing Esteem 
2009” indicating its efforts to compete in the national and international 
institutional competition. While this publication is a voluntary initiative, it is 
likely to add some type of regulatory influence as institutionalist research 
indicates.352 
 
The reporting cycle can be summarised as follows.  First, the reporting is focused 
on accounting for the use of funds to achieve government determined outcomes.  
There are considerable sums and assets involved and so financial reporting is 
appropriate and important.  However, I argue that normatively it should not be 
the first or dominant issue of the reporting requirements.  This structure of the 
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report reflects the normative ordering of the regulatory framework. Second, it is 
focused on the more immediately measurable outcomes.  That is, to the focus is 
on outputs, compliance, and those qualities readily measured.  Third, it operates 
within the quality framework determined by the government—which has 
declared its purpose in the quality agenda as providing “quality assurance” to 
international markets to maintain the standing of Australian higher education—as 
opposed to quality education. While certainly there is a public interest in this 
disclosure, the use of that information in some decision making contexts is 
questionable.353 
 
b. Accountability standards 
 
In considering a regulatory system and the level of coherence in its structure, the 
importance of the choice of accountability standards cannot be overemphasised.  
As noted in Chapter 2 choosing one standard over another is a normative 
political choice that shapes the organisational objects.  At a most basic level, the 
standards society expects from the university institution are those critical 
products, “teaching excellence, acquiring critical thinking and analytic skills, 
excellence in research, enriching civic values and promoting a learning 
society.”354 Yet these basic and most important products present the most 
complex and difficult if not intractable problems in measurement. Indeed, one of 
Power’s main criticisms of the audit explosion is its dysfunctional impact on 
audited organisations.  Power argues forcefully that the re-organisation and 
design of activities, structures and processes in order to make them auditable not 
only distracts them from their core or first order activities, but have the potential 
to fundamentally distort them.355 He uses as an example the higher education 
system in the UK with its Research Assessment Exercise and Higher Education 
Quality Council356—a system which Australia has sought to emulate. Further, 
although accountability for these critical institutional products is primarily 
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political through the Westminster system, the actual impacts on university 
operations and what forms the basis of ministerial reporting is the audited reports 
presented by bureaucrats to politicians. 
 
The legal standards for the university corporation are set out in the objects of the 
corporation as found in the enabling statute. Further, legal standards flow from a 
number of pieces of legislation calling for different types of accountabilities and 
the individually negotiated funding agreements. The problem with classifying the 
standards in the Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth) as legal standards is 
that they are not legal standards in the sense of command and control. That is, the 
standards are not backed by authority to enforce through the legal system.  
Because the Federal government lacks jurisdiction to enforce compliance using 
the legal system, it can only use its tool of treasure. The standard it chooses will 
only be enforced by censure or reward.  
 
While some of the general information about the standard contained in the 
individually negotiated funding agreements may be surmised from “Performance 
Against Targets” type sections in Annual Reports, the specifics of the standards 
as set out in the individually negotiated funding agreements are held in 
confidence.  Attempts to gain access without resort to Freedom of Information 
legislation to these funding agreements for this dissertation were denied by both 
university corporations as well as the Federal government.   
 
The only other source of information about university performance, Auditor 
General Offices of the various states and the Commonwealth to date have been 
for finance only.357 No Australian university has been subjected to a performance 
audit by this office. Thus availability of appropriate measures from government 
sources is limited. 
 
There are significant informal institutional standards which apply to the 
university that are of long standing—leading to another stream of conservatism 
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stemming from the institutions of the academic profession rather than political 
orientation.  These standards are based on reputation and prestige. The measures 
of prestige and reputation each carry their own distinct standards.358 An example 
of these standards which have recently become more formalised are the rankings 
by Shanghai Jiao Tong University,359 Times Higher Education Supplement,360 
and Leiden University.361 Recently, the Australian government has raised the 
possibility of developing its own national ranking system to reflect its own 
interests in the university and presumably to both help inform students and 
pressure university organisations to compete. University organizations compete 
in order to develop their prestige, reputation and to survive.   
 
Prestige, reputation and survival of a university organisation are dependent in 
part on members of the academic profession that form the core of the university.  
Standards for the academic profession are prestige related based on published 
outputs, place of employment and grant money generated among other things. 
Standards are based on perceived quality and quantity of work.  Although these 
standards operate independently of the university organisation, they are 
intimately related as their inclusion in various ranking indicates and exercise, as 
Dill points out, the ultimate control over production.362 
 
i. Public Standards: Education, Research and Public Service 
 
The standards for education are in the first instance coordinated at the national 
level and are of an NPM style.363 This coordination, all rather recent and 
untested, is done through the Australian Qualifications Framework (AQF), 
currently presided over by John Dawkins, and quality is assured through the 
Australian Universities Quality Agency (AUQA).  The AQF is formed by the 
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Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs 
(MCEETYA), replaced in 2010 by the Ministerial Council for Tertiary Education 
and Employment (MCTEE).364 The Australian Qualifications Framework 
establishes the range of qualifications from high school through to the doctorate.  
It identifies the competencies the qualifications are purported to certify. It is a 
minimal output standard. For example, the standard for a bachelor’s degree is as 
follows: 
 
• the acquisition of a systematic and coherent body of knowledge, the 
underlying principles and concepts, and the associated communication 
and problem-solving skills; 
• development of the academic skills and attributes necessary to undertake 
research, comprehend and evaluate new information, concepts and 
evidence from a range of sources;  
• development of the ability to review, consolidate, extend and apply the 
knowledge and techniques learnt, including in a professional context;  
• a foundation for self-directed and lifelong learning; and 
• interpersonal and teamwork skills appropriate to employment and/or 
further study.365 
 
Knowledge is viewed traditionally as systematic, coherent and discipline based. 
The standard for the knowledge objects while primarily set internally by the 
university corporations as self-accrediting bodies, are increasingly set externally. 
 
AUQA, the quality regulator, was established in 2000.  Its mandate is set out in 
its Constitution.  Section 1.5 states that its objectives are to:   
 
(a) Arrange and manage a system of periodic audits of: 
(i) the quality of the academic activities, including attainment of standards 
of performance and outcomes of Australian universities and other higher 
education institutions; 
(ii) the quality assurance arrangements intended to maintain and elevate 
that quality; 
(iii) compliance with criteria set out in the National Protocols for Higher 
Education Approval Processes; 
(iv) and monitor, review, analyse and provide public reports on the quality 
of outcomes in Australian universities and higher education institutions.366 
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Interestingly, nowhere in the Constitution is there a definition of quality—or for 
that matter, in its Audit Manual.367  Rather, AUQA works on the assumption that 
the higher education provider has an objective of providing quality programs and 
focuses its attention on the quality systems within the particular provider 
organisation. It attempts to work with the particular university to help it achieve 
its mission and qualities the particular university seeks to achieve rather than 
imposing an external standard.  
 
Basically, AUQA is a quality standard auditor with an internal focus, examining 
quality processes and aimed toward organisational improvement. That is, it 
identifies processes that are deemed to ensure quality within the university, 
aiming at consistency across courses and programs in terms of delivery and 
overall standardisation.  
 
The National Protocols, which as noted have statutory force, are very broad 
organizational standards that set out the nature of organizations wishing to use 
the word “university” in their names. They set out certain specific standards such 
as the size of the governing board.  This change was part of a neoliberal political 
agenda designed to change the nature of the university corporation to make it 
more like a trading corporation.368  It is an external standard designed to suit state 
interests. 
 
As noted earlier, the measures and standards for research are difficult to 
establish. Nevertheless, governments have attempted to standardise the measures 
by way of various frameworks—the Research Quality Framework under 
Howard, and the Excellence in Research Australia under Rudd. Although neither 
of these standards translates directly into legal standards for reasons just noted, 
they are designed to have a direct impact on funding. Standards for public 
engagement are non-existent, although some efforts have been made to develop 
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policy for such engagement369 and measure public engagement as composing 
part of the positive externalities of higher education discussed above and in the 
chapter on public goods.  Whether such standards are beneficial or helpful is 
questionable at best as their impact changes research and publishing and invites a 
strategic response.370 Indeed, the impact of such standards and measures have 
been used by management, it has been argued, such that teaching and research 
have been “colonised by hard managerialism”371 leading to what has been 
referred to as the “McDonaldization of Higher Education.”372  
 
 
ii. Private Standards: Prestige and Survival  
 
The private or quasi-market standard for measuring university organisations is 
prestige and prestige itself is measured by way of rankings.  Prestige is based on 
a set of indicators taken to be representative of quality.  These include everything 
from notable graduates, attractive architecture and grounds, to well recognized 
members of the academic profession, “stars” carrying tokens of professional 
esteem such as Nobel prizes or highly cited articles, honours bestowed by public 
bodies such as honorary degrees, public consultancies to government, and 
prestigious positions on academic and other professional bodies. It is further 
supplemented by the size of research grants, laboratory and other resources put at 
the disposal of these members of the profession and their trainees.  Prestige is a 
combined result of financial savvy of its management and the investment the 
academic profession is able to make in the execution of its educational and 
research mandate.373  
 
Survival is a more complex matter for the university organizations and dependent 
in part on their prestige. Not only must they obtain resources from their 
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environment but they must effectively mobilise the resources they do have.  They 
must be able to attract and retain quality academics. Further they must engage the 
members of the academic profession to expend discretionary energy in order to 
obtain the best efforts in education and research. University organisations must 
also attract students of sufficient quality, determination and economic power in 
order to survive.  Finally, the university organisation must encourage and enable 
its academics to produce reputable research and contribute to solving local 
problems.   
 
c. Accountability for Australian University Corporations: Social 
 
In addition to the political and legal accountability, this dissertation argues that 
the university has a public social accountability. That is, members of the 
academic profession bear public accountability.  Their accountability occurs 
through their participation in the university’s dissemination mission: the 
academic’s research and teaching functions. The professional accountability is 
for compliance with the norms of the profession. 
 
This public accountability is most evident when members of the academic 
profession  fail with respect to their professional obligations vis-à-vis the 
profession, as seen in certain recent instances in the case of fraudulent data by 
Professor Hall at UNSW,374 with the case corruption of student results at the 
University of Newcastle and consequent discipline recommendations against 
Professor English375 and a public resignation of Vice-Chancellor David Hall at 
Monash University for plagiarism committed at various points in his career.376  
 
d. Accountability for Australian University Corporations: Markets 
 
The Rudd government proposed to adopt Bradley’s recommendations in creating 
a market for students via a voucher system—a proposal continued under the 
Gillard Government. While the details are not yet available, the general idea is to 
cause the university corporations to produce those services in demand by 
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students.377 This accountability will cause the universities to shift resources 
toward producing the courses, which reflect the preferences in the current market 
of students.  
 
Further, the university corporations have a type of market accountability by way 
of their cooperation with parties in the private sector. That is, universities will 
only find funding to produce research desired by the private sector.  Both of 
these accountabilities reduce the organisations’ ability to pursue their own 
independent objectives.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the regulatory framework for the university is 
complex.  It has identified the wide variety of social objectives and problems 
assigned to the university and which have been used to inform policy.  The 
policies driving the regulation have ranged from nation building, to global 
competitiveness to social equity.  Over time the social objectives and problems 
and their related policies have shifted from broad public foci to private economic 
concerns.  The argument about the role of the university is picked up and argued 
in detail in Chapters 5 and 6 and implications for regulatory coherence 
considered.  The lack of continuity of policy over time has had significant, 
destabilising effects on the university—an argument to be advanced through 
Chapters 6 and 7. In addition to policy informed by government agendas, the 
regulation of the university has been driven by ideology. NPM based regulation 
by information with its heavy reliance on audit mechanisms has moved the 
university toward shifting its normative ordering to prioritise the production of 
second order auditable outcomes rather than first order less measureable goals of 
teaching, research and public service.  
 
A variety of regulatory arrangements have been utilised to implement the various 
policies.  These have included commissions such as the Commonwealth 
Universities Commission, the Australian Universities Commission and CTEC 
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staffed by academics and later by bureaucrats.  More recently, the administration 
has been done by departments internal to government such as DEEWR, and the 
use of quality agencies. AQUA and the proposed TEQSA.  The framing of the 
social problem and regulatory response including administrative arrangements 
have followed the concerns and ideology of the government of the day rather 
than any coherence with norms or organising problem.  The lack of attention to 
coherence, leads to an increasingly incoherent system of regulation.  The 
jettisoning of the buffer agencies and their related expertise leads to the 
suggestion that government’s commitment to its ideology causes it to ignore 
specialist input.  The rejection of the CTEC, the last buffer agency, is in line with 
Power’s argument that under the NPM audit regime, technical expertise has been 
displaced by managers whose grasp of the underlying issues is marginal, but 
epistemologically questionable faith in auditable numbers unshakable.378  The 
impact of this incoherence is manifested in the impact of the auditable measures 
where the institution of the university and university organisations are re-
organised to produce auditable outcomes. Auditable outcomes, it was argued, are 
the outcomes of second order activities and over time tend to become a substitute 
for producing the first order outcomes for which the university (or any other such 
organisation) is designed.379  
 
The Chapter has also examined in detail the regulatory features of the legislation. 
The last major legislative reform led to the enactment of the Higher Education 
Support Act 2003 (Cth). It remains the foundational piece of legislation. The 
Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth) although a hard law instrument, 
because of the limited jurisdiction of the Federal government, relies extensively 
on soft law models of regulation. That is, rather than using authority, it uses 
incentives to gain compliance, and as noted, information.  Its various funding 
schemes create a plethora of competitive arrangements which conceive of 
university organisations as competitive rational individuals pursuing largely the 
same goals and objectives in the same competition. The creation of an 
increasingly competitive ground on identical measures, it is argued, creates 
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intensified pressure to compete as opposed to carrying on its traditional 
functions. That is, the intense competition consumes additional resources which 
are shifted from first order operational issues to addressing competitive demands.   
 
Further, the regulation re-shapes the university organisations and the institution. 
It does so by imposing significant auditable reporting obligations on the 
university organisations. In doing so, the legislation shifts the attention of the 
university from its mission as argued in Chapter 5, to the production of auditable 
outputs. Both of these changes introduce new incoherence into the regulatory 
framework as they require the university to shift their focus from the research 
and teaching at hand to competition on measures which are not necessarily 
relevant to their operation, and to auditable outputs which would otherwise not 
consume limited resources.  
 
Under the Rudd Government, there were to be some significant changes which 
have been continued under the Gillard Government.  Although the details have 
only been partially released, it is clear that there is increased funding, a new all 
encompassing quality agency, and a demand driven system of education 
provision by way of student vouchers. The voucher system is the use of a market 
type instrument which is designed to increase competition between university 
organisations.  These changes have the potential to change considerably the 
institution of the university in Australia. Whether or not they do, and if so, in 
what ways, is a matter of speculation at this point. Accordingly, no conclusions 
about the coherence or incoherence of these changes has been argued, although 
the voucher system will be discussed at different points including the final 
coherence analysis in Chapter 7. 
 
The accountability system for the university and the higher education system 
generally is diverse utilising a variety of accountability mechanisms.  It uses 
Westminster ministerial responsibility, legal, social and market mechanisms.  
The Westminster system, as noted, is overburdened. Accordingly, it cannot and 
does not inform the public about the nature and position of the university system.  
The legal accountabilities are limited with respect to the Federal government. 
However, this constraint on legal accountability is side-stepped by the heavy 
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reporting obligations supported by NPM’s preferred method of regulation—
regulation by information.  The report and audit obligations are re-shaping the 
university in ways that it is argued are incoherent with its actual tasks. The types 
of accountabilities are for things ranging from social inclusion and equity 
objects, through to economic objects, but does include accountability for 
knowledge objects coherent with the university as argued in Chapters 5 and 6—
those of knowledge creation, preservation and dissemination. 
 
The chapter has argued that the extensive regulatory regime which penetrates the 
university institution and organisation deeply with the government’s various 
agendas, using invasive regulatory techniques does little to advance the 
university’s mission.  As such, it is incoherent at this basic level. Further, it has 
argued that the imposition of both broad and deep audit regimes has added a 
further dimension to the incoherence as such regimes tend to distract 
organisations from their first order tasks.  Finally, audit regimes cause 
organisations to re-organise themselves from organisations best suited to 
achieving their missions to organisations that are easily auditable.  In other 
words, the audit regime of regulation by information adds to the incoherence 
already imposed by government policy agendas. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE PUBILIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE, THE PUBLIC GOOD 
AND THE UNIVERSITY 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter addresses the first level of systemic coherence.  It identifies and 
unpacks the preliminary decisions that need to be made in systemic terms.  That 
is, it examines the nature of the public and the private in broad terms, examining 
the political and economic discourses around these two spheres, connects them to 
their underlying philosophical commitments and lays a foundation upon which 
the rest of the regulatory superstructure is to be built. The chapter argues that the 
public and private are not hard categories, but malleable political concepts and 
not reducible to technical economic units of analysis.  Building on this 
theoretical foundation, the chapter then turns to consider the place of the 
university in these arenas.  It argues that the important social and political role of 
the university, and its diverse inputs, processes and outputs make locating it in a 
simple dichotomy problematic.  The chapter argues that the university is more 
likely to thrive where it is viewed as a public institution.  And accordingly, the 
regulatory demand for some location in these social categories leads to the 
argument that the better place for the university is in the public sphere. 
  
As noted in Chapter 2, theories justifying regulation fall into two broad 
categories—public and private.  That is, there are theories which hold that public 
good is attainable through the political process and which view incomplete 
markets and market failures as problems which can be resolved through some 
type of regulatory intervention.  These theories support regulatory intervention.  
There are other theories, however, which are based on suspicion of government, 
political processes and are ruled by a faith in markets. These theories reject 
public good and all regulation except that which supports private property and 
markets.  Both of these theories hold implicit views of government, the nature of 
society and conceptions of individual members of society. These larger issues are 
matters of philosophy, politics and other social sciences. The particular issue for 
this dissertation, following the convention, is referred to as the “public-private 
divide.” 
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Further, as noted, the public-private divide concerns the proper role of 
government, society and conceptions of individual members of society. The 
public-private divide is significant for identifying government interests, its role 
and responsibilities, including public goods as well as the economic implications 
of those identifications. The ideas of public good and the public-private divide 
underlie much of the debate about regulation, the university institution, higher 
education and indeed political debate generally. As will become evident through 
the argument, it is an important distinction for regulatory purposes. This chapter 
examines in detail the ideas of public good and the public-private divide, and 
their significance for higher education and the university.   
 
Although the idea of public good is in the first instance an idea in political 
philosophy about social coordination, determinations about the divide and public 
goods can be derived from analysis of social objects, economic outputs and 
political debate as well as derivation from the classifications of history, 
sociology, and law.  As Breyer notes there exists a sharp divide in disciplinary 
approaches to regulation based on the public-private divide.  Whereas approaches 
to regulation of organisations deemed public are subject to political science 
analysis, public law and government scholarship, organisations deemed private 
are subject to management, economics and corporate law.380   Breyer’s 
distinction is significant as it points to two discrete sets of regulatory norms 
applicable to organisations and projects depending on the public-private 
classification and appropriate for the analysis of the various projects of the 
different sectors.  The discussion which follows illustrates the discrete norms and 
their significance for regulation generally and higher education and the university 
specifically.  
 
To illustrate briefly, in the context of university regulation, where the university 
is viewed as a private organisation providing private goods without public 
consequences, the need and justification for public involvement including 
regulation, finance and oversight is minimal.  Where the university is seen as a 
significant public institution, providing public goods with public finance, the 
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case is markedly different. High levels of public regulation including scrutiny of 
decision making and accountability are deemed not only appropriate but 
necessary.  The examination which follows proceeds from five disciplinary 
perspectives—historical, economic, political, sociological and legal. Broadly, 
historians indicate that the divide and the issues it represents were identified 
some 2,500 years ago in the city state of Athens.  From the perspective of 
economics, higher education is both public and private. It is a public good, a 
private good bearing characteristics as social goods and an economic good.381  
From the perspective of politics the question is developed as a decision about the 
role of the state and the requirements of both state and society taking account of 
the practical and political implications of a normative commitment to democracy.  
From the sociological perspective one sees a variety of public goods well beyond 
the economic.  Finally, from the legal perspective, the distinction is the result of 
both common law and legislation as characterised by assignments of rights, 
duties and liabilities in a balancing of the individual and the collective.   
 
2. Historical: Government, The Public and The Private 
 
The traditional public-private dichotomy stems from classical Greece.382  
Community leaders had rights in the home with respect to their domestic affairs 
which were not subject to public scrutiny. The home (oikos) and domestic 
arrangements were considered to be private matters at the sole discretion of the 
householder.  In addition to domestic arrangements, however, the householder 
had public civic duties. These included payment of taxes, participation in 
political life and military activity as determined by the state. As Humphrey’s 
observes: “the Athenians in the fifth century discovered two of the major 
problems of western political theory: the relation between public and private 
interests, and the relation between politics and the economy.”383 These two 
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problems lie at the core of the controversy over the role of government and its 
regulatory tasks. 
 
Moving the discussion forward from the Athenian city-state to the re-
organisation of society after the revolutions of the 16th and 17th centuries, the re-
creation of the public and the private as well as the role of public government had 
to be re-invented. 384 Whereas prior to the revolutionary overthrow of the 
absolute monarchs whose authority was based on the doctrine of the divine right 
of kings, and whose authority over public government was based on a 
combination of religion and bloodlines, after the revolutions a new basis was 
needed on which to establish public governmental authority to control society.  
The basic political issue was one of constituting a society deemed voluntary, 
instead of one based on religion, kin or coercion.  In western societies this 
problem was answered by way of the Social Contract.385  Social Contract theory, 
through intellectuals such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, answered questions 
organized around issues such as what permits a society to function? What form 
of public government over private households is justifiable and with what rights, 
obligations and limitations?  In other words, it provided a philosophical 
justification and political basis for the public-private divide. 
 
These Social Contract theorists imagined the initial state of Nature—a state in 
which no government existed—and from that initial position formulated what 
they believed to be the justification for authority to regulate an ideal form of 
social organization or relation between governors and governed—i.e. 
government.   In all its forms, the essential Social Contract addresses the 
organization of society, and it does so uniformly on the basis that the public is 
formed for the potential benefit of improved private households.  Next social 
contract theorists argued that government serves the dual purposes of both 
coordinating public collective wants as well as advancing private household 
rights.386 In other words the Social Contract is an effort to define what benefits or 
                                                 
384
 Hobsbawm, E. (1962). The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848 NY, Mentor. 
385
 Drawn from Sheehy, B. (2007). "Reconsidering the Corporation and the Lateral Obligations of 
the Social Contract." The ICFAI Journal of Corporate and Securities law 4(2): 7-31. 
386
 See for example, de Jasay, A. (1989). Social Contract, Free Ride. New York, Oxford 
University Press pp. 1-4. 
 172 
goods must be provided or produced by the public government for the benefit of 
the public collective as well as the private households in order to legitimate its 
existence and justify its actions. Thus, the next question is: What type of public 
and private spheres must be created and what related services must a government 
provide to have a claim for legitimacy? And, what actions are justified actions? 
 
The answers to these questions developed into two distinct streams each leading 
to expanded views of the role of government.  The basic collective good 
provided by public government was security: protection from assault and 
destruction of the collective’s means of survival. This basic good provided a 
basis for taxation and military duties. These physical protections and 
appropriated resources are supported and supplemented by regulation: the legal 
system and laws—laws creating  interests, determining which interests will be 
assigned to whom, on what basis (economic, the common weal, or some other 
value) and which interests are protected by the state. These goods are for the 
people at large—a public good. The role of public government therefore is not 
only creating public and private space, but also creating conditions in which 
society including among other things, its means of reproduction (culture) and 
sustenance (economy), can operate effectively. This understanding of public 
good and the role of government led to the two streams referred to earlier. 
 
The first stream had to do with a developing notion of humanity.  Religious and 
philosophical thinkers began to advance ideas concerning human dignity and 
rationality, which came to be reflected in political thinking.  No longer was it 
sufficient for government to merely provide protection against violence and 
unjustified taking of property, but it was necessary to advance certain rights for 
individuals to flourish.387  Human flourishing requires those things which 
enhance freedom and dignity from the basics of food and shelter, to education of 
both the hand and the mind.  This view coalesces with the notion that democracy 
requires the citizen to have a basic understanding to participate in political life.  
The reformers of nineteenth century education saw education as a basic public 
obligation which created a public government obligation to provide basic 
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education. For a government organised on a non-elitist basis, i.e. a democracy, 
the distribution of goods supporting human flourishing and participation in 
governing should be provided as widely as possible—hence the ideas of a 
broader public sphere and of public goods as a fundamental task of government 
extending well beyond the basic security and property guarantees of the original 
Social Contract theorists. 
 
The second stream answering to the role of government and an enlarging public 
sphere was developed from the socio-economic changes stemming from the 
Industrial Revolution.388  Both technological innovation and capitalist economic 
systems require an increasingly educated workforce.  The industrial revolution of 
the late eighteenth century expanded exponentially the need for an educated work 
force to create, maintain and develop again the tools of industrial production, 
while capitalism needs to grow the economy and its corollary support services 
sector.389  Combined, these two streams met in a demand for enlarging the public 
government sphere and for public goods generally and education in particular. 
Thus education at all levels and government support for it remains a live issue. 
Among important contemporary approaches to the issue is economics to which 
the discussion next turns. 
 
3. Economic theory: Public Goods and the Public-Private Dichotomy  
 
Economists view the public-private divide as objectively presented, or as 
Marginson argues, a naturally occurring phenomenon, with a sharp division 
between the two.390  The public sphere is the sphere in which public goods exist: 
all the rest of human activity is in the private sphere which is dominated by 
private property and exchange markets. Taking this assumption of a natural or 
objective division as a starting point, classification as public or private becomes a 
technical issue for the science of economics.  
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To develop an understanding of the public-private divide from the economic 
perspective, the neo-classical economist Paul Samuelson defined public goods as 
those goods which are non-rivalrous and non-excludable in terms of 
consumption.391  Marginson points out an important assumption in Samuelson’s 
version: that goods by their nature are intrinsically public or private.  As a result, 
Marginson observes, in Samuelson’s perspective goods are naturally private or 
public. Samuelson classifies a good as non-rivalrous when that good can be 
“consumed” by one party without depriving another party of the use of the same 
good.  A classic example of this is knowledge: each party can obtain the same 
knowledge without in any way depleting the overall supply.   
 
The second characteristic, non-excludability has two facets.  The first facet arises 
when it is impossible or prohibitively costly to provide a good to a group and 
exclude individual parties who would use but not pay for the goods.  One 
common example is defence services.  All benefit from national defence and it is 
impossible to protect only those who are paying for this good—non-payers 
cannot be excluded.  The second facet of non-excludability is where a good’s 
benefit cannot be restricted to an individual purchaser and excluding groups who 
do not pay.  Where such goods are purchased by an individual, it is not only that 
individual who benefits from the purchase.  Rather, other individuals “the 
public” may also benefit. A classic example of this type of public good is found 
in public health.  Where an individual is inoculated against some illness such as 
malaria, not only does he or she avoid the illness but at the same time reduces the 
risk of those nearby from receiving an infection as well (an “externality”)—
regardless of the other parties not paying for it. From an economic perspective, 
public goods are “public” because producers cannot adequately sequester the 
benefits of their production to private parties—themselves or paying consumers. 
According to economic theory no private party will invest in the production of 
goods which can be freely had.392   
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Economists also identify public goods as something inadequately supplied by the 
market—i.e. a type of market failure. In the case of public goods, economists 
argue that non-excludable, non-rivalrous goods will not be created to meet an 
acknowledged need, and so the market will fail to produce the needed goods. 
Where market failure occurs, the government is required to step in and provide 
some regulatory solution, either in the form of public provision, public finance or 
in the form of regulatory reform, changing the market rules.  This category of 
public good is evidently open to political debate about the quantity and quality of 
the goods and even the existence of market failure itself.393 Nevertheless, for the 
most part, economic analysis of public goods fails to take account of the political 
nature of the public-private classification decision.394  Economists’ personal 
political commitments inevitably inform their positions.  
 
The political dimension of economic public goods was addressed by the neo-
classicist Kenneth Arrow.  Following economic individualist methodology, 
Arrow sought to identify the appropriate areas in which government should 
produce and distribute goods and services through mathematical modelling based 
on individual preferences. The theory had been that those goods could be 
identified and valued on the basis of aggregation of individual preferences—a 
view Arrow originally held.  Arrow’s breakthrough, however, was his 
demonstration of the impossibility of arriving at a social welfare function on the 
basis of the aggregation of individual preferences.395  That is, public goods 
cannot be identified or receive appropriate levels of finance on a mere 
aggregation of individual preferences.  Not only are individuals’ preferences in 
fundamental conflict, there are problems in preferred levels of support, and the 
free rider problem. Arrow, despite a life long interest in shared values, like his 
fellow orthodox neo-classical economists has been unable to identify a 
measurable common, public good, and hence, unable to identify and decide 
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which goods should be publicly supplied on a technical, non-political basis.  
Quite simply, economics lacks both theory and technique for public goods.  This 
leads economists to their default position—conceptualising as much as possible 
on the private side of the public-private divide.   
 
In sum, the basic problem of public goods as traditionally conceptualized by 
economists is a failure to sequester the purchased benefits to paying consumers 
and the economic benefits of production to the producing suppliers.  Economists 
conceptualise public goods as problematic also because the consumption of those 
goods fails to destroy the resource and so fails to create new demand, create an 
adequate market and more economic activity/transactions.  Finally, no 
aggregation of individual preferences is possible either for purposes of 
identifying public gods or desirable levels of such goods.  As such private goods 
are the preference and focus of most economists’ analysis. 
 
a. Economic analysis of the goods and services of higher education 
 
From an economic perspective it is possible to exclude people from educational 
opportunities and in terms of non-rivalrous consumption, education meets the 
test at least partially.  It is self-evident that the consumption of educational 
services precludes others from accessing the same services to some degree.  
Where one person occupies a seat in a classroom, that seat is no longer available 
to others, and even in the age of the internet, where one thousand people are 
using a server to provide and exchange information, others cannot do so.  
However, consumption of information for the development of knowledge from a 
broad view is non-rivalrous. One person’s consumption of information does not 
exhaust the information’s resource potential.396 Accordingly, from an economic 
perspective there is little room and perhaps no legitimate argument for the public 
supply of education.  Indeed, a call for public provision of education may appear 
to be more a case of special pleading.  In this view neither the university as an 
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institution nor any distinct university organisation or other higher education 
provider has any claim to public government support.  Its educational goods are 
excludable and at least somewhat rivalrous.  Accordingly, from a neo-classical 
economic perspective the market should be allowed to determine supply and 
demand.  
 
There are several important private goods generated by higher education. 
Marginson identifies and describes four private goods from higher education.  
These are first, self-goods—those goods which advance personal development 
without regard to exchange value.  Second are positional goods: goods that 
provide social status.  Third are knowledge goods, being those goods which in 
certain instances may be protected by the law of intellectual property.  Finally, 
are the training goods which prepare a person to enter the workforce.397  While 
there are considerable private goods to be derived from a higher education, those 
goods are neither the whole nor even the major contribution of the university.  
Their public dimension will be taken up with a discussion of a range of important 
social goods provided by the university discussed later.  
 
The common problem whereby the cost of goods is more easily measured than 
the benefits of the goods is particularly problematic in the context of public 
goods.  One important aspect of public goods identified, can only poorly 
measured and that is the matter of externalities—such as in the health example 
above.  The externalities of higher education are extensive and, difficult to 
identify and measure.398 As such they are hard to quantify and analyse despite 
efforts to do so.399  These externalities are: static human capital, which raises the 
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productivity of other production factors; dynamic externalities, such as the 
improved ability to learn new things including job tasks and new technologies 
(particularly associated with higher education400) and other, non-pecuniary 
externalities.401  These values are particularly important in understanding higher 
education.  
 
Higher education’s positive externalities are particularly significant in the current 
world where the value of human capital is increasing exponentially in what is 
referred to as the information age.  As Usher and Cervenan, authors of an 
international study of higher education, observe: “In many ways, accessible mass 
higher education is the foundation of the modern knowledge economy.”402  
Participation in the knowledge economy and the growth of that economy requires 
high levels of participation in higher education.  The issue then becomes what is 
a desirable level of participation in higher education.  Given the high level of 
positive externalities, there appears to be a strong argument for investment of 
public funds into public higher education. Indeed, no economy in the world 
whether developed or developing is ignoring higher education.403  The value of a 
highly educated population to the overall functioning of society including the 
economy has become an increasing concern and focus of policy discussed in the 
section which follows.404    
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In summary, the public-private dichotomy proposed by neo-classical economic 
theory is too strict and reverses the correct order, at least according to 
sociologists,405 anthropologists406 and others. The development of private 
household interests cannot occur in some individualist vacuum. Maintaining 
society by public government is a first priority. The private is contemporaneously 
intermeshed with the advance of the collective public sphere. Public institutions 
such as the government, regulation and the university are critical points of focus 
for the development and maintenance of the public sphere and hence the private.  
Put differently, such public institutions provide the bedrock upon which the 
private sphere rests. As such, their importance can neither be neglected nor 
relegated to status as an irrelevant off-shoot of non-economic productive goods 
and activities. Despite this fact, political debate driven by economic interests 
tends in that direction.  
 
b. Public economic support for higher education and the university:  
 
The idea of the university education as a public space deserving of public 
economic support goes back to dealings with the first ultramontane 407 
university, the University of Paris. Shortly after his return to Italy from France in 
1165 A.D., Pope Alexander III issued a decree to provide for the abolition of 
payment for a licence to teach (licentia docendi).408  This position was confirmed 
at the third Lateran Council of 1179, where it was decreed that both the licence 
and the teaching should be free of charge.409  This decree recognised both the 
public good and the hazard of commodifying and selling higher education. The 
Council addressed the issues of student admissions to ensure that students were 
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admitted on merit instead of financial capability, and that teachers were 
adequately paid. These regulatory measures which were taken to address the 
issues of corruption and simony in the issuance of licenses to students who had 
simply bought them,410 established the institutional norm of university education 
as a public good, a matter taken up again in Chapter 5.  
 
On the island of Britain, public support for higher education arrived only slightly 
later.  The citizens of Oxford paid a tax for the support of students as early as the 
thirteenth century.411  Economic justification followed some 500 years later.  
Adam Smith wrote:  
 
For a very small expence the publick can facilitate, can encourage, and can 
even impose upon almost the whole body of the people, the necessity of 
acquiring those most essential parts of education.412  
 
A variety of studies have been undertaken identifying the public benefits of 
education.  Studies of the overall contribution of higher education to the 
economic development and well functioning of a society indicate significant 
returns on investment.413  Analysis of OECD countries suggests that investment 
in higher education brings both significant public and private benefits.  World 
Bank educational economics expert George Psacharopoulos’ analysis is helpful 
in this regard. 414  His analysis suggests that social return on investment in higher 
                                                 
410
 Ibid p. 80. 
411
  Lawrence, C. H. (1984). The University in State and Church. The History of the University of 
Oxford. J. I. Catto. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 1: 97-150., cited in Nardi, P. (1992). 
Relations with authority. Universities in the Middle Ages. H. de Ridder-Symoens. New York, 
Cambridge University Press. 1: 77-107 p. 84, n. 23. 
412
 Smith, A. (1786). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. Edinburch, 
Adam and Charles Black p. 352. 
413
 There is a vast literature dealing with the economics of education, including a number of 
journals dedicated to the topic. It is well beyond the scope of this dissertation to engage it and 
neither is it necessary for the purposes of the discussion. Psacharopoulos, G. (1994). "Returns to 
Investment in Education: A Global Update." World Development 22(9): 1325-1343 provides a 
more detailed analysis and discussion, although quite dated. Psacharopoulos, G. and H. A. 
Patrinos (2002). Returns to Investment in Education: A Further Update. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper. Washington D.C World Bank. is the best update. Psacharopoulos’ work 
has been subject of critique Bray, M. (2004). The Costs and Financing of Education: Trends and 
Policy Implications, Asian Development Bank.. 
414
 There is a vast literature dealing with the economics of education, including a number of 
journals dedicated to the topic. It is well beyond the scope of this dissertation to engage it and 
neither is it necessary for the purposes of the discussion.Psacharopoulos, G. (1994). "Returns to 
Investment in Education: A Global Update." World Development 22(9): 1325-1343., provides a 
more detailed analysis and discussion, although quite dated. Psacharopoulos, G. and H. A. 
 181 
education in OECD countries is equivalent to the return on investment in primary 
education.  Psacharopoulos provides an exact value on the public social return on 
investment in higher education.  He calculates the public investment to generate 
an 8.5 per cent return.  This public investment and return are not the only 
calculation he provides.  As noted, there is also a significant private return.  
Psacharopoulos provides the comparative private return on investment in higher 
education at 11.6 per cent, with a return that outstrips the value of investment in 
secondary education.415  Studies of the Australian situation suggest an even 
higher rate of return, 14.5 per cent.416  In other words, education, including 
higher education, is an excellent public investment.  
 
As noted, the value of higher education has been recognized by nations globally 
as demonstrated by the OECD, a special higher education program417 and its 
journal dedicated to higher education management.418  In 2002, 53 countries 
reported providing 63% of the costs of their tertiary institutions.419  As it is, 25 of 
28 of the countries forming the OECD fund more than 50% of the costs of 
tertiary education from the public purse.420 Obviously, the majority of the 
world’s governments have a broad notion of public good at least in respect of 
higher education and the necessary regulatory and budgetary decisions have 
followed.   
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c. Critique of economics and regulatory recommendations  
 
As noted, neo-classical economists’ normative preference is for the private 
sphere.  It is premised upon their views of a profit driven market as a naturally 
occurring phenomenon, superior and hence preferable method of controlling 
supply and demand.  As well, neo-classicists lack a theory and model of public 
goods that takes account of political, social and social concerns. As such their 
economics fails as a science designed among other things to study the 
phenomenon of public goods.421 
 
There are a number of other critical problems with economic models which 
should preclude excessive confidence in those models or an over reliance on 
economic regulatory recommendations.  Perhaps most problematically, neo-
classical analysis fails to address the foundation of the society in which the 
economy is embedded and thrives422—the public sphere. The neo-classical 
failure to adequately address public goods and the more broadly, the 
preservation, transmission and dissemination of knowledge for the continuation 
of society is a matter of concern —particularly in a non-traditional society which 
lacks other institutions for the intergenerational transfer of sophisticated 
knowledge.   The problem is that economic analysis “directs primary attention to 
monetized outputs regardless of their impacts on people,… ignores the 
environments of the system of market activity [including social environment].”423  
Some neo-classical economists are well aware of this, and insist that the 
maintenance of non-economic values are of paramount importance for the 
maintenance of society.  Downs, for example, in his 1962 article correcting errors 
in his theory stated: 
“Any description of a democratic system which does not include some 
mechanism for self-perpetuation is an incomplete description.  It does not 
explain why people keep obeying the rules that make it possible.  This 
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omission is, in my opinion, the biggest single failing of my own 
economic theory of democracy.”424   
The message of sustainability or the continual reproduction of the conditions 
necessary for a government (democracy) and an economy (market)—i.e. the 
issues identified by the Athenians, are a matter of great concern.425 
 
Another example of the problematic limitations of neo-classical modelling of 
public goods, is the noted issue that individual preferences for public goods are 
often in conflict.  Accordingly, attempting to develop policy and regulation for 
public goods on this basis, while politically astute, is a poor regulatory choice, 
setting the foundation for regulatory failure.  That is, while it may be popular to 
promise the commonsense view that regulation will be developed on the basis of 
the aggregation individual preferences and not to advance some government 
inspired project from a regulatory perspective, which must take account of 
matters such as Arrow’s and Simon’s discoveries, collective policy decisions 
developed from the aggregation is impossible. Further, communal and collective 
preferences are significantly different from individual preferences.426 While 
individual preferences are regularly modified it may be that public preferences 
are not.427 Finally, the need for a sense of community beyond market and well 
apart from individual preferences is widely recognised.428  Accordingly, to rely 
too much on neo-classical economic models is not a wise policy choice. 
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Economists’ policy and hence regulatory advice, based on their normative 
preference for “naturally occurring” private property as argued by Locke and as 
markets extrapolated from Smith, emphasises commodification of goods and 
services, increasing property rights, expanding market mechanisms, and where 
possible creating new markets in their entirety transforming economically non-
productive public goods (regardless of social or other production) to 
economically productive private goods.  Governments follow this economic 
advice by withdrawing from the production and provision of public goods and 
services, by privatising their goods and services including higher education—an 
approach to governance advanced by neoliberalism’s NPM.429    
 
Yet as noted, the effort to divide phenomena both social and physical into an 
objective, natural public and private divide in order to develop social and 
economic policy, and to do so as if the divide created exclusive hard categories 
as economics does fails to take account of the weaknesses of the models and the 
political nature of the issue. Attempting to make the divide appear to be a natural 
division suited to technical criteria masks the reality of the political nature of the 
decision and the need for debate which underlies regulatory decisions. 
Accordingly, a sharp public-private divide not only is not natural as economics 
would have it, but as poor theory is likely to create unhelpful, limited 
perspectives and ultimately to recommendations setting a foundation for 
regulatory failure.   
 
Despite neo-classical economists’ private regulatory recommendations, 
governments historically and globally have recognised other less easily measured 
but important public benefits from higher education and the university and have 
provided public support in the form of regulation, finance and resources. 
 
Political thinking has moved beyond the simple dichotomy of economic 
modelling in most instances.  As the rise and fall of the welfare state and the 
fading of neoliberalism which held to the older dichotomy demonstrate, fresher 
and more nuanced thinking about the governments and governance will continue.  
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For instance, Colin Crouch writing in 2004 building on the work of du Gay finds 
an array of governance and government policies which combine elements of 
“substantive state,” “associations”, “community”, “networks”, “market”, 
“procedural state” and “corporate hierarchy” for purposes of social, political and 
economic coordination.430  In other words, progressive political thinking rejects 
the simplistic dichotomy that serves economic modelling that leads to regulatory 
failure. As public administration scholar Ronald Moe quips in his critique of the 
application of neo-classical economics to government activities: “the real world 
is not limited to economic premises.”431 
 
4. Politics and the Public-Private Melange  
 
To move the analysis forward, a more nuanced consideration of the nature of 
educational goods and the university as a social institution is necessary.  That is, 
not only must the analysis consider higher education as an economic good to be 
regulated according to its position in a private-public dichotomy, but it and the 
university must also be considered as social phenomena located in the public-
private melange.432  The analysis begins by contrasting the economic and 
political approaches to the idea of the public good and then delves into a detailed 
discussion of different versions of the public good. 
 
In contrast to economics which begins with an assumption about goods and then 
moves on to discuss the role of public and government, political analysis begins 
with the body politic as a public body and its needs and considers resources, 
goods and services against that background. Political analysis of the public-
private divide approaches the two spheres on the basis of debate rather than the 
purported scientific distinction of economic modelling. The political analysis 
proceeds from an analysis of the role and nature of government. It then places 
certain activities within the public sphere defined ideally as a non-economic 
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space where the goals of human society and human life can be determined 
independent of the distortions introduced by economic concerns of finance and 
economic value.  While the nature of the public and society are contested, 
sociologist and philosopher Jurgen Habermas’ definition will work. He defines 
the public as the sphere “beyond the state or private interests.”433  In Habermas’ 
version, matters not determined public are placed into the private sphere while 
those in the public will have resources allocated to coincide with the politically 
determined outcomes.  
 
Political scientists, political economists and other scholars view public goods as 
those goods required for people to live as a collective—including, environmental, 
physical, psychological and institutional which facilitate social well-being. In 
this debate “public good” and “public goods” are not equivalent terms.434  To 
distinguish the economic and political uses of the words public good, the term 
“Public Good” needs to be investigated.  Doing so will provide a better 
theoretical framework for understanding public good, analysing the public-
private divide and the role of higher education and the university in society.   
 
Professor Jane Mansbridge suggests that “public good” is an essentially 
contested concept.435  That is, following Gallie’s notion that certain ideas such as 
those forming the grounds of political debate include in their very essence a 
conflict of ideas and values,436 Mansbridge claims that the contestability of 
public good results from the unsettled nature of politics itself.   This unsettled 
nature of politics and its role in human society denies the possibility of resolution 
on the basis of objective scientific knowledge about society or the individual or 
the self and by definition precludes a single normative basis for the public good.  
This position stands in marked contrast to the economic version of public good 
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discussed above. Mansbridge’s position rejects the normative basis for much 
policy making which is based on neo-classical economists’ individualism and 
appeal to self-interest.  Her position acknowledges Arrow’s theorem of the 
impossibility that the whole of the public will be best served by each pursuing 
his/her own self-interest, and rejects the political and ethical commitments of that 
purported science.  
 
Recognising economics dominance in contemporary political debate and policy 
making, Mansbridge raises a caution in relying on its norms.  She argues that a 
society (and by implication policy) that focuses exclusively on individual self-
interest is a: 
 
“a society [that] will not be able to produce efficiently a large number of 
goods that require subtle and complex forms of human cooperation.  
These subtle forms of cooperation -- which range from not littering, 
voting, and obeying the law all the way to volunteering for combat -- 
depend not only on self-interest but also on many individuals acting for 
the public good on the basis of primarily internal rewards.  A normative 
structure resulting from the large-scale practice of narrowly self-
interested behavior would degrade the lives of everyone....  Our 
generation thus faces … the growing necessity, in an increasingly 
interdependent world, for sophisticated forms of cooperation” 437 
 
Mansbridge is arguing what Arrow demonstrated: society is more than a mere 
aggregation of individual preferences.  In essence, while contemporary political 
debate is premised on a sharp distinction and even a conflict between the public 
and the private, Mansbridge, after a careful historical survey suggests that there 
is a considerable confluence of public and private good, and that the longer 
standing view in western thinking supports only a weak division between the 
public and the private.  
 
Mansbridge notes that public good has three notions or areas of contested 
meanings, two of which are relevant to the discussion.  First, public good is 
thought to be the aggregate of private individual wants.  As noted, there are a 
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number of problems with this view: Arrow has demonstrated that it is impossible 
to arrive at a public utility function based on the approach.  
 
The second notion of public good Mansbridge identifies emphasises the political 
nature of public good and the resultant public-private divide.  Following Walter 
Lippman, Mansbridge identifies this stream of thinking about public good as 
something that results from a political process.  Lippman argued that the 
positions and decisions taken by a group of people pursuing debate about public 
good determined what the public good is.438  In other words, the public good may 
be that good which a group of well informed, rational people, acting with 
disinterested benevolence would choose.  The public good and hence the location 
of divide is thus a decision based on wholly political and philosophical 
deliberation.  
 
To understand the public good, Mansbridge argues: "[t]he phrase serves as a site 
for contest over what is ‘public’ and ‘good,’ and it serves to direct approbation to 
those who act for the public good, especially in contrast to promoting their 
private interests.” 439  Further, she argues: “[a]lthough the present state of 
imprecision is not necessarily better than a more precise definition would be, at 
least one of the present functions, serving as a site for contest, would be 
destroyed by narrowing and fixing forever the meaning of the ‘public good.’”440  
Thus vagueness is a desirable characteristic as it facilitates an important 
democratic function—that of providing a critique of and proposals for the 
direction of society—a critical function and contribution of the university. The 
public-private divide and public good is something that must be subject to on-
going political debate, being modified to suit the particular context of a society.  
 
A third view, not inconsistent with Mansbridge’s thinking draws political and 
unorthodox economic thinking together. Amartya Sen441 and Martha 
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Nussbaum442  envision economic public goods as those goods which are needed 
at a basic level to allow individual to make meaningful choices they see such 
goods as creating a positive obligation on government to create an environment 
in which people are able to make such choices about their own lives and 
development.  Sen and other unorthodox economists view the neo-classical 
approach and the market as limiting freedom, limiting options to the choices 
offered by the market and  further limiting those choices to those particular 
individuals with resources. Instead of limiting the discussion of public goods to a 
discussion of GNP per capita 443—that is a discussion of public welfare in terms 
of market performance—Sen examines what it is that people do with their goods 
and how that contributes to the “Good Life”.  Governments and citizens alike 
have adopted this view with respect to education as critical to the good life and 
an important public good—i.e. a good or service to be supplied by the 
government free or below cost444—for more than a century. 
 
Public goods and the public-private divide from a political perspective are 
artefacts resulting from engagement in the political process, artefacts determined 
by public debate.  That is, debate pursued without economic or state imperatives, 
and focused particularly on the common weal.  Those goods including the 
political process which enhance the functioning of human society (not something 
reducible to economic development) are public goods, and merit public support.  
They are assigned to the public side of the divide and merit regulation 
appropriate to those ends.  
 
The classification of higher education and the university institution as political 
public goods is evident from a closer inspection of democratic political 
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systems.445  Participating in a democratic system of governance in an informed 
way in modern society is a challenge. It requires a level of understanding of the 
issues, challenges and opportunities facing the nation state—and an ability to 
evaluate critically, claims and counterclaims made by competing politicians and 
other interested parties.  Higher levels of higher education allow individuals to 
compare more effectively and efficiently the policies of competing candidates, 
and make more informed decisions about the shape of the community in which 
they wish to live.  Higher education provides a critical frame of reference from 
which to evaluate competing claims and to hold accountable those in power—the 
key component of democratic theory. 
 
The political view of public goods and the public-private divide as a melange 
rather than a dichotomy provides a different justification for the role of 
government and for argument for public provision of economic support for the 
university and higher education than does economics. It is a wider, more realistic 
role; however, it is less susceptible to measurement.  
 
5. Sociology, Public Good and the University  
 
Again, unlike economics, sociology does not view the public-private divide as 
objective or naturally occurring phenomenon.  Rather, it views the divide as a 
social construct, movable as necessary or desirable to understand the framing of 
issues,446 used to provide analysis of events and policies, and to identify 
structures and processes that support societal functioning.  Further, sociology has 
no specific category termed public goods.  Rather, it analyses the operations of 
society and those things which sustain society as a whole. Thus, the discussion 
which follows does not offer justifications for assignment to either side of the 
divide or classification of higher education as public good. Rather, it examines 
the role of higher education and the university institution in society with respect 
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to these matters. (The two chapters which follow—Chapters 5 and 6—address 
the sociology of the university more broadly and in greater depth.) 
 
To understand the public and private in higher education from a sociological 
perspective one must ask two questions: What is education and in particular 
higher education? And, what is the role of higher education in society? The 
questions can be approached in a variety of ways. One must ask the nature and 
purpose of education generally, and then inquire about the nature and purpose of 
higher education specifically.  Education itself serves as part of socialization 
process; that is equipping people with the thinking skills and knowledge required 
to participate in society.  It is necessary for the development of humans, as 
rational, deliberative beings in a society composed of like beings.  
 
Further as noted above, in a society which does not place as strong a reliance on 
the traditional personal forms such as myths and religion for preserving and 
transmitting critical knowledge for societal collective survival, the importance of 
a strong impersonal/bureaucratic social institution such as the university  to 
perform such preservation and transmission functions becomes critical. As 
Burton Clark writes the university, as the home of the academic profession 
provides “critical centers of meaning and as primary devices for linkage into the 
larger world”. 447  In other words, the university provides a significant public 
function by providing means for significant swaths of human knowledge to be 
connected, it provides meaning and the orientation that allows human society to 
continue to function particularly where it is no longer based on religion or ethnic 
uniformity. (These and other functions of the university are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5). Thus, for a complex economy, the complex knowledge and skills 
preserved and transmitted by the university are a critical public good necessary 
for the maintenance of a society dependent upon those skills and economic 
ordering.  
 
The distinction between “lower” and “higher” education also requires definition 
for sociological analysis.  These terms are not used with normative or pejorative 
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connotations.  Lower is vocationally orientated and focused on the development 
of technical skills, teaches people the “how” of an activity.  The idea of higher 
education, by way of contrast, is about teaching thinking about the “why” of 
things—whether in a philosophical sense or a critical thinking, problem solving 
approach to scientific or technological problems.  Higher education requires a 
critical examination of the phenomena under consideration and an understanding 
of its role and context physical, social and/or psychological.  Higher education is 
a critical part of contemporary society and a significant mission of the university.   
 
Higher education scholar Brian Pusser conceptualises the whole of higher 
education as a public space.  Following on Habermas’ idea of the public sphere, 
quoted above as “beyond the state or private interests” Pusser observes that the 
university has provided that space as an essential public good.  That is, such 
public space allows deliberation, critique and innovation free of both state and 
private commercial/political interests.448  Given the increasing colonisation of 
public space and personal identity by both state and private corporate interests, 
the need for such space and its value and importance is increasing.  
 
Sociologist Craig Calhoun describes the university as the “paradigmatic 
institution of the public sphere.”449  Calhoun identifies four senses of public in 
the university.450 First, he sees the university as public on the basis of its 
economic inputs.  He notes that the university draws its financial resources from 
a variety of sources including governments. In addition to direct payments, it also 
receives less evident benefits such as the benefits of various tax incentives, 
credential accreditation, and regulatory support.451 
 
Secondly, Calhoun identifies it as public in the sense that there is accountability 
to outside, public interests.  That is, unlike a private body such as a business 
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corporation, which only answers to a very limited audience, the interests of a 
wide variety of people and interests effected by the university are accounted for 
through the organisational structure, political process as well as “markets.”  
These interests have historically been the church and the state.  Both of these 
external bodies have formed the public or at least belonging to the public sphere. 
Yet, universities have always argued for a degree of autonomy and to be able to 
regulate themselves internally, much like private corporations and to some 
degree by reference to other universities.  
 
Thirdly, Calhoun sees the outputs of the university as public. The knowledge 
produced and the education provided particularly as it pertains to civic 
participation, as being a public good.  He notes, however, that these goods have 
been de-emphasised of late in the university discourse in favour of instrumental 
knowledge claims focusing on university credentials providing better incomes 
for graduates and the benefits of technology being provided to private parties.  
 
Finally, Calhoun observes the public benefit provided by the university as it 
provides a critique of knowledge.  The university provides the critique by 
conducting its research in the public sphere.  By opening its knowledge to public 
debate and subjecting it to the scrutiny of logic and evidence, the university 
challenges knowledge discourses based on “social bases, pedigrees, or 
institutional and political backing.”452 While certainly Calhoun’s explication of 
the public good from a sociological perspective is not comprehensive, it does 
point to a number of important goods provided to the public by the university.  
 
There are a variety of other public goods/social benefits from the university.  For 
example, higher education provides social mobility and hence facilitates equality.  
Where policies promoting equitable access to higher education are implemented, 
higher education acts as a ladder and leveller, allowing merit based virtues of 
hard intellectual work to even out social differences based on power stemming 
from non-merited things such as inherited wealth, race, or other aspects of 
heritage.  The overall good is that a more equitable society is a more stable 
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society and less inclined to violence and harm. Finally, higher education operates 
as a collective public good by shaping a common culture.  Again, these ideas are 
explored in greater depth in the next two chapters.  
 
6. Regulation, Law and the Public and Private Spheres 
 
Law has developed an approach to the assignment of projects to the public or 
private spheres by way of a theory of government and creation of areas deemed 
private—that is, not subject to state intervention.  Like its binary categories of 
legal-illegal, law forms a sharp dichotomy and as will be seen, struggles in the 
current environment where shades of grey increasingly mark that boundary. In 
creating the legal/illegal dichotomy, law starts with the powers and authority 
granted to government under constitutional law and then derives from those 
powers the role of government, the extent of the public sphere and so delineates 
the public-private divide.  That is, law has created two areas: public law and 
private law—at least in theory.453  Justification for regulatory purposes at law 
comes from the legal classification of an actor, organisation or activity as being 
public. This classification is based on tests.  
 
With respect to public law—the matter of concern in this dissertation—law has 
two tests for the assignment based on an implicit understanding of the role and 
nature of government. As noted, the constitution governs the powers of 
government.  However, where the constitution is silent or unclear about 
government powers, or where government action is challenged, the case law sets 
out the tests.  In determining the public-private divide in Commonwealth 
countries, the law has developed two tests. 
 
First is the public powers test. This test examines whether the power being 
exercised is a public power granted pursuant to legislation.  That is, where a body 
or person was using powers in an “exercise of prerogative” or as “derived from 
legislation” it was deemed to be exercising government powers and hence 
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subject to public law.454  The legal issue under this test is one of determining 
whether the body is acting on a power conferred by statute “under an enactment.” 
Where the body is doing so, the body is determined public. The leading 
Australian case revolves around the termination of Professor Burns from the 
ANU.455 In that case it was held that the termination by the statutory university 
corporation, the ANU, was not a decision under an enactment.  That is, the power 
to terminate Burns was not derived from the statute creating the ANU. Rather, 
the power to terminate was a common law contractual power and hence not an 
exercise of governmental power. 
 
The second test is a public functions test, being an examination of whether the 
activities in question are customarily exercised by a government. In the classical 
liberal tradition of the nineteenth century, Lord Watson was able to write that in 
the UK the "administration of justice, the maintenance of order and the 
repression of crime, are among the primary and inalienable functions of a 
constitutional government."456 Of course as society became more complex 
socially, economically and politically, government grew and the determination of 
government functions became more problematic.  Nevertheless, the test still 
stands.  
 
This test was taken up and applied in Australia through the Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in the adjudication of labour disputes.  
In 1959 Windeyer J in R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission; Ex Parte Professional Engineers' Association457 opined: 
 
The functions which government in fact undertakes vary with the time in 
history and the country concerned and the nature of its polity…. [and] 
will reflect political philosophy current at a particular time … I cannot 
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see any ground for saying that, in law, any one activity which government 
undertakes is really any more a true function of government than any 
other. No fixed criteria for the application of the assumed distinction have 
been formulated. And it has no firm historical foundation.458  
 
This test has been described as a “but for” test in that but for the fact of private 
provision, the government would step in and provide.459  Addressing the same 
issue more recently, the House of Lords appears to have collapsed the two tests 
into one in its recently offered opinion:  
 
What, then, is the touchstone to be used in deciding whether a function is 
public for this purpose? Clearly there is no single test of universal 
application. There cannot be, given the diverse nature of governmental 
functions and the variety of means by which these functions are 
discharged today. Factors to be taken into account include the extent to 
which in carrying out the relevant function the body is publicly funded, or 
is exercising statutory powers, or is taking the place of central 
government or local authorities, or is providing a public service.460 
 
The House of Lords by taking account of governmental function and the exercise 
of statutory powers brings together the two approaches to the test and adds 
considerations of public financing, fulfilling roles traditionally taken by 
government and provision of public service—apparently begging the question.  
 
Some recent innovations have been suggested in Australia.  Colin Campbell 
suggests that a better approach to a legal determination of public power would be 
based on the exercise of a monopoly power461—a position also used in 
economics to justify regulation.  That is, where a body is exercising a monopoly 
power, it is exercising a public power and should be subject to judicial review. 
Where the universities are exercising a monopoly of degree granting power, and 
a monopoly power on the use of the word “university” as they have through the 
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Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth), they may be exercising a public 
power.462   
 
The examination of the public-private divide in law cannot stop at the Federal 
level. Law in the States also address the issue.  In the Victorian context the 
legislature has embarked upon law reform process to clarify the distinction and 
the test.  In Victoria the Public Authorities Act 2004 (Vic) (PAA) has a two 
pronged approach.  As Bini observes, in the first instance, the PAA assigns 
organisations to the public side by identifying a range of entities from 
departments, to administrative offices, special bodies such a police, exempt 
bodies such as universities and local government committees, and listed bodies 
such as health centres.463 The second innovation that the PAA introduces is by 
placing on the public side all entities in which the minister or the Governor in 
Council may appoint 50% or more of the directors. 464   These innovations are too 
new to have judicial interpretation, and accordingly, other jurisdictions merit 
consideration. 
 
In an American legal analysis of the public-private divide, an analysis which 
differs only slightly from the Commonwealth model, Moe argues that the public 
side of the equation is fundamentally related to sovereignty.  That is, where there 
is an exercise of sovereign powers, the organisation must be public.465  For 
example, where there is coercion, such as violence or taxation, a sovereign 
exercise of power is taking place, and any body exercising such powers must be 
public. Further, where matters of public safety and security are concerned, public 
control is seen as a premium value.466    Moe notes that the challenges of 
contemporary society have obviated the potential for a standard set of criteria for 
assigning an organisation to the public or private spheres.  Rather, there are 
various dimensions of an organisation’s structures, processes and functions, each 
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one of which can be placed on a continuum allowing it to be located on the 
public and private divide in each of the dimensions. Moe identifies these 
anchoring continua as: the organisation’s subjection to various types of 
legislation including legislation concerning revenue and profit related taxes, 
freedom of information, administrative decision reviews, government audit, 
bankruptcy, and various public service conflicts.467 Merely being subject to 
public regulation alone is insufficient for classification to the public side.  That 
classification must occur with some of the other criteria. 
 
With respect to the university, the case of Australian National University v 
Burns468 found that the university in that specific instance was not acting under 
an enactment. It was simply exercising powers as any other employer.  In Griffith 
v Tang,469 the majority took the position that the university was acting on its 
internal procedures and hence not to be faulted. Kirby in his dissent observed the 
grave consequences of being excluded from a PhD program and suggested that 
some type of remedy should be available.470  The other significant case in this 
regard is University of Western Australia v Gray471 —a case involving ownership 
rights in intellectual property in innovative medical research both struggled with 
the location of the university on public-private divide.  In that case, the Federal 
Court of Appeal stated:  
 
UWA is a special purpose statutory corporation.  It was created to serve the 
public purposes served by a “university”… that there is nothing in the 
evidence to suggest that those commercial activities have displaced, either 
totally or if in part to what extent, UWA’s traditional public function as an 
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institution of higher education in favour of the pursuit of commercial 
purposes (if it lawfully could do so under its Act)”472 
 
Clearly, the court in this case decided that the university was on the public side 
of the divide.  This ambiguity in the case law, at times placing of the public 
Australian university on the private side of the divide in two instances but on the 
public on the other is troublesome from a legal perspective.  
 
As noted in Chapter 6,473 university corporations in Australia are public 
corporations in all matters save some private contribution of finance. Law has yet 
to come to grips with the changes to the institution transforming it from largely 
private to largely public since the end of World War II, let alone the new 
financial pressures and reform resulting from the neoliberal regulatory agenda,474 
and the university’s increased role in the provision of important public goods 
necessary for the maintenance of technologically and economically advanced 
societies. Law does not yet have a good way to deal with the common public-
private dichotomy in the current melange in which governments operate today. 
The solution has been to make that decision on a case by case basis, at times 
producing the contradictory outcomes noted above.  What occurs is a decision to 
make the assignment to one or the other side of the public-private divide 
depending upon which feature of the organisation or operations under scrutiny in 
the particular case. 
 
7. Conclusions: Public Good and University Regulation  
 
Much of the discussion of public goods and the public-private divide rests on the 
assumption of a real and natural distinction between the public and private 
spheres.  The underlying assumption, critical from a regulatory perspective, is 
that public law and money should be used for public ends and private law and 
money for private ends. Yet, as noted, there is reason to query strict definitions 
of public good as well as the sharp dichotomy.  Moving the analysis from a 
substantive scientific issue to a philosophical and disciplinary issue, Marginson 
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refers to the goods and the dichotomy as a shorthand for significant distinctions 
at the intersection of three disciplines—economics, law, and politics.475 
Marginson writes:  
in terms of the requirements of explanation and of policy making, more 
important than the formal legal title of ownership, is the social and 
cultural character of the outcome or ‘goods’ produced by higher 
education: the effects of these institutions in teaching/learning, research, 
certification of graduates, community and national service.476   
 
In other words, the justifications determine the classification of goods and 
services as public or private—a regulatory matter of priority.   
 
Normatively, Marginson describes the dichotomy as an artefact of the liberal 
focus on the individual instead of the collective.477  There are significant 
implications from this normative preference for regulatory purposes. Given that 
the public-private divide is more a continuum than a divide, it should not be 
surprising to find the vast majority of institutions, organisations and activities 
having elements of both. Accordingly, the implication for regulators is not 
somehow “purifying” the regulated object to fit neatly into one or the other side 
of the divide, but to use the division for purposes of lexical ordering. That is, by 
assigning to one side or the other the regulated object, those responsible for the 
control of the regulated object when confronted by a choice between competing 
objectives with conflicting norms are able to select or prefer the objective which 
aligns with the appropriate side of the divide. 
 
As Marginson notes, the classification of goods as public goods can just as fairly 
be based on an examination of their production and/or consumption by a public 
collective as on a private individual basis.478 In the context of higher education 
the public good of higher education is not self-evident solely by examination of 
its private economic, or social, political and public economic impact.479  The 
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matter of assignment is a political decision rather than something inherent in 
higher education itself.  
 
The assignment to the public or private side is an important decision with 
significant consequences.  A failure to take adequate account of the purposes for 
and implications of the decision can lead to conceptual opacity which sets the 
groundwork for regulatory failure.  As Moe notes, efforts to “somehow bridge 
the legal and organizational terms the public and private sectors… encounter 
problems which weaken the capacity of the organization to achieve its assigned 
mission.”480  That is, without a clear regulatory assignment leading to clarity in 
understanding an organisation’s assignment, an organisation’s awkward straddle 
of the boundary compromises the effective execution of its mission. Recognising 
the same issue in the context of Australian government companies, Bottomley 
stresses the importance of treating such enterprises “as if” they were one or the 
other at least where there is genuine debate on the issue.481   
 
Analysis of the university institution and of higher education in terms of public 
good and the public-private divide leads to the conclusion that they have 
significant contribution to and form an integral part of the public good.  This 
conclusion has a number of implications for regulation.  Regulation of the 
university and higher education needs to take account of that very significant 
public good component as well as the economic benefits both public and private.  
A regulatory design that fails to do so will result in a governance agenda for the 
university institution and higher education which is dysfunctional.  Indeed, as 
Prewitt observes, “much of public policy and law is about policing what occurs 
at the borders separating the three sectors [state, market, and society] and about 
determining what function will be performed in which sphere.”482  Failure to take 
hard non-ideological political decisions not only fails to responsibly discharge 
the public duties on government, but by failing to establish appropriate, coherent 
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regulation sets a foundation for regulatory failure and institutional failure—a 
failure too easily hidden through inappropriate accountability regimes.   
 
The foregoing analysis of the public good and the public-private divide suggests 
a number of issues for consideration in terms of regulation.  Perhaps most 
importantly, not only is there no purely technical economic reason for making an 
assignment to one side or another, but there are significant non-economic reasons 
for assigning it to the public side.  Among these, it has been argued that the 
university itself is a premier public space for the debate about matters public and 
private including the nature and location of the divide.  It has also been argued 
that higher education more broadly is an increasingly important public good in 
the information age.  Further, sociological analysis similarly envisions significant 
public goods coming from the university.  As well, law does not provide a 
singular model for public goods or the public-private divide.  Finally, it is clear 
that a political decision needs to be made to assign clearly such organisations to 
one side or the other of the divide.  Accordingly, assignment is a political 
decision, a matter for debate.  While a detailed discussion of the functions of the 
university—and hence its important role in society—are set out in the next 
chapter, a preliminary conclusion can be drawn here.  The university should be 
assigned to the public side of the public-private divide on the basis of its 
significant public good. I have agued that the public-private divide is an idea that 
helps sort out collective and government functions and responsibilities from 
those suited to individual resolution.  Further, I have argued that as an outcome 
of political debate, decisions concerning the appropriate location of organisations 
on the divide are matters not amenable to technical solution, political decisions 
must be made and for functional purposes, must be made clearly. Finally, as 
governments enact decisions creating the public-private divide, organisations are 
forced to work with those assignments. 
 
Political decisions about assigning it to the public or private need to be clear, 
non-partisan and brave.  Failure to do so will most likely lead to regulatory 
failure, corruption of the public mission, and lead the institution into dysfunction 
as it attempts to staddle the divide. The preponderance of good economic, 
political, social and legal reasons are sound reasons or justifications for assigning 
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the university and higher education to the public side of the divide.  The political 
decision and regulatory consequences as well as internal regulatory practices 
need to be developed with this in mind. These issues are explored in greater 
detail in the chapters which follow examining the institutional (Chapter 5) and 
organisational (Chapter 6) characteristics in turn.  
 
Higher education is a public good in historic, economic, political, sociological 
and legal senses.  Higher education provides considerable public benefits to 
society at large, effecting positively a wide range of things from individuals’ 
personal development, to improving quality and quantity of civic participation, to 
providing a well educated, highly skilled work force, and sophisticated 
consumers.  It provides social mobility, equality of opportunity not based on 
inheritance or economics. Its serves as a focal point for the preservation, 
transmission and dissemination of knowledge critical to the functioning of 
technologically and economically advanced societies which cannot rely on the 
bonds of tradition to accomplish these tasks.  These significant public roles and 
public goods provide adequate regulatory justification for assignment of the 
institution and functions of the university and higher education to the public side 
of the divide.  
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CHAPTER 5: REGULATORY OBJECTIVES AND THE INSTITUTION 
OF THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A key issue in regulatory coherence, as argued in Chapter 2, and supplementing 
Feaver and Durrant’s systemic coherence, is coherence between social and policy 
norms.  Social norms are those norms embedded in institutions.  By “institution” 
is meant the norms, practices and rules that create a particular community, 
including an understanding of who makes up that community, what its objectives 
are and the methods employed to achieve those objectives.483 By organisation is 
meant a particular group of people collaborating to achieve a particular 
objective.484 Institutions are created around norms which have some objective 
and are perpetuated over time.  Institutions such as parliament, the legal system, 
the market and the university485 all have different norms, and regulating each 
requires sensitivity to those norms. Policy norms are those norms selected by 
politicians which reflect their political philosophies and which are then reflected 
in legislative and regulatory agendas. Incoherent norm systems cannot co-exist.  
One must give way to allow the other to rise.  Trying to maintain incoherent 
norms systemically will negatively impact either or both of the extant institutions 
or the political agenda. Accordingly, this dimension of regulatory coherence 
needs careful attention. 
 
It has been argued in Chapter 2 that regulatory coherence demands either 
coherence between the policy norms and existing institutions, or that regulation 
be crafted carefully to take account of such institutions where there is to be a to 
change institutions or creation of a new one.  That is, where politicians have 
decided to use regulation to create or modify an institution, they do so with 
attention to existing institutions. Failure to attend to the institutions is likely to 
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lead politicians and regulators into the creation of incoherent regulation and so 
lead to regulatory failure.  
 
This chapter addresses these issues by asking and answering three questions. 
First, it asks the institutional question: what is the institution of the university? 
And, importantly, is the university a unique institution, or is it merely another 
generic institution in contemporary society? The chapter argues by way of 
literature surveys and application of those surveys to the university that the 
university is a distinct, social institution based on non-profit knowledge norms.  
The first survey is an historical examination of the institutional tasks or 
“missions” over the centuries.  A more complete institutional answer, however, 
requires the chapter to examine the university institution from a number of 
additional perspectives.  These perspectives are developed through critial surveys 
of economic, sociological, legal and political literature and application of that 
literature to the university. Not only do these disciplines provide competing 
policy and regulatory recommendations, but more importantly they provide 
different understandings of the institution itself. Secondly, the chapter asks the 
policy question: what do politicians and regulators require of the university 
institution?  It answers this question by the same historical review of the 
“missions” of the university and subsequently with a specific political regulatory 
focus in sections 7 and 8 of this chapter.  This historical and contemporary 
examination helps to capture the historical institution which informs the 
contemporary university, provides a characterisation of the contemporary 
institution and provides an understanding and basis for critique of the 
contemporary missions assigned to the institution by current governments.  
Answering these questions provides a strong basis for arguing that the university 
is a foundational social institution of western society and a provider of important 
public goods, which also provides private economic and social goods.  
 
The third question is derived from the answers to the first two questions about 
the nature of the institution and the policy question of what politicians ask of the 
university.  The third question asks the coherence question: are the policy 
demands coherent with the institution?  The answer to this latter question is 
mixed—to the degree that the knowledge norms and public good agendas form 
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part of policy, the answer is in the affirmative; however, where policy shifts the 
university’s foundation to private and economic norms the policy is incoherent.  
These answers therefore not only inform political decision makers as to where to 
place the university in terms of the public-private divide, but also provide for an 
understanding of how to regulate it and for what purposes or objects the 
institution of the university can and should be used.   
 
Concerning the second issue, policy objectives, it should be noted that they can 
be markedly diverse, ranging from such objects as increasing and concentrating 
political power over civil service agencies by appointments and restructuring 
management hierarchies—as under NPM reorganisations of government 
bodies—to the promotion of cooperative and democratic norms.  Such 
procedural and ideological objectives may have little or no substantive 
involvement in the institution itself, yet their underlying norms may be a source 
of serious conflict and dysfunction for the institutions upon which they are 
imposed where those institutions are founded on other norms. Although it may 
seem self evident that procedural norms are likely to have an impact on 
substantive issues, it is a position that is controversial. For example, as noted in 
Chapter 2, some economists and business scholars advocate “context indifferent” 
management and regulation—i.e. that good management and regulation is not 
dependent on the institution’s organisations, but on the implementation of 
generic prescribed formulae and techniques.486  Although one of the significant 
theses of this dissertation argued in this and the following chapter is that the 
university is a distinctive social institution, the universalist approach just 
identified presents a challenge to that view.  Further, as it is in vogue with 
management scholars and is consistent with NPM advocates, it forms a 
background for much policy making for, and regulation and governance of, the 
university.  The challenge for one holding a distinctive view of the university is 
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as one Vice Chancellor put it: “If the universities have no independent mission of 
their own other than … training of individuals for jobs, then they should not be 
surprised that they are treated like any other supplier of service.”487   
 
There are critical political ideologies and normative assumptions that underlie the 
belief in generic regulatory policies and practices.  Essentially, these views and 
philosophies are premised on rationalist reductionist models of humankind and 
its institutions and organisations.  These views were discussed in the previous 
chapter’s critique of economics and political ideologies. While they are relevant 
to the discussion in this chapter, they are tangential to the main argument which 
is that universities are a unique social institution contributing to societal well-
being—i.e. public good.488  Accordingly, the reader is referred back to the 
previous chapter’s critique where appropriate and the focus of this chapter is 
premised on those foundational arguments.  
 
This chapter’s examination of institutional objects provides a clear understanding 
of the policy choices, institutional objectives as well as the potential for their 
coherence.  Coherence cannot be assumed to inhere among institutional objects, 
and as will be seen, is a matter critical to the coherence analysis of Chapter 7. 
Indeed, there is little potential for coherence where policy objects are at odds 
with institutional objects. While that coherence analysis is carried out in detail in 
Chapter 7, this chapter provides the foundation for that part of the analysis.  
 
Understanding the objects of the university institution requires a somewhat 
expansive examination of the institution both historically as noted, as well as an 
examination through various disciplinary lenses.  The university is not a recent 
local invention and it is a mistake to consider its regulation as if it were.  Rather 
it is one of the few institutions to survive from the medieval era.  Over the 
centuries, the university has been many things: the training ground of the clergy 
and of the deputies of the court and lawyers, the place for the perpetuation of the 
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elite, an engine room for nationalism, the weapon of the secular governor against 
competing church power, the research centre providing nation states with 
technical advantage in war, feeding their populaces, a creator of economic and 
social good, the representative of ecclesiastical power against secular authority,  
a political strategy, a centre for coordinating society, as well as society’s critic 
among a host of other things.  The foregoing representative list identifies only 
some of the educational, vocational and political objects of the university.   
 
Additionally, there are other significant institutional and organisational objects 
that need to be taken into account.  These include concerns of maintaining 
legitimacy, enhancing prestige and economic survival.  Further, account must be 
taken of the use of the institution and its organisations by individuals and small 
groups, internally such as students, administrators, or academics, as well as 
externally by business and politicians seeking to advance their own agendas.  In 
addition, the university has a social mission of sorting and credentialing members 
of society. Finally, shifts in politics over the last few decades—a short time in the 
centuries long history of the university—have attempted to impose economic 
objects including revenue generation and in some instances profits on the 
institution.  
 
This variety of roles, functions and objects of the university is monumental, 
difficult to distinguish and hard to evaluate.  They seldom appear together in 
briefs of politicians, policy advisors, and regulators.  Nevertheless, a clear 
understanding of these objects is necessary for effective regulation.  These 
various tasks of the university are usually compiled into the vague term 
“mission.”  It is important to note the change in the meaning of the term 
“mission”.  Whereas earlier it referred to the transcendent objects of an activity, 
it now means objects of measurement for accountability purposes.489  The earlier 
meaning is more appropriate in the context of the university and it is used in that 
sense in this chapter dissertation (it is used differently in discussing 
organisational mission in the next chapter).  
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Where one begins with an examination of the institution, one finds that how one 
defines the university institutionally provides a foundation for the determination 
of all regulatory matters from policy objects, to assignment on the public-private 
divide, to appropriate instruments, administrative arrangements and 
accountability.  Given the various approaches to understanding the university, as 
noted, the chapter examines the institution from a variety of disciplinary 
perspectives.  With respect to the university any broad notion of its mission 
depends on particular views of humanity, epistemology and the institution of the 
university in society. 490 These views would include such things as the belief in 
the limits of human nature and human potential, the possibilities of knowledge, 
ordering of information, and knowledge as a public good among other things.491 
 
After the review of the historical institutional missions and the disciplinary 
perspectives on the institution, the chapter then turns to examine specifically the 
mission of the university in the Australian and particularly the contemporary 
challenges posed by policy. Abraham Flexner’s observation in his 1930 study of 
the university in Germany, the UK, and the USA is worth bearing in mind: 
“Every age, every country, has its unique concrete needs and purposes. For that 
reason there can be no university type, persisting through the ages, transferable 
from one country to another. Every age does its own creating and re-shaping; so 
does every country.”492 The university in Australia is no exception.  Flexner’s 
comment does not mean that the university can be anything from an iron foundry 
to apple orchard.  His idea, rather, is that the emphasis of the university 
institution can and must be shaped by the environmental context. The continuity 
of the university in each of these contexts is its normative commitments around 
knowledge: knowledge creation, knowledge preservation, and knowledge 
dissemination.  It has maintained the primacy of knowledge as an intrinsic value 
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regardless of any particular knowledge’s instrumental utility. The university is 
the premier knowledge institution of western society. How that has been 
interpreted over time and geography varies as shall be demonstrated;493 however, 
those variations do not alter the institutional norms around knowledge or their 
normative ordering. This argument leads to the final argument and section of the 
chapter addressing the coherence between the institution and policy. This section 
argues that the increasing incoherence between the institution and policy are 
leading toward an increasingly dysfunctional institution and ultimately a form of 
regulatory failure.  
 
2. Historical Institutional Missions of the University: Research, Teaching and 
Public Service 
 
As a point of departure for answering the questions of the nature of the university 
the comment of Barnett, a UK scholar of the university, is interesting: “[the] 
university no longer knows what it is to be a university.”494 His point is that the 
changed environment including the regulatory environment of the university 
institution over the last few decades has radically changed the institution.  As a 
result, there are many assumptions that no longer apply to the contemporary 
university.  Trying to move beyond this ambiguity, Jarvis, a renowned higher 
education scholar observes:  
“the university is a part of the social institution that seeks to respond to 
humanity’s will to understand the truth in every walk of life and in the 
universe within which all human life is lived…. The will to truth 
demands an educational institution that offers, as a service to everybody 
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who wishes to participate, lifelong and life wide quality research, 
scholarship and teaching.”495   
 
To consider the university as an institution, there must be some similarity or a 
convergence among a number of organisations which consider themselves 
“universities” that is sufficient to allow them to be placed together as a single 
social institution. These similarities will be with respect to capacities, objectives, 
and resourcing needs; a similarity in resources in terms of staff, students, 
infrastructure, and finance; an accord with respect to the vision and mission both 
among the various professionals within organisations, between organisations, and 
as between that institution and the government.  
 
Many efforts have been made to define the university more carefully and 
exhaustively. Some, such as the famous view espoused by Cardinal Newman, 
have viewed the university as “an idea.” 496 This group of thinkers views the 
university as an ideal state of affairs, an institution based on normative primacy 
placed on knowledge, given to the contemplation of disinterested knowledge.  In 
this view, the university institution is supported by a system of organisations 
providing higher education usually with the support of public authorities who 
accept a normative or lexical ordering prioritising knowledge.  It follows that the 
funding and control of the university is by these authorities. 
 
Others have viewed the university instrumentally. That is, the university has been 
considered an instrument to achieve objectives of other parties rather than 
asserting its unique social contribution with respect to knowledge. It has been 
used instrumentally by the state, the church, and more recently, by business 
through providing preparation for participation in capitalist production. As put by 
one scholar “they are… essentially education and training establishments that 
will lead to a form of capitalist cultural reproduction rather than centres of 
democratic criticality, that we might expect from the more traditional 
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university.”497 This comment reflects a normative conflict on the value and 
nature of knowledge, the normative objects of social coordination, and the related 
normative ordering of the missions of the university.  Further, it leads to the 
question: Is knowledge approaching or approximating “truth” or is its value 
merely instrumental to increase economic efficiency or some other such end? In 
the latter context the university has become less about the wisdom of the sages 
and the struggle for meaning and more about the economic value arising from 
know-how of technology.  
 
Underlying the foregoing discussion are some critical but unarticulated 
assumptions.  These are the normative assumptions about the value, nature, and 
control of knowledge on the one hand, and the role of the university in relation to 
that knowledge and society at large on the other.  The assumptions about 
knowledge, as mentioned earlier, include the value of knowledge as of intrinsic 
value or only instrumentally through its economic exchange value.  If one is to 
take the latter view, all knowledge leading to psychological comfort or well 
being, environmental well-being, or peaceful co-existence is only valuable to the 
degree that it can be commodified and sold.   
 
Where higher education’s knowledge is an esoteric knowledge498—a private 
knowledge for the privileged, elite of society—then cloistering it in a university 
serves those purposes.  Where higher education’s knowledge is viewed as critical 
to a society’s ability to develop an informed democracy, to enable individuals to 
develop and prosper in the broadest sense, to foster the well-being of society 
including future generations it is viewed as an invaluable public good, it is a 
good that should be shared as widely as possible—a important norm to underpin 
university regulation.  In a time when knowledge was more easily controlled and 
society was stable from generation to generation, it was easier to justify payment 
by sponsors such as religion, governments, and wealthy individuals. However, 
where knowledge is considered a private good, a commodity, the role of the 
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university is re-drawn. The contest between public and private conceptions of 
knowledge and the university reflect a larger shift in the social conception of 
knowledge.  As sociologists Marta Calas and Linda Smircich observe:  
“The moment ‘knowledge’ was positioned as a commodity in the wider 
context of capitalist modes of production and (‘free’) market forces, 
universities were to receive declining support for continuing as 
sanctioned sites for the production of innovations in the arts, the sciences 
and the professions, and still much less support for continuing as places 
for ‘disinterested knowledge’ in the quest for a better society.”499  
Thus, at a basic level the contest is a contest one about the nature of 
knowledge—as an expression of universal truth and the university its 
handmaiden as Newman would have it, or as Mode 2—i.e. an applied, context 
specific, production oriented, project limited knowledge, with neither on-going 
organisational nor institutional nor social value beyond its transactional 
economic value.500  This debate is part of the larger debate on the nature of 
knowledge from a pragmatic perspective purportedly apart from the stricter 
philosophical enquiries of epistemology.501  It further reflects an academic divide 
between modernist and post-modernist views dubbed “the culture wars,”502 
which in turn add another layer of complexity. Unsurprisingly this complexity is 
reflected inconsistently in regulation of the university. While seemingly esoteric 
questions and issues, they go to the fundamental regulatory questions of what is 
being regulated, by whom and for whom? Is it correct to assert that the university 
is 
the place to which a thousand schools make contributions; in which the 
intellect may safely range and speculate, sure to find its equal in some 
antagonist activity, and its judge in the tribunal of truth. It is a place 
where inquiry is pushed forward, and discoveries verified and perfected, 
and rashness rendered innocuous, and error exposed, by the collision of 
mind with mind, and knowledge with knowledge503?   
Regulating the university to favour the creation and protection of intellectual 
property is part of a particular normative agenda as is regulating the university 
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for the purposes of broad concepts of knowledge and political literacy for 
democratic participation.  
 
Regulatory issues surrounding the university of course are not new. Circa 1250, 
Humbert de Romans, Master General of the Dominican order and graduate of the 
University of Paris, listed a number of causes for complaint about scholars 
which, while reflecting medieval views on the university’s mission, have a 
remarkably contemporary ring to them. Humbert complains about the waste of 
resources, failing to take advantage of opportunities to expand the mind, lack of 
focus, poor learning habits and not putting one’s learning to good use.504  One 
can see from this list both an idea of the objects of the university and the 
perennial frustrations of in those involved in its regulation and governance. The 
university’s primary job is providing students with the opportunity to develop 
knowledge about the world.  To achieve this objective, however, it must engage 
in two additional tasks: the preservation of old knowledge and creation of new.  
If it fails to do these, what will it teach? 
 
Although the mission of the university is often summarised, for example, as 
teaching, research and public service, this trinity is in fact shorthand for a variety 
of missions.  It is important to note from the outset that the missions are not 
always in alignment nor necessarily coherent:  some missions are coherent and 
others are in conflict.  This theme of conflicting missions will be highlighted in 
this chapter.  They are significant because while some conflicting missions may 
be incorporated within a single institution, others will be fatal to it.  While the 
three main missions may largely be coherent or reconcilable, further examination 
and explication of the university’s missions is in order to understand the 
functions and role of the university in society.  These latter functional missions 
of the university, i.e. missions developed from an understanding the role of the 
university in society are separate and distinct from the sociological institutional 
and organisational missions, discussed separately. 
 
 
                                                 
504
 Exposition of the Rule of Blessed Augustine, in Thorndike, L. (1944). University Records and 
Life in the Middle Ages. New York, Columbia University Press Doc. 34, pp. 73-74. 
 215 
3. Historic Knowledge Based Missions 
 
Historically, the university developed for the purposes of educating, testing and 
credentialing people seeking the right to teach.  That is, students attended the 
universitas in order to study and upon successfully passing examinations, receive 
the licenciate permitting them to teach. As part of the teaching and examining 
role, scholarship developed.  That is, books on all topics of inquiry were studied, 
examined, copied and recopied—by hand of course—and lectures based on those 
studies were prepared for dictation to students.505 These scholarly activities form 
the foundation for the research mission discussed later.  Over time the 
universities developed extensive libraries for use by teachers and students alike. 
To rulers and wealthy individuals the value of university educated graduates was 
self-evident and demand for educated people drove students to the university.  
This teaching activity started the sorting and credentialing mission of the 
university.  Further, as local citizens recognized the social, political and 
economic benefits of the university corporations in their respective cities, local 
political leaders worked to keep them in place.  Society’s experience with the 
institutional led to an expansion of the university’s mission. 
 
One of the most basic conflicts in the university institution lies deep in its 
history.  That conflict is the conflict between the disinterested pursuit of 
knowledge for its own sake and the utilitarian mission of career training.  This 
conflict goes back to the origins of the university. As Classen observes:  
“the schools of the twelfth and the universities of the thirteenth century 
never set themselves the goal of providing the courts and municipalities 
with specialized experts.…. From the very beginning, education was 
subject to the tension between the fundamental and primary impulse to 
seek the truth and the desire of many persons to acquire practical 
training.”506   
The medievalist Cobban characterises the medieval university as a largely 
vocational school:507 it taught law, medicine and theology all for purposes of 
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employment.508  Yet, as he elucidates elsewhere, the curriculum of medieval era 
was designed for intellectual and spiritual development, not skilling for 
employment.509  Essentially, the medieval university was a vocational capstone 
on a classical—or “liberal” as it would more readily be known—education. 
 
One finds echoes of this historical comment in both the contemporary 
sociological research and economic criticism of the university. Sociologists note 
that the role of the university is as much about sorting and providing 
credentials—at times quite disconnected from actual abilities and skills—as it is 
about providing education.510  Economists complain about the cost of universities 
and their lack of focus on job skills, seemingly oblivious to the critical social 
functions with which the institution is charged and the potent non-economic 
benefits the institution provides.  Indeed, at a most basic level some would view 
the utilitarian and ideal objects of university as fundamentally in conflict.511  This 
is not the conflict, as shall be demonstrated. It is significant to note that the 
conflict is not about the value of knowledge per se, or the university’s role in its 
creation, preservation and dissemination; rather, the issue is which knowledge is 
to be created, preserved and transmitted.  That is a normative and political 
debate—whether the knowledge of value is only that which generates 
immediately recognisable economically valued knowledge or whether there 
might be some other knowledge, such as how to organise and regulate an 
economy or a society, which might be of value. These normative and political 
dimensions of knowledge and the university’s mission of knowledge creation, 
preservation and dissemination will be seen throughout the missions which 
follow. 
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a. Development of Individual, Citizens and Civilisation 
 
Higher education has long had the dual aims of individual human development 
and the development of citizens capable of participation in collective social and 
political life.512  The former aim is identified with the humanistic movement with 
its emphasis on the redemption of fallen creatures through ethical 
development.513  The university itself was seen as having a mission of 
evangelizing in medieval times,514 and so contributing to civil society or 
“Christendom” as it was then called.  This “socio-political mission” of creating 
citizens has been carried forward throughout the millennia in various forms.515  
As Rudy sees it, the institutional mission of the universities is to be “nurseries of 
humanism and science, scholarship and social responsibility….dedicated to their 
basic task: to further the quest for truth and to release the full potential of human 
creativity.”516 In the Marxist version of this mission, the university is the 
institution for training the elite necessary to maintain the ruling class.517  Still, 
regardless of how one sees it, there has been a strong tradition of the university 
as contributing to the maintenance of society and, where admission has been on 
the basis of something other than privilege, the levelling of society.518 The 
development of individuals, citizens and society remains a contemporary mission 
for the Australian university as seen in Chapter 3 and discussed below.  
 
This view of the importance of development of citizens is a critical mission of 
the university today in Australia and not merely some misplaced nostalgia or 
idealistic critique.  Justice Owen, the Commissioner charged with the inquiry 
into the $4 billion collapse of HIH Insurance stated:  
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“I think all those who participate in the direction and management of 
public companies, as well as their professional advisers, need to identify 
and examine what they regard as the basic moral underpinning of their 
system of values. They must then apply those tenets in the decision-
making process. The education system—particularly at tertiary level—
should take seriously the responsibility it has to inculcate in students a 
sense of ethical method. In an ideal world the protagonists would begin 
the process by asking: is this right?”519 
 
Owen J’s views of the role of tertiary education in Australia’s largest corporate 
collapse is instructive in that it is his view not that tertiary education needs to 
improve its ability to generate revenue, or develop technical or professional 
skills.  Rather, Owen J’s concern is with the failure of the tertiary education 
system in developing students’ faculties needed to engage in critical, ethical 
thinking about personal as well as collective objects.  In Owen J’s view, the 
failure of HIH is in part a failure of tertiary education in Australia.520  The 
university has a mission of developing students with collective social 
commitments and abilities in contrast to merely training self-interested business 
managers operating in an amoral environment.  The education provided by the 
university must not only be more than how to make a profit. It must provide 
education which is properly described as “higher education”—critical, reflective 
and broadly aware.  
 
b. Training For Statesmanship   
 
The philosophers of antiquity saw the main objective of higher education as the 
preparation of individuals for successful participation in politics, a type of 
“seminary that provided councillors and law-givers for republics and reigning 
sovereigns.”521 Such notables as Cicero, Seneca, and others all received higher 
education as training for politics.  Society has long looked to the university to 
provide experts on all manner of issues, providing advice and advisors to 
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governors of all types of organisations. 522  The University of Paris, for example, 
was so involved in the governance of the city, that it became impossible to 
distinguish between university and royal opinion at times.523  The papacy drew 
heavily from the graduates of the law school at the university corporations of 
Bologna and Paris from their earliest days.524  As the clergy played a significant 
role in the governance of society, functioning as judges, ambassadors and in 
other important civic roles the education of the clergy as statesmen has been an 
important function of the university.525   
 
Leaders of all developed commonwealth countries are university educated, as are 
most diplomats and one would assume all senior civil servants. The idea of a 
civil service based on technical ability rather than social standing has been a 
hallmark of civil service and bureaucracy since the 18th century.526  Every 
Australian Prime Minister since Chifley lost office in 1949 with the exception of 
Keating has been university educated, and its first Prime Minister, Edmund 
Barton, like the UK’s first Prime Minister Robert Walpole two hundred years 
earlier, was a university graduate. While this history does not prove the 
university’s institutional mission, it is evidence of an important institutional role 
in the shaping and training of leaders. 
 
 
c. Liberal Arts 
 
The mission of the university has long been centred on the teaching of the liberal 
arts. The curriculum adopted by the medieval university came from the culture of 
late antiquity—that of the first century B.C.  It was based on the three literary 
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arts: grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic, and the four branches of mathematics: 
geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and theory of music.527  As the thirteenth 
century scholar Humbert de Romans observed, the liberal arts were a form of 
personal development and not limited to the immediately practical.528  This 
curriculum formed the basis of all education at the universities, and provided a 
foundation for the learning of higher knowledge, namely theology, law and 
medicine.529  The revival of the liberal arts in the middle ages, of course, resulted 
from the rediscovery of the classical works of antiquity, and the effort to 
integrate them into the belief in the revealed truth of the Christian church.530  The 
importance of the liberal arts in the formation and development of western 
culture, science and technology need not be re-iterated here. Suffice it to say that 
the liberal arts provided a significant part of the foundation. 
 
In the contemporary context, liberal arts provide a basis for discussion about 
meaning—from the mundane meaning of fluctuations in the economy, to the 
meaning and conduct of collective existence and social organisation, to the 
esoteric discussion about the meaning of life.  The university’s objective of 
maintaining and developing the liberal arts makes it society’s primary place for 
debate about the development, challenge and transformation of meanings socially 
and collectively as well as individually. That is to say, the university holds a 
special if contradictory role as both the guardian of culture, and the critic of 
society, being both conservative and creative. The liberal arts provide the 
foundation for that discussion including its language, its arguments, its values 
and logic. The university’s mission in this regard is again in conflict, to be both 
conservative and radical.  It may be that this mission is the most difficult of all 
mission to evaluate in terms of its success except to say that this integral role as 
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embraced by the academic profession has been sufficient to sustain it for nearly a 
millennium at the heart of the university.  
 
d. Development Of Scientific Research 
 
Humanity has gained knowledge about itself and its environment through various 
versions of research throughout recorded time.  One important and long standing 
object of the university institution has been scholastic research.  The origins of an 
institution of higher learning dedicated to research can be traced back to the 
Museum of Alexandria from around 285 B.C.E.531  According to Marrou, the 
Museum supported the research of “geometers, astronomers, physicians, 
historians, critics and grammarians.”532 The scholars were maintained by the king 
and their needs attended to by others so they could dedicate themselves to their 
research.533  Its librarian, Callimachus, catalogued the collection amounting to 
one hundred and twenty thousand volumes.534  Although not initially established 
for educational purposes, it did over time develop into an educational institution 
that lasted well into the fourth century A.D.535 
 
The Italian universities of the Renaissance of 1475-1600 had research as an 
important mission. It has been argued that they were the basis for the 
Humboldtian research university which inspired other German universities, 
American, UK and ultimately, Australian models.536  Although the advancement 
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of knowledge and the institutionalization of its advancement are long standing, 
research generated knowledge as an end in itself537 has only gained prominence 
and become a significant focus of human endeavour since the Enlightenment.  
This relationship between society’s interest in knowledge and the Enlightenment 
is significant because the driving force in the establishment and growth of the 
university has been the Enlightenment belief in the progress of the human 
spirit.538   
 
As Cobban explains, the result of the Enlightenment was that the work of 
scholars at the medieval university changed from “a random study of scientific 
data to a more fully integrated mathematical investigation in physical 
phenomena, underpinned by a method of scientific inquiry comprising 
observations, hypothesis and experimental verification.”539  That shift also 
paralleled a shift in western epistemology from one in which all knowledge was 
by divine revelation, to one in which human agency was efficacious in discovery 
of truth.   
 
The German decision to integrate research and teaching as in the Humboldtian 
university has been a model emulated throughout the world as integrating 
research and teaching into a single organisation, with research leading the way.  
This is not to say the advancement of empirical research is the sole or main 
driver of the university.  Many of the great university organisations of 
contemporary society made teaching their main mission, for both the professions 
and the liberal arts.  Indeed, teaching was the foremost institutional mission as 
discussed above.  
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Teaching in the traditions of a discipline is backwards looking or historic. In 
other words, teaching as imparting knowledge is working with the accumulated, 
refined and re-worked knowledge of the past.  In contrast, research is an 
innovative mission. It is forward focused in the creation of new knowledge and 
future focused, and its creative character sets it in opposition to traditions taught, 
at least in some views.  Further, these two activities take different mindsets, 
different abilities, and either one can easily consume the energies of an 
individual. Abandoning either mission, however, is to abandon the institution of 
the university.  Any organisation wishing to comply with the institutional norms 
of the university has made scholarship a significant part of its activity and 
mission—a point recently illustrated by the for-profit University of Phoenix 
which responded to criticism of its status as a university through creation of a 
National Research Centre. 540 
 
There are significant normative issues underlying the research mission in terms 
of disinterested basic research, commercialisable applied research, and the 
revenue generating mission of the contemporary university. Ruegg argues that 
despite the importance of utilitarian professional training of university studies in 
the medieval era,  
“the university as a body serving only [these] material interests and 
freedoms, would have shared the fate of other medieval institutions;…. It 
was the collective responsibility for the organization and discipline of the 
striving for knowledge…. which gave some meaning to the liberties and 
privileges of scholars and masters, transcended their immediate material 
interests, and assured the persistence of the autonomy of the university in 
its most distinctive activity, which is that of scholarly and scientific 
teaching and research.” 541   
 
In fact, Ruegg believes this normative commitment to knowledge is the basis of 
the notion of the transmission of knowledge as a public good.542 Further he 
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believes that the normative commitment is what allowed scientific discovery to 
take hold.543 
 
Regardless of how knowledge is conceived, it is insufficient for an organisation 
that wishes to participate in the institution of the university to teach but not 
engage in research broadly defined. A university which fails to research is by 
some accounts at least not a university.544 This has been a criticism of the for-
profits, such as McDonald’s Hamburger University and Motorola University545  
and just noted University of Phoenix which responded by its “National Research 
Centre”.546 Smith argues that the notion of “The University” is outdated, and all 
that exists is a constellation of organisations with various objects relating to the 
creation and dissemination of knowledge, known as universities547—although it 
may be significant to observe that the comment appears to conflate the global 
institution with various local organisations.  Such perspectives, however, fail to 
take adequate account of the social nature of knowledge and the community or 
collective environment within which much successful teaching and research take 
place. 
 
e. Training For Professions 
 
In the medieval university, the professions attracted considerable numbers of 
students.  Indeed, the earliest universities were outgrowths of the law schools at 
Bologna, and there is evidence that students hurried their liberal arts studies in 
order to move on to the lucrative professional studies as soon as possible.548  The 
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professions were considered vocations and universities were seen as 
organisations dedicated to training teachers, theologians, lawyers and doctors.549 
 
Students at the earliest universities in Australia, namely Sydney and Melbourne, 
were for the most part engaged in studying for Arts degrees preliminary for 
qualification for studying professions in the UK.550  Training for the professions 
has remained an important function of the university. The Australian government 
has recognized this function and published its findings, recommending among 
other things, on the growth of opportunities for professional training by 
increasing related university enrolments.551   
 
This training for the professions has both public and private components as well 
as entrepreneurial and caring dimensions.  The public good of the professions is 
their contribution to the social order and individual well-being of members of 
society.  The private benefits of professions are to the professional in terms of 
social prestige and in many professions, economic reward, as well as to the 
individual beneficiary of professional services as well as society as a whole.  
 
f. Contributing to the nation-state and social welfare policy 
 
The mission of the university has been closely linked with the creation and 
development of the nation-state.  That is, by developing the notion of the nation-
state, an ethnically based group, training the bureaucracy to serve the 
government, the university has played a significant role in the development of 
the nation-state as a power, assisting it in the definition of roles, developing 
control over the populace and a political agenda—for both left and right wing 
governments. The social and political missions of the university can be seen in 
the early history of the university in Australia.552 The University of Melbourne 
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was established for the combined purposes of competing with the University of 
Sydney and making higher education more readily available to the local elite.553  
This impetus for the university as social competition may go some distance in 
explaining the Australian university’s imbalance toward utilitarian professional 
training over intellectual leadership, research and scholarship.554 Yet, the 
knowledge of importance was the ability to understand the dynamic socio-
political and geographic environments of the colony in its position on the 
opposite side of the world from the homeland.  The knowledge from other 
countries was considered crucial for the development of and integration into the 
larger global political and economic systems. That knowledge was to assist the 
growing colony to establish and build itself eventually into a nation-state, a 
public good.  
 
Part of the nation building mission policies involves the social welfare and social 
mobility policy agendas of governments from post World-War II to the 1970’s.  
In that era, the university was seen as an important part of governments’ policies 
to decrease disparity between socio-economic classes providing all citizens with 
equal opportunity to achieve higher social standing and increased economic 
resources.  This shift transformed the university from a private elite institution to 
a public egalitarian institution.555  It also added a further conflicting mission 
demanding academic excellence for the finest minds while insisting on equal 
access for all. The government’s use of the university to achieve social equity 
through social mobility—referred to as a mission of accessibility.556 
Problematically, this accessibility mission has come into conflict with its mission 
of excellence.557  The university as a public institution is expected to be 
inclusive, fostering diversity, yet it must have policies which promote inclusivity.  
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These policies may at times limit free expression of controversial views.558 This 
shift has been moved a step forward as the knowledge privileged by government 
has been only that which produces immediately foreseeable economic 
advantages.  
 
This section has argued that while the university is certainly not the only 
institution that is charged with the creation, preservation and dissemination of 
knowledge—other research institutions, think tanks, government laboratories, 
museums and organisations such as libraries serve these functions—the 
university is a special institution in that institutionally it functioned best as 
autonomous from sponsoring interests in the creation, preservation and 
dissemination tasks.  Further, it is founded upon an intrinsic view of the value of 
knowledge rather than an instrumental view. Although training for professions, 
statesmanship, and research have been outcomes, the consistently operative 
foundational norm has been knowledge conceived of.  In these ways the 
university is a unique knowledge based institution with its historic mission being 
the preservation, transmission and creation of knowledge.   
 
Other perspectives on the institution, however, are important for understanding it 
and its potential.  The chapter next turns to these, first economic, then 
sociological, legal and political.  
 
4. Economic: Profits, Non-profit and Development 
 
This section examines the university institution from the perspective of 
economics. While some balk at the notion,559 there has been recent discussion of 
an economic mission of the university.  This discussion of economics is critical 
in the assignment on the public-private divide.  As noted in the previous chapter, 
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much of the policy advice and political decisions are made on the basis of 
economic perspectives and advice. For this reason, a consideration of the 
economic mission of the university is important.  
 
There are in this discussion two distinct economic missions of the university.  
One is external and the other internal.  The external economic mission refers to 
the university’s significant economic contributions to its external environment in 
terms of the advancement of knowledge, hard technology as well as shaping of 
policy, culture and hence ultimately, society. Bringing in new ideas and 
developing local knowledge are innovative missions of the university and the 
university has been effective in this regard.   
 
Externally, there has been discussion of the university as having an economic 
objective in terms of facilitating economic development resulting from enabling 
people’s creativity and innovation.  While certainly not its main function 
according to the majority of higher education scholars, in a certain way it is 
another form of its public mission—disseminating knowledge by the transfer of 
technological innovation created there.  Stephen Sample, former president of the 
University of Southern California, suggests that it is a core function of the 
university.  Sample stated: “we need to incorporate technology transfer as part of 
the basic mission of the university.”560 One important concern arising from this 
view is that transforming the university to support economic growth is a subtle 
way of redefining "public good" to mean supporting those activities that facilitate 
corporate activity in the global knowledge economy.  Some argue that this focus 
diverts the university from addressing “the most urgent social, economic and 
educational needs of the population,” 561 a diversion to serving corporate 
rationality, or simply the other personal, public and human missions discussed 
above.  Further, this view of the university’s external economic mission must 
take into account the larger issues of core public values and critical public 
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mission of the university which, if the university is to be assigned to the public 
side of the public-private divide are decidedly non-commercial.  It may be that 
the normative implications of placing economic revenue generation whether for 
base operations or for profit are so inimical to the university institution as to 
shatter its core.562  This discussion leads to consideration of the internal 
economic mission. 
 
The discussion of the internal economic mission of the university is the most 
controversial. The controversy stems from a combination of fact and ideology.  
The fact is that university organisations are significant economic actors in their 
own right in terms of the production and provision of goods and services, 
consumption of resources, distribution of goods and services, and employment.  
They are economic actors at local, state and international levels.  
 
Through the normative lens of neoclassical economics, the exchange of money 
for the provision of service should be treated as a commercial transaction.  
Normatively, as noted, this transaction should be a private for profit transaction.  
An organisation that is the providing party in such transactions should be a 
private profit generating organisation.  There is no reason for it not to be—from 
this perspective at least.  From a political perspective, neoliberals favour 
privatisation and as such, seek opportunities to privatise public organisations 
including the university institution to the maximum extent possible to increase 
the sphere of private economic activity.  As such both neoliberal political 
scientists and neoclassical economists might be disposed to see universities as 
privatisation opportunities to be welcomed, creating new profits in the private 
sector, and expanding economic freedom.563 Thus from this perspective, the 
internal mission of the university should be changed from higher education to 
generating a profit.  
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There has been a start on the scholarship on the university as a private, for-profit 
enterprise, and some centres have been established to examine it.564  Although a 
doctoral dissertation at Harvard has been offered,565 and a recent collection of 
essays566 overseas, to date there has been very little done in Australia.567  A 
question similar to the earlier VC’s568 sharpens the focus from generic 
organisational management to a for profit enterprise: “if the ‘corporate 
university’ is hardly distinguishable from a business corporation, one has to ask: 
upon what basis should universities exist?”569    
 
The University of Phoenix is the sine qua non of this for-profit model of the 
university.  Private university scholar, Breneman, referred to it as the “poster 
child” of the group.570 The University of Phoenix, a subsidiary of the Apollo 
Group, has current student enrolments of 224,880.571   It has been in operation 
since 1976.572 The university has been described as a “stock market darling”573 
because of its outstanding financial performance, business model and 
management.   
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To understand the “university” in this model one can do no better than to quote 
the founder and CEO of the owning corporation.  In her article on the University 
of Phoenix, Ana Marie Cox quotes John Sperling, Chair and CEO, Apollo 
Group, owner of the University of Phoenix, on his view of the university.  
Sperling declares: “This is a corporation, not a social entity. Coming here is not a 
rite of passage. We are not trying to develop their value systems or go in for that 
‘expand their minds’ bullshit.”574  This view is the consequence of the 
implementation of neoclassical economics and is a concern to some who view 
the university differently. The lack of interest in students’ intellectual 
development and narrow normative view of job readiness, challenge the idea of 
this particular organisation as a part of the university institution—and hence its 
right to refer to itself by that title. Further, it is suggestive of other institutional 
norms such as intellectual development and a poly-normative environment or 
approach to studies.   
 
The for profit model has worked in very limited circumstances.575  Essentially, it 
functions in niche areas such as adult part-time education.  These for profit 
universities have survived, however, only by free-riding on non-profit 
universities for such resources as libraries and qualified academic staff.576 
Analysis of the shift to for profit models and market regulation have been 
addressed by a number of authors—from economists to social theorists and 
higher education specialists.577  They have published various critical, insightful 
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and comprehensive analysis of the models.578 All of these studies point to a 
variety of serious limitations and consequences of leaving universities to for 
profit organisations and their regulation to markets. Indeed, Breneman later 
questioned the model as a variety of Federal government lawsuits were filed.579 
The lawsuits, for the most part successful, alleged exploitation of students by 
providing misleading information and high pressure sales, inappropriate 
accessing of public funds, improper incentivising of admissions counsellors, 
misleading the market, failure to hold sufficient study group hours, various 
efforts to game regulators and labour issues.580 While it is not suggested that 
profit driven university corporations will necessarily operate this way, there are 
two important consequences arising from this behaviour.  First, the value of a 
degree is largely reputation based. That is, the value of a degree depends to a 
large degree on the reputation of the organisation issuing the degree.  Secondly, 
the actions of the corporation operating the University of Phoenix are hardly 
anomalies in the business sector. In the Australian context, an on-going spate of 
scandals concerning private providers of TAFE and language skills attests to the 
problems associated with the introduction to the profit motive into the provision 
of educational services—a matter dealt with in greater detail in the next chapter 
and considered from a coherence perspective in the analysis in Chapter 7.   
 
In the Australian context, as noted, since Dawkins the university has increasingly 
been pressed to finding means to generate revenue and reduce its expenses.  
Indeed, some argue that this pressure has been so great that its public good ethos 
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has been lost and hence the university is ‘in crisis.’581  It is argued that the 
mission of the university may be in a stage of transformation from a public 
institution which provides public goods to a wide array of citizens on the basis of 
academic merit into a private, for profit business providing whatever courses can 
be sold to people with the economic resources to pay. The issue of public good 
has been dealt with in depth in the previous chapter.  
 
Were the university and its mission to become like any other business, that is, 
simply generating a profit, it could not but radically change the university.  To 
think about it clearly, one can conduct a simple thought experiment of the 
university-as-a-business.  In that model, the university would examine its 
resources and if it determined that it were more profitable to sell debased, 
plagiarised or incorrect knowledge, work to narrow minds by advocating a single 
perspective or truth, then it would readily engage in such activities582—as there 
are no widely accepted business norms to restrain it from doing so.583 Further, if 
it was more profitable to sell all the facilities and fire all the academic staff, 
simply printing “degrees” on fancy paper, then that university-as-a-business 
would do so. Business has a clear over-riding norm: make a profit.584 The 
reaction against such “degree mills” suggests that a university is more than a 
business, and as the discussion thus far would indicate, other than a business.  
 
The shift to revenue generation from the external environment and maximising 
economies within create a serious threat to the university. As Professor Gavin 
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Brown, the former Vice Chancellor of the University of Sydney stated, 
“concentrating on garnering the resources and squeezing out the efficiencies that 
would allow one to achieve lofty goals.”585 In other words the careful 
implementation of for profit management practices undermines the ability of the 
university to fulfil its public mission. Further, it contradicts the public good 
objects which motivate many of the academic.   
 
If one acknowledges the core of the university institution as being the academic 
profession consistent with Clark’s concern for a stimulated heartland586 it is 
interesting to note the following.  Concerning the academic profession, Weber 
discussed the profession’s idea of a “calling” as something more than a mere way 
to earn a living.587 The idea has not died.  Rejection of the producer-consumer 
relationship model for relations between academics and students remain.588 For 
example, there have been calls for academics to take a “Hippocratic Oath”,  
requiring public good or interest be put ahead of one’s own interests, and there 
are those who argue that fiduciary relations exist between teacher and student.589  
Further, there is also the traditional idea of disinterested methodology of science 
as a service to society. Robert Merton championed the idea as “communism, 
universalism, disinterestedness, originality and scepticism.”590  None of these 
core university ideals is compatible with the profit motive, and in fact, are 
inimical to it. Essentially, the consensus is that the profit objective and revenue 
generation undermines the university, destroying the academic ethos.   
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In concluding this section on the economic perspective of the institution, it has 
been argued that while the institution does have economic impacts, the 
conception of the institution of the university in the first instance through an 
economic lens is to miss its nature fundamentally.  The university is not first 
about economics. It is about knowledge and a normative ordering which places 
knowledge in the first position.  The introduction of strong economic goals is in 
conflict with the knowledge goals and more likely to corrupt or divert the 
institution from its foundational institutional norms.591  To argue as economics 
might that the university needs to be conceived as simply another economic 
institution is to fail to understand the institution. Accordingly, to develop policy 
on economic premises is to have selected an incoherent policy foundation for this 
institution. Having seen the university institution through an economic lens and 
contrasted it with economic norms, the dissertation now turns to examine it 
sociologically. 
 
5. Sociological: Sorting, Storing and Survival 
 
Other important institutional missions of the university are sociological.  These 
missions as will become evident, are also important from a political point of view 
because they go to the core philosophies and theories of society, government and 
humanity.  The social missions are important from a regulatory point of view 
because they provide justifications for assigning the university on the public-
private divide.  A sociological analysis of the institution of the university 
provides evidence of important social functions or missions of the university in 
the social ordering, reflecting political theory and social policies such as those 
effecting hierarchies and equality. The university creates and facilitates 
hierarchies and stratifies society by providing honours to some while denying 
those same honours to others.  The political questions are whether this is 
desirable, and if so, on what basis? The answers to these questions not only 
reflect political philosophies but also provide powerful arguments for assigning 
the university and higher education to one side or the other of the public-private 
divide.  
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From a sociological point of view there are two dimensions of the university’s 
mission: the university’s institutional mission in society and its 
institutional/organisational mission to survive and thrive as an institution and 
organisation in its environment.  The first deals with societal institutional 
expectations put on the university, that is, how the university contributes to social 
order.  The second deals with how institutions and organisations respond to their 
environment. This section deals with the societal and the institutional and 
organisational missions in that order.  
 
a.  Societal: Sorting, Weeding, Cooling and Credentialing 
 
The university provides a critical social function in contemporary society. 
Contemporary western society lacks traditional bonds of kinship and culture for 
sorting and credentialing people for various positions in society.592 For people to 
find a place in society there are a variety of mechanisms available.  These 
mechanisms include violent power as discussed by Hobbes centuries ago and 
found in collapsed states today, economic power, which when used in the context 
of government is considered a form of corruption, and nepotism.  Aside from 
these mechanisms are other favoured means that rely upon more universally 
accepted values such as intellectual, athletic or artistic abilities. Higher education 
and the university rely on intellectual norms.  
 
Whereas traditionally the university was tasked with credentialing people, Cote 
and Allahar note that more recently the sociological mission of the university has 
expanded.593  Formerly undertaken by the high schools, the sorting of individuals 
is now left to the university. Complex societies require sorting into fields and 
hierarchies to allow them to operate.  Whereas earlier, high schools failed 
students who did not have academic ability or interest, in the 1970’s a policy of 
“social passing” allowed students who had failed the academic standard to “pass” 
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in order to avoid social embarrassment.594  This policy, once implemented in the 
high schools, created a mass of undifferentiated, unsorted high school 
“graduates” who received inflated marks and graduated with records that do not 
reflect achievement of academic standards. 
 
Cote and Allahar argue that a significant number of students in this mass of high 
school graduates lack academic ability and are ill-prepared for university studies.  
Hence it is left to the university to conduct sorting, weeding and cooling 
functions.  In the first instance it must sort out those who lack ability and then to 
prepare those who have the ability and interest.  The university must then weed 
out those who are unsuited to advanced and professional studies from those who 
are.  Finally, it must “cool” the hopes and expectations of those students whose 
dreams are beyond their abilities.595  This evaluation appears to be applicable to 
the Australian situation.  
 
The ultimate outcome of this process is determining who among the sorted group 
become eligible for the credentialing function or object of the university. That is, 
the university provides credentials to those who survive the weeding process, and 
the particular status of the credential further establishes rank in social, 
educational hierarchy as the outcome of the sorting and cooling functions. This 
whole process and object is referred to as “credentialing”—a term invented in the 
1970’s by the sociologist Collins,596 and is the object of the weeding process.  
This mission becomes problematic when revenue generating norms dominate 
academic norms and result in the hobbling of the credentialing standard.   
 
 
b. Societal Storing: Holding space for underemployed youth 
 
The second function Cote and Allahar identify is creating a holding space for 
youth in a chronically depressed labour market.  Cote and Allahar note that the 
youth labour market in North America collapsed in the 1970’s and never 
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recovered597—and it appears that the parallel events took place in Australia.598  
As manufacturing industries moved to low cost, less economically developed 
countries, the market for young, unskilled people in western developed 
economics decreased dramatically.  The net result is that it has been hard for 
young people trying to find their way into the labour market.  The connection 
between youth unemployment and the university two is logical—there are youth 
who need their time consumed and higher education at a university which 
consumes time.  
 
Government policy in Australia took advantage of the situation proverbially 
killing two birds with one stone.  On the one hand, it created an opportunity to 
introduce a large swath of the population to higher education and on the other 
solved the problem of high unemployment. Pushing unemployed youth to 
become students at the university has become part of the Australian higher 
education policy dialogue. A recent article in The Australian newspaper 
discussing higher education noted that youth unemployment was at 16.4% and 
considered the relationships between the two as axiomatic599—which indeed to 
some extent they are. These sociological missions of the university both collide 
and coincide with the conflicting missions of excellence and equality.   
 
The sorting, weeding and cooling mission also relates to what is often referred to 
as the “pastoral” mission of the university. The pastoral mission is seen as the 
university institutions manifestation of the caring and helping tradition of 
professional service. In the case of the university, the pastoral mission can be 
seen in the caring or psychological/emotional investment of academics in the 
intellectual development of students, and the instilling of a passion for a 
discipline or area of specialisation.  Law recognises this role through the 
imposition of a fiduciary duty and characterisation of teacher-student relationship 
as fiduciary.  
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c. Survival: Institutional and Organisational  
 
The sociological mission of the university as an institution and as individual 
organisations is survival and growth. Institutional survival refers to the 
reproduction of the university institution—i.e. the norms, practices and rules of 
university organisations around the globe generally and in Australia in particular. 
This reproduction is a matter of the values embedded in the university enterprise 
and in particular the reproduction of the values of the academic profession.  It 
may be that in this area, the greatest concern resides as the traditions of 
professional work, autonomy and personally tailored service are jeopardised by 
the massification of higher education.600   
 
Organisational survival refers to the individual university organisation’s ability 
to survive in a competitive environment. Survival in this context is a function of 
the ability to obtain sufficient resources to continue its operations.  The survival 
depends crucially on success in the competition for prestige and reputation—the 
former referring to achievement of status enhancing acquisitions such as 
attractive campus buildings and star researchers, the latter referring to high 
quality education.601 University organisations must both cooperate and compete 
in order to survive. 
 
Where these two missions are not in conflict, or where the organisation is not 
under threat such as by lack of resources, the educational mission can be attended 
to more easily.  However, where the university organisation’s survival is in 
question, the mission of the organisation’s short-term survival must dominate to 
the detriment of educational and all other missions. A determination of the threat 
to survival of the university, of course, requires a conception of the nature of the 
university as well as an evaluation of the nature and potential of the threat—a 
normative and political problem as argued throughout this dissertation. Where 
the university no longer offers a social location for knowledge as a value in its 
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own right, but merely as a location for the dissemination of knowledge with 
immediately recognisable economic value, the university loses its claim to 
societal legitimacy and hence its claim for public support. It is merely another 
participant in a market economy.  The institutional legitimacy of the university in 
society rests at least in part in its role as a harbour for disinterested knowledge—
and its tasks in the creation, preservation and dissemination of that knowledge.   
 
The sociological analysis of the institution of the university provides insight into 
the complexity of the university’s role in society.  Far from simply providing 
trained graduates for gainful economic employment, the university is seen as a 
complex institution fulfilling multiple important if conflicting missions. The 
reduction to the simple rationalistic model presented by economics is at odds 
with this complex situation, and in fact, is inimical to the fulfilment of these 
other equally or arguably more important roles. The argument in this section 
further supports the position that the university is a distinct and unique social 
institution. These roles and institutional norms are encapsulated in the law that 
creates individual university organisations. The dissertation now turns to 
examine the law’s handling of the university organisation as a particular instance 
of the institution.  
 
6. Legal Objects 
 
Law, as the institutionalisation of political and ethical decisions, provides an 
instance of reification of institutional norms.  In the context of the university it 
does so both through the larger regulatory regime focused on the institution and 
found in the Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth) which is the primary 
focus of this thesis and through the provision of legal form to university 
corporations as actors in a socio-legal system.  The legal person of the university 
corporation is discussed in the next chapter dealing with the university 
organisation.  
 
As noted in Chapter 3, the Act identifies a number of broad objects which reflect 
the institution of the university. These objects are set out in s.2 as:  
(b) to support the distinctive purposes of universities, which are: 
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(i) the education of persons, enabling them to take a 
leadership role in the intellectual, cultural, economic and social 
development of their communities; and 
  (ii) the creation and advancement of knowledge; and 
(iii) the application of knowledge and discoveries to the 
betterment of communities in Australia and internationally; 
 
In sum, the Act sets out the objects as education for purposes of participation in 
the intellectual, cultural, economic and social discourse, the creation and 
advancement of knowledge and the application of knowledge to contribute to the 
betterment of the community however defined.602  These institutional norms are 
protected by the institutions surrounding particular university organisations.  
Again, these are enacted in the legislation.  The legislation acknowledges that 
individual university corporations have enabling legislation which “empower[s] 
them to achieve their objectives as autonomous institutions through governing 
bodies that are responsible for … its ongoing independence”603  In other words, 
the Act recognises and institutionalises the university institution as providing a 
public good to the community on a normative ordering that prioritises knowledge 
norms.  Further, the Act supports the institutions of autonomy and self-
governance allowing the organisation to govern itself in alignment with the 
national and global institution of the university—a matter arguably better 
understood by the academic profession than by managers or bureaucrats.  
 
These institutions are reflected in the enabling statutes of the individual 
university organisations which are organised at law as corporations.  Although 
taken up in detail in the next chapter dealing with the university organisation, for 
purposes of clarity and continuity of argument the issue is addressed briefly here. 
The Melbourne University Act 1958 for example, in s. 4A provides the following 
broad objectives: 
 (a) to provide and maintain a teaching and learning 
environment … 
 (b) to undertake scholarship, research … to the advancement 
of knowledge and to the benefit of the well-being of the Victorian, 
Australian and international communities; 
 (c) to equip graduates of the University to excel in their 
chosen careers and to contribute to the life of the community; 
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 (d) to serve the Victorian, Australian and international 
communities and the public interest by— 
 (i) enriching cultural and community life; 
 (ii) elevating public awareness of educational, 
scientific and artistic developments; 
 (iii) promoting critical enquiry, informed intellectual 
discourse and public debate within the University and in the wider 
society; 
 (e) to confer degrees and grant diplomas, certificates and 
other awards. 
 
The courts have examined the university’s institutional mission in the case of 
University of Western Australia v Gray.604  In that case, as noted in Chapter 4, 
the court opined that the university: “is a special purpose statutory corporation.  
It was created to serve the public purposes served by a “university”… UWA’s 
traditional public function as an institution of higher education.”605 Again, 
although dealing with the corporate organisational form of a single university 
organisation, the court appears to be alluding to a common understanding of the 
institution of the university in its interpretation of the statute. 
 
In sum, the social institution of the legal system recognises the diverse missions 
of the institution of the university.  These are sufficiently distinct to call the 
attention of the Parliament in the enactment of legislation creating the specific 
university corporations.  These statutory corporations are given distinct and in 
law unique mandates around knowledge and public good broadly conceived. 
This analysis of the institution of the university at law supports the contention 
that the institution is a unique institution.  Further, the policy behind the 
university at the state level appears largely coherent with the historical institution 
of the university discussed above and the sociological missions of education and 
credentialing. 
 
7. Policy  
 
The institution of the university has co-existed with political authorities for its 
entire existence. In the early centuries the political institution was a form of the 
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city state. Over time the nation state came to be the dominant political authority 
and the university has had to interact with that larger public governmental 
authority as a result.  The influence, of course, has been bi-directional, as seen in 
the advice provided by the university to the statesmen of old and as this 
dissertation demonstrates with the regulation of the university by the nation state.  
This government impact on the institution has occurred as a result of the 
regulatory environment including resources.  This section examines the missions 
granted to or imposed upon the institution of the university by government, first 
generally and in the subsequent section, the Australian government.  
 
a. Policy: Government and the University 
 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the objects of the university are not 
limited to those sui generis to the institution.  Rather, external parties shape and 
impose other missions on the institution.  Among the leading external influences 
on the shape of the institution are the government.   
 
The political system has had a close and direct involvement with the institution 
of the university since its origins in eleventh century Bologna.  The political 
recognition of the value of the university’s mission as a creator, preserver and 
disseminator of knowledge and culture has long been reflected in policy.  For 
example, from the middle ages Pope Alexander IV declared the university to be 
“the Tree of Life in God’s paradise”606—a description unlikely to cross the lips 
of many an academic or politician today—to its position at the heart of the 
current knowledge economy, the university stands out as society’s premier 
knowledge institution. Today governments sponsor major research institutes 
within university organisations with billions of dollars in recognition of the 
intellectual power of those organisations and hence, the institution of the 
university.  
 
Governments have recognised the significance of the university’s knowledge 
mission, by supporting university organisations and by developing policy 
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designed to shape the university.  Over the centuries government support has 
covered everything from housing costs for students in medieval Oxford and 
Bologna,607 to curriculum to be taught in Paris and Rome,608 to efforts to dictate 
subjects taught in teacher training under former minister Brendan Nelson in 
Australia.   Again, these policies and missions are at times in consort with and at 
times in conflict with the public and academic missions of the university.  Both 
ecclesiastical and secular powers have sought to protect and foster the university.  
Both recognized the value of the university’s knowledge for the operation of 
society.  As another example of the powerful position of universities in the 
operations of government can be seen in the history of the Hundred Years War.  
Scholars at the University of Paris were called upon to solve that war,609 and 
although their recommendations were not implemented, the fact of the appeal 
demonstrates both the political power and importance of creative intellectual 
activity in political matters that the universities have had since earliest times.610 
 
Governments and authorities in every country recognising the power of the 
university’s knowledge and as such its considerable influence on and role in 
society have both worked to support the institution and to destroy it.  Positively, 
governments have used the university in the welfare states to advance 
economically and to increase equitable distributions of opportunity among 
diverse populations.  Negatively, governments have sought to suppress the 
university and its academic mission for ideological reasons such as may be seen 
in the University of Berlin during the Communist era, the Khmer Rouge regime 
in Cambodia.611 More recently under neoliberalism governments have sought to 
drive out the political debate carried on universities to avoid debate and critique 
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of the weaknesses of markets and the ideology of market fundamentalism612 with 
its normative emphasis on short-term economic gain—a model preferred by big 
business.   
 
While this brief political analysis does not support any particular view of the 
university as a unique social institution, it does provide evidence of a 
governmental view of the university as an important public institution—whether 
through education, research or social commentary.  Further, it demonstrates the 
government fear of university criticism as independent, critical and knowledge 
based criticism rather than simply another source of biased or partisan critique.  
In other words, it demonstrates negatively the value of an independent university 
to social and democratic principles and processes. In sum, the above four 
perspectives, economics, sociology, law and politics combined create a strong 
foundation for arguing that the university is a unique social institution not readily 
reduced to any particular agenda and likely to be distorted by attempts to shift it 
from its knowledge norms.  
 
b. Policy: Australian Government and the University 
 
In the Australian context, Pick identifies three important visions for the 
university, which he places into a chronological policy framework. 613 He defines 
these first as Martin’s view of universities in Nation Building through the 
formation of national culture and citizenship, second as Dawkin’s idea 
supporting the nation’s move toward economic globalization, and third as 
Nelson’s view of universities as organisations participating in a market needing 
to respond to market forces.614   
 
In the first broad national university policy, as discussed in Chapter 3, the 1965 
Martin report characterised the university as a major tool in a common enterprise 
of nation building.  It was supported by public funds and was truly a collective, 
community effort.  The second policy phase sought to utilise the university as a 
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means of both global competitiveness and global integration.  This phase was 
ushered in and carried forward from the 1980’s until the late 1990’s.  Its focus 
was shifted as a result of a shift in government from welfare state to regulatory 
state, as from provider of public goods to facilitator of markets for private goods 
with a related shift from public to private funding.  Under the neoliberalism of 
the Howard Liberal government, the privatization mission was moved to the 
front.  The mission of the university in this environment is not the dissemination 
of public goods as widely as possible, or the creation of new knowledge for 
public benefit; rather, it is to provide private educational benefits to those with 
economic resources and to produce commercialisable research primarily for 
private enterprise.615  
 
The Australian university had a significant international mission in the Asia-
Pacific region. From 1949 until the 1980’s the Colombo Plan provided 
scholarships to talented and often poor students seeking higher education.  As a 
result of these talented people who had applied themselves diligently to their 
studies returning to their homelands, Australia earned a regional reputation as a 
provider of good quality higher education.  This reputation paved the way for the 
next step in Australian higher education policy.  Australia withdrew its support 
for the scholarship program, created a different scholarship program more 
focused on Australian national interest which it offered through AusAID,616 and 
created a policy of selling its higher education to the privileged of the region, and 
deprived its university organisations of funding adequate to carry out the tasks 
imposed.617 The university has been forced by a government policy of cutting 
funding while increasing demands to exploit its reputation and its geographic 
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position, ultimately travelling a downward spiral in terms of quality and morale, 
in its efforts to stay afloat financially.  In essence, government policy had been to 
use money paid by international students from Thailand, India, Malaysia and 
other developing countries, to subsidize domestic students and balance budgets. 
Doing so has permitted the government to cut university expenditure while 
appearing to continue to provide quality higher education to an increasing cohort 
of domestic students.  The government has by this creative policy achieved a 
continuation of broad participation in higher education while not paying the true 
costs of educating Australia’s own citizens. These uses of the institution by the 
government and shifting norms concerning the nature and value of knowledge 
challenge intimately the institution of the university in Australia.  
 
As Australian government policy shifted away from the welfare state projects of 
nation building and the development of the individual, to the privatization agenda 
of the regulatory state, Federal higher education policy was recast in economic 
terms and focused to achieve private ends.  Achieving this objective with public 
goods which by definition lack qualities that attract market activity posed a 
serious problem for government.  Accordingly, all government could do, short of 
simply publicly abandoning the university which undoubtedly would have borne 
an unacceptable political cost, was to cast them into a position of serious and 
chronic under-funding.618 In this context, Marginson and Considine write: 
“higher education moved from its broad role in public culture and its function in 
raising the level of participation of citizens to a new orthodoxy which favours 
business values and income generation.”619  And indeed, the Australian 
university has become increasingly focused on training of overseas full fee 
paying students in business management620—a matter of pride to the Howard 
government which boasted about Australia’s higher education as an export 
outstripped only by coal and iron ore621 and a source of demoralization and 
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despair to the academic profession and those members of society who look for 
something more in life than economic gain.  
 
Whereas prior to the Dawkins reforms the university was considered an 
important public social institution in Australian society, in line with the then 
Labor government’s neo-liberal ideology, Dawkins claimed it was an industry.622  
As an “industry”, the university ought to have very different aims than it would 
as a social institution.  Whereas the latter is viewed as providing some socially 
useful activity or function, an industry does no more than provide economic 
benefits as a result of production—purposes, objectives and social role are not 
factors. From an industry perspective coal mining, tobacco sales and university 
education are all one in the same. This re-framing of the mission of the university 
as an industry has had profound effects in terms of the shape, funding, and 
objects of the institution.  In particular, it creates opposition to public funding as 
this framing causes appeals for funding to appear no more than special pleading 
of a failing and poorly managed “industry.” Indeed, this has been the rhetoric 
from Dawkins carried forward through the various governments up the end of the 
Howard regime.623 
 
The missions imposed by the Australian government do not tend to add 
coherence to the institution of the university as conceived in the initial 
institutional section of this chapter.  The imposition of nation building, global 
economic competitiveness and finally private profit generation are not 
necessarily coherent with the knowledge norms of the institution. At a high level 
of abstraction the ideas of nation building and to a lesser degree increased global 
competitiveness can be viewed as somewhat coherent.  These missions may be 
coherent as by-products or externalities of the essential knowledge missions of 
the university—creation, dissemination and preservation.  By engaging in these 
missions, the university is likely to contribute to the nation and economic 
missions.  The extent to which these missions become the government’s 
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overriding policy interest in the university and re-shape the university’s 
regulation is the extent to which they limit or minimize the potential for 
incoherence between government missions and the institution of the university.  
The shifting of the foundational norm from knowledge to profit and from public 
to private, however, as has occurred under the neoliberal governments, has 
established new norms fundamentally incoherent with the foundational norms of 
the institution of the university. The incoherence introduced by these changes 
which effect at such a fundamental level may be the incoherence which proves to 
be the fatal form of regulatory failure. 
 
8. Institutional Coherence: Complex and Conflicting Missions 
 
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, there are a variety of conflicting 
missions within the institution of the university and the various university 
organisations.  One of the most basic conflicts is between the disinterested 
pursuit of knowledge—i.e. pursuit of knowledge for its own sake and the 
utilitarian missions of career training.  This conflict, as noted, goes back to the 
origins.  It leads to a curious phenomenon: that training at the university is 
seldom suited to utilitarian, market objectives. Ruegg describes it in historical 
terms:  
“the social role of the medieval university consisted primarily of training 
for more rational forms of the exercise of authority in church, 
government, and society.  This seems to contradict the fact that the course 
of study, the examinations, and the degree were not oriented to the 
provision of any training for occupations other than those of university 
teachers.”624   
 
As noted this conundrum is found in contemporary sociological, economic and 
political criticism of the university, where sorting, providing credentials and 
education, is quite disconnected from actual abilities and skills, the high cost of 
universities without focus on productivity improvements in the job market. The 
utilitarian and ideal aims of university appear to be in fundamental conflict.625  
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Overlaid on this complexity is the neoliberal normative demand that the 
university shift its normative priority from knowledge to privatisation and 
generation of its revenue without regard to social, knowledge and egalitarian 
political norms.  
 
Further, a number of scholars have noted the conflicts within the university. 
Former Chancellor of Vanderbilt University, Alexander Heard, noted some of 
conflicting demands on the university. These he described as:  
“the inherent conflict between the function of transmitting existing 
information or values or skills, on the one hand, and the processes of 
evaluation, criticism, and creativity that question whatever is existing, on 
the other…. The need for a university to be at once utilitarian and 
independent…. And educational freedom [from political control] 
necessary for this strange institution… [which] must be sustained by 
consensus in the society outside.”626 
 
Similarly, Watson notes a number of missions demanded of the university that 
are contradictory.  He puts them into bullet points that reflect sharply 
contemporary rhetoric. The university is simultaneously called to be:  
• conservative and radical; 
• critical and supportive; 
• competitive and collegial; 
• autonomous and accountable; 
• private and public; 
• excellent and equal; 
• entrepreneurial and caring; 
• certain and provisional; 
• traditional and innovative; 
• ceremonial and iconoclastic; 
• local and international.627 
 
None of these missions is unimportant or can be ignored.  Indeed, public support 
exists for all of these varied missions and to abandon any one of them is to 
abandon an important part of the university’s mission.  This variety of important 
collective missions reflect the problem identified by Arrow and discussed in the 
previous chapter—the impossibility of generating collective preferences and 
social welfare functions on the basis of the aggregation of private preferences.  In 
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other words these important missions can only be carried out by a public 
institution and provide a powerful justification for assigning the university to the 
public side of the public-private divide. These public missions have been 
assigned to and taken on by the university with a margin of success. Searching 
the environment for alternative institutions more appropriate to carrying out these 
missions leads back to the institution currently charged with there execution—the 
university.  
 
As Professor Herman Leonard of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
observed:  
 
Society puts the hardest jobs in the public sector…. When there are 
ambiguities about value, or conflicts about priorities and values, we ask 
the government to step in. So we shouldn't be surprised to discover that 
the problems the public sector is handling are the most difficult, most 
confusing, and most conflict-ridden -and, therefore, the hardest to 
guarantee high performance.628 
 
In other words, the complexity of the mission can only be based on a complex 
foundation—that is, in an institution that is complex in itself. Any simplification 
of the mission of the university’s objects to a simple calculus can only occur by 
the denial of one half of the conflicting dichotomies that create the university 
mission in the first place.629 
 
The university has a variety of objects.  These objects are wide ranging and 
include political, social and economic tasks.  They do not always operate in 
concert and yet none appears to be readily severable. Indeed, they are all related 
to and/or outcomes of the basic normative core of the university—the primacy of 
knowledge, and its core knowledge missions of preservation, creation and 
transmission.  The complexity of these missions and their important public nature 
would support argument against assigning the institution or its organisations to 
the private side of the public-private divide.  Further, in the same line of 
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argument, the importance of the institution’s public mission overshadows private 
economic outcomes and so to privatise those crucial social tasks from preserving 
society’s knowledge to sorting and credentialing its people for a life time and 
subsume them to the commercial priorities of private enterprise is not only 
hazardous as the University of Phoenix experience may suggest, and a poor 
choice, but a fundamental misunderstanding of the institution and the role of 
public good organisations not only economically, but socially and politically as 
well.  
 
9. Policy Coherence with the Institution: Adding Conflicting Missions 
 
The complexity of institutional missions is compounded by the institutional 
missions imposed by the governments.  These missions may operate as beneficial 
by-products or externalities of university activity; however, where they become 
drivers of university policy and entrenched in the regulation they may lead to 
incoherence.  Government policy which attempts to shift norms, particularly 
foundational norms is likely to cause a fatal incoherence. That is, where 
government attempts to modify or replace the norms of knowledge and public 
good, the attempt may well destroy the institution itself—a matter recognised in 
the medieval era.   
 
The diversity of missions leads to the question of whether coherence is desirable 
or even possible.  The answer to this question is not clear.  What is evident from 
history is that the university, like other public institutions and organisations, is 
able to survive and manage a number of more or less coherent missions.  
Accordingly, a tightly controlled and enforced coherent policy may result in the 
displacement or destruction of some crucial missions as the conflicting missions 
may be serviced and hence the institution able to survive if those conflicting 
missions not brought into too close a proximity. This proximity issue is dealt 
with in the institutional literature of loosely coupled systems630—a matter beyond 
the scope of the current investigation. The point is that the conflicting missions 
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would lead to the suggestion that incoherent missions heavily imposed are a 
potential source of increasing institutional dysfunction.631 
 
A further issue with the conflicting and complex missions of the institution is the 
rationalist policy’s NPM project of quantifying and carefully measuring the 
activities of government bodies through the introduction of private business 
norms and private management practices. Tightly controlled systems or 
institutions, as opposed to loosely coupled systems, are less able to handle and 
adapt to complex and changing environments.  Such tightly controlled 
institutions do not have the discretion to balance various competing norms and 
tasks in a dynamic environment as they are forcefully focused on the quantified, 
carefully measured activities.  As a result they must fail to attend to important 
but unquantified or unquantifiable missions and activities which underpin 
institutions.  This chapter argues against such quantification and careful 
measures. Such measures introduce problems which result from what Power has 
described as the dysfunctional effects of audit.632 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
The foregoing argument leads to the conclusion that the university is indeed a 
unique institution. It is not simply another institution in the economic system to 
be regulated by the same economic incentives and penalties and to be held to 
account on the same narrow measures.  Rather, it has been argued that the 
university is as much an institution of the present and future as it is of the past.  
That is, it is designed to preserve the best from the past as well as prepare 
citizens for the future. It is both an incubator and a museum.  It cannot be limited 
to providing for the immediate, short term training needs of would be employers 
and employees.  Its knowledge cannot be limited to short term economically 
valued or private knowledge.  As such, it is important that regulation of the 
university and the demands made on it have a strong, long term, future 
orientation which is coherent with the institution.  The university is society’s 
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institution for the disinterested creation, preservation and dissemination of 
knowledge.  It is also an institution steeped in history.  It carries both good and ill 
from history and provides a storehouse, a genetic depository of human creativity 
and intellectual achievement.  Regulation which is coherent with this markedly 
successful institution will support the normative public knowledge foundations.  
Efforts to shift these foundations are likely to lead to regulatory failure. 
 
There is no golden age to which the university institution could return, and even 
if it were possible it is far from clear that it would be desirable.  Indeed, the 
institution is and must be attuned to social (including economic) and 
geographical environment. The environment is shaped in part by government 
policy. Government policy may enhance the university’s functioning as well as 
effective interaction with its environment, or alternatively, government policy 
may prove to be dysfunction creating as it seeks to alter foundational institutional 
norms and re-focus the institution’s points of interaction with the social 
environment from public social good to private economic. 
 
For the university institution to survive certain critical norms need to remain in 
place. These include a prioritising of knowledge, a commitment to knowledge as 
a public good which is created, transmitted and preserved in a non-profit 
normative environment.  Regulation which fails to foster these critical norms is 
incoherent with the organising problem and is a recipe for regulatory failure. 
Where government wishes to alter the institution, it must be attuned to the shape, 
dynamics and purposes of the extant institution.  In the case of the Australian 
university and government, it is clear that the government has gone ahead with 
the change prior to attending to the extant institution. The changes it wishes to 
make to foundational norms shifting the university from providing public social 
goods to private economic goods is incoherent with the institution to the point of 
destroying the institution itself. 
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CHAPTER 6: REGULATED BODIES: THE UNIVERSITY 
ORGANISATION 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In Chapter 5 it was argued that the better view of the university is as a social 
institution dealing with the creation, preservation and dissemination of 
knowledge conceived of as a public good not necessarily tied to utilitarian aims.  
Yet, a university is not only an institution.  As indicated in the Introduction and 
argued elsewhere, the university is also a specific communal organisation 
existing in its own right, with its own internal laws, resources and with its own 
exclusive community of people. It has a hierarchy, mission, and activity, and 
often a connection to a particular city specifically located in time with its own 
political and social organisations, and economy.  Universities such as those at 
Oxford and Paris and later, Sydney and Melbourne, in their various centuries and 
locales, represent a distinct social phenomenon in their larger respective social 
spheres and societies. They are organised communities to be examined and 
considered, each in its own right. These universities present various educational 
programs, services to the communities (including preservation of local social 
traditions, knowledge, and research), and general participation in the political and 
social endeavors of their respective times and places. They have their own 
concerns, projects, objectives and outcomes.  
 
As this dissertation is focused on the regulation of an institution made up of a 
group of organisations, the chapter’s consideration of the university organisation 
is critical.  This chapter examines both the nature of university organisations as 
instances of the institution and as an organisation that is the object of regulatory 
attention.   As will be seen, there is a considerable range of organisational 
options available to the university but the university has consistently selected and 
advanced organisations with particular characterisitics.   The range of options 
and selections made will be examined in detail. 
 
As argued in Chapter 2, a critical supplement to Feaver and Durrant’s regulatory 
coherence is organisational choice.  As distinct from institutions, organisations 
are specific groups which may in turn be instances of a broader institution.  
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Organisational choice is important in terms of regulatory coherence because the 
organisational form carries within it certain norms.  Groups of people will 
develop organisational forms that suit or facilitate their purposes. Such 
organisational choices tend to be coherent with the procedural, structural and 
normative aims.  From the perspective of regulatory coherence, an understanding 
of the nature of the regulated body is imperative. Failure to attend to the 
organisational form may lead the creation of incoherent regulation and so lead to 
regulatory failure. This chapter addresses the nature of the regulated body, the 
university organisation and university corporation.   
 
This chapter asks and answers two questions: first, what type of organisation is 
the university? Second, it asks: what characteristics are best suited to the 
university organisation?  The first question is the essentialist question of whether 
the university organisation is some unique and particularly well suited species of 
organisation, or merely a specific instance of a generic model of organised group.  
The chapter answers this question by surveying the sociological literature on the 
university as an organisation. This literature does not stand alone but is 
connected to the larger body of organisational literature.  The purpose of the 
survey is to establish that the university has developed as a specific 
organisational form that is academic centric relying on a “stimulated heartland” 
as Clark would have it,633 as opposed to a management centric organsation.  
Further, that the university organisation is loosely coupled to allow for a 
diversity of objects including potentially conflicting objects as the new 
institutionalists point out and not a tightly coupled McDonaldised, readily 
audited organisation pursing easily measured objects.  The loosely coupled 
organisation readily facilitates the institutional norms discussed in the previous 
chapter and so leads to the conclusion that the organisational form chosen by the 
university is coherent with the maintenance and advancement of the university 
institution. 
 
Extending the analysis and the argument the chapter turns to consider the 
organisational options from an economic organisational perspective. The 
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framework of economics reduces analysis to its binary alternatives of profit-
nonprofit organisational forms.  It asks whether the university can function 
equally well in for profit and non-profit organisational forms.   It then examines 
by way of literature survey what the particular advantages of this model are, why 
the university has chosen this model and how this model serves more 
advantageously the university’s objects. It argues that the university organisation 
has chosen almost exclusively the non-profit orgnisational model. In making that 
argument it examines the nature and purposes of non-profit organisations and 
impacts of profit making on university organisations.  In terms of coherence 
therefore, the university’s organisational form has been coherent with the 
institutional norms as set out in the previous chapter.  
 
The chapter then turns to consider the university organisation through the lens of 
political science. In policitcal sicence terms the university organisation is a 
public body. This analysis is significant becausethe majority of university 
organisations in Australia are public bodies.  It furthers the arguments of 
Chapters 4 on public goods and the previous chapter addressing the public 
institution of the university arguing that in Australia it is properly classified as a 
public body.  Within the spectrum of public bodies it is argued that the university 
organisation is a type of statutory body—those bodies being farthest from 
political influence.  As an organisation pursuing knowledge norms, an 
organisational form that is less subject to political interference is clearly 
preferable to one with more. Accordingly, this section leads to the conclusion 
that the statutory body model is well suited to university organisations.  
 
Finally, the chapter examines the university organisation in terms of law. This 
part of the analysis both focuses and expands the analysis of political science to 
take account of law’s categories. As a legal body, the university organisation is a 
unique type of corporation.  Its composition and objects are found nowhere else 
in corporate law, and examination particularly of the statutory objects of the 
university corporation lead to the suggestion that it falls clearly on the public side 
of the public-private divide.   
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The chapter argues that the university organisation developed organically to be 
coherent with the institution, with a normative ordering that places knowledge in 
the first position, a non-profit structure that fits clearly on the public side of the 
public-private divide. In sum, all of the different disciplines place the university 
organisation, like the institution, as a distinct and unique organisation delivering 
public goods most suited to the public side of the public-private divide.  
 
As evident from the above discussion, an interdisciplinary approach is called for 
by the nature of the university organisation itself.  Professor James Perkins 
writing in the 1970’s observed: 
 
Organisationally the university is, in fact, one of the most comlex 
structures in modern society; it is also increasingly archaic.  It is complex 
because its formal structure does not describe either actual power or 
responsiblities; it is archaic because the fuctions it must perform are not 
and cannot be discharged through the formal structure provided in its 
charter.634 
 
In the years intervening between Perkins’ statement and the present such radical 
changes as the introduction of market mechanisms, the revolution in information 
technology, and the changing, ideas of knowledge and conflicting demands being 
placed on the univeristy make the situation Perkins describes even more 
complex.   
 
2. Sociological Analysis: Analysis Of Organisational Form 
 
Sociological analysis of the university has contributed significantly to 
understanding both the institution as discussed in the previous chapter, and the 
organisation of the university.   
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The reader is reminded that the term institution is used to mean a group of norms, 
practices and rules whereas635 the term organisation is used to indicate a 
particular group of people collaborating to achive a particular objective.636  
 
Sociology has contributed various models of the university organisation which 
while corresponding to some degree to different eras of the university continue to 
provide important insights.637 Historically, sociologists find professional, 
bureaucratic and community models of the university.  More recent sociological 
analysis has led to a number of models the most important of which are the 
university as professional community, organized anarchy, strategic organisation, 
matrix and entrepreneurial organisation. These models and the implications for 
regulation will be reviewed in turn.638 
 
a. Academic Profession and the Community of scholars 
 
Historically the university has been the home of the academic profession.  The 
first university at Bologna was little more than a group of young men studying 
law with senior teachers.639  The latter group, a group of older men whose 
privileged status as professionals was derived from the two traditional indicia of 
the professions: knowledge acquired over a long period and, a mode of 
organisation that gave some kind of autonomy over their work, formed a type of 
self-regulating guild.640 Although organisational study of the university as a 
community only came to the fore in the 1960’s with studies by Goodman641 and 
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Millet,642 over the centuries the university has always been a professional 
community organised in a communal quest for the preservation, the re-
interpretation/ creation of knowledge and dissemination of that knowledge.  As 
an independent community within the larger community, at times harmoniously 
and at times antagonistically as the various “town and gown” interactions over 
the centuries demonstrate, the university has been a recognised socially as a 
particular type of organisation.   
 
The distinctive independence of this community was maintained because it was 
never wholly integrated with the rest of the community, because variously of its 
non-commercial objectives, its cosmopolitan composition including clergy with 
external loyalties, and its status as an independent professional guild.  This 
distinctive character and independent status was recognized by grants of power 
freeing it from the dominion of various authorities, and from medieval to 
contemporary times facilitated by the grant of the legal corporate form.  Further, 
the distinctive character forms part of the basis for the claims of academic 
autonomy.  
 
The notion of an “academic profession” is somewhat problematic at present. Not 
only have the professions generally suffered at the hands of sociological and 
economic critics who emphasise their self-serving exclusivity and exploitative 
monopolistic practices respectively, but the nature of academic work has changed 
markedly over the last fifty years.  Indeed, it is asserted that one cannot speak of 
an academic profession.643  Instead, there are academic professions—marked by 
a diversity in career tracks such as between sessional and tenured professionals, 
disciplines such as fine art versus hard sciences, and different emphases such as 
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research versus teaching.644 Nevertheless, when one examines norms and 
practices there remain significant commonalities.  These include a high value 
placed on knowledge, a discourse around advanced ideas, peer review, autonomy 
in work, and the exercise of professional discretion in the execution of tasks. 
This similarity not only supports the view of the university as an institution as 
discussed in the previous chapter, but also supports the understanding of the 
university as a distinct organisation designed to house such groups. 
 
The traditional conception of the university institution and its organisations as 
the home of the academic profession was put to severe test in the social 
upheavels of the 1960’s and 1970’s.645  In that era radical attack on the 
institutions of western society was undertaken on a wide scale and included an 
attack on the university institution and its organisations.646 The attack 
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emphasised a division in the academic profession as some members took an anti-
establishment line while others supported western institutions including the 
university.  This split supports the view argued in Chapters 4 and 5 of the public 
value of the university as an open public place for both progressive and 
conservative political debate.  The social changes of the era led among other 
things to a general public distrust of the professions’claims to esoteric knowledge 
and commitment to public good, and  combined with decline of the welfare state 
toward a general turn against government, and in turn a suspicious view of the 
professional community of scholars some of whom supported government with 
professional claims.647   
 
Although some may suggest that the community of scholars model may be 
finished648 legal analysis discussed in a separate section below suggests a 
different view.A few aspects of the legal character of the university are 
signififcant for understanding the community of scholars model.  The university 
took on an incorporated form early on.  As a corporation it was the legal 
organisation of the community of the academic profession.  The academic 
profession’s incorporation has foundations in law which have on-going legal and 
hence regulatory implications.  Historically, the university corporation was 
created as a protection for foreign students.649  This object was achieved by 
creation of a protective legal organisation—a university corporation.  Over time, 
the corporation resulted in a re-distribution of power among on the one hand 
local secular and local ecclesiastical authorities, and on the other central 
authorities of empire and church.  The university corporation served as a location 
of power indpenedent of local authority because of its loyalties located 
extraterritorially.  Further it served too as a location of power for those central 
powers in smaller territories.  Playing both powers off each other effectively led 
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the incorporated university organisations over the course of the first century to 
their place of independence and autonomy650 a strategy and position it has  been 
more or less effective in keeping over the intervening centuries. 
 
The regulatory significance of this autonomy, first intimated in the Authentica 
Habita of the twelfth century, from the perspective of sociological evolutionary 
theories of institutions is as follows.  The millenium long survival of the 
university institution and many university corporations suggests that the 
university itself (as opposed to regulators) is in the best position to determine 
how it should be organized to achieve its objectives, that it needed independence 
in order to do so, and that such independence is critical to achieving its aims of 
protecting and transmitting the corporate knowledge of its members.  The 
development and its significance is commented on by the historian of the 
unviersity Perkin.  
 
No institution so flexible or so productive of new knowledge and 
adaptable experts has yet been discovered. Yet this flexibility and 
productivity still depend… on the academic freedom to teach and to 
pursue knowledge wherever it can be found. If the overbearing state, the 
all-mighty corporation or the heresy hunting churches crush that freedom, 
it may well kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. Without the ability to 
protect themselves from the threat of these powerful forces, the university 
may well suffer the fate of those institutions in the non-European world 
that never enjoyed the autonomy and freedom that the medieval division 
between church and state unintentionally bequeathed to academe.651 
 
The law creates social space for the community of the academic profesion via 
corporate law which draws a perimeter around this community by defining its 
objects, its rights to determine membership, what honours are bestowed on or 
withheld  from whom and on what grounds including what amounts to an offence 
against the norms institutionalised in the corporate charter and the appropriate 
penalty. 
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Examples of these legal issues and the view of the university as a guild or 
community are evident in some contemporary case law.  For example, in the 
1967 judgment of Donaldson J in a lawsuit dealing with the Univeristy of Aston 
in the UK, his honour refers to the “student guild”.652 In Australia students are 
explicity made as members of the corporate university community, in founding 
statutes.653   These founding statutes are quite distinct from both other 
government bodies corporate as well as business corporations. For example, 
while other government bodies corporate may have a single member, such as a 
minister holding a single share, the university has as its members the traditional 
members of the community: academics, university officiers and bodies, students 
and alumni.654 
 
Further, unlike a business corporation, membership rights at the university are 
not automatic on continuing attendance or paying fees. As the NSW Supreme 
Court determined in Ex parte Forster, Re: University of Sydney, 655  it is a duty of 
the university to exclude those who are not maintaining sufficient academic 
standards, and far from obliged to admit by right all applicants, Young CJ in 
Harding v University of New South Wales, declared “no resident of New South 
Wales has any statutory right to be admitted to a university,”656 a statement of the 
law which applies nation-wide.  The university is an exclusive scholastic group. 
In Harding v University of New South Wales, the court affirmed the en banc 
obiter of Ex parte Forster, Re: University of Sydney, that  
The institution which is in question is not only a 'public' university; it is 
also, changing the emphasis, a public 'university'. It is essential to the 
proper performance by a university of its functions that it maintain and 
insist upon high standards of scholarship.657   
The court continued, “that the judiciary (and by implication the government) not 
interfere to impair the University from carrying out its public function in 
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securing the best scholars to be trained with public funds.”658  In other words, 
from a regulatory perspective, the best judges of academic performance are 
members of the academic profession—not the judiciary, not the government, or 
one might venture, the generic managers of NPM. 
 
In sum, the legal form of the corporation institutionalises the institutions of the 
academic professional community.  By providing an organisational vehicle for 
community and setting out certain norms, the university corporation creates a 
context within which a community of people is able to coordinate their collective 
aims in a single organisational form. As the Spanish law puts it a corporation is a 
joint mutual commitment ‘compromiso conjunto.’659 
 
b. Organized anarchy 
 
As a result of the social upheaval, complexities of growth and demands for 
equity, mentioned above, which effected the university in the 1960’s and 70’s it 
became evident that new models for the university were needed.  This need in 
turn led to further analysis and theorizing of the university.  Clark Kerr, the 
President of the University of California from 1958-1967 saw the university as “a 
whole series of communities and activities held together by a common name, a 
common governing body and related purposes” something he termed the 
“multiversity.”660  Changes experienced by Kerr and others led scholars to 
theorize the university in terms of political,661 loosely coupled systems,662 and 
conglomerate663 models.  One of the most original and insightful models was that 
of M. Cohen and J. March who took a radical approach to understanding how 
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university organisations operated by focusing on how their presidents worked.664  
Rather than the standard linear problem solving model composed of problem 
identification, analysis and solution, Cohen and March suggested presidents took 
the opposite approach. That is, Cohen and March suggested that leaders worked 
with a pet solution or agenda, and then worked that through a university 
organisation—“a solution in search of a problem.”  
 
In this same era of social upheaval, industrial unions made their appearance on 
university campuses. Whereas earlier disputes about workplace issues were dealt 
with internally as a matter between professional peers to be resolved on the basis 
of shared professional norms—both leaders and academic colleagues seen as 
belonging to the same porfessional institution—by the late 1960’s university 
academics found reason to organize as they perceived their bargaining power 
declining, a sharper division between them and leaders (workers and 
management) and the need to put pressure on government to increase funding. In 
the Australian context, the Federated Council of Academics formed in 1968 and 
over time with additional amalgamations eventually led to the formation of the 
National Tertiary Education Union.665 Law then worked to help distinguish and 
empower the diverging interests within the university.   
 
The regulatory significance of this model is as its two word title “organised 
anarchy” suggests—the university organisation evolved to function without 
highly centralised control configurations.  That is, as an organisation, the 
university must be organised and configured to allow for loose coupling.  It will 
operate best in this organisational form because it facilitates the variety of 
conflicting missions and values of this highly complex organisation, with its 
various agendas held by management and academics,666 and the problems 
associated with the coordination of the whole. Thus one measure for evaluating 
the coherence of regulation for university organisations is the degree to which the 
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regulation facilitates a loosely coupled organisation, or allows the “organised 
anarchy” to occur.  This measure would align with the concern of institutionalists 
that public educational organisations struggle more with legitimacy667 and 
particularly so when tightly controlled and measured. 
 
c. Strategic organisation 
 
A rationalist model of university organisations is based on the sociological 
theory of resource dependence.  In that model, organisations recognize and 
respond to their institutional environment and in particular to its resouces on a 
rational basis.668  It was introduced through the work of Phillip Kolter669 and has 
maintained a strong hold on the imagination of higher education researchers.670  
The strengths of this analysis are that it acknowledges the role of the 
environment for the survival and development of the university.  Prior to this line 
of thinking, universities were studied as if they were self-contained 
organisations/communities.  Accordingly, a theory which links the organisation 
to its environment brings a significant advance.  The weakness of this approach, 
however, is that it provides too rational a view of the situation, an issue taken up 
and addressed by institutionalists.671  Neither people nor their organisations 
operate nearly as rationally as the models would suggest.  Further, rationalist 
models generally fail because they fail to capture the complexity of the 
environment, problems of internal organisational coordination, and issues arising 
from the individual personalities involved in leadership.  
 
An alternative dichotomy of organisational models arises from the work of Burns 
and Stalker.  These scholars suggest that organisations may be developed as 
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mechanistic or organic systems.  The mechanistic operates as a highly integrated 
machine, relying on careful coordination by a hierarchy of a highly specialised 
workforce in a stable environment.  The alternative model, the organic, allows 
authority, knowledge and response to occur at any level within the organisation. 
This type of organisation is focused more on accomplishing its task than the 
mechanistic which Burns and Stalker see as being focused on internal 
processes.672 
 
Law also corresponds to a rational model.  It does so by the creation of property 
rights and the corollary of contractual obligations to be created and enforced—
essentially, facilitating a strategic approach to future opportunities and risks.  By 
contracting, law allows the university corporation to prepare to meet its 
organisational needs while limiting its potential liabilities.  University 
organisations under government pressure to direct resources to readily 
commercializable research, and in search of revenue made strategic choices in 
the funding of such research and into contracting with academic staff to control 
the outputs of intellectual work. The US government, for example, under the 
Bayh–Dole Act673 allowed universities to retain profits earned under patents 
granted to the individual organisations. This legislation has been followed in 
recent years in other jurisdictions.674 
 
The regulatory implications are obvious. The need for university organisations to 
have legal autonomy and legal powers to contract, hold and transact property 
rights, must be part of their regualtion which indeed occurs through their 
corporate status. Regardless of the actual strategic use of these as proposed by 
regulators, whether government or within the university corporations, to function 
in the legal environment, they need these basic legal characteristics or powers to 
operate where a government wants them to be anything more than an arm of the 
government.  
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The equally important corrollary flowing from Burns and Stalker’s work is that 
in a dynamic environment, coherent regulation will be regulation which 
facilitates the university to operate organically as opposed to mechanically.  
 
d. Matrix 
 
Institutional, open system models have become the norm since the limitations of 
rationalist models of organisations have become more evident.  Among the more 
useful system models of the university has been the matrix model.  Alpert, in his 
1985 article investigated performance in terms of research that occurred in 
apparently moribund organisational forms. 675 Alpert suggested that a matrix 
explains the conflicting structures both internal and external supporting the 
different teaching and research functions in the university while still allowing 
them to be coordinated with the external environment.676 Alpert, acknowledging 
the challenges facing the university under economic constraints, among other 
things suggests a reconsideration of the “invisible colleges” of peers (the 
academic profession), supporting one another in informal communities, viewing 
the university as a matrix of multidisciplinary units, with multiple missions and 
relying on a variety of external supports.677  The matrix model identifies a 
number of parties key to the university organisation’s operations internally and to 
the organisation’s survival by successful relations with the external environment.  
 
The matrix model of the university organisation finds soundings in law in many 
areas. Internally, the matrix model is evident, for example, in the founding 
statutes of university corporations. These statutes allocate certain places on the 
university council to various constituencies such as leaders, students and 
academics internally, political appointees, community appointees and others. 
These members—some from within the university, some from the community 
and some from government—allow the university corporation to coordinate 
various participants within and without the university community more 
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effectively. Externally, the matrix model allows for a significant number of laws 
to shape the legal environment. For example, one recent estimate has identified 
nearly 100 pieces of legislation applicable to The University of Queensland.678 
From laws such as the state based incorporating statute, to the Federal funding 
provisions under the Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth) discussed in 
Chapter 3, to occupational health and safety laws all contribute to the complexity 
of the matrix that Alpert’s model identifies and attempts to clarify. 
 
Using this model to contribute to the evaluation of the regulation, it is evident 
that the complexity of the regualtory arrangements in place must be identified 
and considered. the complexity of the legislation just identified provides a 
justification for claiming that the university orgnaistaions are simultaneoulsy 
over-regulated, under-regulated and mis-regulated. In other words, attending to 
the matrix model should allow a more sophisticated coherence analysis and 
identify an expanded area for potential incohenrence and regulatory failure.  
Essentially, attending to the matrix allows a better understanding of coherence 
and potential to identify regulation mis-matched to the regulated organisation. 
 
e. Entrepreneurial organisation 
 
The dominant model of the university today is the entrepreneurial university. 
This model of the university was created in the late 1990’s by the renowned 
sociologist of higher education, Burton Clark.  Clark based his model on a study 
of five radically transformed universities.679 He identified the five following 
features of the entrepreneurial university as having: “a diversified funding base; a 
strengthened steering core; an expanded developmental periphery; a stimulated 
academic heartland; and an integrated entrepreneurial culture.”680  These 
university organisations had a strong core, enhanced peripheral units, 
discretionary funding bases allowing pursuit of independent pathways, 
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cultivating of areas of particular local importance or strength and a partial shift in 
values referred to what Clark called “entrepreneurial” values.  
 
An important feature for regulatory consideration was Clark’s finding with 
respect to the role and position of the academic profession.  Clark found that one 
of the critical factors for success of the Entrepreneurial University was the ability 
to operationalise entrepreneurialism by integrating effectively divergent 
academic and managerial values. The university organisation, while taking better 
account of the resources in its environment and increasingly conscious of its 
expenditures, was not to abandon its academic norms in favour of revenue 
generating objects.  That is, the lexical ordering of the norms of the university 
required it place the academic norms above the others, including norms of 
revenue generation.  However, it was not to do so without regard to the economic 
resources. 
 
Clark emphasized the importance of the academic profession as core in the 
success of the university.  As noted, one of the five hallmarks is the “stimulated 
academic heartland.”  According to this model, the activities of the university 
were to be judged in the light of academic values, not business values.  In Clark’s 
words: “If not judged by academic values as well as managerial and budgetary 
interests for their apppropriateness in a university, they can move an institution 
towards the character of a shopping mall.”681  Academic values are not to be 
displaced by commerce: rather, they are to be supplemented and informed by 
commerce and management.  In other words, the conception of knowledge, 
education and degrees as mere commodities, private economic goods that are 
sold at a university, transforms the university into simplythan another retail 
outlet. To do so was to radically alter the nature of the institution in a manner 
inconsitent with its objects, its core societal and organisational functionality.  
 
As noted, Clark’s study leds him to view the academic profession as critical to 
the success of the university. The stimulated academic heartland is at the core of 
the successful entrepreneurial university.  The members of the academic 
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profession are engaged with academic activities of teaching and research, not 
overly burdened or monitored, and consulted with respect to their preferences in 
terms of workload. In other words, they are treated as trusted colleagues 
“professionals” rather than economically modeled shirking employees or 
auditable subjects. Their work is not McDonaldised and so difficult to audit.  The 
trusted professional model allows academic values to remain paramount and so 
maintain the unviersty as an institution and as an organistaion distinct from 
managerial centered commercial organisations.   
 
Clark’s analysis provides insight for problems noted by other researchers.  
Slaughter and Rhoades for example, examining the behavioural trends of and 
demands on the academic profession, write682 
 
Today, higher education institutions are seeking to generate revenue from 
their core educational, research and service functions, ranging from the 
production of knowledge (such as research leading to patents) created by the 
faculty to the faculty’s curriculum and instruction (teaching materials that can 
be copyrighted and marketed)…. changes that prioritize potential revenue 
generation, rather than the unfettered expansion of knowledge, in policy 
negotiation and in strategic and academic decision making.683 
 
This model has been considered in the Australian context as noted by Marginson 
and Considine with what they describe as the “enterprise university.”  They note 
that Australian university policy and management has failed in two critical 
aspects: first, it has failed in “stimulating the heartland.”  The result has been to 
create a “schizophrenic split between the managerial and the academic.”  Second, 
it has failed to “create an integrated entrepreneurial culture.”684 The net result of 
the Australian regulatory system is a poorly functioning system that leaves 
Australian university organisations with an overly empowered, disconnected 
management, high levels of conflict within the university between academic and 
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management professionals, a stifling of academic dynamism, an overly high level 
of surveillance, and suffering a loss of public value.685 The marked decline in the 
morale of members of the academic profession may be attributable to this hyper-
powered management model among other things.686  
 
This management centric model, however, connects well with the generic model 
of organisations and management discussed in Chapter 2—a shift presaged by 
the shift from academic to management centric model of the university under the 
CTEC.  Further it facilitates the McDonalisation of the university so it can be run 
more easily and makes it more readily measured and hence auditable—objectives 
argued by Power.687 
 
The regualtory implications of this model as indicated by Clark’s and 
Marginson’s studies are that the thirving university organisation in contemporary 
society must be an organisation which maintains a normative ordering that 
prioritises knowledge, that maintains a “stimulated heartland” and that provides a 
balance combination of academic and managerial values. Further, it implies that 
the regulation must facilitate adequate economic support as well as effective 
interaction with the environment from which the university draws resources.  
Thus, regulation which shifts the economic norm to the top priority, which sees 
the academic profession as human resources bought and sold on a spot market 
model, or which sets either academic or managerail value to the fore and neglects 
the other is regulation designed for regulatory failure.  
 
The failings of the Australian entrepreneurial university model are not only 
facilitated by law but made imperative by a shift in policy norms and consequent 
regulatory design as discussed in detail in the examination of the Regulatory 
Framework in Chapter 3 and evaluated in the coherence analysis of Chapter 7.  
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3. Economic Analysis: Participant In A Market Economy 
 
Unlike the foregoing sociological models which integrate multivalent systems, 
the economic lens’ dualistic view identifies activity as profit or non-profit. This 
section addresses university organisations from an economic perspective as 
operating in a market economy.  Economic analysis is concerned with the 
production and distribution of scarce resources. The default context for the 
economist’s analysis, as noted in the previous chapter, is a market where goods 
are traded between individuals. By definition an individualist model is 
inadequate for organisations.  One response from economists has been the 
development of neoinstitutional economics.  This development allows 
neoclassical economists to apply their analytical framework designed for 
individuals to organisations or “firms” which are treated as if they were simple, 
rationalist individuals. Among firms, economists have developed a theoretical 
distinction between profit driven and non-profit firms.688  Accordingly, in this 
section the university organisation will be analysed along the lines of these two 
broad categories.  
 
Unlike the foregoing sociological analsysis which aimed at developing heuristic 
models for the university based on internal organisational and institutional 
norms, the economic models of the market and the firm are vacant structures 
available for application theoretically at least in any context. That is to say they 
are stand alone models which may be applied broadly in the economy for the 
purposes of understanding how people and firms behave in conditions of 
scarcity.  These models are not suited to capturing the broad public and social 
roles of institutions such as the university; rather, they are focused on the 
economic concerns around exchange, and supply and demand, firm productivity, 
maximising return on assets, and efficiency. Finally, although the economic 
analsyis of the firm has had a significant contribution to the law of the business 
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corporation, it has had significantly less to say about the non-profit firm.  
Economics is a normative discipline evaluating arrangements on the basis of 
conformity to economic values of efficiency, wealth generation and production 
of goods and services which fit the economic paradigm. This normative 
commitment needs to be kept in mind as it provides a backdrop for the evaluation 
of economic models of the university organisation.  
 
a. The university as a business firm 
 
Although the model of the university as a firm goes back at least to the turn of 
the twentieth century,689  the characterisation of the university as a firm has 
become more important as part of a larger discourse in which the state has been 
transformed from the welfare state interested in the welfare of its citizens to the 
regulatory state focused on creating markets—a shift based on the assumption 
that markets are the best way to both manage supply and demand, and to 
distribute costs and benefits.  The discourse of the university as a firm views the 
university as simply one among many other firms—i.e. organisations which 
individuals create for economic purposes.   
 
There are good economic arguments for modeling the university as a species of 
the firm. Universities both consume inputs and generate outputs. They use inputs 
provided by others and employ workers, use plant and equipment, and compete 
for customers.  Some of the university’s activities are readily measured in 
economic terms.690 They provide educational and research services. Further, 
following the analyses of Coase,691 Williamson692 and others, universities like 
other firms function by reducing transaction costs.  That is, a group of suppliers 
and consumers can more efficiently coordinate their activities by organizing 
themselves into a firm than they can by searching for them on open market.   
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Further, analysis of the university as a firm draws attention to certain problems 
pertaining ultimately to regulation.  These problems stem from ownership 
concerns. In the broad economic framework of profit, non-profit and state owned 
firms, the question is whether ownership matters, or at least in terms of providing 
authority for controlling direction and use of funds and other resources.693  This 
line of research investigates the “objective function” of the firm. That is, what the 
firm’s objectives are: maximizing profits, shareholder equity, or some other such 
thing?694   
 
The model of the firm provides some valuable regulatory insights. For example, 
it highlights difficulties in accountabilities when there are neither profit objects 
nor shareholders.695  Without profit objects, other objects need to be crafted, first 
for purposes of guiding the organisation ensuring the objects are consistent with 
the institution and the organisation’s stated objectives.  A further question may 
be asked: should the objects be constructed so that they are readily measurable—
a matter of concern to Power who suggests that making objects auditable has the 
potential to significantly alter not only the processes, but the services and even 
the organisation itself.696  As has been argued in Chapter 2, the altering of the 
organisation may be desired or an unintended consequence which leads to 
Power’s reference of audit being the “fatal remedy.”  Second, without economic 
ownership, the university is responsible first to itself as a group of professionals, 
a reputation based community.  Ownership of the reputation then needs to be an 
incentive for the profession.  From a regulatory accountability perspective it may 
be that implications of both profit and ownership are that the highest level of 
integrity of members is required and that the organisation needs be both granted 
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autonomy and insulated from the market as well as political interests, and be 
placed with an orientation to society at large.  By way of contrast, the business 
firm is subject to no expectations of integrity beyond the minimum imposed by 
law, it is expected to respond to the market, and has only that orientation toward 
society imposed on it by the market of consumers and the law.   
 
b. The university as a non-profit firm 
 
For most of its existence the university has been a non-profit enterprise and as 
such, a markedly different type of enterprise than the for profit firm.697  Given 
the importance of this model, the public good and public policy mission 
discussed in the previous chatper, a discussion of some length follows.   
 
Understanding the nonprofit firm requires an approach rather different from the 
approach suited to the for profit firm. Professor Henry Hansmann in his seminal 
economic analysis of the non-profit enterprise identified two defining 
characteristics of firms that operate in the nonprofit sector.  These are a non-
distribution constraint which constrains managers from distributing profits to 
owners, and the existence of significant information asymmetries.  Hansmann 
denominated these two characteristics as forms of contract failure which he 
believes, in addition to other things, drive nonprofit entrepreneurialism.698   
 
Hansmann observes that the market works with sufficiently complete and 
accurate information to allow the consumer to make reasonably accurate 
comparisons between products and prices prior to purchase, to make a clear 
agreement, as well as determine post facto whether contractual obligations have 
been complied with by the producing firm.699  Where all these conditions are not 
sufficiently met, Hansmann argues that nonprofit firms are a superior more 
efficient form of production and distribution. 
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Hansmann explains why: “The nonprofit producer, like its for-profit counterpart, 
has the capacity to raise prices and cut quality in such cases without much fear of 
customer reprisal.” 700 In other words, the nonprofit producer has the same 
opportunity as the for profit producer to take advantage of the consumer using 
information asymmetries. What constrains the nonprofit producer from doing so 
however is unique to the nonprofit form. Again, Hansmann:  
 
[the nonprofit] lacks the incentive to do so because those in charge are 
barred from taking home any resulting profits. In other words, the 
advantage of a nonprofit producer is that the discipline of the market is 
supplemented by the additional protection given the consumer by another, 
broader "contract," the organization's legal commitment to devote its 
entire earnings to the production of services.701 
 
The result of this constraint is that consumers are less likely to be exploited for 
gain on the basis of information asymmetries.  Thus, a critical place of the non-
profit enterprise in society is where information asymmetries are severe.  The 
measurement evaluation of services is a particularly fraught undertaking. 
Accordingly, the opportunity for consumers to make well informed decisions in 
the purchase of services, as well as to evaluate whether they have received that 
for which they bargained is particularly difficult. In this situation, the nonprofit is 
the preferable approach from an economic point of view.  
 
Universities are a case in point.  As both the nature of the good, and the value of 
the good are pieces of information that cannot be known until after consumption, 
and even then possibly not for many years afterwards, production and transfer in 
a for profit market poses significant risks for the consumer.  Further, as the 
consumption is often a once in a lifetime decision that cannot be repeated the 
cost of a poor choice is increased exponentially.  This issue is well illustrated by 
Professor Winston’s hypothetical consumer: “I went to Harvard the first time, but 
frankly it wasn’t worth it, so I’ll get my next undergraduate education at the 
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University of Montana”.702  In these situations, the non-profit works as a 
participant in what the economist Hansmann models as a trust market.703  
 
The non-profit model, however, leads to another problem.  In the business firm, 
the organisational object or “objective function” is quite clear—at least according 
to economists: it is maximizing shareholder returns.704 In the non-profit firm the 
question of objects is not as clear. What is the common organisational object or 
“objective function” of the nonprofit? And what is to be maximized? Is it the size 
of the budget, or service maximization?705  While economists argue that without 
a single, easily identifiable objective function like profit, the directors of the 
nonprofit are at a loss because of lack focus, the research does not seem to bear 
this out.  Nonprofit directors are successful and efficient in achieving their 
diverse aims.706  Indeed, it is not at all clear that the concerns of agency-principal 
conflicts are significant concerns in the nonprofit sector’s firms.707 
 
A critique of the economic firm analysis of the university has been developed by 
the economist of higher education, Gordon Winston in his article entitled: “Why 
Can’t A College Be More Like a Firm?”708 Winston examines the basis for the 
traditional and dominant model of the university as a non-profit.  In doing so he 
identifies six fundamental economic differences the first three of which follow 
from an application of  Hansmann’s analysis of non-profits and the latter three 
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specific to the university.  First is the non-distribution constraint. A university, as 
a non-profit enterprise, is prohibited from distributing its surplus to owners—
were there to be owners in the first place. As a non-profit enterprise, the 
distribution is to the beneficiaries of the nonprofit, in this case first the students, 
and second society at large. 
 
Second, as a non-distributing entity, the university has less incentive to operate 
efficiently. Whereas the profit motive of for profit firms supposedly causes them 
to operate efficiently, the university has no such objective. In the non-profit 
sector, however, the objective is idealistic, with the net result being that the 
“inefficiency” is not likely wasted. Rather, it has been expended differently: that 
is, it is likely to be expended in the pursuit of idealistic goals including 
“educational excellence… student opportunity and access… [and] diversity.”709  
In other words, the resources are directed to other social and public missions, and 
difficult to measure aspects of services such as quality.  
 
Third, the non-profit’s sources of revenue are markedly different from firms, as 
is the price they put on their services.  Their revenues are donative and/or 
commercial.  The university receives both sources of revenue: donative from the 
public purse and commercial in the form of tuition.  This allows the non-profit to 
charge a price that is below production cost.  In other words, it allows the 
university to provide a subsidized good, education at a higer level of quality than 
the price would suggest.  Indeed, this negative differential between cost and price 
is the basis of quality in higher education.710 This finding is supported by an 
empirical study by Cowen and Papenfuss who found that non-profit universities, 
when compared to for profit universities, maximize “the efficiency of 
reputational certification and attracting donations.”711  As such the “Non-profits 
certify the reputation of the high quality students and faculty, rather than the 
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individuals willing to pay the most. Donations then are used to maintain the 
pecuniary value of the institution.”712  
 
Fourth and following from the second, potential consumers do not know what 
they are getting, and cannot find out until long after they have graduated. As a 
once-in-a-lifetime decision it cannot be corrected.  Accordingly, decisions are 
made on a protective, conservative basis to avoid regrets, and buy the best one 
can afford. Without information, the unrepeatable nature of the decision and the 
corollary conservative investment strategy, the only basis for the decision 
becomes a combination of “animal hunches” and the reputation of the particular 
universities in question.713  The service provided by the university is quite unlike 
most other goods and services purchased on the open market. Thus the consumer 
prefers to rely on a producer not susceptible to deviate from educational 
objectives in favour of profit objects. The issue of reputation also has a 
significant effect on the next characteristic.  
 
The fifth characteristic is the university’s reliance on consumer input in the 
production of its goods. The university is not the only case where consumers 
inputs are essential;714 however, the university is the classic case where students 
contribute to their own learning and the learning of fellow students.  This 
characteristic partially explains why competition for quality students is so 
important as between universities on the one hand, and why competition between 
students to get into universities is so intense on the other. Higher quality students 
produce higher quality graduates which in turn serve to increase the reputation of 
the university which increases the value of the education. In other words, it is a 
type of virtuous circle in good institutions and a negative vortex in the case of 
lower quality institutions.  This distinction between higher and lower quality 
universities leads Winston to his sixth and final distinction.  
 
Winston notes that heterogeneity in price, quality and the price-quality nexus is a 
distinctive feature of universities. High price does not equate to high quality and 
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low price does not mean low quality. Indeed, the price-quality nexus is 
unconnected. High quality education may be free where for example full 
scholarships may be made available to students at Yale, while tuition of 
$39,975715  a not insubstantial amount, for a three year on-line degree at the 
University of Phoenix gives no guarantee of quality.  Subsidies to students can 
run as high as $276,303 per student per annum at Yale.716 
 
At a basic economic level the argument goes against the profit model. Results 
from an economic analysis of private for profit model versus the public higher 
education model suggests that the quality in publicly funded education is likely 
to be higher.717 If there is a public subsidy, the cost of education to the student is 
below market clearance rates.  This subsidy means that there is a surplus value 
that can be extracted from the student.  That surplus can be extracted by such 
things as higher standards of work and accepting higher quality of students.718  
Where a student pays $30,000 for a degree the value of which is $30,000, there 
cannot be an expectation that the student will be willing to put more than the bare 
minimum extra effort.  In other words, the degree is a commodity sold for 
$30,000 and the value is paid in full in cash. Therefore, the additional effort 
needed to read, think, understand, and write are additional “sweat equity” not 
properly factored into the costs of the degree.  Indeed, this important issue of 
student contribution by their work “customer-input feature” has been recognized 
as a factor in the competitive environment for tertiary students and the problem 
of extracting fees (and quality) that results.719 
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Perhaps Winston’s introduction serves as a good conclusion to this section. 
Winston writes:  
in My Fair Lady, Rex Harrison asks plaintively, “Why can’t a woman be 
more like a man?” If she were, he thought, she’d be a whole lot easier to 
understand and to live with. In academic board rooms and … legislative 
chambers, the question has become, “Why can’t a college be more like a 
firm?” If it were so, goes the hope, it would be awhole lot easier to 
understand and to live with.720   
 
As is evidenced by the foregoing discussion, the hope and value of economic 
analysis is more an effort to grapple with the difficult political issues and 
regulatory challenges than an appropriate application of neoclassical economic 
normative preferences.  
 
From a regulatory perspective, the significance of the economic analysis is that 
the university is quite distinct from a business firm. Although some insights from 
that analysis are relevant to the matters of regulation, such as the importance of 
understanding the impacts of missions and ownership, the analysis is not helpful 
in the regualtory decisions concerning assignment in on the public-private divide, 
nor the position of “production workers” in the overall.  From an economic point 
of view, it is clear that the regulatory preference should be the nonprofit model. 
 
These conclusions can be further investigated through an economic lens by 
examining the chartiable enterprise.  The basic economic explanation for the 
existence of charitable enterprises, as noted above, is contract failure based on 
information asymmetry.  This explanation is incomplete.721 In addition to 
information asymmetries there are the important roles played by such non-
economic incentives as altruism, pride in one’s work, and other normative 
commitments such as may be found in the social environment more broadly.722 
Such motives, norms and incentives are under represented in the market—as may 
be extrapolated from Cowan and Papenfuss.  Nevertheless, they are integral to 
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the university which offers social honours such as degrees, and prestigious titles 
such as “Professor,” “Dean” and “Chancellor.” Further, the university as a 
nonprofit allows socio-economic space for a value structure that places a higher 
value on knowledge and public goods over private economic goods.  The 
institutional context of the nonprofit firm rewards those non-economic 
contributions in those other no-economic normative hierarchies. 
 
A further insight comes from examining purposes of investing in non-profit 
firms.  Auteri and Wagner suggest that people invest in nonprofits because they 
are dissatisfied with the outcomes of market based production and distributions 
which are dominated by for profit firms. They describe nonprofit 
entrepreneurialism as “seeking to change the architectural pattern of outcomes 
that are generated within the market economy.” 723 That is, these “nonprofit 
entrepreneurs”, whether private individuals, organisations or governments, think 
that producing and distributing on the basis of ability to pay does not achieve the 
most desirable social outcomes. Further, these entrepreneurs believe that the 
nonprofit form is superior to the for profit model in the development and 
distribution.  Nonprofit entrepreneurs are not focused on personal wealth 
maximization as would shareholders in a for profit firm. Rather they are seeking 
to maximize such things as quality, equity, innovation—whether technical or 
social—or some other such value in which nonprofit firms prove to be a superior 
to for profit firms. Evidence from research in areas such as health care, education 
and environment suggest nonprofits are particularly effective in achieving such 
ends or missions in these areas.724 
 
The university, as the premier provider of higher education has long provided an 
opportunity for a redistribution of society’s resources, at first for the few 
particularly outstanding scholars who were granted opportunities to attend the 
elite institutions, and later, pursuant to a broad policy of equality of opportunity 
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through national policies encouraging broad participation in higher education, 
leading to the massification of higher education. Regulatory decisions placing the 
university organisation on the public side of the public-private divide have 
allowed the university to achieve these important public good objects much more 
effectively than had they been placed on the private side of the divide.  By 
creating opportunities for all citizens to participate in the university, governments 
as nonprofit entrepreneurs created opportunties for all citizens to to achieve 
socio-economic positions based on merit instead of birth.  In other words, it 
challenged market distributions which tended to keep wealth, jobs and 
opportunities within a restricted circle of privilege.  
 
Auteri and Wagner further observe that nonprofit firms, as non-market vehicles 
for the production and distribution of goods and services, serve as an important 
form of non-market ideas and products.  Further nonprofits are a place for the 
creation and dissemination of ideas and products.  Auteri and Wagner write:  
 
While nonprofit enterprises are not normally thought of as areas of 
contest, unlike courtrooms or legislative assemblies, they nonetheless 
likewise operate as arenas of contestation over the substantive 
characteristics of societies, though this perhaps only becomes apparent 
when considered in light of the profit-seeking alternative to the creation 
of nonprofit enterprises.725 
 
As noted in a previous chapter, Mansbridge discusses the importance of a public 
space for debate about the nature of “public good”.  The university is admirably 
suited to providing that space. It provides important space in society for the 
generation of ideas and the contest of ideas on the shape of society.  Such space 
is a vital part of any democratic society or society particularly for a society 
facing serious threats to sustainability as is society today in the face of global 
climate change.  As Auteri and Wagner’s analysis suggests, the non-profit suits 
this purpose admirably.   
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Finally, Auteri and Wagner note the irony and special place of the nonprofit in a 
market economy.  In their words:  
“There is a certain ironic quality to the creation of nonprofit enterprises. 
They emerge within the market economy, and yet operate as agents of 
substantive change to create a different societal landscape from what 
would be generated within an economy that was organized wholly 
through profit seeking firms. There would be no reason for an 
entrepreneur to create a nonprofit enterprise if he were wholly content 
with the societal outcomes generated through the market economy.”726   
 
In other words, not all human activity should be surrendered to short term 
profitability, and space made by nonprofits for the contestation of values and 
society in general are of immeasurable value—perhaps part of the very problem 
of the understanding and valuation of universities in a market economy. 
 
In conclusion, for regulatory purposes there are some important insights to be 
gleaned from an economic analysis of the university as a firm.  By drawing 
attention to the constraints on the nonprofit firms and the lack of ownership, the 
analysis draws attention to both the strengths and challenges of the nonprofit 
university—the critical issues of accountability and the challenge of identifying 
an objective function.   
 
The analysis of the university as a nonprofit firm also draws attention to three 
other crucial factors at work in the university of which account needs to be taken 
for regulatory purposes.  These are the overwhelming information assymetries 
inherent in making decisions about university education, the important social 
policy objective of egalitarianism of the university that is facilitiated by nonprofit 
firms, and the issue arising from the absence of a single clear objective function 
like profit maximization. With respect to this last issue, research indicates that in 
the absence of a single objective function,—i.e. a clear nonprofit/ social or public 
good function—“mission”becomes a substitute and hence is critical to the 
nonprofit enterprise.727  This fact makes it imperative that the university have a 
clear mission, which has significant implications for regulators. Finally, 
economic analysis evidences that accountability in the university must be 
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carefully identified and articulated.  The assumption of accountability by simply 
comparing the university to a for profit firm or too narrowly or numerically 
conceived is exposed as vacuous, as indeed are many of the for profit 
assumptions believed to be applicable to the university. A careful analysis of 
accountabilities needs to be undertaken, as identified in chapters 3 and 4 to 
identify who should have accountabilities for what objects, to whom, by what 
standards, using what processes and with what outcomes.728 
 
A final word of cauton on economic analsysis of the nonprofit firm comes from 
sociology.  Di Maggio and Anheier in their sociological review of nonprofit 
organisations and nonprofit sectors observe that while economic models “possess 
an elegance” that institutional explanations (and other analysis) lack, economic 
modeling is far too narrow to offer much explanation into the institutional 
structure.729  They note a wide variety of roles and functions of nonprofits that 
distinguish them from private firms. These include the origins, behaviours, value 
commitments,730 and legal form among other things.731 The value placed on 
efficiency in business, a means based focus, is inadequate in the context of 
nonprofit organisations which are following a different value rationality.732  
Finally, they note the congeniality between the professional ethos and the 
nonprofit sector, both of which value autonomy, participatory governance, and 
revenue structures which empower.733  In other words, while the economic model 
has important insights to offer, it is a far from complete explanation.  Former 
scientist and Executive Vice-Chancellor of UCSF and entrepreneur Zach Hall 
concludes: “The relationship [between industry and university] is most 
successful, … when the two parties acknowledge and respect their distinct 
missions.”734 
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4. Political Analysis: Public Administative Perspective 
 
A different and important understanding of the regulatory issues can be 
developed by examining the university organisation as a part of the 
administration of government.  Public administration as a scholarly endeavour is 
an independent discipline that lies at the intersection of political science and 
management. It is an effort to understand the organisation and workings 
government and government of various types.  In the analysis which follows, the 
characteristics which mark public government bodies are identified and tested in 
application to the university organisation. The evidence is clear that from the 
perspective of public administration, the university is on the public side of the 
public-private divide.  Again, the regulatory implications are signficant in terms 
of the legal regime and political accountabilities.  
 
In contrast to the previous approaches to the university, public administration 
considers the university as one of a subset of a larger group of state bodies 
including departments, agencies, statutory authorities of various types and 
government business enterprises.  Placing the university among other public 
enterprises and comparing its structure and processes to other government 
providers of public goods, all of which receive some type of government 
sponsorship, provides insight because it suggests what type of government 
organisation it is and adds to the foundational thinking of how the organisation 
should be regulated.   
 
The analysis in this section identifies not only the applicable bodies of law, but 
also the principles of law applicable.  The university was first placed under a 
state agency during the reign of Charles VII of France in 1446.735  There it 
received both financial support and political oversight from the French 
government.  In the English tradition, the university came under state control 
when the elected Chancellor (with the masters’/ academic profession’s approval) 
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moved from the university to the court in the mid fifteenth century.736  Since that 
time, there have been a variety of arrangements as the various powers have 
wrestled for control of the institution and its organisations which in turn and in 
its own right has responded to those powers.   
 
Today, the university in Australia with the exception of two small private 
organisations—Bond University and the University of Notre Dame Australia—is 
a creature of the state legislatures.  As such, it is subject to administrative review 
legislation applying to government bodies of all types.737  Where the office of 
University Visitor exists—an office dedicated to dispute resolution, tracing its 
roots back to the private eleemosynary corporation of the late middle ages—the 
visitor is the state’s governor or the appointee of the governor. This public 
appointment demonstrates the university’s character not as a private charity but, 
as put by the majority of the High Court of Australia in Griffith University v 
Tang, one among the “publicly funded institutions, constituted by statute and 
discharging an acknowledged responsibility of the state.”738 
 
a. Understanding government bodies 
 
The disorganisation and variety among these organisations led the UK public 
administration scholar Professor Christopher Hood to describe them as a 
“zoo.”739  Hood teased out three dimensions of difference forming some type of a 
foundation for classification within this sector.  These three dimensions are: 
mode of creation, formal status and principal resource.740  Each of these can be 
applied to the university.   
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i. Mode of creation 
 
In terms of the first dimension, the mode of creation, the university in Australia 
was created in what Hood refers to as both “bottom up”  and “top down”741 
fashions.  That is, the Australian university was created in the first instance as a 
response to elite demands of the mid-nineteeenth century beginning with the 
University of Sydney the various legislatures have created the various university 
corporations of Australia.  The universities created after Dawkins are “top down” 
bodies. Hood suggests top down bodies as efforts to by-pass “jurisdictions of 
other agencies, governments, lower level governments.”742  One can see the 
applicability of Hood’s hypothesis in Dawkins’ realisation that the university 
institutions, organisations and academic profession would for the most part reject 
his approach, leading him to dismantle the CTEC and carry out his program 
without meaningful consultation with the institution—or the public for that 
matter.  
 
From a legal persepctive, Hood compares the two modes of creation as “trusts in 
the common law tradition as autonomous collective entities created by citizens,” 
being his bottom up category, and the Roman-law understanding of corporations 
as “concessions of the state” being the top down category.743  As just noted, the 
Australian university corporation has changed from a political response to local 
agitation to a national policy initiative, in as seen, for example, in the creation of 
several new university organisations by way of merger in the 1990’s. 
Interestingly, Hood observes it is not uncommon for private bottom up 
intstitutions to become part of government. 744  In such situations, the non-profits 
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may be taken up by government as the broader policy benefits become clear or 
the political attractiveness of their activities become evident.  
 
The role of university organisations, in terms of the power of its social status and 
its power to confer status as well as its potential for the advancement of socially 
desirable goals like equality present a strong case for government to take up and 
integrate them into government. It is evident in Australia that the government by 
taking up the university organisations has been able to task them with the various 
equity missions to achieve government’s social policy objectives, as well as 
directing their focus toward economic norms through the funding arrangements 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
ii. Formal status 
 
Hood’s second dimension, the formal status, refers to the position of the 
organisation on the continuum from core constitutional government to 
independent public authorities delivering public goods, through to public-private 
partnerships.  Hood identifies four dimensions to this formal status: ownership, 
finance, operation and oversight.745    In all four of these dimensions, in nearly all 
instances746 the Australian university has been public: it has been publicly 
owned, publicly financed, publicly operated and publicly overseen. Public 
ownership of the Australian university corporation is evident in that 38 of 40 
university corporations are statutory corporations.  In terms of finance, although 
over time the arrangements have changed in the Australian university with 
students picking up more of the financial burden over the last few decades, it still 
remains arguably public.  The situation of the majority of Australia’s universities 
is that about 55 per cent of funding still comes from the Federal government.747 
 
The decline, however, is significant. Indeed, the decline has reached the point 
that Professor Glyn Davis, Vice Chancellor of the University of Melbourne 
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declared: “we can’t really call ourselves a public University any more, when only 
23 percent of our income is directly guaranteed by the Federal government.”748   
 
iii. Principal resource 
 
Hood’s third defining characteristic of organisations is their principal resource.  
Hood identifies four common types of resources linking organisations to 
government.  These are: “nodality, treasure, authority and organisation.”749   As 
will be evident in the explanation which follows, the Australian university relies 
all four of these government resources in differing measures.  The university has 
an important role as a “node” in “information interconnectedness” providing 
research to the government and operates as government’s premier information 
creating, gathering, organizing, and disseminating institution.  Further the 
univerity relies on government “treasure.”  That is it has a fungible asset, a good 
or service to sell to the public.  It sells education, status, knowledge and skills, it 
grants degrees and sells its research.  The Australian government, by way of 
legislation controlling the use of the term “university” and control over “higher 
eduation providers”750 has given an exclusive or monoply right to the university 
to grant certain titles.  In this way, the Australian university by definition has 
“authority” to command or certify via the granting of degrees, diplomas and 
certificates.  As to Hood’s final resource, the Australian university has 
“organisation”—the possession of goods and humans arranged in a useful 
manner.  The various states have granted organisational powers to the Australian 
university to allow it to carry out its various functions.  
 
b. Three categories of government bodies 
 
While Hood’s analysis provides a framework locating the university in the 
public-private continuum as a form of paragovernmental body, it does not 
charaterise or locate it with the government itself. That perspective can be drawn 
                                                 
748
 Green, S. and D. Rood (2005). Top Uni to Adopt US System. The Age. Melbourne. 
749
 Hood, C. (1986). The Hidden Public Sector: The 'Quangoisation' of the World. Guidance, 
Control and Evaluation in the Public Sector. F. Kaufman, G. Majone and V. Ostrom. New York, 
de Gruyter p. 195. 
750
 Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth). 
 293 
from Prof. Roger Wettenhall’s investigation of government bodies.751  Outlining 
the development of modern government structures, Wettenhall follows the initial 
work of D.N. Chester.752  In 1951 Chester identified three types of government 
bodies: the ministry or department of the central government, the local 
governmental bodies, and “the rest.”753  The category denominated “the rest” 
were often some form of what had earlier been described as “statutory bodies for 
special purposes.”754 These were bodies independent of ministerial control and so 
separated from the core of the governmental architecture.  The category “the 
rest” tend to be function based organisations which in some instances share many 
commonalities with Hood’s paragovernmental organisations.   
 
Chester observed that third category bodies suffer from a number of problems 
including understanding the nature of the category, popular attack—a problem 
Hood also notes as both conservatives and progressives attack paragovernmental 
bodies755—problems of accountability, and so on.  An important aspect of these 
“the rest” bodies is their need for independence and autonomy.  Wettenhall 
observes that these bodies tend to be those that protect the national interest.  That 
is, these bodies provide a buffer for the larger society from the government of the 
day.  These bodies include “electoral commissions, ombudsmen, taxation offices, 
public universities, national broadcasting commissions and a variety of 
regulatory bodies.”756  They work as “trustees of the national interest”—an 
interest which extends beyond the interests of the government in power.   
 
Their special function is to protect national interest when national interests and 
the interests of the government of the day collide.  As a result, “the rest” bodies 
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require strong legal structures, popular support, and independence in terms of 
funding, staffing and operating mandate in order to achieve public objectives.  
Indeed, as Wettenhall puts the dilemma,  
“how to guarantee or protect autonomy, especially when governments 
control the financing and may want to ensure compliance with other 
whole-of-government policies in areas such as industrial relations or 
purchasing, is a major issue running through world experiences with third 
category organisations.”757  
Wettenhall specifically mentions the university as a third sector body. Its public 
mandate requires it to maintain independence from and a critical view of the 
government.  As a public body for the national interest, the university needs to 
maintain indepdence of and critical stance toward all such consolidations of 
power, be they government, business or some combination of the two.  
 
Returning to Chester’s taxonomy of the central government ministry, a municipal 
local body and “the rest”, one notes that the third category body has no political 
leadership per se. That is, unlike central or local governments, the leadership of 
these bodies is not a part of the electoral process.  This lack of political 
leadership is an obvious source of complaint about accountability. Bodies of this 
category are headed by “single executive, or a collegial board or council.”758 The 
challenge is to balance autonomy with accountability of such statutory bodies759 
or, as Wettenhall puts it and just quoted above “how to guarantee or protect 
autonomy, especially when governments control the financing and may want to 
ensure compliance with other whole-of-government policies such as industrial 
relations.”760 
 
The Australian university is obviously not at the core of government. That is, it is 
not a ministry of the central government, nor a local agency.  Rather it fits nicely 
into Chester’s broad third catergory, the “rest.” The decision to shape it as a 
statutory corporation has significance.  Although the distinctive features of the 
university corporation remain unclear, Rashdall identifies them as arising from 
the model of the medieval corporation.  That is, they had the following 
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characterisics: a written body of rules, rights of legal action, appointment of 
officers and a common seal.761 Although it has been argued that rules, legal 
rights and common seal are the hallmarks of the private trading corporation, they 
are equally hallmarks of the statutory corporation, and in this regard 
demonstrates the importance of university autonomy.762  These bodies although 
drawing some of their funding from the state and providing sercies of a public 
nature, have a right to exercise discretion in the execution of their objectives.763 
Wettenhall notes that in Australia, all Chester’s “the rest” government bodies 
have been statutory corporations, regardless of their function.764   
 
As noted, the formal status of the university coropration is as a statutory 
corporation.  The statutes create a separate legal entity, create an indentifable 
membership, provide its objects, create responsible officers, set out powers 
including the right to hold property and sue and be sued.765  The early statutes 
provided economic support.  For example, the NSW Legislative Council’s 
University of Sydney Act 1850 provided for an annual grant of ₤ 5,000 to defray 
expenses.766  It is clear from reading the  University of Sydney Act that the 
government intended to create a body independent of the Legislative Council in 
all manner including finance where its spending was in excess of ₤ 5,000 in any 
given year.  The Act makes no reference to reporting or audit by the government 
but does provide for some control by its power to appoint the first members of a 
self-sustaining senate,767 supervision of statutes, bye-laws and regulations,768 and 
appointment of the Governor as the university Visitor.769   
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This particular statutory corporation was to deliver a range of services to the 
public which have changed over time.  As noted, in the period prior to World 
War II, the university’s main objective was the confirmation of the elite and 
production of professionals for the social, cultural and economic institutions of 
Australian society. After that time, it took on its more familiar role in nation 
building, enfranchising an increasingly larger swath of the public, and enabling 
larger social shifts, accommodating among other things the changes in the nature 
of work and problems with oversupply in the labour market—as discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
 
The view of the university as a statutory corporation that operates independently 
of political interference is found in the case law.  For example, the court in 
Harding v. University of New South Wales770 explicitly notes the necessity of the 
government leaving to the university the exercise of its discretion even if the 
court were to find that the university had made an undertaking to admit a student.  
In that case, Young CJ said in obiter: “I would also have great difficulty in 
considering that this Court had the power to direct the University to do that [i.e. 
order it to accept a student].”771  In other words, the exercise of discretion by the 
university within its areas of competence are matters best left to the university—
a matter reconsidered by the High Court with a similar result in Griffith v. 
Tang.772  The issue of autonomy, however, carries with it special problems and 
with the university itself, as a corporation engaging in private contracts with 
students. 
 
In the case of Harding v University of New South Wales in which the court was 
called upon to to determine the existence of a purported private contractual right 
of an expelled student applying for re-admisstion to the medical faculty, Young 
CJ wrote:  
“it is usually unsafe to apply a combination of public law and private law 
principles to any piece of litigation. As Lord Hoffmann said in giving the 
decision of the House of Lords in R v East Sussex County Council; Ex 
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parte Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd [2002] TLR 102 at paras 33-35, generally 
concepts of private law should not be extended into the public law.”773   
 
While Young CJ’s comment is helpful, it is evident that further legal analysis is 
necessary—and is taken up in the next section.  
 
From a public administrative perspective, it is clear that the Australian university 
is indeed a government body. The significance is not only that the university has 
accountabilities to the government, but also that the public functions of the 
university have been acknowledged by both the state and Federal governments in 
Australia.774  Public administrative analysis assigns the university to the public 
side of the public-private divide; however, it does so only conditionally. That is, 
in instances where private law is applied, the “publicness” of the university need 
not preclude the application of private law. The preference between the use of 
public or private law can only be clarified from a regulatory point of view by a 
clear assignment of the university corporation on the public-private divide and 
appropriate normative ordering in the regulatory framework. Some clarity on the 
issues raised by Young CJ may be obtained by an analysis of the university 
corporation and its place in public law, to which the dissertation turns next. 
 
5. Legal Analysis: The University Corporation and Public Law  
 
This section investigates the legal characteristics of the university organisation—
the unique university corporation—and places it within the public law sphere.  
Unlike Corporations Act corporations which are created by right and have little 
restriction, university corporations as statutory corporations are created with 
specific, legal objects.  They are not free to engage in any activity they may 
choose. Rather, they are given specific tasks and restricted in activity.  These 
tasks, as shall be demonstrated, are markedly consistent with the institutional 
norms noted in the previous chapter’s examination of the university institution 
and missions.   
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The state based legislation creating the university corporation addresses all the 
missions of the university discussed above in some form or other.  For example, 
the Melbourne University Act 1958 (Vic) provides the following broad 
objectives: 
(a) to provide and maintain a teaching and learning 
environment of excellent quality offering higher education 
at an international standard; 
(b) to undertake scholarship, research and research training of 
international standing and to apply that scholarship and 
research to the advancement of knowledge and to the 
benefit of the well-being of the Victorian, Australian and 
international communities; 
(c) to equip graduates of the University to excel in their 
chosen careers and to contribute to the life of the 
community; 
(d) to serve the Victorian, Australian and international 
communities and the public interest by— 
 (i) enriching cultural and community life; 
 (ii) elevating public awareness of educational, 
scientific and artistic developments; 
(iii) promoting critical enquiry, informed intellectual 
discourse and public debate within the University and in 
the wider society; 
(e) to confer degrees and grant diplomas, certificates and 
other awards.775 
 
The organisational objects of the corporation are broad public good objects, 
normatively ordered to prioritise knowledge for communal purposes.  The 
standard set by the objects, s. 4A(a) “excellent ... at an international standard” 
recognises that the local Australian university corporation is part of an 
international institution. Subsection 4A(b) addressing scholarship, research and 
research training, identifies “knowledge” as an ultimate value and not merely as 
instrumental value to be determined by the market.  Further, it identifies the 
benefit not in individual terms, but in terms of the broad public benefit of the 
local, national and international communities. This normative ordering, or lexical 
ordering as Ayers and Braithwaite would have it,776 confirms the Australian 
university organisations’ places in the international institution which place 
primacy on knowledge.  
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The issues of economic norms and other normative orderings while not 
addressed by the statutes have been addressed by the courts. In the case of 
University of Western Australia v Gray, the court specifically stated that despite 
the changed environment which results in onerous economic obligations on the 
university, it is not up to the university to cast aside its public good or other 
obligations and pursue economic objects.  The court stated:  
We accept that UWA has not been immune from the forces, financial and 
otherwise, that are forcing changes in the character of the university 
sector in Australia.  As French J noted, UWA has engaged in commercial 
activities, as have done “most, if not all, universities”.  …  What is 
notable for present purposes is that there is nothing in the evidence to 
suggest that those commercial activities have displaced, either totally or if 
in part to what extent, UWA’s traditional public function as an institution 
of higher education in favour of the pursuit of commercial purposes (if it 
lawfully could do so under its Act).”777 
 
In other words, the university organisation must pursue the public good with 
which it has been charged prioritising its knowledge norms.  Further, it is not 
permitted to re-order its norms under the Act.  
 
The utility value of knowledge and its individual application is not ignored.  It is 
addressed in the subsection which follows: however, the normative ordering 
stays in tact by the proviso that the valuable contribution to the individual’s 
career a university education provides is still used by the graduate to contribute 
to the community s. (4A)(c).  
 
The subsection which follows s.(4A)(d) provides a more detailed explanation of 
the public mission. The university is to “(i) enrich... cultural and community life; 
(ii) elevating public awareness of educational, scientific and artistic 
developments; (iii) promoting critical informed intellectual discourse and public 
debate within the University and in the wider society.”  These objects are clear 
public good as argued in Chapter 4. They are focused on the community, not on 
individual advancement. There is a clear identification that the dissemination of 
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knowledge about the development of humanity’s higher faculties—of thought, 
understanding and emotion—are key objectives of the university.  
 
Finally, s.(4A)(e) merits consideration.  This section, which makes it an object to 
“confer degrees and grant diplomas, certificates and other awards” indicates the 
nature of the university corporation’s activity.  It is to be engaged in sorting and 
distinguishing members of the university by the conferral of degrees and awards.  
These awards are honorific in nature as indicated by titles such as “doctor” and 
“professor”.  The basis for these awards it is assumed is scholarship given that 
this is the university corporation’s legal object. This set of objects and priorities 
is coherent with the institutional priorities and purposes as set out in the previous 
chapter.  In sum, the state parliaments in their enactments of legislation creating 
the specific university corporations appear to have done so in a manner which is 
largely coherent with the historical institution of the university discussed above 
and the sociological missions of education and credentialing. 
 
Turning to the classification of the university corporation within the legal system 
requires further consideration of the public-private divide discussed in Chapter 4. 
This section argues that the university organisation is assigned at law to the 
public law sphere. Professor Ronald Moe identifies a series of questions that 
allow such a classification to be made from a legal perspective.778  Moe points 
out that while economists and policy advisors may fail to adequately identify the 
differences between public and private organisations, there are significant public 
and political goals, as well as important institutional considerations derived from 
the legal status and organisational structures. On the public side, these goals, 
status and structures  are safeguared by public law.  While Moe’s criteria allow 
for the signifanct blurring of the line between public and private, they do provide 
significant benchmarks.  His criteria are more like continnua with the potential 
for describing the criteria as “more” or “less” rather than simply “yes” or “no.”  
As such they are well suited to an organisation like the university which has 
elements of both public and private goods. 
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Moe’s classification criteria are as follows: an organisation’s legal status, its 
enabling legislation, its relations with government as a central, local or third type 
of organisation (as discussed above in the public administration section), the 
extent to which it is subject to administrative law, the extent to which it is subject 
to private law, and the appointment of its executive.  Moe’s framework as 
applied to the Australian university supports the public assignment argued in 
Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
a. Legal character 
 
At law the Australian university is a body corporate, a statutory corporation. It is 
a corporation without share capital or guarantee. It has no board of directors, but 
has a council charged with the supervision of the corporation.  Membership in 
the corporation is not purchased, but is based on association with the productive, 
distributive and consuming functions of the corporation.  In particular, students, 
graduates, members of the academic and administrative staffs are the members. It 
identifies the chief officer as the Vice Chancellor.  
 
b. Enabling law 
 
The enabling legislation for each university corporation is State enacted 
legislation.  The individual states create by statute each university as a legal body 
corporate—with the exception of the Australian National University which is a 
product of the Federal government.779  The enabling statutes set an express 
public purpose for the corporation.  The example of the Melbourne University 
Act as noted above identifies the objects as creating knowledge by undertaking 
scholarship, research and research training for the benefit of the community, 
equipping graduates to contribute to the life of the community; and to serve the 
public interest.780  
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c. Characterisation in the spectrum of governmental bodies 
 
Locating the university on this criteria is somewhat unclear. Although not a legal 
characterisation, in terms of Chester’s analysis, as discussed above, it falls 
clearly into the third category, or “the rest.”781 As further noted above, in terms 
of Hood’s taxonomy, it lands squarely in the public sector.782  The issue of its 
status vis-à-vis the Federal and state governments, however, is unsettled. The 
main source of funding is the commonwealth but the state governments retain 
legislative competence. 
 
These relationships have been tested.  In the case of R v University of Sydney783 
the Commonwealth government had tried to mandate the number of students the 
University of Sydney was to accept and into which faculties they were to be 
accepted. The High Court held that the Commonwealth government had 
overstepped its bounds.  In the words of Starke J. holding with the majority: “the 
Commonwealth is seeking to control education in the universities of Australia, 
which is wholly beyond its power.”784 Thus, it is clearly a Constitutional issue. 
Although the Constitution provides the States with power to create corporations 
including the university corporation, it grants the Commonwealth with power in 
51(xxiiA) to meet economic needs of students.   
 
The decision not to grant legislative competence over education to the 
Commonwealth under section 51 of the Constitution leaves education to State 
jursidiction as a residual power.  This situation reflects the preconfederation 
legacy of states’ responsibility for public education.  This awkward position 
gives the Federal government responsibility for finance but denies it jurisdiction 
in terms of direct legislative control.  To address this, the Federal government 
has taken increasing control by imposing demands through funding schemes 
which make funding conditional upon compliance with Commonwealth 
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legislation, as discussed in Chapter 3, through the Higher Education Finance Act 
2003 (Cth).   
 
The university corporations’ relationship with the State governments which 
nominally exercise control is also not clear.  Although not a state agency, as a 
statutory corporation the university corporation reports to the State and is subject 
to State appointments to council.  Yet, it also has significant accountabilities to 
the Federal government. 
 
d. Legal accountability via administrative law 
 
This issue, taken up in detail in Chapter 3 examining the regulatory framework 
governance, is addressed again briefly here from an administrative law 
perspective.  The university stands in a somewhat ambiguous position in terms of 
the applicability of administrative law.  While the precise reach of administrative 
law is not clear, there are many instances which demonstrate that it is certainly 
not beyond the reach of judicial review on administrative law grounds.  The 
judiciary, however, has been circumspect in interfereing with academic 
decisions.  For example, the academic decision made by Griffith University in 
the case of Griffith v. Tang, was deemed beyond the scope of judicial 
competence, although in his dissent in Kirby J. suggested that such review was 
appropriate, particularly given the stakes for the student.785 In that particular 
case, the student was to be excluded on the basis of allegations of falsification of 
data.  The university had made the decision to exclude and its decision was then 
challenged in the courts on the basis of whether it was subject to review, a matter 
which turned on the prior question of whether the decision was taken “under an 
enactment.”  That is, whether the decision to exclude was a decision specifically 
enabled by the legislation and hence subject to judicial review.  
 
The court held that although the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) did apply to the 
university generally,786 it did not apply as the decision was a normal exercise of 
academic professional discretion under authority properly delegated and 
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exercised, and not a specific exercise of authority granted by the statute and 
which would not otherwise be available.787  To some degree at least, it may be 
that the university’s traditional independence has made the courts reticent to 
interfere excessively with the university on the government’s behalf.  This 
creates a situation where the new entrepreneurial university has an empowered 
public executive with neither private law remedies nor the traditional internal 
constraints imposed by the academic profession to constrain it—a matter for 
consideration in regulatory design.  
 
e. Extent of the application of private law 
 
As noted by Young, CJ above both public and private law may apply to an 
organisation.788    That leads to the penultimate of Moe’s categories.  To identify 
an organisation as private, Moe draws attention to the following characteristics: 
the organisation being subject to taxation, reporting requirements, administrative 
law, creditor recourse, privacy and the extent of political involvement in the 
appointment of executives.  The dissertation turns briefly to consider each of 
these characteristics in the context of the university. 
 
With respect to taxation, the university is not subject to taxation on revenues. 
Further in terms of its disclosure obligations its obligations are quite distinct 
from either proprietary or public trading companies.  Rather than requirements 
with respect to finances of trading companies, the university is required to report 
to both Federal and State governments on matters of finance as well as 
operations.  Further, as the case law discussed above demonstrates, unlike a 
private company, it is subject to various forms of judicial review.  The 
accounting procedures at the universities are complex and must be organized to 
provide data for the further reporting to both levels of government.  
 
While theoretically a university corporation could go bankrupt, the probability is 
that no government would allow that to occur. They have run deficits for many 
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years789 and financiers have yet to make a demand or commence an action for 
administration. To allow a public university to collapse would send negative 
signals of significant consequence on a host of levels.790   
 
f. Appointment of executive 
 
Finally, Moe identifies the appointment of the executive as the last criteria. In a 
private company, the parties holding power are free to nominate and possibly to 
appoint whomever they choose and most certainly would be able to do so free 
from political interference.  In a public corporation like the university, the 
executive are political appointees.  In the university, the executive would be 
office holders such as Chancellors, Vice Chancellors, some Pro- and Deputy 
Vice Chancellors, and some directors and senior managers.  The appointment 
process of Vice Chancellors is less than transparent and in many cases delegated 
to recruitment agents or done on an informal network basis with the Council 
simply approving a recommendation.791 
 
Working through Moe’s analysis, it is evident that the categorization as public or 
private is a simple matter—and requires clear political decision.  As Moe 
observed in his analysis of the Federal Asset Disposition Association, a 
corporation can seek to be “private in its direction and interests but public in its 
rights and privileges.”792  Interestingly, this is exactly the opposite to the 
situation one finds in the Australian university. In the case of the Australian 
university, the government seeks to control, direct and define the university’s 
interest, while forcing the university to find significant private sources of 
funding.  
 
                                                 
789
 See for example, Burke, K. (2005). Universities funding crisis revealed. Sydney Morning 
Herald. and question of Sen. Tierney Education, Science and Training Senate Legislation 
Committee—Questions on Notice 2004-2005 Budget Estimates. 
790
 See discussion in Dill, D. (1997). "Higher education markets and public policy." Higher 
Education Policy 10: 167-185. 
791
  With respect to Vice Chancellors, see O'Meara, B. R. (2002). The recruitment and selection 
of Vice-Chancellors for Australian universities. Melbourne, Deakin University. PhD.  
792
 Moe, R. (1992). Exploring the Limits of Privatization. Classics of Public Administration. J. 
Shafritz and A. Hyde. Pacific Grove, CA, Brooks/Col
 306 
Further, governmental direction of the university is evident throughout the 
Higher Education Funding Act 2003, as for example, the Federal government’s 
decisions with respect to the imposition of structural changes in decision making 
via the National Protocols, its decisions concerning funding allocations, 
imposing student numbers, and forcing the university to focus on private 
economic concerns. Additionally, the private rights and privileges of university 
corporations are narrower than those in the public sector, or those traditionally 
associated with statutory corporations.  In the case of the university this is 
specifically the monopoly on the granting of degrees and the exclusive use of the 
title “university.”  These privileges under Gillard, may be rescinded if the 
Bradley review recommendations on these issues are implemented.  
 
In sum, a legal analysis of the university corporation is coherent with the 
institutional and organisational norms which are public good and normatively 
order knowledge in first place.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The disciplines of sociology, economics, politics and law have been called upon 
to shed light on the nature of the university organisation—i.e. the regulated 
object or target. The university is a unique organisation, focused on public good 
and knowledge norms.  It is not simply a specific instance of a generic 
organisation.  It has been organised legally through the corporate form, and 
indeed, it is the original corporate form for the western world.793 As a 
corporation the university is a collective organized around the objectives noted 
above and institutionalised by the law.  These objects have been predominantly 
some form of the public good. While the incidents of incorporation have changed 
over time, the hallmark of allowing the collective identity to remain while 
specific membership changes, and bringing together resources to pursue agreed 
upon objects continues to stand.  Over time the mechanisms of control have 
changed and identifying, understanding and aligning them is one of the major 
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challenges of contemporary corporate law generally and an issue in the legal 
regulation and control of the university specifically. 
 
While certain aspects of the legal form of the university have undergone a 
metamorphosis over the centuries from legal recognition of a collective 
endeavour of foreigners to seek protection from abuse by citizens by creating a 
universitas to today’s statutory Australian corporation the underlying objects and 
normative ordering have remained stable.  The discussion has established the 
university in Australia as a state-enabled but independent corporation, a 
charitiable corporation,794 with a complex web accountabilities, internal 
constituencies and external stakeholders.795  It can be characterized as a public 
enterprise subject to the constraints of regulators and in the current political 
climate, the quasi-market established for it.796  
 
The current effort to transform the university by shifting its organisational norms 
toward those consistent with private for profit organisational norms, in part by 
changing its structures to mimic those of a for profit corporation poses significant 
problems. These include the difficult and conflicting roles placed on academics 
as members of a professional organisation versus their roles as employees of a 
for profit firm engaged in knowledge production and dissemination. This 
problem is exacerbated even more for senior academics who have taken on 
management roles. Under NPM models, they are to be business leaders driving 
economic norms, but as university leaders they are required to pursue knowledge 
norms.  
 
From a coherence perspective the organisation which has developed organically 
is well suited to its public role, non-profit aims, creation and dissemination of 
knowledge and housing the academic profession.  Law has supported this 
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organisational form and institutionalised it through the creation of the university 
corporation. It is unclear how the university organisation under the current 
economic imperatives with an organisational structure which privileges 
management as a management centric organisation which denies the academic 
profession can survive. As Burton Clark identified in his work, successful 
universities in the current climate need a “stimulated heartland.”  While the 
university corporation’s traditional structures made that heartland sacrosanct, it is 
not evident that the policy and regulatory changes from Dawkins forward have 
been attuned to this imperative. Essentially, they lead to the McDonaldisation, 
audit regime and generic management approaches of NPM which this chapter has 
argued are clearly incoherent with the traditional organisation and its norms.  
 
As with the argument of Chapter 5 addressing the institution of the universtiy, it 
is argued in this chapter that there is no golden age to which the university 
organisation could return.  Indeed, the organisation  needs to be attuned to its 
rapidly changing environment—policy, law, social and economic—and  it may 
be suggested that good regulation facilitates the adaptation. For the university 
organisation to survive as a university, however, certain critical organisational 
features need to remain in place. These include a prioritising of knowledge 
norms, being organised and operating as a non-profit organisation and sustaining 
the academic profession as a profession exercising discretion.  Regulation which 
fails to foster these critical features in an organisational structure is incoherent 
with the regulatory objectives and fails to address the organising problem.  
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CHAPTER 7: ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 
 
1. Introduction  
This chapter provides an analysis of the coherence of the regulation at systemic, 
policy and instrumental levels as well as at institutional-organisational and 
accountability levels.  The analysis includes an examination of the coherence of 
organising problem norms and policy, coherence between the technical aspects of 
the regulation, regulators and targets, tools and instruments and finally a 
coherence analysis of accountability.  Each section—systemic, policy, 
instrument, institutional-organisational and accountability—provides a discrete 
analysis of the coherence.  
 
2. Systemic Coherence 
Systemic coherence, as explained in Chapter 2, occurs where “the underlying 
social need for regulation coalesces… with the normative policy objectives.”797   
This section examines systemic coherence by analysing the organising problem 
its norms and analyses the coherence with policy norms.  It commences by 
examining the coherence of the group of problems collected together as an 
organising problem and assigned as such to the university.  It then examines the 
norms derived from the analysis of the organising problem and those of the 
policy response to identify and evaluate coherence.  
 
a. Organising Problems and Organising Norms 
As explained in Chapter 2, the first issue in regulation is the identification of an 
organising problem—an issue which has been identified as call for a response.  A 
regulatory response is a response to an organising problem in the first place.  As 
advanced by Feaver and Durrant, discussed in Chapter 2, there must be 
coherence between the solution and the problem.  
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In the case of the university, it has been argued through Chapter 5’s critical 
survey, and the examination and analysis of the historical institutional missions 
of the university, that the basic organising problem concerns the creation, 
transmission and preservation of knowledge.  This argument was carried forward 
in Chapter 6 by the survey, examination and analysis of university organisations 
which again were organised around knowledge norms.  This organising problem, 
however, does not arise in a social vacuum.  
 
The basic organising problem, as argued in Chapter 4, stems from the knowledge 
problems of living in a non-traditional society.  That is, whereas in a traditional 
society the knowledge necessary to keep society functioning can be passed on 
without public bureaucratic structures, in contemporary non-traditional societies 
both the amount and the types of knowledge needed for social functioning have 
increased exponentially.  At the same time, contemporary non-traditional 
societies have seen declines in the traditional institutional mechanisms for 
knowledge transfer.  Finally, in contemporary non-traditional societies increasing 
numbers of peoples and cultures are coming into contact creating, sharing, 
dependent upon and required to maintain a complex society and a nation-state in 
a competitive international, globalised environment.  This latter increased contact 
and complexity creates a greater need for even more knowledge to allow the 
effective coordination necessary for society to function. 
 
At the core of this complex of problems is a three-fold knowledge problem: first, 
without traditional systems of intergenerational knowledge transfer, the potential 
for the loss of knowledge over time is multiplied.  The costs of such loss of 
knowledge, whether it be something like the loss of languages and the 
knowledge they encode in contemporary society798 or the loss of technologies in 
past eras—such as the rejection of farming technologies by Australian 
aboriginals799—are most difficult to identify. Further, the increasing types of 
knowledge needed to sustain such a complex society inhibits the potential of 
adequate levels of random, local preservation and transmission to meet the needs 
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of society. Finally, the lack of common cultural understandings about how things 
are done, what knowledge is needed, available, desirable to be preserved, 
developed and transmitted, places an imperative on government to ensure that the 
knowledge which sustains a particular society be protected, enhanced and 
disseminated.  This problem is the one to which the university institution and 
university organisations have responded.   
Additionally, however, politicians have placed a variety of other tasks on the 
university.  These additional organising problems as framed by Australian 
politicians have been identified and examined in the Chapter 3 policy survey, and 
in Chapter 5 examining the historical, social and political institutional missions.  
They include the political and economic goals of “nation building”, “enabling 
citizens” and “globalisation.” This broad range of problems needs to be brought 
together or characterised before it can be examined and analysed for coherence. 
The next section characterises the organising problem.  
 
i. Characterising the Organising Problem 
Returning to thinking about the organising problem, consideration of the 
categories identified in Chapter 2 is necessary.  In that Chapter, organising 
problems were characterised as one of three types: a general societal problem, an 
opportunity or a risk. The organising problem identified by politicians in the case 
of the university is all three types; however as argued here, it is in the first 
instance a type of risk.  The creation, maintenance and dissemination of 
necessary knowledge is at risk of loss because of the inadequacies of non-
traditional knowledge transfer institutions.  
 
Characterising something as a risk requires further refinement and a brief re-
iteration of the risk discussion of Chapter 2.  In the case at hand, the risk of 
knowledge loss is a socially created risk—i.e. a risk that, unlike a risk coming 
from the natural environment, is a consequence of living in a society. A further 
refining characteristic of the risk is that it is imposed as opposed to voluntarily 
adopted.  For example, risks such as car accidents may be adopted or avoided 
depending on choices of movement and means of transportation, whereas other 
risks are imposed, such as the adverse consequences of exposure to nuclear 
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power or other pollutants.  A final aspect of characterising risk is its collective or 
individual nature.  A risk may be either a collective risk or an individual or some 
combination of the two.  With respect to the risk of knowledge loss the problem 
which the university must address, the risk can be characterised as a social, 
imposed, collective risk.  Such a risk is certainly a public or collective risk. It 
cannot be addressed solely by individuals and requires resources beyond the 
reach of the individual in terms of time, ability and expense.  A society’s 
knowledge is a collective matter by definition, and so the organising problem is, 
as argued first and foremost a public risk, socially, collectively imposed. Further, 
given the dependency of advanced societies on knowledge, and which the lack of 
non-traditional means of intergenerational knowledge transfer, and given the 
extreme cost if the risks were to eventuate, an advanced society cannot afford the 
risk.   
 
This analysis of the character of the problem as a type of risk leads to the 
regulatory question: can and should the risk be regulated?  The affirmative 
answer seems uncontroversial for all but a few public choice theorists. So, it is 
argued, there is strong support for a response to these risks by way of regulatory 
intervention. That leaves two further related questions: When and how should the 
intervention be designed?  
 
The risk of loss of knowledge is difficult to identify and quantify, and difficult to 
address.  There are a variety of reasons for these difficulties and they are briefly 
discussed next. The risk is difficult to deal with because it is not something likely 
to happen in the form of a single catastrophic event. Where a society faces the 
loss of an important public asset in a single catastrophic event it is easy to 
identify, consolidate political will and rally the public to demand an 
appropriately focused regulatory response.  The problem is that societies lose 
their knowledge incrementally with little awareness of the loss or its potential 
consequences.800  As a result the problem of the loss of knowledge is difficult to 
identify, difficult to call sufficient political attention to and so difficult to 
prevent.  Further, such losses are difficult to quantify as knowledge and its value 
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are at the same time both contextual and absolute and the value dimensions of 
both contextual and absolute knowledge are both multiple and dynamic.  
 
In terms of addressing risk, as argued in Chapter 2 there are three main 
regulatory options. These are: avoiding the causes, mitigating the effect, and 
creating resilience.  Of the three, in the case at hand it is argued here that the loss 
of knowledge is best avoided.  Neither mitigating the effect nor creating 
resilience to knowledge loss make much sense when the option of avoiding it in 
the first instance is a viable option.  To avoid the risk of knowledge loss may 
lead to some suggestion that a warning system be designed as in many other 
cases of risk.  A warning system, however, would be difficult to develop and 
keep in place for the reasons just set out.  Not only is knowledge changing and 
contestable—as argued in Chapter 5 and in some detail below—but it is also 
dynamic and held by individuals and so subject to escape and dissipation.  
Accordingly, rather than a warning system, an institution dedicated to 
maintenance of knowledge seems to be best. This framing of the organising 
problem creates potential for a coherent problem which can be addressed by a 
regulatory response.  
 
More broadly considered, however, the organising problem to which the 
university is a response is not only a risk. That is the organising problem centred 
on knowledge not only addresses risk, but also creates opportunities and 
challenges. As discussed, knowledge about advanced societies’ systems 
including its knowledge system, presents problems not only in terms of its 
creation, management (preservation) and dissemination but simultaneously 
creates opportunities through its recombination. 
 
All human endeavour has problems requiring on-going research. Complex 
contemporary society not only benefits but will enhance its ability to survive in 
part based on its ability to research solutions to the problems it encounters.  
Given that the knowledge outcomes and their benefit cannot be determined 
beforehand, the allocation of knowledge rights and duties to the public sector 
may be a good first decision for the public problem and opportunities associated 
with knowledge. (Subsequent assignment to the private sector is possible should 
 314 
it become appropriate.)  The assignment of knowledge to the public side of the 
public-private divide it is argued can be logically deduced to be coherent with the 
public norm arising from the previously discussed public nature of the risk.  
 
Both the risk faced and the potential opportunity that arises from the creation, 
preservation and transmission of knowledge provide the foundation for a strong 
argument for regulatory intervention.  There are significant risks where a limited 
view of knowledge constrains the regulatory response and the risks of following 
partisan interests, invoking environemntal law’s precautionary principle801 or 
best response. In the case at hand, the avoidance of the risk of knowledge loss 
would lead to the suggestion that guarding against the loss of knowledge should 
be the primary consideration and should be left to disinterested parties. 
Disinterested parties would be  those whose normative ordering centres around 
knowledge rather than political, economic or other power related norms.  
 
ii. Systemic Norms 
The organising problem as set out above provides a normative foundation for the 
analysis in a number of ways.  First, it sets a significant group of norms around 
knowledge.  That is, the creation, preservation and dissemination of knowledge 
are the critical normative issues.  This knowledge forms the foundation for the 
maintenance of a contemporary, complex, cosmopolitan, multicultural society. 
Given the nature of this society, a strong argument has been made for a broad 
view of knowledge.  A knowledge confined to certain types of commercially 
exploitable knowledge and which are currently relevant in the job market will 
miss not only a wide swathe of human knowledge, but is also likely to miss many 
of the important knowledges—such as knowledge about government systems, or 
the knowledge contained in dying languages, or the non-economic consequences 
of media concentration—that that allow this society to function.  
 
Further given that the organising problem is a type of risk that is best 
characterised as social, imposed and collective, the organising problem falls 
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primarily and in the first instance, on the public side of the public-private 
spectrum.  As noted, however, knowledge creates not only risks, but also 
opportunities—which themselves may further the important objective of social 
survival.  This view of public knowledge based norms reifies the public 
normative foundation for the organising problem. In sum, the organising problem 
so described creates a normatively coherent problem.  Further, it allows the 
creation of a coherent set of norms.  These are encapsulated as follows: the 
paramount task for government is a regulatory response which secures the 
public knowledge necessary to allow a complex knowledge based society to 
operate and sustain itself.   
 
Taking the analysis of the organising problem and organising norms further as 
well as specifically analysing them in the Australian context, there are additional 
concerns to be identified and addressed particularly within the context of the 
regulatory framework. As mentioned above the first organising problem to which 
the university is a regulatory response—the creation, preservation and 
dissemination of knowledge—has two significant dimensions.  These dimensions 
are epistemological and sociological and both have normative implications.   
 
The epistemological dimensions as argued in Chapter 5, are about the nature of 
knowledge and its value on the one hand, and the sociological discussion 
concerns the role of knowledge in society and its dissemination on the other.  
Addressing the epistemological issues, first, it must be asked: what is 
knowledge?  It was argued that if knowledge is no more than another 
commodity, it can and should be protected by private property law and addressed 
as other commodities—bought and sold in a market. If, however, knowledge is 
something more than a commodity exclusively for the satisfaction of individual 
private preferences, i.e. something with special significance to human society 
collectively then there is an interest in it which justifies public intervention. 
While post-modernity may well challenge many aspects of traditional views of 
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knowledge, it does not undermine the value claims of knowledge broadly 
conceived to which the dissertation next turns.802  
 
The question of the value of knowledge is whether knowledge is a value to be 
pursued in its own right or only to be valued as instrumental. While philosophers 
will not agree on the former, politicians and economists at least are likely to find 
common ground in the latter view.  In terms of Australian higher education 
policy knowledge has instrumental value and  is valued to the extent that it has 
exchange value, is able to achieve political support or create other commodities.  
Thus it is not clear that any social or political consensus exists for the pursuit of 
knowledge as a value in its own right (in contrast, for example, to  norms 
concerning preservation of the natural environment or economic growth).  
Further, in terms of normative or lexical ordering, it would appear that 
knowledge as an intrinsic value falls below other instrumental values such as 
economic growth—at least anecdotally (the actual normative ordering is an area 
for further empirical research).  As such, it is difficult to place knowledge into a 
single normative sphere easily suited to a single, lexical normative ordering.  
 
For the university this lack of epistemological answers and related lack of 
philosophical agreement, as noted in Chapter 5, make it difficult to advance 
claims in support of the independent pursuit of knowledge. Rather, the university 
is bound by and limited to its philosophical and political environment.  Without 
such epistemological foundations, the university is subject to the agendas and 
prescriptions put forward by the pragmatic politicians. From a regulatory 
standpoint, knowledge, although properly a public good based on public needs, 
can be conceived as a narrower private good and so presents some justification 
for assignment to the private side of the divide. This discussion of the nature and 
susceptibility to political interference and economic shaping of epistemic issues 
and values leaves the decisions about what knowledge is to be created, preserved 
and disseminated open to considerable, self-interested political manipulation.  
Knowledge to be created, preserved and transmitted may be only that knowledge 
which is agreeable to powerful political and economic interests.  
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The counterargument, whereby the university’s knowledge stands as an absolute 
value, sees the university as having a special contribution. Accordingly, the 
argument consideration of which knowledge is to be created, preserved and 
transmitted depends on prior decisions about the nature of knowledge.  It may 
involve a quest for: truth, basic laws of universal structures and processes, or it 
may be transient, temporal knowledge with little permanent value—a knowledge 
dependent on such things as specific projects, job markets, or marketing.. 
Alternatively, the knowledge may be what is needed by citizens in a complex 
democratically governed society to participate effectively and act as humans in a 
collective social arrangement, or it may be the knowledge needed to amass a 
private fortune. 
 
While abstract, these questions about knowledge are critical for purposes both of 
assignment of knowledge on the public-private divide as well as related issue of 
normative or lexical ordering. The two questions of what knowledge is to be the 
province of governmental concern and what values are to be placed on it—i.e. 
the form of the organising problem addressed by university regulation needs to 
be clear. While these discussions are certainly matters of fierce debate in many 
forums within and external to the university, they underpin a strong argument for 
a university dedicated to knowledge broadly conceived.  The highly contested 
nature of these epistemic issues militates against an early policy decision to limit 
the scope and nature of knowledge to what is immediately useful or fashionable 
among the day’s employers.  This part of the discussion lends support to the 
earlier conclusion that it is public knowledge, broadly defined which is to be the 
core.  
 
The sociological aspect of the organising problem—concerning the nature and 
role of knowledge in society—also needs to be considered.  If one uses survival 
of society as the organising problem, not only are decisions needed concerning 
which knowledge is necessary to survive, as well as how it should be created, 
preserved or transmitted, but also decisions are needed on the related issues of 
how it should be transmitted by whom and on what conditions (e.g. economic, 
geographic or social).  These issues also bear important regulatory implications.  
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Depending on how they are cast and decided, these decisions feed into the other 
normative policy objects for the university such as equity and accessibility.  
 
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, these knowledge issues are directly 
connected to the organising problem as well as supplementary organising 
problems arising from politically and economically associated socio-political 
problems to which the discussion turns next.   
 
b. Supplementary Organising Problems 
Although a single organising problem has been identified—securing public 
knowledge for a complex society—there are in fact four sets of organising 
problems to which politicians have responded using the university.  Further, of 
the four, only two are explicitly addressed by the regulatory framework. It has 
been argued in the Chapter 3 review of Australian university policy and the 
Chapter 5 survey of Australian university missions, that the Australian university 
currently addresses the following four organising problems:  first the already 
discussed traditional problems of creating, preserving and disseminating 
knowledge.  These traditional problems are addressed through research, 
scholarship and education, and are addressed by the regulatory framework.  
Second, the sorting and credentialing problem which is addressed through the 
course of study arranged by the university and the granting of a degree to 
successful candidates is also included in the regulatory framework.  The third is 
the holding of underemployed youth.  This problem, although addressed by 
making available physical facilities, infrastructure and time consuming programs 
offered by the university, is not mentioned in the Australian regulatory 
framework.  The fourth problem  forms a large part of the discussion: it is the 
politico-economic problems of nation building and global competitiveness.  
 
As argued in Chapter 5, the need to have people sorted and credentialed is a basic 
organising problem for all human society. Humans live collectively and in some 
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cultures tend toward hierarchical forms of organising.803  The issue for these 
cultures then is the basis of those hierarchies.  In the complex western societies 
that include Australia one such hierarchy is based on educational achievement. 
This organising problem of sorting and locating people on a knowledge based 
hierarchy is coherent.  That is, the sorting and credentialing functions are 
complementary, and further, these functions operate on a coherent norm related 
to knowledge. Thus far the sorting and credentialing problem is coherent with the 
larger organising problem assigned to the university.  
 
It must be noted, however, that these tasks are not wholly coherent with the 
university where the university is driven by economic norms.  Where the 
university is driven by economic norms, the sorting and credentialing functions 
are carried out not on the basis of knowledge norms but on economic norms.  
The acquisition of degrees on economic norms is a corruption of the knowledge 
norms, a problem recognised in the medieval era and addressed by the non-profit 
institutional and organisation structures and norms as argued in Chapters 5 and 6 
respectively.  While knowledge and credentialing are related, the creation and 
preservation of knowledge neither requires nor is necessarily related to the 
formal sorting or credentialing of people.    While knowledge created by 
credentialed people may be more likely to achieve authoritative status, there are 
certainly many types of knowledge that are created and preserved by people 
without credentials.  For example, indigenous Australians pass on knowledge and 
sort people without the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. It may be more 
efficient to keep knowledge and knowledgeable, credentialed people in one 
place, and this efficiency argument may provide a justification for the creation of 
an institution designed for those purposes.  The institution that results may be the 
best way to tie together the creation, preservation and dissemination problems, as 
well as the credentialing problem.  It does not follow from this economic 
argument, however, that knowledge functions must co-exist with sorting and 
credentialing functions. For these to co-exist additional institutional normative 
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support would be called for—as exists in the university institution where the two 
are deeply, normatively and pragmatically linked.   
 
The sorting function, while as noted traditionally belonging to secondary 
education, has become a matter of higher education.  The imposition of this 
function onto higher education would appear to impair the higher education 
function.  That is, the failure to restrict admission to sorted, suitably qualified 
students lessens the ability of the higher education organisation to limit its focus 
on dissemination to suitably able students as students must have learning skills 
developed before they are able to take up the higher knowledge.  The dedication 
of resources to the basic sorting task may take those resources from the higher 
education dissemination tasks. The transfer of admission decisions from 
academic profession to economic agents in Australia by organisations such as 
IDR, has had a negative effect.804 
 
Turning to the third organising problem, the holding of unemployed youth 
(keeping jobless youth occupied out of the labour market) it appears to be 
incoherent with the challenges associated with knowledge problems.  While it 
might appear that putting young minds in line to receive knowledge available for 
dissemination is logical, the lack of interest and/or ability on the part of those 
youth may in many instances be not only an insurmountable obstacle to them but 
also a hindrance to the operation of university organisations and those students 
who are trying to acquire that knowledge.  If numbers of unemployed youth by 
neither ability nor orientation are inclined to higher education, placing them in 
university and placing this holding task on the university introduces a further 
incoherence into the knowledge problem and the university response.  
 
The fourth complex of problems which Australian politicians have deemed to be 
part of the organising problem are the socio-political and economic problems of 
nation building and economic competitiveness.  Why politicians identified nation 
building as a problem suitable to resolution by the university is not clear.  
Perhaps it was the idea that social capital would be increased and so the sense of 
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community through participation in a communal endeavour such as university 
education would help solve this problem.  It may be as Mansbridge identified,805 
the nation would be built from the public good as a product of a discursive 
process, the creation, challenge and refinement of an idea—a process not 
inimical to the university.   
 
The economic problem is less easily aligned with the university’s knowledge 
norms. Economic growth occurs just as easily from the exploitation of raw 
materials as from the development or exploitation of humans. As argued in 
Chapter 3, Dawkins viewed the university as an industry the purpose of which 
was to train employees, generate foreign revenues from export, and 
commercialisable research. This view reflects a lexical or normative ordering in 
conflict with the university’s institutional normative ordering.806  Further, 
Dawkins’ decision to under-resource the university in order to force it to generate 
its own revenues807 is remarkable in the incoherence it introduced with respect to 
the knowledge norm of the institution which sees knowledge as having intrinsic 
value regardless of its instrumental value, particularly in contrast to knowledge’s 
utility and exchange values. 808  Dawkins’ decision to introduce revenue 
generating norms to the university was an effort to displace institutional norms 
which gave the institution its existence beyond the reach of the market and not 
focused on economic productivity. Perhaps more importantly, Dawkins saw that 
the university was beyond the reach of government and hence “unaccountable”—
a matter which was a major focus of NPM. 
 
The socio-economic problem of an inadequately skilled workforce, identified 
under the Howard government, is an organising problem removed from the 
institutional norms of the university.   Construing training of individuals for 
participation in the job market pursuing private economic and social ends as a 
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significant component of the organising problem is incoherent with the 
disinterested pursuit and dissemination of knowledge as a public good.  While 
job readiness may be an outcome of university education, particularly in the 
professional schools, the effort to revise the university’s normative ordering to 
make training of the workforce the first priority is a source of significant 
incoherence. 
 
Finally, the problems of lack of equity and social mobility have also identified as 
part of the organising problem to be assigned to the university.  While these 
problems may be partly coherent with the university as public good, their 
existence or occurrence is more a desirable externality than a core component of 
the organising problem.  Simply put, the role of knowledge in society gives its 
holders the power and access to positions of power809 and provides one means of 
lifting one’s socio-economic status. Accordingly, opportunity to achieve these 
ends may well lie in access to the knowledge and credentialing resulting from 
university education.810 The resolution of these two organising problems of 
training and equity does not lie beyond the boundaries of the university; 
however, they are tangential and to make them a main or focal point for the 
organising problem to which the university institution is a response is another 
matter.  
 
In summary, connecting all these socio-econo-politico problems and the 
knowledge norms of the university is problematic.  In the first instance, the 
organising problems do not form a coherent whole within themselves— neither 
normatively, nor socially, economically, or politically. This group of organising 
problems covers too broad a range—problems which are inherent in collective 
co-existence in a complex, multi-cultural, democratically governed society.  Such 
a broad mandate even if coherent would seem likely to overwhelm any single 
institution.  
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Further, there is little coherence on the one hand between them and whatever 
common normative foundation they may have and on the other, the university 
institution’s normative foundation.  The only thing that does become clear 
through this discussion of the organising problem is a common thread centred on 
knowledge.  Accordingly, it is argued that the better view prefers knowledge 
norms as holding first preference in the lexical ordering.  In terms of evaluating 
the risk, it has been argued earlier that the risk of loss of the knowledge which 
allows society to function, including knowledge about governance, environment, 
social, political and economic systems is a serious risk.  The social subsystem 
dedicated to knowledge creation, preservation, dissemination is too important to 
risk systemic failure and the consequent dissipation of knowledge to occur. 
While the role of economics cannot be ignored, it cannot be allowed to re-direct 
the institution or its knowledge. 
 
Further, it is clear that the organising problem cannot be addressed by a narrow 
defintion of knowledge.  From this understanding of the organising problem it 
can be concluded that knowledge must be both widely construed and widely 
disseminated.  These two conclusions both follow from and create a coherent 
norm for a foundation of the organising problem around knowledge and 
knowledge as a public good.   
 
c. Normative policy response: regulatory theory and the public-
private assignment 
This section connects the foregoing normative discussion with regulatory theory.  
It answers the question of how the regulatory response is to be connected to the 
organising problem.   
 
As argued in the Chapter 4 discussion of market failure, markets alone cannot be 
relied on to respond to society’s knowledge needs.  Market failure occurs in the 
production and distribution of the public goods such as the knowledge of the 
university. Further there is debate about whether knowledge held by the 
university, and the academic profession in particular should be classified as 
public or private and accordingly assigned to one side or the other of the public-
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private divide.  This issue of classification has been addressed in Chapter 4 
where it was argued that the university belongs more on the public side, in part 
because its knowledge is a critical, foundational public good.  Further as argued 
in Chapter 5, the knowledge of the university is better understood as knowledge 
not limited to specific applications or projects, but knowledge more broadly 
construed. Accordingly, the better argument is placing this public good in a 
sphere other than the market.   
 
As market failure is one generally accepted justification for regulatory 
intervention, and the knowledge goods forming the organising problem are 
public goods, a market failure in this area suggests some regulatory response is 
justified.  It does not, however, identify the type of regulatory response that will 
address the market failure.  As argued in Chapter 4 and elsewhere, it is clear that 
there are many significant non-economic goods unsuited to markets derived from 
the university which also support the conclusion that a regulatory response by 
government is appropriate; however, these arguments fail to indicate what 
response is appropriate.  
 
It is clear that there are large, significant—albeit hard to measure—public goods 
to be derived from the university. That is, from an economic point of view there 
are externalities that cannot be captured by either producers or consumers.  From 
a socio-political perspective the larger benefits of an educated population are too 
important to put at risk and subordinate to the financial interests of markets. 
Further, given the increasing importance of knowledge to the economy, 
multiculturalism and general complexity of society, a better educated population 
is likely a key factor to the successful maintenance of society. These perspectives 
would suggest that a public interest justification of regulating the university is 
coherent with the norms identified as flowing from the organising problem. This 
coherence, however, is not the total coherence as consideration of the private 
perspective makes evident.  
 
A private interest theory perspective identifies the evidently significant private 
economic benefits from the university. Ab initio, the focus on these private goods 
would suggest that a private regulatory response would be most coherent.  
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Individuals obtaining university education generally have greater individual 
economic returns and social status than those not attending. Accordingly, 
examination of these significant, lifelong benefits would lead to suggestions that 
assignment to the private side is more coherent. 
 
There are, however, a number of problems with such an assignment. The first 
issue is that a university does more than disseminate knowledge.811 It also creates 
and preserves knowledge.  Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 5, the nature of 
the knowledge of the university is not only applied technical knowledge suitable 
for private economic uses.  Other non-economic public uses are important and it 
has been argued, paramount—an argument that supports the public normative 
ordering.  In addition, a private interest perspective fails to capture the systemic, 
collective, imposed nature of the risk. While private benefits may justify passing 
on some of the costs of these goods to the individual beneficiaries, it does not 
amount to a justification for displacing the public interest theory, particularly 
given the acknowledged market failure in the supply of public goods generally 
and higher education specifically, and given the significance of the vast public 
good.  Finally the worry of private interest theories free-riding and unrecovered 
private economic benefits do not outweigh the risks related to failure of on-going 
creation, preservation and transmission of knowledge. In other words, the public 
interest theories of regulation outweigh the concerns of private interest theorists 
and as such are more coherent with the public nature of the organising problem.  
 
The foregoing analysis of coherence applied in the higher education and 
university contexts leads to the coherence analysis of the assignment of higher 
education and the university on the public-private divide. While the argument has 
been made that higher education and the university should be on the public side 
of the public-private divide, the regulatory implications of the assignment are not 
clear.  That is, it has not been argued whether it means the state should provide or 
merely fund the provision of higher education for its citizens. That argument can 
be constructed from the analyses of  Chapters 5 and 6 which included a 
discussion of the nature of the university institution and organisation respectively 
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from a variety of perspectives including the economic.  It was clear from those 
discussions that the university’s foundational norms are non-economic and that 
the university organisation functions best when in a non-profit organisational 
model. That is, the trust in its credential, in the advice it provides to students (the 
matter of information asymmetries) trust in its knowledge and the quality of the 
education make a strong case for public provision, not just funding.  Further, 
traditionally the university has been a public, non-profit institution.812 That is, it 
has coalesced with the public, non-profit policy objects placed on it by 
authorities both secular and religious. The regulatory justifications have 
coincided with the assignment of the university to the public, non-profit side of 
the public-private divide.  Thus from a coherence perspective, the norms of 
regulation and the public assignment traditionally coincide, and to the extent that 
one believes in evolutionary theories of path dependent institutional 
development, its evolution along these lines suggest that it has been a successful 
adaptation.813 
 
The regulatory framework which requires the university to re-order its norms in 
order to focus on generating their own revenue effectively produces a normative 
ordering that prioritises private economic policy objects.814 These changes by 
Australian governments have created an incoherence with the norms of the 
institutional organising problem as well as the traditions embedded in the 
regulatory response. This incoherence has significant justificatory implications. 
If private economic preferences obtain normative priority the justification for a 
publicly funded institution fails on two counts. First, from a neoliberal 
perspective the private sector can provide private goods more efficiently and to 
provide them publicly deprives private enterprise from economic opportunity. 
And secondly, from a private interest theory perspective, public provision or 
funding amounts to little more than a subsidy to the socio-economically 
privileged who make up the majority of the university population in the first 
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place—welfare for the middle class. To make the regulation coherent with 
private theories of regulation a different regulatory response is called for.  If the 
regulatory justification is premised on the advancement of private economic and 
social interests, then the regulatory intervention should be simply the creation of 
regulation suited to enhancing private law rights—private property, including 
intellectual property, and contracts, and coordination by way of markets.   
 
d. Conclusion  
In conclusion, a systemic coherence analysis reveals that the organising problem 
in the first instance is coherent.  That is, the problem of the creation, preservation 
and dissemination of knowledge is a coherent organising problem.  The 
additional organising problems of sorting and credentialing, potentially introduce 
some incoherence, although not necessarily so.  It is not that the university needs 
to do only one thing, and indeed it does not do so as the various missions 
discussed in Chapter 5’s institutional analysis demonstrates.  Various approaches 
to university education have been taken over time and met with varying levels of 
success.  For example, some countries have focused on undergraduate education, 
others on research and yet others on public service.815  However, a basic 
determination needs to be made as to the objects of the university and the 
normative ordering of those objects.  For systemic coherence to exist that 
ordering must be coherent with the university’s assignment on the public-private 
divide, and as will be argued, institutionally.  
 
The issue of systemic coherence becomes problematic, however, when the tasks 
of holding unemployed youth, skilling the workforce, social equity, generating 
revenues from export, nation building and global competitiveness are added. At 
this point the incoherence of the organising problem threatens to overwhelm the 
system.  
Simply put, knowledge norms do not coincide with and are incoherent with other 
aspects of the organising problems such as holding youth, or training of labourers 
(as distinguished from education). Further, the broad dissemination and equity 
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agendas are in conflict with the normative re-ordering under the current 
regulatory framework. The regulatory framework requires university 
organisations to prioritise economic norms of revenue generation and production 
of private economic goods and leads to distributions on the basis of economic 
means. Finally, the equity and accessibility norms are not wholly coherent within 
themselves nor with the knowledge norms of the university. Given the systemic, 
collective and imposed nature of the risk, the available subsystems and 
justificatory options, it is clear that private subsystems and justificatory options 
are incoherent with and unsuited to the organising problem’s systemic, 
collective, imposed demand.  That demand requires a public systemic response.   
 
3. Policy Coherence 
Policy coherence as defined in Chapter 2 has both internal and external facets.  
Internally it refers to an alignment of norms driving policy with the choice of 
regulatory techniques as found in the legal instruments.  Externally, it refers to a 
consistent approach to regulation of similar categories of issues, as well as 
consistency across categories where related but distinct objectives are being 
pursued. The analysis in this section will make it evident that the incoherence of 
the organising problem compounded by the list of organising problems added by 
politicians as set out in the previous section, undermines the potential for policy 
coherence.  In other words, as a result of the contribution of the political process 
adding further incoherent missions, it is unclear which normative ordering is to 
prevail and ultimately the potential for a coherent foundation for policy is lost. 
The discussion which follows first turns to examine the coherence and normative 
debate in the policy framework.   
 
a. Policy coherence: norms  
That there exists serious incoherence in policy norms, given the incoherence at 
the systemic level, is unsurprising. The most serious policy incoherence is the 
inclusion of the fundamentally conflicting norms of the public and the private 
without clear assignment on the public-private divide and without clear, coherent 
lexical ordering between knowledge and economic norms. This lack of 
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assignment and lack of lexical ordering provides an incoherent basis for 
organising the knowledge tasks which the legislation must achieve.  
 
For example, whereas the public norms seek the widest dissemination, usually on 
the uneconomic basis of free or subsidised dissemination of disinterested or non-
partisan knowledge, and maximisation of production within given resource 
limitations, private norms operate on an opposite normative foundation. That is, 
the private disseminates on the basis of economic resources, and relies on 
maximisation of revenue and cost cutting without regard to long term or public 
welfare concerns. 816   
Another example of the difference between public and private norms relating to 
knowledge is evident in the objectives and mechanisms employed.  The private 
seeks to restrict creation, preservation and dissemination of knowledge.  It does 
so particularly through limiting access on the basis of economic and political 
power, and by way of intellectual property law among other means. The public 
knowledge norms see knowledge as a public good, made available through 
public libraries, public lectures, and most recently, the public internet.   
 
A third example of the difference between public and private knowledge norms 
comes from the epistemological discussion above.  Arguably private norms more 
easily foster partisan information—that is information which suits private 
purposes regardless of whether those purposes are contrary to public interests, as 
for example, with tobacco and automotive marketing. While public norms are 
clearly susceptible to manipulation by governments, a broad knowledge norm, 
allowing and fostering unrestricted knowledge investigation, and encouraging 
robust debate and critique such as found in the autonomous university institution 
are less susceptible.  
 
The drive to re-order the normative ordering to favour economic revenue 
generation may have impaired the university’s knowledge missions.  This 
impairment may occur because in the creation, preservation and dissemination 
missions, only limited amounts of research and teaching can generate significant 
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surplus revenues, and only a minimal amount can be generated by providing 
access to library services. Knowledge preservation and basic research, although 
critical missions for the institution, are not revenue generating activities.  Further, 
maintaining a cohort of academic professionals able to teach in the publicly 
important but less economically significant and less lucrative disciplines may be 
more likely to be a net loss than a net gain. Yet, it is clear that knowledge other 
than that which can generate a short term revenue surplus, i.e. profit, is critical to 
social survival. The creation and normative re-ordering to favour the revenue 
imperative at a policy level has introduced a source of regulatory incoherence at 
a foundational level in the university.  
Further, it must be noted that the lack of balance between intrinsic and 
instrumental values of knowledge has been problematic in Australia.817 Indeed, 
some lament that discussion of the Australian university takes place in:  
“the absence of any explicit belief by universities, government or 
academics that the role of the university is to foster the personal, moral 
and civic growth of undergraduates. Australian universities have, for the 
most part, been vocationally focused and students essentially pragmatic in 
their expectations, although there is a widely agreed notion that graduates 
should exhibit qualities associated with independent and lifelong 
learning.”818 
The lack of a clear assignment on the public-private divide and correlated 
conflict between knowledge and economics in terms of normative ordering leads 
to a predictable lack of balance between public good, basic research, and the 
creation of citizens on the one hand, and the production of commericalisable 
research and trained, employment ready labourers on the other. This lack of 
balance means that the ability to establish strong policy norms and coherence 
around knowledge or public goods, or alternatively around private educational 
goods is difficult to achieve.  
 
The situation leaves two candidates as the core policy norms: 1) private 
economic goods and significant revenue generation, with a narrow focus on 
generating revenue by the teaching of business and other applied subjects to 
international students, fee paying employment ready professional labourers, and 
on readily commercialisable applied research, or 2) public goods which are 
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provided on broad dissemination principles, for public purposes, and knowledge 
as an integral part of humanity.  While both have knowledge emphases, the 
difference between the two norms amounts to a chasm—particularly when 
juxtaposed and where there is neither coherent normative ordering nor 
assignment on the public-private divide.  The effort to combine the two norms in 
a single policy or for that matter within a single institution is evidently 
problematic. The further policy norms of equity, credentialing and holding in a 
mass education system complicate the already complex issues just raised. 
 
Undoubtedly, there is a desire on the part of all governments to create and 
support an institution based on knowledge norms. Further, while a variety of 
other meritorious policy objects such as economic competitiveness exist, their 
inclusion into university policy must be re-prioritised to establish sufficiently 
coherent policy norms for moving the analysis forward and for the creation of a 
foundation for the analysis of instruments which follows. It has been argued that 
the better and more coherent view is that the public interest and related public 
goods are to have normative preference over private interests and goods in the 
university and knowledge norms to take precedence over economic norms. 
Following from this argument, the analysis which follows proceeds from that 
position.  
 
b. Policy coherence: techniques  
Without coherent policy norms it is unlikely that internal policy coherence—i.e. 
coherence terms of techniques will exist—in either the internal and external 
dimensions.  The lack of policy coherence in terms of technique is evident in 
even a cursory examination of the legal instruments. Although as argued in the 
Chapter 6 examination of the State-based legislation which provides a broad 
public good objective and wide managerial discretion, the Federal legislation 
examined in Chapter 3 narrowly focuses on the various policy objectives 
including the conflicting missions and greatly restricts the scope of managerial 
discretion.  These policy objectives as argued in Chapter 5 and above are in 
conflict among themselves as well as with the state based legislation, and they 
are in conflict with the norms of the university institution.  
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These problems of internal policy incoherence reflect the larger lack of policy 
coherence in jurisdictional assignment.  That is, while there is reason to assign 
university regulation to one or another level of government, the bifurcated 
jurisdictional assignment makes coherent policy and legislative frameworks 
difficult.  The Constitution assigns partial responsibility for education to the 
Federal government making it responsible for the support of students while the 
states have jurisdiction over the creation of the university corporation, including 
its establishment and objects.  In such a situation the potential for incoherence is 
not only self-evident but additionally multiplies.  
 
It is not that one or the other government need have complete jurisdiction or that 
both do not have legitimate interests in the university institution or university 
organisations. Rather, the issue is that the weak and competing conceptions of 
the organising problem and of the university institution preclude the development 
of a clear policy foundation and so impairs the development of coherent 
regulation.  In essence, the way jurisdiction is divided providing the Federal 
government with jurisdiction over distribution of funds but being and unable to 
use any tools but financial incentive, while providing to the states jurisdiction 
over all other matters including programs, curriculum and organisations is a 
recipe for incoherence. This allocation facilitates additional incoherence 
particularly where governments have competing agendas.  
 
Further, the Federal instrument, the Higher Education Act 2003 (Cth), which 
imposes heavy student loads819 with decreased resources, while not explicitly 
prohibiting the non-revenue generating activities of basic research, knowledge 
preservation, and teaching of less popular courses, effectively precludes such 
autonomous university organisational normative ordering choices by placing 
university organisations in a condition of constant financial crisis. For example, a 
university not struggling financially could continue to support a significant 
philosophy department despite that department’s limited ability to generate 
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revenue.820  This condition of on-going crisis impairs the university’s ability to 
engage in these normatively preferable and epistemologically significant 
activities. The net result of this incoherence has been: a significant narrowing in 
the conception of knowledge, narrower range of values and a decline in quality 
of education.821  These changes have been necessary to accommodate as many 
revenue generating international students822 as possible in order to subsidise the 
university organisation’s operations and cross-subsidise the research activities.823 
 
Two further instruments the Commonwealth Grant Scheme and Other Grants 
inhibit management discretion and hence university innovation.  This result 
ensues because the instruments’ incentives which are paid as bonus for 
compliance are not funds in excess of basic operating needs. Rather, the 
incentives paid pursuant to these instruments provide only a partial make up for 
the shortfalls in basic funding.  In other words, instead of being incentives in the 
sense of payments for voluntary performance of those missions which a 
university organisation can internalise with minimal disruption, the incentives 
function as lifelines for organisations desperate for funds and eager to comply 
simply to achieve short term survival regardless of the costs of such compliance 
in terms of internal disruptions or long term incoherence.  If the competitive 
funds were provided as bonuses, they would allow university corporations to 
develop diversity, follow independent strategies, and adapt to local needs. 
Adequate funding would permit them to pursue knowledge norms as interpreted 
in response to both global and local institutional environments rather than the 
demands of the prevailing labour market.  However, government appears not to 
have taken this into consideration. 
 
While appearing to be competitive market type instruments, these instruments 
create a competition with few if any winners.  Fierce competition destroys the 
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earlier collaborative social norms of the institution.  Fierce competition 
encourages maximising individual’s potential for immediate success in surviving 
without regard to either collective institutional norms or long term survival.  
Such competitive strategies for gaining access to the precious resource are likely 
to include a debasing of standards, disinformation, collusion, or any other 
strategy likely to give advantage. It is questionable whether knowledge norms 
can surface let alone survive in such an environment.824 
 
The external instrumental coherence, that is the coherence with other similar 
regulatory regimes across other sections of government, is a broader matter for 
government’s overall policy on society generally, and not an issue addressed by 
this dissertation.  It is sufficient to note that the following bodies contribute to 
regulatory incoherence. In addition to Department of Education, Employment 
and Workplace Relations (DEEWR), the Federal government acts through 
AQUA, and the Australian Learning and Teaching Council.  Further the 
Ministerial Council for Education, Early Childhood Development and Youth 
Affairs (MCEECDYA) (formerly Ministerial Council on Education, 
Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA)) as a joint Federal and 
state council, with its Australian Qualifications Framework, allows the various 
Federal and state governments with their respective ministers for education, and 
subsidiary agencies such as Australian Education International to contribute to 
university regulation.  They do so by developing nation wide standards among 
other things.  Additionally the Federal government requires the university 
corporations to report directly to a number of Federal bodies including the 
Australian Tax Office, Centrelink, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 
Australian Research Council (ARC), National Health and Medical Research 
Council (NHMRC), Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency.  
All of this reporting facilitates objectives far from the policy objects of the 
university. The state governments require the university corporations as statutory 
corporations of the various states to report on performance among other things. 
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As well, there are statutory duties to report to organizations like Universities 
Australia and Graduate Careers Council of Australia.   
 
All these other bodies place demands on the university that force it to contribute 
to their various mandates supporting discrete policy objectives ranging from 
immigration compliance to identifying and prosecuting tax fraud. The costs 
associated with compliance with the legislation and support of these other policy 
objectives leads one to suggest that those objectives cast further incoherence into 
the already complicated policy coherence of the university.  
 
Finally one cannot turn from a discussion of policy coherence without 
identifying the inherent contradiction in the policy objective of successive 
governments which have sought to create diversity but insist on a single set of 
measures as set in the regulation.  For example, the diversity mandate requires all 
university organisations to compete in a single ranking, the Excellence in 
Research for Australia (ERA), using the same system of measures, incentives, 
and requires the same accountability in terms of outcomes. This approach does 
little more than institutionalise isomorphic tendencies driving university 
organisations away from diversity.825   
 
4. Instrumental Coherence 
 
This section investigates instrument coherence—discussed in Chapter 2 as 
coherence between positive instruments containing specific regulatory techniques 
and the social and normative drivers of policy. As argued in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, 
the university rests is in the first instance on the norms of knowledge as a public 
good.  Further, as argued it is the premier knowledge institution of an 
increasingly complex non-traditional society which lacks the traditional 
institutions for the creation, preservation and transmission of a society’s 
knowledge. Chapters 3 and 5 also identified normative drivers of policy only 
tangentially related to the university which were equity and economics.  The 
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instrumental coherence question then asks: are the positive instruments coherent 
with these norms?  
 
a. Analysis of Instruments 
 
The legislation is the Federal government’s Higher Education Act826 and the 
Other Grants legislative instruments827 and the various State Acts creating the 
various university corporations.  The social and normative foundation for the 
university as defined in in this legislation, as analysed in Chapters 3, 5 and 6, is 
the creation and preservation of knowledge broadly defined and wide 
dissemination of that knowledge viewed as a public good with such 
dissemination to occur on a non-economic basis.  Do these instruments reflect 
coherently these social and normative foundations? At a basic level, one would 
expect cooperation and collaboration to be the favoured foundational techniques 
to achieve these goals.  More creation, preservation and dissemination would 
seem to be a more likely outcome of cooperation than competition.  
 
The instruments, however, are competition-based instruments relying on 
economic incentives to drive university organisations achieve the aims.  The 
basic idea behind these instruments, as explained in Chapter 2, is that by creating 
competition government can allow organisations to adapt themselves to the 
competitive environment and government can avoid being burdened with the task 
of creating detailed rules.  Further, as market based instruments, in theory they 
alleviate the burden of accountability as markets are believed to perform that 
duty.828 Examining the instruments, including the National Protocols, it is 
evident that government is not taking advantage of the benefits of competitive 
instruments.  In fact, the level of detail in the control of the university 
organisations could appropriately be described as micro-management.829  
Further, given the onerous reporting requirements, it appears the government has 
little faith in the operation of markets to provide the accountability upon which 
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the instrument selection is based.  On the basis of these arrangements, it may be 
concluded that the instruments are incoherent within themselves.  That is, the 
government has created competition based instruments that fail to rely on the 
benefits of competition, and impose the burdens on government competition 
instruments are designed to avoid. 
 
Competition, while certainly a naturally occurring motivator among university 
organisations, has been a technique favoured by neoliberal governments.  
Governments have attempted to create, stimulate, monitor and direct competition 
in a variety of ways.  These efforts have been less than an unqualified success.  
In addition to requiring a significant investment in resources in order to comply 
with such competitive exercises, these schemes have also undermined the 
collaborative, public norms of knowledge that have been part of the university 
institution for most of its existence.  As a result of the competitive arrangements 
university corporations are increasingly entering into confidential, private 
commercial arrangements, and doing so competitively with one another. Not 
only do these overly competitive arrangements undermine the collaborative 
institutions, but they also harm the public good by depriving the public of one of 
the important social functions of the university—the non-partisan evaluation of 
knowledge claims put into the public sphere.  For example, drug companies may 
partner with and fund university research centres but bind and even attack 
university researchers who may find problems with the drug companies’ 
products.830 
 
In sum, the instruments are incoherent with the social and normative foundations. 
The competitive demands and structures put in place are at odds with the 
collaborative, public conceptions of knowledge called for in the foundations.  
This issue will be examined from a slightly different perspective in the section 
which follows. 
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b. Analysis of Technique: Regulatory Bodies 
 
The techniques of regulation include consideration of the use of regulatory 
bodies.  The main non-departmental regulatory body reporting to government is 
the Australian Universities Quality Agency or AUQA.  AUQA, a company 
limited by guarantee, operates as a standards regulator. As noted in Chapter 2, 
standards regulators typically can be categorised by their focus on one of three 
possible points: design/ process standards, performance/ output standards, and 
target standards.  AUQA is a standards regulator of the first type—examining 
quality processes and aimed toward organisational improvement.  By way of 
contrast, AUQA identifies processes that are deemed to ensure quality within the 
university, aiming at consistency across courses and programs in terms of 
delivery and overall standardisation. It is not an inter-university comparator or 
guarantor of educational quality. It is a management quality auditor.   
 
The drawbacks of this type of standards regulator are identified in the regulatory 
literature.  Such regulators are highly intrusive, may inhibit innovation, require 
the regulator to lead innovation, and of course suffer from the difficulties 
associated with predicting harms and other unintended consequences.831  
Although government seeks to create a competitive market this type of regulator 
is not a market regulator per se.  A market regulator would watch behaviours 
which undermine the functioning of a market. That is, a market regulator would 
monitor such things as false or misleading information, anti-competitive 
behaviour, collusion, and price gouging.  AUQA does not have this mandate or 
capacity—a matter which should be taken up in the consideration of the design 
of the new regulator TEQSA. 
 
The decision to task the university regulator with internal quality control is 
incoherent with market regulation in the first instance. To have the regulator 
focused on internal processes is incoherent with the basic premise of market 
regulation: market regulation operates on the presumption that organisations left 
to themselves will respond most efficiently to the market conditions in which 
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 339 
they find themselves.832  A market regulator ought to be focused on the market, 
not the participants.  AUQA is not designed to achieve the outcomes needed to 
be an effective market regulator.  Further, from the perspective of regulatory 
theory, such internal, process oriented regulators stifle the innovation necessary 
to create diversity in the higher education sector.  Thus from the regulatory 
perspective the decision to create such a regulator is incoherent with the 
organising problem and government policy.  The lack of coherence the objects of 
the regulation—i.e. the organising problem—is manifested again at this level.  
 
AUQA’s role is puzzling as there was no evidence that the university 
organisations were lacking in quality management and quality assurance 
processes.  What was clear was that there were quality of education issues 
resulting from underfunding.833 Perhaps the best explanation for AUQA’s 
mandate is that the Howard government carried on Dawkins’ view that the 
universities were bloated, inefficient organisations that could be improved with 
proper management834 and presumably responding to some form of external 
audit. Still, this explanation does not address the fundamental problems of 
knowledge creation, preservation and dissemination. The regulatory body 
addresses neither academic nor societal nor market concerns.   
 
The impact of AUQA on the university’s knowledge objects is less effective than 
it could have been835 and unlikely to be different in terms of improving depth of 
education, intensity of learning or research. What AUQA has achieved, however, 
is in line with Power’s predictions about the unintended consequences of audit.836  
As argued in Chapters 2 and 5 Power has argued that audit regimes shift attention 
from essential tasks which may be unmeasurable to the unessential, secondary 
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but auditable tasks.  As Power further argues,837 however, such measures make it 
possible for government to increase responsiveness of agencies (in this case the 
university organisations) to government agendas. The Australian government’s 
agenda, is as noted, the commercialisation of the university and the goods and 
services it provides.  
 
While the Rudd and subsequent Gillard governments plan to do away with the 
agency, plans for replacement are insufficiently clear to address in this part of the 
analysis in much depth. What is clear is that the new regulatory agency will take 
up some of AUQA’s functions and so be subject to the same critique.  As a 
matter of concern; however, there are plans for TEQSA to set national academic 
standards within disciplines—something traditionally understood to be a matter 
of expertise of the academic profession. This step provides the basis for 
suggesting that in broad terms there is a consistent approach by government to 
the university. In Chapter 3 it was noted that bureaucrats of the Martin era 
expressed their lack of knowledge about the university and higher education 
systems. At that time, bureaucrats saw the university institution as a distinctive 
and valuable social institution with its own institutional norms. This view of a 
distinct social institution seems to have been overtaken by the generic 
management model discussed in Chapter 6 which informed Dawkins’ 
ideologically driven economic.  The government’s TEQSA appears to take this 
trend a step further from generic management to generic definition and control of 
knowledge.  
 
A second critique of this type of regulatory body is that as argued in Chapter 2 
the potential for Responsive Regulation and Smart Regulation requires an 
intermediary body and an interactive relationship, successive governments have 
removed all intermediary bodies with the result that this type of regulation 
functions more in a command–like mode: “comply or perish” stick.  A 
Responsive Regulatory approach would allow university organisations to adapt 
to achieve regulatory objects within their local contexts, and as they interpret 
those within the university institution of which they are a part.  Such an approach 
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is considerably different from the current approach where government 
determines regulatory objects, irrespective of the university institution and 
imposes on university organisations an inflexible mandate to achieve those 
objects.   
 
The second alternative, a Smart Regulatory approach which in addition to the 
Responsive Regulatory approach just described may provide for a body 
composed of multiple stakeholders or Public Interest Group (PIG) which would 
include members of the university at all levels and more specifically, academics, 
managers (in this regard, not dissimilar from the Australian Universities 
Commission) and students and other community groups such as public groups 
and business.  The regulatory objective, as drawn from the organising problem 
and input from the PIG, would be tabled and a model of regulation developed 
which would enhance the university’s institutional objects of knowledge 
creation, preservation and transmission, as well as integrate with appropriate 
normative ordering those objects not incoherent with these institutional objects.  
The Commonwealth, however, has taken an approach which is not only 
incoherent with the instruments, but heavy handed also incoherent with 
regulatory best practice, with the autonomous traditions of the university 
institution, and with the nature and purpose of the statutory corporation.   
 
5. Conclusions Systemic, Policy and Instrument Coherence  
 
The normative coherence between the systemic and the instrumental levels is 
problematic.  At the systemic level, the organising problem was characterised as 
a broad, collective, systemic and imposed risk that called for a coordinated, broad 
systemic response.   The organising problem created public norms around 
knowledge broadly construed.  While certainly some types of scientific 
knowledge may be created in competitive private environments, most knowledge 
is public and created, preserved and transmitted through collaborative, voluntary 
and cooperative arrangements—be they family, neighbourhood, profession, 
nation or country. These general norms provide a normative basis for instrument 
selection.  That is, instruments which foster collaboration, volunteering and 
cooperation. Evidently the government has rejected those norms and is looking to 
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re-norm the institution on the basis of market principles—introducing a 
considerable degree of incoherence. 
 
The normative coherence between the policy and instrumental levels likewise is 
poor.  At the policy level, the lack of assignment to one side or the other of the 
public-private divide, combined with ambiguous normative or lexical ordering, 
leaves the two norms of private economic gain and broad public benefit in 
conflict without normative structures or processes for resolution of that conflict. 
The ensuing lack of clarity and heightened incoherence find their reflection in the 
instrumental incoherence just described. The balance of the regulatory 
negotiations do not occur in public and as a result, no further analysis of the 
regulatory coherence is possible.  
 
Finally, at the level of instrumental coherence the regulatory body fails to 
address the most important tasks of knowledge creation, preservation and 
dissemination. Further, it fails to regulate the quasi-market created by 
government. Instead, it is focused on internal management processes and so not 
only undermines the benefits of market regulation from the outset but diverts 
attention from the regulatory objectives of education and research and creating an 
environment which supports such. Essentially, from the perspective of 
instrumental coherence, it may be concluded that the regulatory framework has 
collapsed under the systemic and policy incoherence. 
 
 
6. Institutional, Organisational and Administrative Coherence 
This section addresses the coherence between the regulation and existing 
institutional and organisational arrangements, and between those arrangements 
and the administration of the regulation—i.e. the adjudicative, executive and rule 
making duties of the regulator under the regulatory framework.  These two 
analyses are conducted in order.  
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a. Regulatory coherence and the Institution 
In the first instance, coherence analysis necessitates consideration of the 
traditions and institutions of the university.  These institutions were critically 
examined through the surveys of Chapter 5.  As Dawkins was well aware, the 
university was not tabula rasa awaiting the impression of his ideology.838 
Considering the university as an institution posits the university organisation as 
an autonomous organisation, and an independent corporation—independent of 
external interference in terms of its objects, process and operations: independent 
in education, organisation and bestowing of honours. From its earliest history 
each university organisation established its own curriculum, stood independent of 
local civil jurisdiction and resisted outside interference or review.839  This 
tradition, however, is paralleled by a tradition of reliance on external sponsors—
state and church—who demanded and received power to determine educational, 
organisational and financial objects and the bestowing of honours, albeit only 
with considerable acrimony.840  Coherence analysis must therefore be alive to the 
balance of the competing claims of autonomy and accountability.841   
 
The Australian university institution is subject to the institutional norms of the 
academic profession worldwide and the leading university organisations.  Over 
the centuries the university institution has created standards, including a variety 
of competitions.842 These include competitions for: students, scholars,843 
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graduate employment (particularly with multinational corporations),844 and of 
course, for prestige.845 Increasingly important in the international competition are 
the rankings, a form of regulation by information, which have had significant 
impacts on university organisations’ responses.846 The development and 
publication of formalised rankings has had a significant impact on universities. 
Governments seeking to control and extract new accountabilities from university 
organisations pressed the rankings into service. These rankings have encouraged 
both cooperation and competition as university organisations seek to improve 
their standings in the rankings.  As noted, however, regulators of the university 
tend to overlook the norm of collaboration. This norm is evident in the long 
history of international cooperation and collaboration between university 
corporations, by sharing of resources, faculty and student exchanges, and sharing 
of knowledge published as a public good.847   
 
It is evident that the institution of the university is centred on knowledge norms, 
social norms (as opposed to economic norms), and housed in the non-profit 
sector of the economy.  Coherence with the institution at the national and 
international level requires compliance with those norms.  As is evident from the 
analysis, the regulatory framework in Australia is only partially in compliance 
with those norms.  Further, with its strong emphasis on competition, and neglect 
of cooperative and collaborative norms the regulation for the Australian 
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institution appears to be leading away from the larger institutional norms.  
Incoherence at this level is likely to lead to dysfunction and friction with the 
larger institution—possibly leading to the undermining of academic collaboration 
internationally as the parties pursue disparate, incompatible norms.   
b. Regulatory coherence and the Organisation 
In terms of the university organisation an coherence, as argued in Chapter 6, 
university organisations in Australia as in most of the developed west, are 
statutory corporations. They have legal autonomy and have had relatively little 
external accountability. The significance of this legal status is that it increases 
their potential to operate independently of the ideology and interests of the 
government of the day. While they may depend on their government for their 
resources, their ability to respond to and act with integrity toward their 
knowledge mission has depended on their freedom from political interference.  
As such, these university corporations have been able by way of their corporate 
organisational form to contribute significantly to their countries.848  
 
The policy of competition discussed above has been effective resulting in less 
collaboration and increased division.849  The lack of coordination between 
university organisations and the regulating department of government has 
allowed a different type of incoherence to arise in addition to the inefficiency and 
redundancy that Dawkins’ reforms sought to remove.  Dawkins rationalisation 
led to university organisations being created by re-structuring TAFE’s and other 
organisations such as CAE’s and re-naming them “universities.”  Such re-naming 
did little to change an organisation from a tertiary education provider to a 
university.  Meek has referred to this strategy as a recipe for mediocrity850—a 
matter described in this dissertation as regulatory failure resulting from 
regulatory incoherence. These “university” organisations are what government 
dictates regardless of compliance with institutional norms. The problem as put by 
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Professor Glyn Davis and noted elsewhere is: “A university [in Australia] is 
whatever the Federal funding agency and its minister decide a university is.”851  
This regulatory approach can hardly be evaluated as coherent with the 
organisation. 
 
Organisational coherence also requires analysis of the nature or character of 
organisations. In Australia all of the university corporations are non-profit 
bodies, most are public and only a few are private.852  These organisations are not 
structured for profit generation, nor are they designed for private type service 
arrangements—i.e. producer and consumer relationships and market 
regulation.853 Rather, as argued in Chapter 6 addressing the public law 
classification, these organisations are bodies with wide memberships, wide 
public duties and responsibilities. They answer to a public mandate and report 
publicly on that mandate in Parliament. Accordingly, coherence demands that 
such organisations follow a normative ordering for which they are structured, 
which places their public knowledge goods, public interests and public service 
first.   Re-ordering those norms along the lines of private economic goods and 
markets as would a corporation limited by shares is a source of regulatory 
incoherence.  The regulatory drive to re-orient the organisations and hence 
academic professionals to generate revenue through such things as grants and 
consultancies are incoherent with the organising problem.  
 
As further analysed in Chapter 6, the better organisational model was “organised 
anarchy.” This model allows a variety of potentially incoherent norms to be 
pursued, acknowledges the complexity of the organisation and its missions and is 
coherent with the exercise of professional discretion.  Finally, it appears more 
coherent with the Clark’s “Entrepreneurial University.” Its drawback is that it is 
difficult to manage from an NPM perspective and difficult to audit. The 
regulatory framework, however, is incoherent with the better organisational 
model as for example, the National Protocols which penetrate deeply into the 
                                                 
851
 Davis, G. (2005). The University, Singular and Plural. Australian Financial Review Higher 
Education Conference  
852
 Bond University, Australian Catholic University and University of Notre Dame Australia. 
853
 Sheehy, B. and D. Feaver (2010). "A Theory of Regulatory Coherence." Unpublished. 
 347 
management and governance of the university to attempt to create a tightly 
coupled organisation. 
 
In conclusion, there is a significant level of incoherence between the regulatory 
framework and the institutions and organisations that make up the university.  
 
7. Accountability Coherence 
 
The coherence analysis of accountability queries whether the accountability 
regime ensures that the risks, opportunities and problems identified in the 
organising problem have been addressed by the regulatory response: this includes 
accountability by the regulator and regulatee.  In this case, accountability should 
be for the university’s fulfilment of its institutional mission or objectives: the 
creation, preservation and dissemination of knowledge.   
 
The importance of coherence in terms of normative or lexical ordering 
accountability is self-evident as effective and appropriate accountability is 
predicated upon an appropriate and clear assignment on the public-private divide 
and a clear normative ordering.  
 
The analysis asks two questions: first, do the accountabilities ensure the 
organising problem / risks and opportunity identified are being addressed, 
monitored, errors corrected and forward planning appropriate?  In other words, is 
the accountability regime aligned with the policy objectives? And second: are the 
accountability regimes normatively coherent with the rest of the normative 
framework underlying the regulation? That is, it questions whether the 
accountabilities align with the norms of both policy and the university institution. 
These two questions are addressed through the analysis of the three 
accountability types: political, institutional and legal.  
 
a. Political, and Public Institutional Accountability  
 
Accountability has two facets.  First, there is a broad accountability of the 
university to the public via the government and via the academic profession.  The 
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chain of accountability via the government to the public for the institution of the 
university is exercised at least nominally through a vote.  Second, there is the 
accountability of the university organisations bureaucratically by way of 
reporting, aggregated into the single institution of the Australian university, to 
government. These accountability chains are dealt with successively.  As argued 
in Chapters 2 and 4, political accountability follows from the assignment on the 
public-private divide.  A public body has public political accountabilities via the 
Westminster system and a private body has private accountability via markets.  
Further as a public institution, the academic profession has public accountability. 
The first question is whether the accountability suitably scrutinises, provides 
feedback, holds to account and permits reform on the basic organising problem 
and associated risk of knowledge loss, and the additional government policies 
related to economics, equity and underemployed youth.  Are the creation, 
preservation and transmission of knowledge in a non-traditional, complex society 
on an intergenerational basis being adequately safeguarded?   
 
The Australian regulatory framework sets accountability for the institution in the 
first instance with the government and not the academic profession.  By doing so, 
it should be noted that the regulatory framework focuses institutional attention 
away from the norms of the academic profession—the core institution of the 
university—to the bureaucratically determined auditable targets and objects of 
government policy.  The audit, as noted earlier, is an important from a 
sociological point of view as providing legitimacy to organisations.  This 
legitimacy is particularly important for the university, for as Selznick notes, 
among organisations that struggle for legitimacy, those with the greatest struggle 
are public educational organisations.854  The struggle for legitimacy via audit is 
in conflict with the basic connection between competence and trust—the 
hallmarks of professions.   
 
As argued in Chapters 3 and 5, Australian government policy and the Australian 
university mission respectively, have decided the Australian university is to 
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provide job training and foreign revenues from the export of services.855  These 
tasks are at odds with the institutional norms including accountability norms.  
The extent to which the university is able to fulfil its knowledge missions has 
been reduced narrowly to government visions, permissions and resources to do 
so.   
 
Accountability for certain limited knowledge targets has been developed through 
bureaucratic auditable accountability frameworks of the Research Quality 
Framework under Howard and the Excellence in Research for Australia under 
successor Labor governments.  These two frameworks attempt to achieve 
accountability as audited metrics from the university organisations for research 
outputs. The government policy of objective as noted in Chapter 3 is generating 
international economic revenues. It needs, therefore, auditable metrics to support 
Australian university producers on the international market. The effect of this 
accountability structure, however, is markedly negative, de-railing research 
programs, undermining the institutions of quality and collegiality of the 
academic profession, and creating a host of other unintended consequences.856 
 
Do the accountability frameworks address the knowledge creation, preservation 
and transmission missions? In the first instance at least they may appear to do so. 
However, a more careful analysis suggests they do not.  Specifically, they ensure 
only certain types of knowledge and practice are maintained, and it is far from 
clear that these are the important let alone vital ones.  For example, the 
privileging of industry knowledge needs by way of subsidies through the 
Australian Research Council Industry Linkage grants, or the CISRO 
(Commonwealth Scientific and Industry Research Organisation) while pursuing 
significant industrial objectives take scarce resources away from other socially 
productive research. These activities though worthwhile they may be focus on 
the opportunity aspect of knowledge, and specifically its economic and 
technological instrumental opportunities—without giving adequate weight to the 
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risks they may entail including the loss of other knowledge (an issue identified in 
the organising problem) deprived of resources by way of consequence.  Further, 
something as apparently simple as quantifying research outputs has created a 
whole bureaucracy within university organisation consuming resources including 
the already scarce time of the academic profession which would otherwise be 
used preparing for dissemination of knowledge through teaching and publication, 
or creating new knowledge by research—another example of Power’s concern of 
second order issues taking precedence over first order priorities.857  
 
Bureaucratic accountability is also pursued via large aggregated reports from the 
various university corporations which are tabled in both Federal and State 
Parliaments.858 In the Federal parliament, these “Performance Against Targets” 
reports contain a wealth of information and are based on voluminous amounts of 
data. 859 However, the data and reporting are constrained to the parameters 
dictated by the norms of the government in power.  That is, only the 
government’s normative policy version the creation, preservation and 
dissemination of knowledge and of knowledge itself are clear from those reports.   
 
There is no mechanism in place to monitor and assess these institutional issues. 
The only objective independent information comes for the OECD which found 
that during the decade of the Howard government the Australian university went 
backwards from the middle to the bottom of the OECD rankings in terms of 
public financial support.860  It is not argued that the rankings measure all the 
important values of the university.  Rather, the point is that the rankings are able 
to capture some significant features of the university regulatory system, and that 
such a significant fall may well be indicative of a risk of regulatory failure.  The 
value of an international ranking independent of government and university is 
that it allows some limited comparison within a global institution and as such the 
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potential for identifying risk of failing institutions, organisations based upon the 
regulatory policies in place to support them.  The issue is that government tends 
to report information suited to its normative agenda and so possible to create the 
perception that the university is well supported and not at risk of failure—witness 
the Howard government’s media campaign championing the financial success of 
the university as evidenced in the sound bite “Australia’s number three export 
after iron ore and coal.”861  The quote makes clear that government publicity 
concerning universities lacks normative coherence with the institution and so 
skews accountability structures to matters of secondary relevance. While 
accounting for the contribution to the economy by exports of coal and iron ore is 
appropriately measured in financial terms, this measure is not an appropriate 
measure of the social institution or the contribution of the university.   
 
What accountability does the government hold for the institution of the 
university and its knowledge?  The answer to that question is dependent on 
government of the day: its interest in the university, its willingness resource the 
university and to accept information about the university from independent 
sources.  Bureaucratic accountability is shaped by government priorities, and in 
the present era, largely by policy analysts in an NPM framework.  As a result, 
bureaucratic accountability is conceived in the current regulatory framework as 
responsibility for delivering on the auditable metrics determined by the analysts.  
The accountability is not for an independent knowledge based institution 
providing for the creation, preservation and dissemination of all the knowledge 
Australian society needs to sustain itself. This set of bureaucratically determined 
auditable metrics and arrangements creates an incoherence in that it deters the 
university from being accountable to the public for the knowledge missions 
entrusted to it—again an issue argued in above and in Chapter 2 with respect to 
Power’s audit concerns.862  As the auditable metrics do not measure the 
institution’s success at discharging its institutional responsibility, the university 
fails to answer to society because it is forced instead to attend to government 
accountabilities which reflect the normative ordering of that government. 
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As the individual university corporations are State bodies, they have 
accountabilities to the State.  The State governments assert that they are the 
correct bodies to receive accountability, yet they appear to take little interest in 
their university organizations.  A search of Hansard for Victorian Parliament 
between 1998 and 2009, for example, revealed not a single question or other 
request for information about the state’s eight university corporations—a 
disturbing state of affairs in a State which has one of the nation’s premier 
university organizations and that in a nation whose reliance on export of higher 
education has been increasing.  Hansard of NSW provided a similar result 
excepting one question concerning the conflict between the Chancellor and the 
Vice-Chancellor at the University of New England—which was answered by 
deferring to the autonomy of the university.863 This state of affairs exists 
notwithstanding the sharp denunciation of the University of Newcastle’s 
handling of plagiarism by the Independent Commission Against Corruption,864 
serious allegations in the transition of Vice Chancellors at Macquarie 
University,865 and a major challenge to the academic integrity of Professor Bruce 
Hall conducting immunological research at UNSW866 to mention but some of the 
more recent major non-financial failures of university corporations.  
 
It may be argued based on the above that there is limited political accountability 
for the university.  As argued above in Chapter 3, under the current regulatory 
framework, the survival and well-being of the university is dependent upon the 
ideology of the government of the day and not on the knowledge norms of the 
institution.  When government policy cast the university as a contributor to the 
nation and society of Australia, it was a priority for government and resourced 
accordingly. Where government policy casts the university as a mere provider of 
largely private economic goods and where collective preferences are no more 
than the aggregate of individual private economic preferences, the university is 
forced to shift its norms to pursue tangential or conflicting policy objectives such 
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as revenue raising.  This structure of accountability leaves the government only 
weakly accountable for the institution of the university.  
 
The weakness of bureaucratic accountability for the institution of the university 
is illustrated by the Bradley Review established by the Rudd government.867  The 
decision of the Rudd government to commission a thorough review of the higher 
education sector was not part of an inter-governmental accountability cycle. This 
is not to say there is no public accountability for university expenditure or 
knowledge.   
 
In sum, accountability for the institution of the university is both weak and 
incoherent.  There is no organisation independent from government responsible 
to report to government or to society on the condition of the institution. Further, 
the government’s reporting system works not to provide broad accountability for 
the institution but for measuring university alignment with government policy. 
Perhaps most problematically, government efforts to develop accountability on 
academic matters have been developed by the use of economic norms, and 
narrowly defined short term metrics, all of which are fundamentally at odds with 
the academic norms they purportedly measure.  In other words, the 
accountability regime is normatively incoherent with the problem, risk regulatory 
response and institution. The risk identified as the organising problem is not 
being effectively monitored or evaluated leaving no possibility for correction 
where government goes wrong.  Further, by focusing on the specific economic 
measures to the detriment of other less tangible measures, the accountability 
structure re-enforces the regulatory incoherence rather than providing a 
corrective accountability.  
 
b. Institutional Accountability: Academic Profession, Rankings and 
Markets  
Non-bureaucratic accountability systems are part of the traditional university 
institution. These systems rely on standards based on reputation—of individual 
members of the academic profession, disciplinary based groups/departments, 
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university organisations and even national systems.  These standards are based 
on quality of research as judged by expert peers and teaching quality judged by 
students which have been created through networks centred on the academic 
profession.  These standards in turn provided a foundation for hierarchies within 
the academy.  This accountability follows Boven’s model of professional 
accountability.868   
 
A demand for information about quality in the university led media businesses to 
develop rankings, and governments seeking prestige and answering calls for 
accountability in higher education, saw potential value in these rankings which in 
turn became increasingly formalised. An example of these ranking, their recent 
formalisation and the public contest about them can be seen in the competing 
rankings and methods represented among Shanghai Jiao Tong University,869 
Times Higher Education Supplement,870 and Leiden University.871  This 
competition is illustrative of the increasing place of ranking in providing forms 
of public accountability for the university institution in various countries and for 
particular university corporations within those countries. Rankings, however, are 
not the clear indicators they first appear to be. The creators of the highly cited 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University ranking, for example, recently commented:  
“Methodological problems involve the balance of research with teaching 
and service in ranking indicators and weights—inclusion of non-English 
publications, the selection of awards, and the experience of award 
winners. Technical problems exist in the definition and name given to 
institutions, data searching and cleanup of databases, and attribution of 
publications to institutions and broad subject fields.”872  
Finally market-like accountability is hoped to occur as a result of Bradley’s 
student voucher demand driven system. It coincides with the Federal 
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government’s attempt to re-assign the university to the private side of the public-
private divide. Accountability in this quasi-market system has been reconceived 
as being to individual students rather than society as a whole.  Accountability so 
conceived requires the producer to respond to/ or be accountable to current 
student preferences.  The result is that the university institution will become 
captive to the knowledge norms set by current largely undergraduate students. 
Where there is little demand, regardless of the reason, the knowledge will be 
lost—whether ancient languages, mathematics or engineering—and where there 
is great demand, such as the design of entertaining video games or new ways of 
marketing fashion, the university will shift its resources to provide.  
 
Thus, the increased emphasis on student preferences and re-orienting 
management in order to focus on reshaping university organisations to capture 
student interest, force an incoherence which restricts the institution’s ability to 
fulfil its broader social mission.  
 
c. Legal Accountability for University Corporations 
 
The regulatory framework provides legal accountability for the university 
corporations. As noted, the Australian university at law is a statutory corporation 
with legal accountability via the courts.  The leading cases as argued in Chapters 
4 and 6 lead to the suggestion that the university corporation while created by 
statute with significant public accountabilities is still sufficiently free to take 
necessary actions.  Yet, it is clear that they must do so in a manner consistent 
with their status as public bodies forming part of the public service.  In answer to 
the core question concerning accountability for addressing the organising 
problem of knowledge creation, preservation and dissemination, although both 
the Federal and state legislation broadly mandates such, it fails to provide 
appropriate or adequate standing or remedies.  
 
d. Conclusions on Accountability Coherence 
This argument leading through consideration of accountability in political, 
institutional and legal perspectives returns the dissertation to consideration of the 
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issues surrounding the standards by which the university and hence 
accountability is being measured.  These in turn raise the fundamental questions 
about the nature of the university and the policy objectives to be integrated into 
the accountability regime.  The accountability issues are a reflection of the 
complex and at times conflicting objectives discussed in the earlier this chapter 
and Chapter 5. These objectives include conflicting objects described as 
knowledge based versus politically, socially and economically based objects.  
Further, additional conflicts were noted such as, effectiveness versus efficiency, 
which two measures are themselves contested and traded off again against 
equity.  Equity too is to some degree in conflict with matters of quality.  In 
addition there are questions about long-term versus short-term standards and time 
frames—the university cannot work on a spot market model—as well as the 
balancing of private and public objectives to be considered.  These conflicts 
reflect the normative dimensions of the political, institutional and legal standards.  
 
The reporting structure, process and substance follows the policy concerns of 
government, not the social risks of the organising problem or the institutional 
mandate of the university institution or the university organisations.  The 
reporting structure, process and substance instead reflects  successive Australian 
Federal governments’ preoccupation with economics and their apparent efforts to 
shift the university toward the private side of the public-private divide.  The 
reporting structure facilitates this shift by characterising the university as a 
supplier of private economic goods and contributor to the economy.  While given 
the considerable financial sums and other assets involved, clearly reporting 
requirements pertaining to finances are important; however, the normative 
priority placed on those financial and readily measured and audited outcomes in 
reporting fail to amount to proper reporting.  This criticism has four dimensions.  
 
First, the reporting can be described as focused on accounting for the use of 
funds to achieve government determined outputs rather than ensuring the risk 
identified in the organising problem is being minimised.  Second, it is focused on 
the more immediately measurable outcomes in line with NPM and auditable 
metrics.  That is, the focus is on outputs, compliance, and those qualities that are 
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readily measured, rather than the most important.873  Third, it operates within the 
quality framework determined by the government—which has declared its 
purpose in the quality agenda as providing assurance to international markets874 
for purposes of maintaining Australia’s export revenues rather than ensuring the 
missions are being carried out. And fourth, it ignores the widely acknowledged 
and critical inherent problems of what is and can be measured.   
 
At a most basic level, the organising problem identified and regulatory response 
place responsibility on the institution of the university for the provision of the 
critical products of: “teaching excellence, acquiring critical thinking and analytic 
skills, excellence in research, enriching civic values and promoting a learning 
society.”875 Yet measurement of these basic and most important products present 
the most complex and difficult if not intractable problems in measurement 
theory. Recall from Chapter 2, “[the] two shoals on which public accountability 
policy has foundered: that public goals are too complex to reduce to simple 
quantifiable measures; and attempts to do so corrupt public service.”876  More 
recently, as government has shifted to an audit model, the forceful imposition of 
audit on the university has caused it to re-focus on the second order issue of 
creating and generating auditable measures to the detriment of the first order 
issues of research, teaching and public information. As argued in Chapter 2, this 
approach is implementing what Power describes as “the fatal remedy” which 
may lead to irreparable damage to the culture of trust and goodwill that the 
academic profession and hence university ultimately rely upon.877 
 
Thus, although it may be fairly easy to generate auditable measures, there are 
deep and likely intractable problems for a variety of reasons.  First, as mentioned 
the destructive effects of the suspicious and reductionist audit approach is 
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incoherent with the trust based professional model of the complex university 
organisation as argued in Chapter 6.  Second, determining what precisely is being 
measured, and in fact, whether what is being measured is the desired public good 
is likely not possible.878 For example, to create accountabilities for quality of 
education, quality of research and process one must be certain that these are 
measurable in order to be assured that they can be accounted for. While arguably 
these activities and these outputs are the most important, they are also the most 
difficult to measure, not only because of the variety of issues such as the 
contested nature of quality itself, the conception of the consumer (individual or 
society) served by the university but also the time scale, being the time lag 
between delivery of the education and the proof of its worth over the course of a 
lifetime.  
 
Neither complexity nor difficulty are sufficient reasons to abandon attempts at 
setting standards or accountability; however, in considering the development of 
and accountability based on such standards these critical problems must be kept 
in mind.  As such, accountability for these major knowledge objectives should be 
soft, and acknowledge the roles of discretion and trust—in sum, matters 
traditionally assigned to the professions as the preferred way to address these 
difficult types of problems.  Arguably, accountability for the core knowledge 
objects of the university corporation may be unascertainable, and hence, it is 
appropriate to be reminded of Mashaw’s caution: “Every exercise in devising 
appropriate accountability system is thus an exercise in comparative 
incompetence.”879 As Power has argued in his analysis of the audit approach to 
UK university system, too tight a reign on the university serves neither society 
nor the institution well.880 
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Political efforts to measure and weigh the university with precision such as occur 
through Australia’s extensive reporting requirements seems to suggest that 
politicians have failed to grapple with the basic problems of measurement and 
the university.  Further, the weak political accountability for the university 
institution, where there is no independent reporting body, suggests that the 
university institution remains at risk of failure, and further that this risk is 
exacerbated as a result of politically determined objects which are at best only 
marginally coherent with the university institution.   
 
Accountability for the institution of the university would be best served by an 
independent body standing between government and the university 
corporations—like the CTEC which was dismantled by Dawkins for refusing to 
bend to his political agenda. The CTEC provided independent advice, informing 
both government and the public about the situation in the universities.  It allowed 
a form of accountability that is not possible without some such independent 
intermediary.  Such a body could enhance coherence or at least contribute to the 
coherence critique by pointing out where and how the government’s policy is 
coherent and incoherent and make suggestions about revisions to policy.  Unlike 
Universities Australia, the Vice Chancellors’ body, which depends on lobbying 
and persuasion, an independent regulatory body in the CTEC vein would have 
direct access to the minister, and be able to put issues directly.  
 
The drawback of such an agency is as Dawkins experienced: it may not be 
amenable to minister’s policy preferences and may provide public criticism of 
such policies. Further, it may be susceptible to capture by the university sector 
where it is staffed predominantly by academics—an unlikely event given the 
“tribes” 881 that make up an increasingly divided profession.882 It is unclear that 
such drawbacks outweigh the potential benefits an independent intermediary 
could play. The current reporting system stymies critical debate about the nature 
and value of knowledge, the efficacy of the university and its role in the public 
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sphere, and leads to valuing only that which the government wants valued and 
measured.   
 
Market accountability by way of student voucher is a significant deviation from, 
and incoherent with, the legal accountability. Legal accountability is for 
compliance with the broad public good set out in the objects of the statute, 
whereas market accountability is for the individual preferences of students 
seeking a variety of self-interested objectives. Thus, whereas Labor’s proposed 
voucher system may direct economic accountability toward individual students’ 
preferences without regard for public preferences, the state based enabling 
statutes create legal accountability though the restricted statutory objects to the 
public at large.  It is not to say that the university corporations should disregard 
students. On the contrary, the enabling statutes explicitly state that an 
environment conducive to learning is part of the legal obligation placed on the 
university corporation. However, the potential for increased incoherence results 
from these conflicting accountability regimes.  
 
Essentially, the system of accountabilities creates incoherence and causes 
confusion.  The assumption that the objects are indeed measurable and lines of 
accountability can be drawn—a particular problem for any institution with 
socially oriented, long term, public good objectives—misleads the government 
and the public that a host of measures achieves appropriate accountability of the 
government for ensuring the knowledge missions of the university are not put at 
unnecessary or unacceptable levels of risk.  The fact that the university’s mission 
is so important but difficult to measure makes it difficult for the public to hold 
government and its ministers accountable for the university institution.  The 
implication of this is that the government can only be held accountable for 
ensuring adequate resourcing—a matter of both political decision and 
professional expertise.  The public must rely on government because information 
about conditions and operations of the university institution, the university 
system and university corporations, as well as the complex nature of the objects 
of the university, (i.e. information provided by accountability regimes) cannot 
but be incomplete.  Governments therefore have a heightened responsibility for 
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ensuring the well being of the institution including providing a coherent 
regulatory framework. 
 
The analysis of reporting at both institutional and corporate levels leads to the 
conclusion that the accountability regime is incoherent. The tight measures, 
driven by economic incentives and market like drivers are at odds with the social 
knowledge problem and the institution of the university itself.  That is, the 
normative ordering around knowledge norms are at odds with the readily 
measureable, with the economic incentives and with the young adult students’ 
private preferences. The normative accountability is also incoherent. Much of the 
accountability follows economic incentives and supposed quantification of what 
is known to be immeasurable, ignoring the important potential of professional 
accountability for the most important missions of the university—its knowledge 
missions for the maintenance of society.  
 
8. Regulatory Coherence and Incoherence in the Regulatory Framework 
In summary, the analysis of regulatory coherence in this chapter has been both 
broad and deep.  Beginning with the level of systemic coherence, it will be 
recalled that there are two sets of problems assigned to the university.  These are 
the knowledge based and other politically assigned problems.  As to the first, it is 
evident that the organising problem of knowledge creation, preservation and 
transmission is the foundational problem which calls for a regulatory response.  
The organising problem is a broad problem affecting potentially all of society. 
The problem is one of risk but with significant elements of opportunity.  The risk 
is the loss of the knowledge necessary for the maintenance of a non-traditional 
complex society; however, opportunity exists as a result of the potential to create 
new knowledge beneficial to human society and survival through the processes 
associated with mitigating the risk.  
 
Further, the regulatory response has been to conceptualise the problem as a 
public problem and so to assign the problem and its resolution to the public side 
of the public-private divide.  At the systemic level, therefore, the normative 
foundation is to be found in the broad based public problems around knowledge.  
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The core social institution charged with addressing these problems has been the 
university which institution has long held public knowledge norms as its 
foundation.  The institution has utilised organically developed non-profit 
organisations.  At this basic level, there is no systemic incoherence.  
 
The second set of organising problems identified by politicians are the social 
issues of credentialing, sorting and holding unemployed youth. The regulatory 
response to these problems has also been to assign them to the public side of the 
public-private divide and to search for appropriate institutions and mechanisms 
to address these problems.  One institution available to politicians is the 
university. These tasks while not wholly incoherent with the institution are not 
wholly coherent either. The university is in a position to credential those who 
have demonstrated a degree of competence in the acquisition of knowledge. 
However, while credentialing is an outcome of sorting, the low level of sorting 
required of the Australian university—as with university in other jurisdictions—
falls below higher education standards and as such depletes the university’s 
resources available for missions such as higher education which are coherent 
with its higher education institutional position. The fortuitous consequence of 
youth enrolment in the university is that unemployed youth find their time 
occupied.  This consequence, however, does not contribute to the formation of a 
coherent foundation for the university. To place the university as the core social 
institution to address this complex of problems  is to introduce incoherence by 
shifting its institutional mission away from the knowledge norms to the socially 
worthwhile but institutionally incompatible and distinct tasks of sorting and 
holding unemployed youth.  
 
At the systemic level, the regulatory response of assigning the university 
institution to the public side of the public-private divide carries with it certain 
implications for normative ordering.  At a most basic level, this dissertation 
argues that the knowledge tasks must take precedence over other tasks.  In 
particular it has been argued that the revenue generating norm must be secondary 
and subservient to public institutional norms.  The regulatory response does not 
preclude revenue generation; however, it places an imperative that revenue 
generation is lower in priority to maximising the creation and distribution of the 
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public good, knowledge. Accordingly, the policy of directing the university to 
engage in significant revenue generation and to direct it by economic incentives 
into areas contrary to its institutional mission are serious sources of regulatory 
incoherence at a systemic level.   
 
One important task of politicians is to make decisions about the quality of 
services they expect.  Levels of funding must be connected to the quality desired 
to avoid the decoupling and gaming identified in Chapter 2 derived from Power’s 
work.883 This issue is particularly important for the university as argued in 
Chapters 5 and 6 with its non-profit norms, and as a non-market institution 
dedicated to the distribution of public goods. The same criticism of regulatory 
incoherence which results from the introduction of revenue generation norms 
applies in respect of the public equity objects.  Social equity objectives may be 
achieved as a positive externality; however, to make it a normative priority is to 
undermine coherence. Further such equity objects may well be in conflict with 
the revenue generating norms as people from lower socio-economic levels are 
less likely to participate in higher education in the first instance for a variety of 
reasons not the least of which is the lack of resources and the relative cost of 
higher education compared to their means. The prioritising of the revenue 
generating norm is thus in conflict with this particular equitable mission.  
At the level of policy coherence, the problems identified at the systemic level 
find expression in the policy norms and in specific legal instruments. As noted, 
from a policy perspective whereas the public goods enterprise operates with the 
norms of maximising of production and distribution, in the neoliberal policy 
universe these norms are displaced by the private enterprise norms of revenue 
generation and cost cutting—a problem identified in the context of dysfunction 
in the American higher education policy.884 These norms are instituted through 
the Higher Education Funding Act 2003 and related legislation which effectively 
demand more from the university than the government is willing to resource 
placing the university in a state of continual financial crisis.  Contrary to 
government policy of using revenue constraints to drive efficiency and innovate 
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new sources of revenue, there is the inevitable need to conserve resources by a 
reduction in the quality of the service being provided—an uncomfortable issue 
not addressed by either increased quality audit or surveying student “customers.” 
 
The instruments, reflecting neoliberal philosophy of competition, introduce 
further incoherence.  In conflict with the significant cooperative norms in the 
academic profession and among universities, the instruments create a highly 
competitive environment.  These competitive norms work contrary to the 
cooperative norms of the university.  At this same level as noted, until the 
neoliberal era ushered in by Dawkins, government relied upon advice from an 
independent advisory body about an institution that belonged to the public 
sphere. Under neoliberalism the university has been re-cast as another industry 
like iron ore and coal—a generic industry with revenue generation potential. The 
intermediary advisory council was dissolved and the regulation re-designed to 
deliver the presumed efficiencies of markets. The funding and regulatory 
arrangements were no longer conducted through consultations with the 
individual university organisations which make up the institution, but were made 
by ministers in consultation with policy advisors. Such an approach to the 
delivery of public goods and the guardianship of society’s premier knowledge 
institution is incoherent with the public missions of the university and indeed, it 
may be argued, with government.  It leads to the conclusion that this type of 
arrangement is a less than optimal arrangement for a government charged with 
the preservation of the knowledge which undergirds a democratic society.  
 
In terms of institutional, organisational and administrative coherence, as noted, 
the university institution has a tradition of collaboration as well as competition. 
The preference of competition over collaboration is incoherent with institutional 
norms. Further, at this level, coherence between organisational independence and 
autonomous pursuit of the mission are incoherent with the high levels of 
intervention from and reporting to government.  Finally, at the level of 
accountability, the incoherence is considerable. Whereas the objects of the 
university function primarily around non-commoditised difficult to measure 
public goods, the accountabilities have been structured to be measured in great 
detail as if it were measuring the production of mere private economic goods. 
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The incentive structures related to that accountability rather than being coherent 
with institutional norms of knowledge, prestige and reputation have been built 
around the economic and neoliberal models of human society: revenue 
generation and output production numbers. 
9. Conclusions 
The analysis leads to the conclusion that there is significant incoherence in the 
regulation of the Australian university.  Although recognising the organising 
problem as a risk that is social, imposed and collective, government has designed 
the regulation increasingly as if the organising problem were a matter of private, 
individual, economic choice.  As noted in Chapter 3, with political debate in 
Australia being focused on economic growth combined with government’s 
strong commitment to neoliberalism and economic rationalism, priority will be 
given to those bodies which have normative orderings coherent with that 
ordering, leaving bodies which have other normative orderings to be either set 
aside or pushed toward the favoured ordering.   
 
This incoherent approach to the organising problem leads to incoherent 
approaches to the assignment on the public-private divide. Whereas an 
organising problem cast as a  public problem would favour a normative ordering 
placing the university on the public side of the public-private divide, neoliberal 
governments’ have attempted to shift the assignment by re-ordering norms to 
align more closely with orderings suitable to private economics.  It is evident that 
governments’ normative ordering and objectives are incoherent with university 
institutional normative ordering and objects.  Institutional ordering such as the 
pursuit of knowledge for its intrinsic value and objects such as collective socio-
political well-being, personal development, arts and social projects are incoherent 
with government ordering preferring commoditised knowledge and government 
objectives of revenue generation and work place training.  
 
The justification for the change under neoliberalism is one of Breyer’s 
justifications for regulation—“rationalisation.” Rationalisation is a justification 
for regulation; however, as Breyer cautions, it is suited to economic regulation, 
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not social or other types of regulation. 885  Dawkins and successive Australian 
governments seem to have ignored evidence in favour of ideology.  Further, the 
rationalisation process and norms, at least as practised in Australia, focus on the 
private cost cutting agenda rather than the public maximisation of resources and 
distribution norms. 
 
The legislative instruments used follow the incoherent theorising of the 
organising problem, risks, institution and organisation. They attempt to introduce 
market mechanisms of competition into the public domain.  These mechanisms 
encapsulated in the instruments, however, are incoherent internally. That is, 
although designed to create markets the benefits of which are less prescriptive, 
lower monitoring and lower cost—the instruments do not rely on market 
outcomes in terms of allowing university organisations to manage and create 
their own rules, or accountability by way of markets instead of government audit.  
Further, the measures and standards have been drafted to capitalise on the readily 
measured, and revenue generating potential rather than the risk avoidance, public 
good and collective, collaborative norms of the institution.  The net benefit has 
been a short-term saving to government of public expenditure on the university, 
permitting the education of Australian citizens to be subsidised by international 
students, and a decline in the quality of university education in Australia.   
 
It is not that tasks assigned to the university such as government’s economic 
development and equity agendas cannot be carried out by the university. The 
issue is that they require significant resourcing if they are to be carried out in a 
way that is not incoherent with or cause a negative impact upon the university.  
Successive governments from the Hawke government forward, however, have 
created a compound problem by simultaneously imposing such missions, 
requiring increased student numbers and requiring the university to become 
increasingly financially independent.  With its severe resource restrictions the 
university has been force to become a type state owned enterprise. The university 
faces the challenge of raising substantial revenues from the private sector 
creating the previously noted incoherence between its institutional public mission 
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(discussed in Chapters 4 and 5) and the government imposed private finance 
missions.886  
 
While certain political decisions and related regulatory responses such as equity 
concerns are unlikely to be implemented without additional regulation, there is 
no reason such policies could not be implemented via special purpose regulatory 
initiatives suited to the particular concern and/or university organisation.  In fact, 
from a regulatory perspective, enhanced coherence including organisational 
coherence is likely to be an outcome. Examples of effective regulatory 
intervention include overcoming university reticence concerning massification of 
education as well as some of the equity initiatives.  However, incoherent 
regulatory intervention changes not only the organisation but also the critical 
knowledge institution of western society thereby enhancing the risk rather than 
avoiding it by regulation.   
 
The Labor government’s decision to introduce a voucher system elevates an on-
going incoherence in the university system.  There are two elements to the 
incoherence introduced: in the first instance, university organisations all need to 
compete in the same student market. Where the majority of students prefer short 
courses in business management and video games, the university will be forced 
to develop those programs at the expense of others.  Not only will this result in 
greater uniformity among university organisations, but it will lead to declines of 
alternative options as knowledge and fads change.  
 
Second, it fails to take sufficient account of the complex nature of the organising 
problem and its regulatory solution.  The Labor government’s mix of competitive 
instruments is not only incoherent with the object of regulation—higher 
education, a public good—but also with the institutional traditions of the 
university. The voucher system misidentifies the consumer of university services.  
It posits the individual student as opposed to society as the sole or at least 
primary beneficiary of the social institution of the university.  By identifying the 
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consumer of university education as the student seeking private economic goods, 
governments move the university institution away from its broader more 
important social missions of the creation, preservation and transmission of 
knowledge.  
 
In sum, the regulation is incoherent from systemic, policy, instrumental, 
institutional-organisational and accountability perspectives—and ripe for failure. 
With this knowledge, there is great opportunity for reform, starting with a re-
visioning of the university for a nation.  The Australian university has 
accomplished much and made a significant contribution to society, just as its 
counterparts elsewhere have done over the centuries.  There is currently a strong 
interest in the university as the Bradley Review and government response have 
demonstrated.  A renewed sense of the university as something more is in the air 
and the time is ripe for public debate to allow it to fulfil a role greater than a 
contributor to private wealth and job training, and to reform its regulation to take 
on such a role. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
1.  Introduction 
The research question for this dissertation is the following: is the regulation of 
the university good regulation?  This has required an examination of the 
university and how it fits into the regulatory framework, and an analysis of 
whether that framework is coherent. The answers to these questions have led 
through a consideration of a variety of issues. The issues and themes identified, 
however, allow a clear answer to be established.   The short answer is that the 
regulation is not good regulation. It is poorly designed regulation, fundamentally 
incoherent and is likely to lead to the university becoming increasingly 
dysfunctional887 over time as it shifts institutional public knowledge norms 
toward private economic norms. This conclusion follows from the analysis 
summarised below.  
2.  Review and Summary 
After the Introductory chapter which identified the research question and set the 
socio-historic context, the second chapter examined the theories and methods of 
regulation, and provided an overview of the issues and decisions to be made in 
the development of a regulatory scheme.  That chapter identified the issues of the 
organising problem, the nature of the problem—opportunity, problem or risk, the 
regulatory response in terms of public and private interest theories as well as the 
theories of regulatory design—from regulatory failure, through smart regulation 
to regulatory coherence.  It next identified the various tools and instrument 
choices to be addressed by governments, in broad terms, their normative 
functions, and accountability options.  This chapter led to a number of 
conclusions.  These were that clarity in the organising problem is critical as is 
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assignment on the public-private divide (discussed in Chapter 4).  Further, the 
chapter argued that there are a variety of potential justifications for regulation 
which need to be considered carefully before determining whether any regulation 
is necessary, and considerations about the nature of the regulatory response. That 
is, first, whether the response should be focused on avoiding a risk, or mitigating 
or developing resilience, and then whether the response should be in the public or 
private spheres. Finally, it argued that where the assignment was to the public 
side of the divide, the use and provision of adequate public resources was 
critical. 
 
The third chapter examined the nature of the public-private divide and the 
location of the university on that divide. This chapter set out the parameters of 
that important distinction and the foundations of the debate. It examined the 
divide from a variety of perspectives—namely, politics, economics and law.  It 
made clear that contrary to assumptions underlying Samuelson’s economic 
theory of public goods, the divide is not a naturally occurring phenomenon; 
rather, it is the invention of humans.  That fact does not diminish its importance 
from a regulatory perspective.  Instead, it makes clear that it is a matter for 
political debate: there is no non-political technical decision to be derived from 
economics to which politicians can defer.  It was argued that the university is 
best assigned to the public side of the divide.  That is, regulation for the 
university should ,as its default position, be thought of as public regualtion. 
 
Given that there is no technical solution to determining which side of the public-
private divide is preferable, and that while the divide is not a clear and simple 
dichotomy, it was made clear that some assignment to one side or the other is 
desirable from all perspectives. The implications of the divide for the university 
and various economic, political and legal justifications for the assignment of the 
university were considered.  These considerations led to the conclusion that the 
university should be assigned to the public side of the public-private divide. 
 
Chapter 4 identified and examined the regulatory framework. It began with a 
consideration of the policy which sets the basis for identifying the organising 
problem.  It was noted that the policy had changed significantly over time, most 
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recently under neoliberalism toward the classification of the university as a 
provider of private economic goods.  The analysis then moved to the framework 
in terms of the regulatory administrative arrangements, tools, instruments, and 
accountability structure.  This analysis noted without comment some anomalies 
in the regulatory framework particularly with respect to the tight control on the 
university while at the same time making the environment extremely 
competitive.  This competition is the result not only of the regulatory design of 
instruments, but also of the policy of declining funding while simultaneously 
increasing demands. Further it noted the impact of the current absence of an 
intermediary advisory body on the university as an institution in Australia.  
 
Chapter 4 makes a contribution to knowledge because it draws together the 
overarching policy as well as the regulatory framework for higher education in 
Australia from a legal perspective. No other such exposition exists from a legal 
perspective.  This contribution is important because it provides insight for policy 
makers, regulators, academics and interested others on the exact nature of the 
regulation, the points of intersection and a platform for critique and further 
regulatory reform.  
 
The chapter concluded that the regulatory framework, while still in transition 
under the current government, has a wide variety of policies forming the 
organising problem. Further, it was concluded that although the university was 
assigned to the public sphere there were a number of inconsistencies in that 
assignment. For example, the lack of clarity in the missions and difficulties in the 
legal assignment made clear that the regulatory framework is not internally 
coherent. Additionally, it was evident that there was an exclusive reliance on 
competitive instruments which while nominally harnessing markets were in fact 
highly controlling. 
 
Chapter 5 examined the university as an institution answering the question of its 
contribution to the social subsystem of higher knowledge. That is, the chapter 
examined what type of regulatory objects or response the university institution is 
suited to provide. It examined the mission of the university from a variety of 
perspectives: historic, social, economic, and political science.  This chapter 
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identified the range of objects which had historically and could potentially be 
assigned to the institution. That is, it reviewed a range of missions which the 
university had pursued with varying degrees of success and where possible, it 
provided some analysis on the impact of those missions on the institution.  The 
tasks considered were education and other knowledge-related functions; the 
sociological tasks of sorting, ‘weeding’ and credentialing; economic roles; the 
political roles of critique and space for debate; and then some of the uniquely 
Australian missions of nation building and global competitiveness/revenue 
generation. It drew attention to the variety of missions the university has pursued, 
their potential conflict as well as complementarity, and the dynamic changes over 
time.  
 
This chapter too makes a significant contribution to knowledge.  It is significant 
because it draws the main theories from the disciplines mentioned and applies 
them comparatively to the single institution of the university. This comparison 
provides new insight into the institution by tackling its multifaceted nature 
simultaneously and the parameters that should be considered by regulators 
seeking to create good regulation.  
 
The chapter concluded that the university has traditionally been a non-profit 
institution for a variety of reasons, including: market failures of information 
asymmetries and failure to produce adequate public goods, and the institution’s 
important contribution to discourse in the public sphere among other things. 
Finally, the chapter made clear that while the university can carry out a variety of 
missions, not all of which need be purely knowledge based, from the perspective 
of the institutional mission it belongs clearly on the public side of the public-
private divide. 
 
Chapter 6 examined the organisational characteristics of the university. It 
addressed the regulatory problem of the nature of the body to be regulated.  The 
examination from five disciplinary perspectives: philosophy, sociology, 
economics, politics and law, identified the organisation’s position on the public-
private divide, and the important norms in and around the organisational 
structuring that placed it firmly on the public side. 
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Like Chapter 5, this chapter makes a contribution to knowledge.  By examining 
the university organisation through a variety of disciplinary lenses and 
comparing these perspectives, it sets out the foundations of the political debate 
about the organisation. This contribution is significant because it draws the main 
arguments together and examines them in a less political fashion than a political 
science or a normative economic perspective. Instead it evaluates them from an 
organisational perspective for match between organisational form, organisational 
norms and institutional objects. This comparison provides new insight into the 
normative parameters that should inform regulators. 
 
Chapter 7, the coherence analysis provided a complete coherence analysis of the 
regulatory framework.  It examined all aspects of the regulation from a 
regulatory perspective analysing all levels for coherence. At the systemic level, it 
found that the organising problem was overly large and incoherent. Further that 
the policy response was normatively at odds with the norms (identified as those 
norms which would emanate consistently from the organising problem 
coherently constructed).  At the level of policy, the analysis revealed that policy 
norms and instruments were also incoherent with the organising problem as well 
as with the policy response. Further this incoherence was carried into the choice 
of instruments.   
 
Analysis of the institutional, organisational and administrative coherence also 
revealed problems. That is, the institutional and organisational norms were at 
odds with the norms of the regulation and the regulatory framework.  The 
analysis of accountability structures revealed incoherence demonstrated in that 
neither the university institution nor the university corporations were subject to 
appropriate accountability structures. The incoherence resulted from the 
reporting structure which focused on government’s concerns as opposed to 
accountability for addressing the organising problem as well as the problems of 
the Westminster system, namely, the lack of effective accountability to the public 
via Parliament.  The analysis concluded that the regulatory framework was 
incoherent at all levels.  
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This chapter is innovative because it is the first coherence analysis of a national 
regulatory framework. By the same token it is the first coherence analysis of the 
higher education regulation in Australia.  Its finding of incoherence is significant 
for two reasons: first, it is assumed by politicians and regulators that regulation is 
coherent in the first instance. No government intentionally designs regulation 
that is incoherent—although it may be incoherent in its ultimate politically 
compromised form.  The finding of incoherence alerts policy makers, regulators, 
and other interested parties to the existence of incoherence in the regulatory 
framework and problems associated with it. This conclusion leads to the second 
and main significance which is that regulatory incoherence is a cause of 
regulatory failure, and in the case of the university, a failure which Australian 
society cannot bear.  This review of the dissertation sets the basis for the 
evaluative questions and recommendations which follow.   
 
3.  Evaluation of Regulatory Framework 
 
A regulatory framework can be evaluated from a number of perspectives.  It may 
be that a regulatory framework is incoherent yet draws the response; ‘so what?, it 
achieves the desired ends’.  This line of argument, however, draws attention to 
the fundamental evaluative standard: reference to its success in addressing the 
organising problem it is designed to resolve.  In the case at hand, the organising 
problem as noted is a complex of problems identified by politicians. In the first 
instance these are the creation, preservation and dissemination of knowledge.  
The further organising problems have been sociological problems of sorting and 
credentialing, socio-political problems of social mobility and equity, and nation 
building, and the economic problems in the generation of revenues and preparing 
labour for the workforce. As noted throughout the dissertation, success in the 
achievement of the objects or missions of the university is difficult to measure, 
and particularly so in the short term. What is evident from the Bradley Review 
among other studies is that since the radical shift in the regulatory regime 
introduced by Dawkins more than twenty years ago the Australian university has 
declined in most significant measures.  The only measures where it has increased 
are in the dramatically increased student numbers and the revenues it now 
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generates on its own. These changes have not been insignificant—from the few 
thousand international students and a small percentage of revenues in the 
Dawkins era to approximately 250,000 international students and the majority of 
revenues measured in billions of dollars in the present.888  
 
By the same token, however, the declines have also been significant. In terms of 
public financial support, the Australian university, formerly a mid-ranking 
system in the OECD, as a result of funding cuts has fallen to the bottom.889  This 
movement is dramatic and not easily reversed.  Further, the quality of education 
has declined over the period. Staff to student ratios have increased to the highest 
level in the OECD and students complain about the quality of their experience 
and the difficulty of meeting with academic staff.890  Further, students’ financial 
stress has added significant strain to their lives and is a cause of decreased ability 
to study.891  While the issues of measurement addressed throughout the 
dissertation caution against a strict or overly certain interpretation of measures, 
measures of these types—staff to student ratios and time available to students—
are measures likely to be indicative of institutional capacity to achieve the 
various coherent institutional missions of the university. This state of affairs 
leads to the conclusion that the ability of the university to address the organising 
problem has been significantly compromised by the regulatory framework.  In its 
most important task, therefore, the avoidance of risk of loss of knowledge, the 
regulatory framework is a failure. 
 
A further approach to evaluation of a regulatory framework can be made by 
examination of the condition of the social subsystem it is designed to regulate.  
Not only did the Bradley Review find significant problems in the delivery of the 
response to the organising problem, it found, as did a number of other studies,892 
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that the state of the Australian university institution and its organisations are not 
in a good condition.  The run down condition of the infrastructure893 is matched 
by the demoralised, over-worked staff.894  Further, other studies have noted a 
serious conflict within the university between academic and managerial staff,895 
described by one study as bullying896—an ultimately unsustainable dysfunctional 
state of affairs.  
 
In terms of accountability the question is: does the regulatory framework provide 
sufficient accurate, relevant, detailed and complete information to create the 
potential for accountability in the form of a review of what has happened, the 
ability to hold those responsible accountable for censure,897 remedy of policy 
error, and to provide a solid basis for forward planning? This thesis concludes 
that to a large measure, the information provided is accurate and detailed.  The 
problems, however, are related to the relevance and completeness of that 
information.  That is, while information may be correct, all of the information 
necessary for evaluation may not be available. These problems are consequences 
of the problems associated with measurement.  Measuring the objectives of the 
university is nearly impossible in the short term for reasons that the value of what 
is learned or knowledge otherwise created and preserved may not be known in 
the short term, as noted in Chapter 6, and hence, developing an evaluative short 
term measure of the university is impossible. This results in attending to what 
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can be measured with the unintended consequence of normative re-ordering.  As 
the saying has it: “what is valued is what is measured rather than measuring that 
which is valued.” The accountability structure in this sense impairs the ability of 
the university to fulfil its obligations.  
 
The system of accountabilities which contains a significant amount of irrelevant, 
incomplete and detailed information causes confusion and an inability to trace 
accountability for the different objects of the university institution (assuming that 
the objects are indeed measurable and lines of accountability can be drawn—a 
particular problem for any institution with socially oriented, long term, public 
good objectives).  These important but difficult to measure objectives make it 
next to impossible for the public to hold the government and its ministers 
accountable for the university institution. Even in terms of informing the public 
about conditions or operations of the university institution, the lack of an 
independent advisory body denies the public insight into the university.  In this 
sense, the accountability regime within the regulatory framework is poor.  
Further, neither state nor Federal ministers table reports dedicated to the system 
in their respective parliaments, nor on individual university corporations. The 
university is included as a subsection of the broader reports on education tabled 
by the ministers responsible for education.  This organisation of the 
accountability structure leads to the suggestion that the knowledge subsystem for 
which government is charged and delegated to the university remains at risk of 
loss. 
 
Another important evaluation of the regulatory framework, also coming from the 
accountability framework, asks the coherence question: how does the 
accountability system interact with the norms of the academic profession? Any 
evaluation of the accountability system should work to enhance the functioning 
of the profession rather than as a substitute for professional accountability 
structures.  The poor state of the Australian academic profession, as various 
studies have indicated,898 suggests that the accountability system is failing to 
achieve a fundamental function—allowing rectification of erroneous policies and 
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censure of those responsible. As noted in Zemsky’s work899 the neoliberal hope 
of markets providing suitable information and warning about the state of the 
academic profession is misguided.  
 
The normative incoherence identified in the previous paragraph is an expression 
of the conflict between the norms of knowledge and public good on the one hand 
and economics and private enterprise on the other.  The furtherance of the private 
economic norms via the regulatory framework exacerbates a conflict already 
within the university that resulted from the post-World War II shift from elite to 
mass education mission in which academics were replaced in university 
management by managers.  The different norms, provide on-going organisational 
conflict.  For example, in his dissertation “Quality Assurance at Australian 
Universities” Nathan Jiang finds that management prefers a quality system which 
sees the quality system as an opportunity to improve in competitive rankings 
with the associated benefits of prestige, funding both public and private, and 
student preferences.  This competitive view favoured by management, however, 
is distinct from the view favoured by academics.  The latter view the main 
purpose of standards to be providing “quality teaching, research training, and 
research results, and contribute to knowledge and discipline development.”900  
This conflict is described by Jiang as a conflict between competitive and 
academic purposes. While not suggesting that academics are without a 
competitive motivation, Jiang suggests that academics value the aforementioned 
list of values ahead of competition whereas the managers hold the opposite. The 
lack of consensus on these basic issues reflects normative conflict at the 
operational level of the university organisations exacerbated by the regulatory 
framework. 
 
The regulatory framework does not foster an environment which encourages 
teaching and research, contact with the students, or which take issues of low 
morale and staff disengagement seriously. The conditions of academic 
                                                 
899
 Zemsky, R. M. (2005). The Dog that Doesn’t Bark: Why Markets Neither Limit Prices nor 
Promote Educational Quality. Achieving Accountability in Higher Education. JC Burke and 
Associates. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass: 275-295. 
900
 Jiang, H. N. (2007). Quality Assurance at Australian Universities. Education. Wollongong, 
University of Wollongong. Ed.D. p. 233.  
 379 
employment in Australian universities are unappealing,901 with staff morale 
declining over the last decade.902  Research in the literature suggests that 
university organizations across Australia are failing with two-thirds experiencing 
low morale among academic staff.903  As an organization dependent on academic 
staff’s expenditure of discretionary energy, and upon whom the university’s 
success is staked, the low morale is unsustainable.904  This decline in academics’ 
well-being predictably has negative effects on education: Marginson argues that 
executive drive and entrepreneurial zeal have had negative consequences on 
academic success.905 Thus, from the perspective of the well-being of the 
subsystem too, the regulatory regime is a poor one.  
 
Evaluating the regulatory framework from the perspective of the organising 
problem of creating an educated, diverse citizenry able to understand and make 
social, political choices is also important.  A normative shift from public to 
private economics is evidenced in the growth in the numbers in business 
degrees,906 which increased in international enrolments by more than 700% in the 
same decade that saw domestic non-business students increase by less than 2% 
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and domestic business students by about 150%.907  These figures suggest that 
there has been a shift to a focus on business studies and leads one to question 
whether this focus can be said to be “enriching cultural … life” as found in state 
legislation, or for that matter, whether business studies (premised on economics’ 
self interest theory) complies with statutory object of “enriching…. Community 
life.”  Does this business focus advance the legal mandate of (ii) “educational, 
scientific, and artistic development”?908  The issue is not that business studies do 
not belong in the university;909 rather, the argument is that the balance is off.  
Fundamental to this dissertation is the idea that the university should create, 
preserve and transmit knowledge that allows the whole of the human being to 
participate in society, and for that society of human beings to live collectively 
successfully.910  The university is tasked with the provision and creation of that 
knowledge. The regulatory framework since Dawkins, as noted, has created a 
dramatic shift away from the public knowledge norms toward private economic 
concerns.  In this sense, it is a failure. 
4.  Recommendations for regulatory design 
As seen from the analysis in this dissertation, summarised in this Conclusion, the 
first and critical task for the designer of a regulatory framework is defining a 
coherent organising problem.  That problem needs to be developed usually 
through wide consultation and broad well-informed thinking.  The identification 
of an appropriate and coherent organising problem is, however, not sufficient by 
itself to provide the foundation for good regulation. The second critical task for 
regulatory designers after the identification of a coherent organising problem is a 
clear assignment to one side or the other of the public-private divide. In the case 
of the university, coherence analysis suggests that on the basis of an examination 
of the organising problem evident in the regulatory justifications and the public 
good(s) emanating from the university, a clear, coherent normative basis is 
discernable which assigns the university to the public side of the divide.  
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This assignment will require political decisions about the two sets of norms 
currently within the regulatory framework—1) the value of knowledge and the 
value or role of economics, and 2) the public and the private.  These two sets of 
norms push in different directions and a clear appropriate normative ordering 
must be put in place. It is not that they cannot co-exist: organisations are never 
single purpose.  Rather, decisions need to be made as to which norm and which 
objective will have priority particularly in the case of conflict. 
 
These two tasks—the creation of the organising problem and assignment on the 
public-private divide—form the basis of policy development. Policy 
development should consider first the critical knowledge risk and the wide array 
of benefits of higher education, and draw from that consideration that regulation 
should focus on the widest tenable distribution of the public benefits of higher 
education. As a public social good, it is significant from an equitable perspective 
that as many members of the public as possible receive those benefits, and 
indeed, one of the policy imperatives following from the post-World War II 
massification of higher education was just that.  The public social good also has 
significant private social good implications. As a means for social mobility, 
higher education provides an opportunity for individuals to improve their 
chances based on effort and ability rather than inheritance.   
 
Second, with respect to the economic goods, as argued in depth in Chapter 4 both 
public and private economies derive significant benefits from higher education. 
High rates of return on public investment in higher education make higher 
education an attractive option, particularly in the on-going development of the 
knowledge economy.  The private benefit is extensive as well, lasting for the 
balance of the graduate’s working career and thereafter into retirement.911 The 
private benefit may justify some private contributions by private beneficiaries.  
 
Third, it may be that the greatest personal benefit is the development of the 
individual’s mind or ultimate human potential—the knowledge and critical 
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 See in addition to Chapter 4, Sheehy, B. (2010). "Regulation by Markets and the Bradley 
Review of Australian Higher Education " Australian Univeristies' Review 52(1): 60-68. 
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thinking abilities opened up by the higher education experience.  The value of the 
opportunity to achieve one’s potential, to gain insight into the world and one’s 
place therein is difficult to evaluate. To put a price on this good is problematic as 
it provides different benefits over the course of one’s life.  To do without higher 
education on the basis of decisions made early in life because of perceived 
private economic costs or because of public policy decisions about assigning 
higher education matters strictly to one or the other side of the public-private 
divide on the basis of economic theory rather than political debate is 
inappropriate in a democratic society.   
 
In terms of designing appropriate public goods regulation Peter Drahos’ 
observations mentioned in the introductory chapter need to be considered.  
Appropriate design of public goods regulation requires more than regulating the 
university as if it were a public utility: rather, designers of the regulatory 
framework must attend to a wide range of matters, from the provision and 
distribution of public goods, to their potential for uptake, their character as norm 
dependent or independent, capability dependent versus automatic flows, and 
status as either primary, providing a foundation for a host of other public and 
private goods, or secondary.912 Considerations of this kind are evidently critical 
for the design of effective regulation for the university. 
 
Further, there is much to be culled from a careful consideration of regulatory 
theory. For example, Smart Regulation, which prefers complementary 
instruments, less intervention over more, escalating responses and triggers, and 
empowered third parties to act as co-regulators with a view to maximising win-
win opportunities would provide a markedly different regulatory framework as 
the current regulatory framework adopts none of these ideas.  As analysed in 
Chapter 7, the current regulatory framework lacks complementary instruments, is 
highly interventionist, lacks a system of triggers and responses, and has avoided 
third party participation. There is considerable scope for implementing Smart 
Regulation in the design. One such important change in regulatory design in 
terms of regulatory administrative arrangements would be the re-instatement of 
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an independent advisory body.913 The re-instatement would be consistent with 
Smart Regulation in that its presence would facilitate a dialogue between 
university and government, bringing the expertise and insight of the regulated 
body (organisations and institution) to the regulation.  A well designed body, 
such as the former CTEC discussed in Chapter 3 would allow university 
organisations to act on their missions as they see fit rather than being at the 
disposal of the government.  With an independent body advising government of 
the risks and issues, the government would have actual information about the 
university as opposed to the channelled reports it now receives and society would 
have a clearer view on the state of the institution.  
 
At a basic level, a soft law approach to regulation of the university law has much 
to offer.  In the first instance, it is consistent with the institutions of the university 
itself.  Its development from the medieval era to the present has depended largely 
on these forms of self-regulation via information sharing, both formal and 
informal, through libraries, academic conferences and academic and student 
exchange programs. They measure themselves, their organisation’s learning and 
achievements against their peers.  The academic conference which is a 
formalised information sharing event is a prime example of how it works.  It is 
an existing institutional practice in which academics share information about 
their research, offer information, ideas and criticism to others for the purposes of 
improving the overall output of the research endeavours of the university. 
Conferences while not without their problems,914 may prevent the worst errors 
from being published and certainly provide the opportunity to improve ideas by 
being subjected to open discussion and debate. Further information sharing by 
word of mouth and citation has driven the reputations of individual academics 
and their university corporations for centuries.  Indeed, the first university at 
Bologna was developed around the famed teacher, Ireneaus.915  Given the 
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complex nature and mixture of goods produced, as well as the complexity of 
university organisations themselves, some form of quasi-autonomous or self-
regulation that includes a significant level of input from the academic profession 
would appear to be the most suitable choice. Such a body should be in the form 
of a statutory corporation in order to preserve independence from government.  It 
would be composed of academics from various Australian organisations, and 
given the global nature of the institution as well as Australia’s higher education 
ambitions, academics from leading global university organisations and 
institutions, as well as government, and some community representation 
including students.  This body would be charged with the review and 
development of regulation, and refrain from advising on matters of academic 
work, curriculum, and student affairs allowing those issues to remain within the 
domain of the respective university organisations. It would have to be funded by 
Federal and state government to avoid being overly dependent on the 
government of the day. 
 
Good regulation would need to take better account of, and more effectively 
integrate the university’s sociological functions.  It would need to take particular 
account of their normative implications.  The university provides credentials to 
those who succeed and the particular status of the credential further establishes 
rank in social, educational hierarchy as the outcome.  The problem of attempting 
to fulfil this object when revenue generating norms dominate academic norms is 
the hobbling of the credentialing standard.  That is, the knowledge creation, 
preservation and dissemination missions of the university as expressed and tested 
through teaching, must be the basis of the credentialing and related sociological 
mission.  Further, that mission is best accomplished by the exercise of 
professional discretion of the academic heartland through teaching, assessment 
and counselling, rather than the application of standardised management controls 
suited to economically tasked and drivien organisations.  The normative 
dimension of the sociological mission relates to what is often referred to as the 
                                                                                                                                    
Patterns. Universities in the Middle Ages. d. Ridder-Symoens. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 1: 35-76., 45, 48. 
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“pastoral” mission of the university.916 That is, the caring and helping tradition of 
professional service. In the case of the university, it is the caring or 
psychological/ emotional investment of academics in the intellectual 
development of students, and the instilling of a passion for a discipline or area of 
specialisation.   
 
The entrepreneurial economic and pastoral caring missions imposed by the 
regulatory framework on the university are in fundamental conflict. It is far from 
clear that any of these critical sociological missions should be secondary to the 
profit motives of private enterprise.  At a most basic level, it must be queried 
how a university can discharge and advocate a public good of sharing 
professional expertise and knowledge, encouraging the expenditure of 
discretionary energy while extracting the maximum amount of economic 
resources from the student at the same time?  Australian regulators’ efforts to 
displace knowledge norms in favour of economic norms have created a deep-
seated normative conflict for the university as an institution. 
 
The effort to divide phenomena both social and physical into a natural order 
aligned with a natural public-private ordering on which it is appropriate to 
develop social and economic policy, and to do so as if they were exclusive hard 
categories not touching each other fails to take account of the weaknesses of the 
models and the political nature of the issue. Attempting to make it appear a 
natural division suited to technical criteria masks the reality of the political 
nature to the decision and the need for debate which underlies regulatory 
decisions. Accordingly, a sharp public-private divide not only is not natural as 
economics would have it, but as poor theory is likely to create unhelpful, limited 
perspectives and ultimately likely to lead to recommendations setting a 
foundation for regulatory failure.   
 
The discussion of the public nature of the good of higher education and the 
university by no means precludes private benefits.  Indeed, the private benefits 
are manifold.  Among these it is evident that the private good of education 
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 Côté, J. E. and A. L. Allahar (2007). Ivory Tower Blues: A University System in Crisis. 
Toronto University of Toronto Press p. 41-44. For discussion and analysis, see Chapter 5 above 
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includes the advancement of personal knowledge, increased employment 
opportunities, higher status as one possesses a positional good, honour and all the 
associated benefits. Regulation should be designed to take account of these 
private goods as well.  
 
As higher education scholar Pusser cautions, however, the university provides 
both significant social and economic goods with public and private aspects.  
These goods, he observes, are effectively impossible to disaggregate and 
measure.  As a result, he argues it is imperative that all the outputs be put into 
any equation to avoid privatising the easily measurable, profitable goods while 
allowing the important public and social goods to whither.917 Regulation which 
allows this disaggregation and fails to adequately account for the value and 
importance of public goods will fail as a regulatory response to the risk presented 
in the organising problem—the creation, preservation and transmission of 
knowledge.    
 
Effective regulation will require political consultation with the academic 
community. As Professor Newman writes:  
policy makers and academic leaders [must] engage in ... substantive 
discussion with each other about the nature of higher education [as a 
private economic good training for the workforce, or a public good 
contributing to the well being of society as a whole].  In the absence of 
such debate and of conscious planning…. The result is likely to be the 
loss to society of some of the attributes of higher education that are 
essential to a free and effective society.918   
Good regulation will take account of these issues in framing an appropriate, 
coherent organising problem and making an appropriate and coherent assignment 
in the public-private divide.  The regulatory arrangements and instruments will 
provide flexibility to allow the university to shape itself to promote the 
knowledge objects that help achieve broad social, political and personal objects 
of both social and economic value.   Recognising that there is a wide range of 
significant public, personal, social, political and economic goods that are 
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produced by the university derived from the academic profession, regulation 
must ensure that the core academic activities are protected, stimulated and 
allowed to operate without excessive focus and constraints arising from less 
relevant measures. 
5.  Preliminary considerations of Labor’s reforms under Prime Ministers 
Rudd and Gillard 
The legislation to be enacted under the Labor government of former-Prime 
Minister Rudd and presumably taken forward by Prime Minister Gillard has not 
been released and all that is available at the time of writing this dissertation is the 
policy document.919  Accordingly, only the outline of the regulation is available.  
From the policy document, it appears that the complex organising problem 
identified by Labor continues the paths established by previous governments.920  
Labor is not following the path without some reforms.  For example, in contrast 
to the Liberal Government’s policy shaping in terms of economic exports 
comparable to coal and steel, the Labor government construes the policy in terms 
of nation building which is used to justify significant funding increases.  By 
doing so the Labor government is reducing some of the pressure on the 
university with respect to generating income.  Reducing pressure allows the 
university to engage in lexical or normative re-ordering, returning knowledge 
closer to the primary position it requires. If the university engages in this lexical 
re-ordering, a reduction in systemic incoherence, should translate into better 
institutions (i.e. more coherent) and hence, more likely to be effective in the 
pursuit of its knowledge norms.  
 
The Labor government also plans to introduce some type of voucher system. 
This system too is a change from preceding governments.  It may be argued that 
doing so improves coherence between university course offerings and society’s 
interests—at least with respect to students. However, such a system not only fails 
to represent society and long term interests, it also creates incoherence with 
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respect to the broader knowledge missions. Those missions are not limited to the 
knowledge fashionable at the moment nor to the commercial interests of big 
business.  Further, as economists have demonstrated, (see Chapter 4) seeking to 
derive collective utility functions by aggregating individual preferences is 
impossible.  Rather, what is required is political effort to identify and enact 
collective preferences which will ensure the long term survival of society. 
Instead, the voucher system with its increased emphasis on individual students’ 
private preferences will put additional pressure on the normative ordering 
preferring short term individual interests over long term collective interests.921   
 
The unknown core of the Labor regulatory regime is the new agency-the Tertiary 
Education Quality and Standards Agency “TEQSA.”  As noted in Chapter 3, it 
will have a broad mandate, setting standards, evaluating compliance, and 
punishing the non-compliant.  TEQSA appears to be an effort to solve the 
difficult issue of ensuring quality in the provision of services as well as providing 
a means of regulating by information. Problematically, the evidence is that 
students make poor use of such information. Further, there does not appear to be 
a consensus on what the quality issue are, let alone their causes. The Bradley 
Review does make clear that one cause of the problems is the poor level of 
funding.922 
 
Further, the academic standard TEQSA is set to create and enforce may introduce 
institutional incoherence if that standard is at odds with professional norms of the 
academic profession—a potentially serious incoherence as seen, for example, in 
Jiang’s study cited above.923  Further, this agency’s mandate appears incoherent 
with the policy of “respect, trust and shared goals”924 which is at the basis of the 
new mission based compacts—that is it appears to create external policy 
incoherence. 
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Although Labor government policy seeks to shift government-university 
relations to mutual trust and respect, presumably allowing university 
organisations more autonomy to determine and pursue their own missions, it is 
unclear how either the compacts or TEQSA will do so.  If government continues 
the control exercised under the Institutional Grant Scheme it seems unlikely there 
will be any significant change; however, if it does, the government creates the 
potential for the university to increase coherence at least at the level of 
institution-organisation-administration. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The dissertation asks and answers a large question: “Is the regulation of the 
university good regulation?” As noted, the regulatory framework in Australia has 
produced contradictory outcomes.  For a neoliberal, the measure of a policy is 
the extent to which the public sphere is dismantled and private economic 
opportunity created.  Applying that standard to the regulation, it is clear that 
individual economic interests are allowed to penetrate deeply and that revenue 
generation has increased substantially.  Thus, from this perspective, the 
regulatory framework has been a success. By all other measures, however, the 
Australian university institution and its university organisations are in a poor 
condition in terms of reputation, finance, capacity, academic profession and 
organisational coordination and institutional cooperation.  The neoliberal model 
of the university is incoherent with the institution and so its regulation is 
predictably incoherent. 
 
Federal government funding has had a variety of positive and negative outcomes.  
On the positive side, the increase in the size of the institution affording an 
increasingly large number of Australians to participate in university education 
has been a significant positive.  It has been a positive socially, in providing 
avenues for social mobility for an increasing proportion of the population to 
improve their circumstances.  It has been positive economically allowing 
Australia to improve its goods and services, improving the standard of living and 
the knowledge not only of the nation but of the globe.   
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On the negative side, the Federal government has used its power to force changes 
that are incoherent or at best incompatible with the better functioning of the 
institution and its organisations.  These effects can be seen in such things as 
decreased quality of education, decreased variety in offerings, and the damage 
resulting to the organisations resulting from a normative preference for private 
economic goods. The legal framework in which university corporations 
discharge legally mandated objects does not shelter from governmental 
interference because the university corporations are coerced by economic 
instruments employed by the Federal government to exercise their legal 
autonomy. 
 
The public functions of teaching and research are entrenched by law and granted 
status over the private benefits. The need for revenue generation imposed by the 
government too transforms the university’s focus.  Certainly, university 
corporations must and do engage in a number of non-knowledge activities; 
however, the purpose and focus of university activities and attentions must stay 
knowledge oriented.  Moving to financial speculation as recent developments 
indicate,925 diverts attention from the legal public mandate.  
 
The regulatory framework for the institution of the Australian university forces a 
shift in its objects to revenue generation disrupting the public good mission and 
academic norms which rank scholarship, integrity and transformation ahead of 
economic values.  This shift in normative ordering is not a minor matter.  
Dislodging this ordering is dislodging the foundation of the institution of the 
university, dislodging the intrinsic, public value placed upon knowledge. It is not 
that the university must never change or must be permanently funded without 
limit or only funded publicly.  Rather, it is that a decision to dismantle and shift 
the normative foundation of such an institution that has successfully adapted and 
responded to one of society’s increasingly critical organising problems and 
which institution has evolved over the course of nearly a millennium in doing so, 
such shifting of foundational norms must be done with great caution.  The 
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regulatory framework undermines those foundations apparently with little regard 
to them in the first instance.926 
 
If the organising problem to which the university responds no longer exists, the 
university has lost its function—a case not made by any political party. If the 
regulatory response, however, changes merely as a consequence of ideology, the 
decision to dismantle and shift the normative foundations of the institution 
requires public debate and caution. 
 
The normative change under neoliberalism marks an important change in the 
university’s relationship vis-à-vis the government.  It has been described as a 
shift from the government as the “patron of the university to the government as a 
consumer of higher education services” 927 and has resulted in a change in the 
mission of the university.  Whereas the university formerly functioned as an 
institution of embedded liberalism in the welfare state, the shift to the 
neoliberalism necessitated an attack on the university among other institutions, to 
change how societal organization is perceived.  As noted in chapter 3 the notion 
of “public good” requires a site for debate about a society’s direction, projects 
and prospects—fundamental in a democratic society928—and the university is the 
ideal site for this contestation.   
 
The regulatory framework and resulting normative re-ordering has forced the 
university to focus more on vocational, business orientated training and away 
from critical thought. Whereas the university traditionally promoted a broader 
vision of humanity, a multitude of perspectives and brought a critical perspective 
to political debate, the re-orientated university is less able to do so.  
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In terms of the knowledge missions of creation, preservation and transmission 
the better approach appears to remove decisions about knowledge away from the 
political arena and allow the problems to remain with knowledge specialists, the 
academics and the students who choose to study particular areas and types of 
knowledge in the organisational, legal form of the statutory corporation.  The 
current regulatory framework in which there is no independent advisory body 
limits Parliament’s ability to understand the university and its public mission.  
 
It is not that the regulatory framework precludes the public institutional mission 
of the university.  On the contrary, for example, section 4A(d) of the Melbourne 
University Act 1958 (Vic)reads: “[the university is to dedicated to] (i) enrich... 
cultural and community life; (ii) elevating public awareness of educational, 
scientific and artistic developments; (iii) promoting critical informed intellectual 
discourse and public debate within the University and in the wider society.”929  
These objects clearly refer to public good. They are focused on the community, 
not on individual advancement at the expense of or without regard to the 
community. They identify the dissemination of knowledge about the 
development of humanity’s higher faculties—of thought, understanding and 
emotion—as being a key objectives of the university.  
 
The normative stresses currently on the university have led some to state that it is 
in a state of crisis.930  This normative pressure, combined with the political 
pressure of answering different and conflicting demands of many stakeholders 
such as government, funding agencies, students, taxpayers, and academics may 
                                                 
929
 Melbourne University Act 1958 (Cth) s 4A(d) 
930
  See e.g. Moberly, W. S. (1949). The Crisis in the Universities. London, SCM Press, Scott, P. 
(1984). The crisis of the university. London, Croom Helm, Neilson, W. A. W. and C. Gaffield, 
Eds. (1986). Universities in crisis: a mediaeval institution in the twenty-first century. Montreal, 
Institute for Research on Public Policy: Institut de recherches politiques, Senate Employment 
Workplace Relations Small Business and Education References Committee (2001). Universities 
in Crisis : report into the capacity of public universities to meet Australia's higher education 
needs. Canberra, The Senate, Williams, R. (2001). Crisis in Our Universities. Ockham's Razor. 
Australia, ABC National Radio, Amaral, A. and A. Magalhaes (2003). "The Triple Crisis of the 
University and its Reinvention." Higher Education Policy 16, Calhoun, C. (2006). "Is the 
University in Crisis?" Society(May/June ). 
 393 
lead to its undoing as it is forced into a normative re-ordering, surrendering its 
foundational institutional public knowledge objectives. 931  
 
The regulation of the university is a complex affair. It requires a consensus on 
objects, a creation of appropriate policy, selection of appropriate instruments and 
an accountability to match.  The Australian university has both waxed and waned 
in the environment created by politicians, perhaps more so than abroad.  What is 
clear is that the current system is poorly conceived, incoherent, leading to 
dysfunction, and in conflict with the overall institution of the university.  
Ultimately, it is a recipe for regulatory failure.  Perhaps the relationship between 
the university and society has been put best by Professor Perkin, the renowned 
scholar of the university: 
No institution so flexible or so productive of new knowledge and 
adaptable experts has yet been discovered. Yet this flexibility and 
productivity still depend—as in the days of Abelard, Aquinas, Luther, 
Galileo, Newton, Descartes, Adam Smith, Kant, Humboldt and 
Einstein—on the academic freedom to teach and to pursue knowledge 
wherever it can be found. If the overbearing state, the all-mighty 
corporation or the heresy hunting churches crush that freedom, it may 
well kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. Without the ability to protect 
themselves from the threat of these powerful forces, the university may 
well suffer the fate of those institutions in the non-European world that 
never enjoyed the autonomy and freedom that the medieval division 
between church and state unintentionally bequeathed to academe.932  
It is hoped that Australian regulators are able to create the space necessary for the 
university to contribute in the future as it has in the past.   
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